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Capital Investment in a Regional Economy : Some Aspects of the 
Sources and Employment of Capital in North Somerset, 1750-1830.
Abstract
The concentration of studies of capital investment on an 
aggregative approach at the national level has led to an 
inadequate explanation of the procedures by which capital 
investment took place. This thesis seeks to achieve a fuller 
understanding of the process by examining the whole matrix of 
capital investment in a particular region - north Somerset - 
for a limited but important period - the early years of 
industrialization, 1750-1830. The review of the historical 
context of this region includes a study of the gentry, 
attorneys, bankers, and merchants, whose interaction is 
analysed through a broad range of cases drawn from agriculture, 
mining, manufacture, and transport. The costs involved in the 
creation of fixed assets and their distribution, the 
relationship between fixed and circulating capital, and the 
returns to investment are all subjected to close analysis.
The conclusions are, first, that there was a clear distinction 
between land- or resource-based ventures (enclosures, drainage 
schemes, mining, transport), financed from within the region, 
large in structure and with a slowly built up capital input, 
and the capital- or trade-based enclaves (manufacturing), 
smaller in scale and dependant upon a network of capital and 
credit facilities from outside the region, chiefly from 
Bristol. Secondly, the study shows the importance of legal 
authorizations (enclosure Acts, partnership agreements), in 
defining the sources of capital and their outlets. Thirdly, the 
operation of an impersonal capital market is revealed, based on 
institutional mortgages (turnpike trusts, improvement 
commissions). And finally it is shown that both professional 
(legal, banking, surveying, engineering) and entrepreneurial 
skills (manufacturers, coal masters, merchants) played a vital 
part in the supply and employment of capital. The conjunction 
of this wide range of factors is demonstrated for the first 
time to be of crucial importance in the process of capital 
investment in north Somerset.
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Maps of the Region of North Somerset
The first is by J.Haywood, ’A Map of Somersetshire engraved 
from an actual survey with Improvements'. London, 1790.
Scale : 6 9 \  Statute Miles to a Degree
That is, 2 \  inches equals 10 miles
All except the southern edge of the region is here clearly 
defined. This may be taken to run from the mouth of the River 
Axe near Uphill, along the line of towns below the southern 
edge of Mendip (Axbridge, Wells, and Shepton Mallet) and so to 
the eastern boundary near Frome.
The second map shows the parishes within the region. Again the 
southern boundary can be traced from Uphill on the west coast, 
through Wells to Frome in the east.
This map is published by the Institute of Heraldic and 
Genealogical Studies. The dates indicate the commencement of 
registers for the parishes. The heavy lines show ecclesiastical 
jurisdictions. The key refers to those few cases where names 
cannot be written on the map.
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Preface
Part of the research on which this thesis is based was 
undertaken in the 1970s, and an earlier version of this work 
was submitted to the University of Bristol in 1979 under the 
title Capital Formation in North Somerset, 1750-1830*. The aim 
was to explore the process of capital formation in a regional 
economy. This approach proved unacceptable to the examiners on 
the grounds that capital formation was an aggregative concept 
to be pursued at the national level. My work was not in the 
'mainstream' approach to the subject. With the support of my 
supervisors the thesis was withdrawn, and successful 
negotiations were undertaken to submit a new version of my work 
to the University of London. An early submission was 
anticipated but this has been delayed for several reasons.
First, my earlier work has now been supplemented by much new 
research, especially on the regional context within which the 
process of economic change was embedded. Next, with the 
purpose of sounding out the wider response within the economic 
history profession to the ideas developed in the first version 
of this thesis, a number of articles have been published in the 
intervening years. These have been favourably received, largely 
because of the originality of approach. Research upon the 
Parliamentary enclosure of common and waste land, published in 
the Agricultural History Review, gave a new emphasis to the 
importance of land sales as a method of financing costs, and
-11 -
drew attention to the failure of earlier studies to take this 
into account because of their concentration on the open 
fields-*-. This contribution to the subject was acknowledged by 
Michael Turner, then working on a comprehensive account of 
enclosures, and led to a modification of his view that such
9
sales were but a minor feature of this process .
An article on the financing of the turnpike roads was based 
on the Bath Trust, but placed in the context of other case 
studies and of national surveys and aggregative work . It was 
welcomed by the expert reader of the Economic History Review 
as being 'very, very new1. He asked for more not less of the 
specific evidence upon which my criticisms of the aggregative 
approach were based. I therefore developed further the charge 
that by ignoring the renewal and amendment Acts which 
determined the length and organization of the turnpike trusts, 
aggregative studies had shown themselves to be incapable of 
dealing with the complexities of historical reality. Their 
findings were therefore suspect. Amongst historians of the 
turnpike trusts these strictures were received sympathetically, 
as shown for example by a review of the article in the 
bibliography published annually in the Journal of Transport 
History^ . Since then it has been observed in a study of the 
Staffordshire turnpikes that the evidence for that county 
'underlines the necessity recognised by Buchanan to examine 
such subsequent Acts in any study of turnpike evolution'^.
- 12 -
The author upon whose thesis I had commented critically did
not respond so warmly, and when his research came to form the
basis of a contribution to the major work on capital formation
published recently, my observations were dismissed in a first
footnote as demonstrating the fallacy of generalizing from a 
£
single case . In responding to this charge I have expanded 
upon the misjudgements underlying the aggregative approach 
adopted by this author,in an article published in the Journal 
of Transport History .^ It does not seem an exaggeration to 
suggest that this dispute is about more than the financing of 
the turnpike roads. It is also about the role of the 
aggregative method in historical studies, and the discomfort of 
its practitioners when challenged about the inadequacy of their 
approach and the inaccuracies of their results.
A more comprehensive article on capital formation in north 
Somerset in the years 1750 to 1830, published in Southern 
History, represented an attempt to explore the ways in which 
historical evidence on the sources of finance and its 
investment can be used to investigate the processes by which
o
capital was formed in the regional economy . This exercise 
caught the eye of the Economic History Review’s assessor of the 
many periodicals published in the year 1986. She drew attention 
to the importance of 'the study of markets, middlemen, 
commercial organization, and credit' which, my article 
suggested, 'may tell us more about the first industrial 
revolution than the traditional industrial and fixed capital
- 13 -
studies'. The reviewer went on to summarize the nub of my 
article that, 'trade-based undertakings in Somerset at first 
stimulated then retarded developments in the region. 
Manufacturing ventures remained a part of the merchanting 
network instead of becoming agents of industrialization'^ .
This argument was based in part upon evidence from the local 
gunpowder industry, which had already been the subject of 
contributions to American and French journals^ when it 
received fuller analysis in an article in the Industrial 
Archaeology Review^ .  In this piece the task of surveying the 
physical evidence, drawing up plans and elevations, and writing 
an appendix on water power was undertaken by my associate. The 
documentary evidence, historical interpretation, and writing of 
the text was my work, drawing upon some of the material already 
in my first thesis. This important industry in the Bristol 
region had been previously entirely neglected, but by 
emphasising its significance in relation to Bristol merchant 
capital, credit, and trade (especially the Africa trade) in the 
eighteenth century, and its importance at that time within the 
overall history of this industry at the national level, its 
great consequence is becoming recognized.
Tables setting out the financial structure of one of the 
gunpowder partnerships are included in the new version of my 
thesis. But then such tables were also in the earlier one, and 
for other sectors of the regional economy as well as the
- 14 -
gunpowder industry. They are included because it is believed 
that such statistical information provides evidence from which 
an analysis of the process of capital formation can be 
attempted. It does not however present a firm enough basis 
from which to undertake an aggregative study, even at the 
regional level, and as it seemed in the late 1970s that the 
definitive programme for current and future research into 
capital formation in its historical perspective had been set by 
the research plans of Charles Feinstein, Sidney Pollard, and 
their colleagues, the future prospects for my own approach to 
the subject did not look promising. But the situation is now 
changing and I am encouraged to submit my thesis in its new, 
revised, and expanded form, because I think that this last 
reason for my delay is becoming less significant.
Not only does the now generally favourable response to my 
articles indicate a growing change of attitude within the 
profession itself (exemplified also by recently published 
studies such as that edited by Pat Hudson under the title of 
Regions and Industries ), but the possibility that the time 
has come for a start to be made on a wider approach towards an 
understanding of the process of economic change is suggested by 
the disappointing results of studies undertaken on an 
aggregative basis over the last two decades. These have 
culminated in the publication of the finished work of Charles 
Feinstein, Sidney Pollard et al in 1988, which shows that there 
has been little development since the preliminary survey of the
- 15 -
research project was published in 1971 . Problems of
definition and evidence remain unsolved, and the question of 
the process of capital formation in its historical context 
still lies beyond the scope of the different contributions.
This research tool has not lived up to its earlier promise and 
the expectations of the profession.
The challenge of contemporary scholarship is now seen 
increasingly to be that of teasing out answers to tangible 
problems, particularly at the regional level, and on a 
quantitative but non-aggregative basis. It is because the focus 
of economic historians is becoming less narrowly fixed on the 
aggregative approach at the national level, and more broadly 
appreciative of attempts to seek answers to problems through 
the analysis of the interplay of factors at the regional level, 
that it now seems appropriate to submit this research for 
consideration by the University of London.
- 16 -
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Introduction
The aim of this thesis is to investigate the process of 
capital investment in a regional economy, through an analysis 
of the sources and productive employment of capital in north 
Somerset between the years 1750 and 1830. It is intended to 
point out some of the shortcomings in past studies of capital 
formation and to indicate from work in this region how these 
weaknesses may be overcome. These aims are based on the premise 
that the study of capital formation has both a measurable 
aspect, concerning the increase of stock over time, and a 
narrative dimension, concerning the explanation of the process 
by which capital formation has taken place. Most previous 
studies in this field have concentrated on the first element to 
the neglect of the second, and this narrowing of the subject 
has resulted in a loss to our understanding in both respects - 
to the quantitative aspect because this would benefit from a 
greater infusion of empirical evidence than it has so far been 
given, and to the study of the process of capital formation 
because this has hitherto received little attention.
This over-emphasis on measurement is particularly 
regrettable for the crucial years of the British industrial 
revolution, as the documentary evidence for this period is too 
insubstantial to bear interpretation by the quantitative 
approach alone. The authors of British Economic Growth 1856- 
1973 have observed that in going back beyond the mid-nineteenth
- 18 -
century, data limitations weaken the value of national income 
accounting relative to other methods-*-, whilst a distinguished 
reviewer of the recently published Studies in Capital Formation 
in the United Kingdom, 1750-1920 has warned researchers that 
despite the 'cornucopia of figures.... there is not a lot of 
firm bedrock in any of..(them for)...the underlying data are 
patchy, discontinuous, and often no more than contemporaries' 
hunches that chance to have been expressed in numbers as well
o
as words' . Even more pertinent from the point of view of the 
present study is the further criticism that 'If there is any 
relationship between the thematic or sectoral chapters..and the 
work on the national statistics... it is nowhere mentioned 
and...the two parts of the book proceed in stately independence 
towards interesting but not altogether consistent 
conclusions' . Yet this is the volume that marks the 
culmination of more than twenty years research by a large and 
talented team, concerned with the estimation of the capital 
employed in the national economy over the years from 1750. The 
severe doubts raised by the finished work range from the poor 
quality of the underlying data and the failure to knit together 
the sectoral studies with the estimates for the national 
economy, already mentioned, to the complete neglect of the 
question which would provide a significant context for all this 
effort, namely the matter of the process by which investment 
was undertaken and capital thus formed.
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There could be no clearer indication of the need for a fresh 
view than this failure by the 'mainstream’ approach to look 
beyond the task of charting economic change, to that of 
interpreting and understanding it. In contrast, the focus of 
this research is the investigation, analysis, and 
interpretation of the investment process, here taken to mean 
the sources of capital, the means of its transfer, and the 
productive assets created. The study of this process is central 
to the thesis. The analysis is conducted in a quantitative but 
not aggregative manner. The evidence is interpreted in 
narrative form, which is essential if links and processes are 
to be established and explained. The relationships surveyed 
include not only those between the sources of capital and its 
uses, but also wider matters such as the largely unexplored 
bridges between the commercial and industrial communities. The 
physical closeness and financial links between north Somerset 
and the major port of Bristol provide an opportunity for this 
relationship to be investigated in some detail.
Reliance on historical evidence produces several problems, 
of which three particular constraints must be mentioned. The 
first relates to timing, for only from the mid-eighteenth 
century was there in north Somerset a beginning of that 
accumulation and continuity of primary evidence judged to be 
essential for a sustained analysis of capital investment. With 
the coming of the railways in the 1830s, and the attendant 
changes in forms of transport and methods of finance, the
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period covered by this research ends. The second constraint 
relates to the range of evidence available, which is inevitably 
limited by special circumstances. Primary sources may have 
survived because they were of an institutional nature (the 
papers of turnpike trusts, improvement commissioners); or 
constituted a legal claim or title to land (enclosure awards); 
or authorized the collection of a rate (drainage commissions), 
or because they had been filed with family or estate papers 
(mining and manufacturing concerns). Not only does this mean 
that detailed and continuous evidence has rarely survived for 
significant aspects such as residential building, routine 
agricultural investment, and many manufacturing concerns, but 
also that even amongst more fruitful sources such as the 
turnpike trusts, such material is unlikely to be 
comprehensively available. To some extent these difficulties 
can be eased by reference to secondary sources, but there 
remains the problem of assimilation, of judging the weight of 
generalization which can be borne by possibly unrepresentative 
evidence. Third, the material which has survived may not be 
available in a form capable of yielding easily the kind of 
information being sought. Considerable ingenuity was required 
to derive evidence on the capital involved in enclosures from 
the sums raised by the sale of land as recorded in the awards, 
and to reconstitute the finances of the Bath Trust from its 
mortgage deeds in a way which reveals when capital sums were 
raised, and not simply when they were authorized. The decoding 
of brass company papers posed a further challenge.
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Of the several criticisms to which this reliance on an 
historical approach can give rise, two of the most important 
are that the coverage may be too limited and the presentation 
too detailed. The former has already been acknowledged, and 
provided the available primary and secondary works are 
consulted, then the generalizations formed in the course of 
traditional research are no more hazardous than those issuing 
from the aggregation of deficient data on a statistical basis. 
Indeed, there may even be certain advantages, for unlike the 
aggregative case, the precision of the particular is not lost 
within the whole, and the extent of the generalization is more 
likely to remain clear.
On the second point, it has to be admitted that detail may 
become a morass of information from which no conclusions will 
ever emerge. But the skill of the historian lies in assembling 
appropriate evidence from which, if the right questions are 
asked, significant answers may be drawn. It is greatly to the 
discredit of the historical profession that when seeking to 
criticise detailed work of a local character the word 
’antiquarian' is used as a term of abuse. This is not to 
condone naive and inadequate research, but to recognize the 
importance in their own time of the largely topographical 
studies pursued in the past, on the basis of the collection and 
classification of observable data. Not all the problems 
grappled with then can be answered now, even by using modern 
techniques. As to the role of detail, there is mounting
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evidence that some current research suffers from a paucity 
rather than an excess of this, to the extent that in a review 
of current literature John Chartres was moved to observe that 
he may have detected the origins of ’pseudometric history15.
This thesis begins with a survey of the historiography of 
capital formation so that the study may be placed in the 
context of different approaches to the subject of capital 
investment. It includes a review of current literature and a 
consideration of problems of concept and method. In Part II 
there is a survey of the historical and geographical context of 
north Somerset, which includes an account of its population, 
settlement patterns, and social structure; the interactions 
with Bristol; and the activities of professionals in the area.
A survey of these aspects of the regional economy is new, and 
of especial originality is the analysis of the Commissions of 
the Peace and the Law Lists in order to build up registers of 
information about the gentry and the attorneys respectively. 
Part III is given over to an account and analysis of the 
investment of capital in north Somerset in the given years, in 
a range of cases drawn from agriculture, mining, manufacture, 
and transport. The aim is that of identifying the sources of 
capital, the means of its transfer, and the manner of its 
productive employment in these different branches of the 
economy. Where possible tables of figures have been assembled
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within the general narrative of the thesis, so that the links 
and relationships underlying investment can be explained 
through both. Problems of evidence preclude a comprehensive 
coverage, but efforts have been made to link the specific 
evidence with that more generally available on the region.
In conclusion an interpretation of the process of capital 
investment and its influence on economic change within the 
region will be suggested, based on an analysis of the pattern 
of the different forms of economic activity in north Somerset.
1 R.C.0.Matthews, C.H.Feinstein & J.C.Odling-Smee,British 
Economic Growth 1856-1973(Oxford,1982),p.5.
2 F.M.L.Thompson,Review of Pollard & Feinstein eds.,Studies 
in Capital Formation(1988), Agric.Hist.Rev.,37,1(1989),
pp.lOA-05.
3 Ibid.,p.105.
A J.A.Chartres,'Review of Periodical Literature,19781, Econ. 
Hist.Rev.,2nd ser.XXXIII,1(1980),p.137.
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Part I The Historiography of Capital Formation.
Chapter 1 A Review of General Issues 
i Survey of Relevant Literature.
The analysis of the growth of the major industrial economies 
of the world, especially that of Great Britain during the 
classical period of the industrial revolution from the mid­
eighteenth century to the 1830s, has in recent years focussed 
on the role of capital formation in these changes. Detailed 
statistical series have been built up, but despite the interest 
generated by these attempts to quantify the investment of 
capital, the subject remains in an unsatisfactory state. In his 
welcoming ’Foreword' to Pat Hudson's volume on The Genesis of 
Industrial Capital, Francois Crouzet cautioned that, 'in 
computing national investment proportions the essential 
spadework of collecting and interpreting new data has sometimes 
been n e g l e c t e d ' B u t  the problem may be deeper than this 
tendency to neglect historical research, relying on statistical 
techniques in the effort to attach numbers to the amount and 
proportions of capital invested. It may also reflect the 
continuing failure to flesh out the subject by analysing the 
way in which productive assets were created.
The importance of the process of capital formation is of 
internationally acknowledged significance. In the introduction
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to The Industrial Economies : Capital, Labour and Enterprise, 
Robert Solow and Peter Temin point out that it is as important 
to ask how capital investment was motivated and financed as to 
know how much of the growth of output was attributable to such 
investment'^. Yet there have been no comprehensive answers to 
the first question. C.H.Feinstein1s contribution to the volume 
is outstanding, but by focussing on the investment side of the 
process to the exclusion of the savings and finance aspects he 
thereby excludes the study of the process of capital 
formation^.Instead the reader is directed in a footnote to the 
discussion of the supply of capital in Crouzet's editorial 
introduction to Capital Formation in the Industrial Revolution, 
which cannot be regarded as providing a full consideraion of 
the matter^. The question raised by Solow and Temin was not 
dealt with any more satisfactorily by other writers, whose 
difficulties of data and interpretation may be said to have 
been summed up by the conclusion of the American contributors 
that 'From this mixed evidence a hazy picture emerges'-*.
In a similar work of many talents, nine leading scholars
have contributed to the Studies in Capital Formation in the
£
United Kingdom, 1750-1920°. This volume was long awaited as 
participants had first come together twenty years earlier in an 
attempt to estimate the amount of capital invested in Britain 
in the period of the industrial revolution, and to assess its 
role in the growth of output and productivity. A comparison of 
their finished work with the progress report published in 1971^
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shows that one subject, shipping, was lost along the way, and 
that although there are useful additions including the iron
industry, woollen textiles, corn milling, and steam power,
Avn-i&JTfojiS
there are still regrettable omissions e special lysine tall-ifcrouo 
mining, the brass and copper industries, chemicals including 
gunpowder, pottery and other lesser aspects of manufacturing 
industry, railways, passenger and goods carriers and, perhaps 
most significant of all considering its importance within the 
national domestic capital stock, housing.
The recital of this list of omissions shows that Feinstein's 
recognition in an earlier work that 'so much still remains to 
be done on the individual sectors which can alone provide a 
proper foundation for aggregate estimates', has not borne fruit
o
in the present volume . For those sectors which are included 
most contributors have tried to achieve a national coverage, 
though even here there are anomalies such as the chapter on 
steam power, devoted to one firm, and that on insurance 
policies, viewed chiefly as a source of evidence^. The chapters 
also vary as to their completion date, which has affected the 
incorporation of new research. That by Ginarlis and Pollard for 
example relies heavily on the former's thesis of 1970, although
the authors avoid revealing that date in their citatv ion of
the work. Footnotes carry no references later than the 1960s, 
except for a summary dismissal of my own work of 1986 on the 
evolution of the turnpike trusts. The substantial work by J.R.- 
Ward on canals, of 1974, receives no mention^.
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The text of B.A.Holderness1 study, completed in 1980, is 
mentioned not because it is out of date but since it 
exemplifies the problem of congruity between the sectoral and 
aggregative studies. Both he and Feinstein tried to quantify 
agricultural investment on the basis of landlord's rents, but 
from their different data and calculations they achieve 
different results, about which they then fail to enlighten the 
reader by any reference to the other's work, other than a 
formal mention^. The editors' argument that in both parts of 
this volume 'the very variety of source and method must help to 
cancel out errors and prevent the cumulation of bias', does not 
inspire confidence. Nor does the fact that in for example 
Feinstein's series for manufacturing plant and machinery the 
basis of calculation was so greatly changed that the estimates 
for fixed capital formation before and after the mid-nineteenth 
century could only be made to cohere by raising the earlier 
ones by 37 per cent. Feinstein concedes that 'extreme caution 
should be exercised by all users of this structure' .
The pitfalls in the compilation of the estimates presented 
in Part II have been made so clear by Feinstein that there will 
be scope for revision and improvement for some time to come.
The future of the kind of studies undertaken in Part I is less 
clear because they fall between two stools, being neither 
sufficiently statistically-oriented to benefit from the 
speculative approach adopted successfully in the building up of 
the national aggregates, nor sufficiently historically-rooted
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to be capable of meeting the demands of interpretation which is 
the mark of the valid historical study. The sectoral and 
thematic studies therefore do little to add to Feinstein’s 
work, without having found an independent role that is 
important in its own right. This does not mean that there is no 
future for studies of capital formation of a non-statistical 
sort, but that the most satisfactory form of research to 
complement the estimation of the national aggregates would be 
that which investigates the process of capital investment.
The historical method of research is well suited to this 
challenge. Attention to the framework and mechanisms of change 
can give the subject a structure which is multi-faceted rather 
than one-dimensional as at present. This would breathe fresh 
life into an area of study which is in danger of languishing 
because of its detachment from the history of the social and 
economic systems in which it should be rooted. This approach 
can also stave off the most fundamental criticism of the 
narrower focus seen in the volume edited by Feinstein and 
Pollard, which is that it fails to interpret and explain its 
subject. It may be that in the study of capital formation in an 
historical context, the limits of useful quantification have 
been reached.
Before going on to consider the concepts, methods, and 
evidence to be used in such an approach, reference must be made 
to other works published in the years since a major study of
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capital formation was first mooted in Sheffield in 1969.
Despite the significance of this matter, there have been few
comprehensive studies of capital investment. Particularly
disappointing from the Bristol point of view is the Liverpool
University project entitled The Supply of Capital and the
Economic Development of Merseyside 1690-1880, for this produced
no report of substance. The document finally deposited with
the S.S.R.C. reads more like a prospectus than a report on 
1 ^finished work . Other studies on a regional basis have been 
restricted to a post-1830 or even later period, by data 
limitations. This suggests that although such deficiencies may 
be masked by statistical techniques, the availability of data 
determines the areas, periods, and sectors chosen in this field 
just as much as for the more traditional 'source-oriented1 
historians. A.G.Kenwood1s study of north-eastern England 
exemplifies this point, whilst his 'Fixed Capital on 
Merseyside, 1800-1913' is misleadingly titled for the work is 
limited largely to construction activity in the years from 
1838, and contains little reference to the sources of capital 
and the mode of its employment. South Wales has since claimed 
Kenwood's attention, but attention is still focussed on later 
decades^. Scottish studies like those by John Butt on iron and 
cotton, Ian Donnachie on brewing and T.M.Devine on tobacco have 
identified sources of capital but say little on the processes 
of its formation^.
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In the gestation period of the Sheffield project several of 
the contributors have published valuable interim studies, for 
example Pollard on British coal production, which aims to 
establish output and capital costs and hence capital formation, 
and Holderness on landlord’s capital formation in East Anglia, 
which has convinced him ’estate investment was not the whole of
1 ftthe matter' . In textiles much of both D.T.Jenkin’s study of 
fixed capital formation in the West Riding woollen industry and 
of S.D.Chapman's work on cotton manufacture are based on 
insurance records, and so subject to the possible inaccuracies 
of these indicators of financial assets. When the latter steps 
outside the conceptual constraints imposed by a concentration 
on the estimation of fixed capital alone, as in his study of 
the financial environment within which firms operated in the 
years 1790 to 1850, especially as regards the period of credit 
they were allowed, then he is able to add greatly to our 
understanding of the neglected theme of the relationship 
between fixed and working capital^. But even when attention 
has been paid to the sources of finance by these authors and by
others not associated with the project such as J.R.Ward in his
r-
work on canal finance, as mentioned, it would probably still be 
true to say that a consideration of the processes by which 
capital was formed is lacking.
C.W.Chalklin and R.S.Neale have described the context of 
capital formation in building, and are concerned with a 
'process' and a 'product' respectively, but they are limited by
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1 Rthe chosen sector and urban setting . Many business histories 
are similarly disappointing. In the statistical appendix to
B.W.E.Alford1s study of W.D.& H.O.Wills for example, the 
analysis of this Bristol firm is concerned primarily with the 
partners’ profits and not with the composition of the total 
capital employed and the credit position of the firm, still 
less with the sources of capital and the mode of its 
employment. Other business historians have varied from the 
disdain for capital and finance shown in Charles Wilson’s study 
of Unilever and W.J.Reader's of I.C.I., to the interest in 
these aspects displayed in D.C.Coleman's work on the paper 
industry and Courtaulds. The writings of W.E.Minchinton on the 
British tinplate industry, Peter Mathias on brewing, R.H. 
Campbell on the Carron Company, and Alan Birch on iron and 
steel, all devote space to financial matters, but the range of 
information conveyed varies greatly, and all suffer the 
disadvantage of not having been conceived with an enquiry into 
capital formation in m i n d ^ .
This criticism cannot be levied at J.Ginswick's study of the
Australian Gaslight Company, with its quantification and
analysis of capital. This case study is concerned with more
than measurement, it also analyses the legal framework within
which the company operated, the sources of finance in the
colony and Great Britain, and the process by which this was
on
converted into real assets . Similarly with Lorna Weatherill's 
studies of the pottery industry. The evidence assembled is not
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susceptible to analysis at an aggregate level, but meets the
more modest aim of providing information on the structure of
the capital employed by businesses which were small relative to
many enterprises in for example textiles and ironworking. It is
shown that capital was ’invested in financing credit to the
wholesale and retail trades' rather than the more usual
reversal of this position, a conclusion which reveals the
importance of studying the financing of firms in their
context, rather than in the isolation of their own business 
21organization .
Of all the works of economic history published in the last 
ten years, none has seemed more encouraging than that by Pat 
Hudson on The Genesis of Industrial Capital. This study shows 
a welcome awareness of the importance of the process of capital 
formation: it embraces theory, yet is based on a thorough 
examination of the relevant archives; it is concerned with what 
happened in a sector of a regional economy, rather than with 
speculation about some nebulous aggregative whole; and it 
places the topic under review firmly in its historical context 
by seeing economic change, especially the financing of factory 
industry in Yorkshire, as an 'embedded process impossible to 
extract from the plethora of non-economic relationships'. This 
approach has been rewarding, not only because it gives an 
understanding of the financing of factory production in one 
region, but also because it raises questions of a wider 
significance including the relative importance of landed
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resources, mercantile funds, and ploughed-back profits, and the
relationship between fixed and circulating capital in financing
o 2
industrial change . Another lesson to be learnt from this work 
is the author's avoidance of the term ’capital formation1, for 
its current narrow interpretation has made its use unwise 
in anything other than aggregative studies. Hudson has 
circumvented this problem by writing of 'capital accumulation'. 
It is hoped to achieve the same dispensation by adopting the 
term 'capital investment' in this research.
The dearth of studies on the context and circumstance of 
economic change in Britain has begun to arouse comment. From 
the vantage point of a survey of periodical literature in the 
Economic History Review of 1990, Katrina Honeyman has concluded 
that for the years 1700 to 1850 'Interest in the speed and 
extent of Britain's transformation seems to be evaporating, and 
industry itself formed the basis of very few articles of note 
in 1988'. In the same journal in 1988, in a lukewarm review of 
Studies in Capital Formation, W.A.Cole observed that the 
importance of this work would 'largely depend on the 
reliability of the estimates it contains', which the authors 
had so far failed to interpret and assess. His hope that they 
would remedy this by participating in 'the renewed debate on 
the role of capital formation which publication of this volume 
is likely to provoke' shows no great conviction that 
aggregative studies at the sectoral or national level have a 
lively future ahead of them. The more rewarding prospects may
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therefore beckon for research which in the words of Crouzet’s 
'Foreword' to Hudson's book, 'brings back the debate to 
earth'^ .
ii Concepts and Definitions.
Historians have so far paid little attention to the problem
of how capital is formed, yet there is no lack of challenge in
seeking to explain this matter which is of importance to
economic theory as well as to empirical economic history, since
it involves analyses of the flow of savings, the role of
financial intermediaries, and the act of investment in the
creation of productive assets^. The reluctance to explore
these relationships may not however arise from a failure to
appreciate their significance but from the many difficulties of
a conceptual, methodological, and evidential nature which must
be faced. Of these the conceptual problems arise less from the
difficulty of importing ideas refined for use in economics into
the different discipline of history, than from the disparity
between concept and evidence to be found in both. In economics
this may be seen in the theoretical problems inherent in the
measurement of capital and the practical difficulties involved
in the construction of estimates in developing countries. It
was after all the economist Joan Robinson who remarked in the
context of a modern study of capital accumulation that 'it is
of no use framing definitions more precise than the subject-
9 Smatter to which they apply'^ .
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Further evidence of the shared nature of the conceptual 
problems comes from another outstanding figure in this field, 
Simon Kuznets who has stated that 'No standard definition of 
capital formation exists at present; and I doubt whether one is 
desirable now', for in the pursuit of 'different analytical 
purposes and problems' different definitions may be 
appropriate^. These remarks do not imply that the subject is 
in disarray, but that a distinction must be drawn between the 
broad terms of the general concept and the precise definition 
of its application to particular circumstances. This 
flexibility is desirable in the historical context too, if the 
development of our knowledge of the processes of capital 
formation is not to be constrained. The subject is more than a 
bundle of techniques for the collection of data, it is also a 
system of ideas, and however much it may be necessary to 
delineate acceptable procedures for the purposes of 
measurement, to achieve comparability of data, it is essential 
that the concept itself should not be confined within too close 
or ’standard' a definition. To do so would be to introduce an 
authoritarian note into the pursuit of the subject, depriving 
it of much of its interest and scope for development.
A definition of capital formation as :
"Additions made during a particular period of 
time to the stock of goods which are for use in 
future production. These are both fixed assets, 
such as buildings, items of plant and so on, and 
work in progress, stocks of raw materials and 
finished goods"
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was proposed by the economist J.Hibbert at the conference in
9 7
Sheffield to launch the major study already referred to ' . Its 
general acceptability to economic historians was shown in its 
adoption by Crouzet, editor of essays on Capital Formation 
ij\£he Industrial Revolution, although it is there relegated to 
a footnote and there is little discussion of conceptual
90
problems in the book as a whole . Feinstein and Pollard also 
fail to consider the matter, announcing that their recently 
published volume was 'not the place to debate, once again, the
9 0
meaning of "capital"'^7.
For present purposes Hibbert's definition is acceptable,
provided the term 'additions' can be taken to mean both the
incrementation of capital stock, and the process by which this
was made. The case for a broad understanding is that 'real
capital' as a factor of production and 'money capital' as yet-
uninvested finance are complementary terms which embody the
two sides of the investment process. Both are to be
distinguished from stocks, bonds, and money claims, which
represent a relationship between creditors and debtors.
Capital goods (which may range from the narrowest category of
commodities used by business enterprises, to the broadest
including all economic goods) are purchased by financial
capital. The accommodation of the two distinguishable aspects
within the one concept has been expressed by Kuznets:
By capital formation we understand the addition to 
...existing stocks of capital goods;or the flow of
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the means of payment that become available for the 
financing of additions to such stocks' .
In the study of capital formation it is thus as legitimate to
investigate the flow of the means of payment as it is to
measure the additions to capital stock. The two are part of
the same process.
Despite the harmonization of these two aspects in one broad 
concept it is not at present advisable to use the term capital 
formation to cover both, for through a restrictive 
understanding of the term it has become associated with 
exercises in measurement and an aggregative approach, rather 
than with an exploration of the whole process. The term 
’investment1 offers a way of avoiding the dilemma, although 
this alternative has sometimes itself been thought so hazardous 
its use has been discouraged. I refer here to both the United 
Nations report on Concepts and Definitions of Capital Formation 
which states that since the term investment generally signifies 
'...the acquisition of securities and other financial claims, 
its use has been avoided', and the Central Statistical Office 
Publication, Sources and MethodsrNational Accounts Statistics 
which notes that 'Investment in fixed assets and stocks is 
described as capital formation to distinguish it from
o-l
investment in financial assets'J . Some have tried to avoid a 
charge of error in this matter by using both terms, a group of 
American scholars expressing this option neatly with the words,
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'Investment (sometimes called capital formation)...' . But 
this line of defence is ambiguous, and it is preferable to take 
a more positive approach and seek merit in the adoption of the 
term 'investment'.
In this study capital investment is taken to mean in general 
the productive use of current resources to achieve a future 
return, and in particular the conversion of monetary savings 
into actual additions to physical assets. The process involves 
three separate but interdependent activities of which saving is 
the making available of resources through the setting aside of 
current consumption; finance is the intermediary function 
enabling the transfer of funds from savers to investors; and 
investment is the activity by which resources are used in the 
production of capital goods. All played an important role in 
the growth of income and productivity in the years known 
conventionally as the industrial revolution. It is a great 
advantage of this term that it allows research to be conducted 
as an open-ended enquiry, whereas studies of capital formation 
have been driven into a cul-de-sac by their narrow concern with 
the measurement of 'fixed' and durable goods (for example, 
farms, drainage works, mines, machines, roads, and canals), 
frequently to the exclusion of the study of working capital in 
the form of raw materials, semi-manufactured goods, and 
finished items held by manufacturers and traders. The study of 
capital investment however allows for a more comprehensive and 
less dogmatic approach.
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A further merit of the term is that through its concern with 
the financing of the flow of additions to capital stock, 
investment can be seen as the active element at the heart of 
the subject. As such it presents a number of practical
problems, of which a major difficulty is the identification of
particular sources of funds with a specific use, especially as 
in an historical context the rudimentary forms of financial 
organization may limit or delay the matching up of pools of 
savings of an unrealized potential, with areas of unsatisfied 
demand. But whereas in this matter of linkages between savers 
and investors the functioning of attorneys or the development 
of banks may be subject to detailed historical investigation 
as to numbers and forms of organization, the role of the
entrepreneur is more difficult to establish. Yet he was often
the catalyst who, by undertaking the process of investment, 
transformed savings into capital stock. These matters serve as 
a reminder of the human motivation and commercial organization 
which are central to the problem of investment.
Capital investment is thus a complex process, deeply rooted 
in society, and requiring examination within that context if it 
is to be studied effectively. It is perhaps the most positive 
merit of this concept that it permits no divorce between the 
subject and its historical, social, and economic context. 
However great the intellectual satisfaction to be derived from 
the estimation of additions to capital stock by statistical and 
conjectural means, the study of the financing of this process
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through the assembly and analysis of historical evidence is of 
great importance for the understanding of the whole subject.
It is therefore worthy of serious consideration.
iii Method and Evidence
The pre-occupation of some economic historians with the 
application of the skills of the economist rather than those of 
the historian to the problems of economic change, may have led 
to the neglect of the process of capital formation. I am not 
referring primarily to the adoption of the hypothetico- 
deductive approach, and the modelling and analytical techniques 
of the 'new1 economic history, for in the building up of data 
on capital formation in Britain there is a flavour of the 'old' 
economic history, though with much of the material 
statistically rather than empirically derived. I am however 
suggesting that the emulation of the economists' skills of 
measurement at the national level, devising approximations and 
aggregations to overcome deficiencies of data, may account for 
the failure to study the procedural aspects of the subject in 
its historical context.
The case for concentrating on the national economy as the 
basic unit of research was made for economists by Kuznets on 
the grounds that it is the sovereign state which formulates 
policy and sets the institutional conditions within which
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economic activities are pursued . However historians are not
for the most part concerned with producing analyses for policy
making, and there are cases where the region is a much more
appropriate and 'real1 unit for the investigation of economic
change. This consideration, and the dangers of 'an excessively
aggregative approach to the study of industrialisation’, were
stressed by the S.S.R.C in a report of 1971. They noted that:
'To approach certain relationships from the assump­
tions of a 'national economy', or to formulate gen­
eralizations which subsume piecemeal variety, is to 
obscure reality.With structural, sectoral, and reg­
ional change being so pronounced during the early 
stages of industrialization...national aggregates 
and averages may be more than usually misleading. 
Studies on a regional or sectoral basis not only of 
industrial growth itself, but of particular aspects 
of processes such as capital investment..can reveal 
critical relationships far more clearly than nat­
ional studies'^  .
These warnings have been virtually ignored in the years 
since they were issued. The major study of capital formation 
initiated in Sheffield was shaped on an aggregative basis with 
no evident concern for the major practical problems involved, 
especially the loss of any evidence of variety entailed by this 
method, and the detachment from reality which this imposed. Nor 
has concern been shown about the theoretical issues implicit in 
the subject, such as those debated in the long-running 
'Cambridge controversy' about the measurement of capital, 
especially the difficulties arising from its heterogeneity^^.
It may be that these problems are not so important for studies 
of national statistics as for other branches of economics, or
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that these estimations may be in any case best compiled by a 
process of 'measurement without theory1. Whatever the reason it 
is unacceptable that capital formation should be interpreted 
simply, and without justification, as an aggregative concept. 
Despite widespread practice aggregation is no necessary part of 
any recognized definition of capital formation: rather it is a 
chosen method which has led to the neglect of alternative 
approaches.
Any idea that the volume edited by Feinstein and Pollard 
represents a now out-dated approach to the subject will be 
dispelled by reference to the recent study of Regions and 
Industries edited by Hudson. The author introduces the first 
chapter with the observation that 'Disaggregated analyses of 
the industrial revolution in Britain are currently out of 
fashion'. Instead the emphasis is on calculations of the 
movement of aggregate variables and the fashioning of 
hypotheses about causal relationships, an approach which 
provides a limited 'perspective on industrial change and 
economic development', for 'aspects of economy and society 
which were innovative or unique to the period have been 
neglected'. Hudson concludes that the complexities of economic 
growth in the historical situation mean 'its precise impact and 
importance eludes the national-level quantitative methods so 
fashionable in the current historiography'^.
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It cannot of course be claimed that traditional historical 
research based on respect for the integrity of original sources 
produces ’facts’ which represent an absolute truth, for they 
too are shaped by the perceptions of the researcher and the 
nature of the material under scrutiny. But at least the 
historian can draw conclusions in full knowledge of the varying 
weight to be placed on different strands of evidence. In 
contrast, in pursui^6f aggregate figures the ’new’ economic 
historian is frequently obliged to incorporate estimates of 
doubtful provenance, coming from sources and obtained by 
methods not susceptible to easy checks. An example may be 
provided from a case stated more fully elsewhere whereby 
figures concerning investment in the turnpike roads, compiled 
by Ginarlis through a process of backward extrapolation on the 
mistaken assumption that such roads were of a constant size 
throughout their life history, were incorporated by Feinstein 
in published estimates, so giving them an undeserved
o 7
credibility .
It is ironic that in relation to his own work Feinstein lies 
in the tradition of pioneers who have stressed the doubtful 
nature of the estimations produced, warning for example of 
speculations, rough guesses, and arbitrary assumptions, 
especially before 1800. Re-working his material led to the 
observation that ’The substantial scale of the present 
revisions to earlier work should perhaps be sufficient warning 
of the conjectural nature of any estimates of capital formation
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for the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries'. He admitted that 
'In most cases the required series can only be compiled if the 
historian is willing to cast aside normal procedures (and 
inhibitions) when faced with the absence of relevant records, 
and turns instead to insecure guesses about possible orders of
o o
magnitude' . Despite such cautions conjectured figures may be 
represented as reliable evidence from which firm conclusions 
may be drawn.
Even more serious than the conversion of speculation into
on
dogmatic assertion , is the maintenance of an insufficient 
distinction between historically and statistically derived 
'facts' to be found for example in work on the ratio of 
investment to national income in the nineteenth century 
American economy. A 'dramatic increase' is claimed, but data 
pre-1840 is notoriously deficient on both increases in capital 
stock and the size of the national product^. A study of the 
incestuous web of cross-references cited in support of the 
quantitative evidence for the earlier years of the study shows 
only a tenuous link with historical reality, and the reader is 
informed at one stage that 'We must be primarily concerned with 
problems of acceptable prediction rather than attempts at a 
thorough explanation and analysis of known events '^. Other 
sources which rest in inaccessible worksheets are difficult to 
pursue, but the general absurdity of sustaining an analytical 
argument about a 'dramatic increasey'in investment ratios on the 
basis of data with such problems of accuracy and comparability
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is confirmed by reference to the published works of the authors 
cited. These show that the past is seen as ’the social
to a large extent 'the chronological ordering of events' and 
that although 'the model is crude, the information used to
Such bald claims may offend 'new' economic historians in 
Britain by their lack of subtlety, but they are very revealing 
about this approach. They show that in adopting the procedures 
of the sciences (including economics and the social sciences), 
historical studies must move so far from their traditional base 
that they may no longer be regarded as history. The 'old' 
method defines the problem, evaluates sources of information, 
and then collects and analyses data of both a qualitative and 
quantitative nature about for example individuals, interest 
groups, and the economy, from which a concluding explanation 
can be drawn. In contrast the 'new' method is concerned with 
generalization. Individuals, events, and social and economic 
life are important in relation to the testing of a theory, but 
not in their own right. The pages of a work embodying the 'new' 
approach, edited by Roderick Floud and Donald McCloskey, are 
almost bereft of people and their culture despite the fact that 
amongst the most fundamental factors in growth may be the non­
economic ones such as the activities of entrepreneurs^. Their 
neglect of significant matters was grudgingly admitted in a 
review which acknowledged that in contrast to this work, a new
scientist's laboratory', that analysis' ignores
illustrate (test) the model is in many cases even cruder'^
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publication by Christopher Clay which attempted to relate 
economic to social questions, provided a focus permitting him 
’to examine some largely ignored questions'^ .
The suggestion that the limitation of scope may be one
indication of the fundamental unsuitability of neoclassical
theory as the organizing framework for historical research was
developed by Peter Temin in his consideration of 'The Future of
the New Economic History’ in the early 1980s. He concluded that
the ’economic model of behaviour' was but one 'among several,
suitable for the analysis of some but not all problems’, and
was hopeful that new approaches on for example the operation of
firms would bring the profession into 'greater touch with the
diversity of human behaviour which has been the mainstay of all
history'^. But a less optimistic conclusion was reached by
Stephen Wentworth, who saw the 'cliometric program' as
'marginalizing history'. He observed that:
'The range of historical problems amenable to syst­
ematic treatment as testable hypotheses in specif­
ied neoclassical models proved to be quite limited.
Many basic themes and traditional problems of econ­
omic history are thereby excluded... or at best must 
await promised theoretical and econometric develop­
ment within the neoclassical paradigm. Such basic 
themes..as economic development, industrialization, 
structural change, technological interdependencies, 
the nature of the labor process, class relation­
ships, non-market decision making, social conflicts 
and the social and political character of the state 
are precluded from meaningful systematic treatment 
in the cliometric approach'^ .
A British slant to this matter was provided by C.H.Lee in his
report to the S.S.R.C. on Social Science and History. By
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referring to six accounts of enclosure in the eighteenth 
century, of which half were written in the ’traditional 
literary style’ and half employed econometrics, he raised the
\ V "  ■prospect of the complementary of such studies, but this neat 
facility will only rarely be available to flesh out the 
econometric approach, based on a highly specified but narrow 
model^ .
The doubts raised by the restrictiveness of the neo­
classical framework and the high degree of aggregation required 
by its procedures, which must exclude the non-quantifiable 
whilst at the same time risking violence to the available 
information through its unwarranted or excessively speculative 
use, raise echoes of an earlier controversy on the neglect of 
historical evidence in which it was suggested that 'The worst 
use of theory...is to make men insensible to fact'. It would be 
unwise to reopen the debate between Cunningham and Marshall 
because the former’s overstatement of his case helped to give 
the latter the better of the argument. Nevertheless 
Cunningham's judgement that the 'neglect of the patient study 
of actual fact' is disastrous 'because it prevents the 
economist from finding out the narrow limits within which his 
generalizations are even approximately true', is worth quoting 
because the criticism remains as valid today as when it was
A O
madeH°. It is not however past controversies but present 
studies which demonstrate the need for more factual 
information, to supplement in general the data which has been
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overstretched in the pursuit of national aggregates and the 
testing of hypotheses, and to ensure in particular that the 
concept of capital formation does not remain confined within a 
narrow and restrictive interpretation which fails to take into 
account the historical dimension of the subject.
iv Conclusion
It has now been demonstrated that there are no conceptual 
barriers to the study of the process of the formation of 
capital in a regional context, because this subject need not be 
pursued by definition on an aggregative basis and in a national 
framework. Nor are models refined according to neo-classical 
theory necessarily the best or even the only organizational 
framework for proceeding with this research. The way is thus 
cleared for a consideration of a more fruitful method by which 
to study the relationships underlying the process of capital 
investment.
In the following study of north Somerset the structure of 
the region is investigated before an attempt is made to 
understand the processes of capital investment taking place 
within it. This involves an analytical and interpretive 
account of the context of the region, its population and social 
structure, its relationship with Bristol, and the circumstances 
of its agriculture, manufacturing, mining, transport and trade.
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Matters such as legal and financial services, and
entrepreneurial and merchanting skills, receive the fullest 
treatment possible because of the significance of their role in 
the process of economic change. Through this comprehensive 
approach, aspects of society which are neither amenable to 
aggregative study nor easily incorporated into models, become 
elements of the framework within which change can be studied.
Within this context the focus of research is the process by 
which money capital was converted into real productive assets. 
For this purpose a continuity of evidence on investment is 
desirable, but this is difficult to come by as was shown by 
Stanley Chapman’s study of cotton spinning in the east 
Midlands. Here a sufficient continuity of documentary evidence 
was found for an analysis of the financial structure of only 
one firm, and then for just thirteen years^. in north Somerset 
this shortage of a continuity of information has been countered 
largely by the selection of case studies within the different 
sectors of the economy, for which such material can be built 
up. In this way it has been possible to secure evidence of the 
process of capital investment at the grass roots level. 
Conclusions drawn from the case studies have then been related 
as carefully as possible to the pattern of development in north 
Somerset, with a full awareness of the dangers inherent in such 
unique survivals of evidence.
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Since this research is concerned essentially with charting 
and explaining a process it deals in the minutiae of change, 
assembled however not for its own sake but for the purpose of 
analysis and interpretation. Where possible evidence has been 
tabulated but its explanation takes the narrative form which 
was well-justified by Barry Supple in his survey of 'Old 
Problems and New Directions' in the early 1980s. He wrote that:
'The new techniques alone are not,in the last resort, 
satisfying because they do not address themselves to 
the foundations of historical concern - a narrative 
of the past as it unfolded, in its roundedness and 
interrelatedness. To write narrative history should 
not be a matter simply of telling the story of indiv­
idual events, and certainly not of dispensing with 
systematic analyses and models. Yet,even in economic 
history, our best hope is to narrate and explain a 
particular past...(which) cannot be adequately app­
roached without an understanding of the full and com­
plex range of causal relationships in a real world'50.
It is the aim of this study to investigate, analyse, and 
interpret capital investment, a process which was of great 
significance for the history and economy of both the region and 
the nation in the formative period under discussion.
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Part II The Context of Economic Change in North Somerset
Chapter 2 The Region of North Somerset: Settlement Patterns and
Population Change
i The Case for Regional Studies
If a study of the process of capital investment is outside
the 'mainstream1 approach, then so also is the idea of basing
it within a region. The emphasis upon macro-economic
investigations at the national level has meant that the recent
major volume on capital formation in the United Kingdom edited
by Feinstein and Pollard includes no reference to localities
(region, county, or town) in its index, and makes scant mention
in its text-*-. The same can be said of the volumes edited by
Floud and McCloskey, which have no reference to 'region' in the
index/glossary, though over six column inches are devoted to an
explanation of 'regression analysis'. Some indications of place
may be found, but they contain little information for the
reader about the reality of the subjects which the models seek 
o
to explain . However, a regional approach can be justified, in 
the case of the present study by the greater ease with which 
relationships underlying the process of capital investment can 
be pursued here than in the national context, and more 
generally by the opportunity thus provided to test current 
national generalizations. The assumptions underlying 
statistical series, of a uniformity amongst the regions,
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especially before the early decades of the nineteenth century, 
remain unwarranted until tested against historical evidence.
It is encouraging that after its long eclipse by more 
fashionable approaches there is renewed interest in the study 
of the region, due in part to the fact that several new 
subjects can be studied more effectively at the micro- than 
the macro-level. Proto-industrialization is such a case , as is 
the relation between the core and its periphery, which demands 
that the latter be studied as carefully as the former^. New 
thinking on the timing of the industrial revolution has also 
led to a growing emphasis on the regional basis of the economy 
before 1830, in the East Midlands for example-*. For the 
Victorian period Lee has begun to present the Overwhelming 
case for studying economic growth at regional level’, and on 
the basis of the Census of Population he has defined three 
major growth types: textile; mining and metal working; and 
metropolitan regions. A fourth type was the slower growing 
rural, often peripheral, area .
But economic historians with these new interests do not have 
to face a clean slate, for over the last few decades the study 
of localities has been nurtured by historians convinced of the 
appropriateness of this approach. The influential work of Alan 
Everitt has emphasised that local society is worthy of study 
because its sense of cultural identity is expressed in a social 
and economic cohesion based on roots that are different from
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those of the 1 community of the r e a l m ' a n  approach which is 
lifting local history from its earlier more limited focus. In 
agricultural history too there has been an emphasis in recent 
decades on regions and the farming practices within them, 
developed particularly by the 'Leicester School' of historians. 
Joan Thirsk for example has used local detail effectively to 
illumine the regional structure of the economy and society of
o
early modern England . In urban history too there has been a 
growing concern with early modern towns, their political, 
economic, and social structures, and their inter-relationships
Q
within the national economy . The return to regional roots has 
come late in social history though with the publication of the 
Cambridge Social History of Britain this omission is being 
redressed. The first volume is devoted to Regions and 
Communities, though sadly without reference to the south west, 
especially Somerset^. In business studies too the importance 
of the regions is becoming recognized, as shown by recent work 
on Bristol
Whilst these historians of different persuasions have by 
their adoption of a regional approach been expressing 
dissatisfaction at the way studies have been confined to the 
national level, a similar process has been taking place amongst 
historical geographers. John Langton has been a leading 
protagonist, setting out to 'challenge the widespread belief, 
shared by historians and geographers, that industrialization 
destroyed regional distinctiveness in England as elsewhere', by
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claiming that on the contrary this identity was enhanced in the 
early industrial economy by the regional nature of development, 
which was related to the patchy and disjointed network of 
inland transport. Only with the coming of the railways did the 
balance between regional separation and national integration 
tilt decisively in favour of the latter^ . Both Langton and 
Derek Gregory are critical of Pollard's volume on Peaceful 
Conquest: the industrialisation of Europe 1760-1970, the former 
regarding it as a regional study of 'a more old-fashioned 
kind1, the latter making the more serious criticism of its 
emphasis on the diffusion of technical innovation at the 
expense of a 'geography of investment'. On entering the debate 
Michael Freeman expressed regret that Langton's paper would 
find 'no immediate audience amongst economic and social 
historians', but the publication of the volume edited by Hudson 
on Regions and Industries, should dispel such fears^. The 
value of this book lies partly in the evidence it provides of 
work already being carried out on the regions, and partly in 
the contribution it is able to make to the fundamental question 
of the origins and progress of industrial change, so much of 
which was in its early days a regional phenomenon.
ii The Region of North Somerset
Arguments in favour of the study of regional history as a 
way of discovering the diversity of parts within the national
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whole, do not imply that localities themselves necessarily 
represent a homogeneous unit. This is particularly the case 
with counties, which may form an area of administrative 
convenience rather than a natural region. In the historic 
county of Somerset there is a range of topography and 
settlement which quickly becomes apparent through the comments 
of writers over the years, as well as by personal observation. 
In the first volume of the Victoria County History it was 
claimed that 'Few counties in England present so great a 
diversity of scenery as Somerset, and none possesses a greater 
variety of geological formations'^. In the eighteenth century 
these features of special interest meant that the county was 
studied not only by those with an interest in its history such 
as the Reverend John Collinson whose work provides a good 
general survey of the period, but also and more unusually by 
those intrigued by its underlying structure. John Strachey and 
William Smith are worthy of special mention for both were 
concerned with the stratification of rocks, particularly in 
relation to the exploitation of coal, the former in the early 
eighteenth century, the latter from the 1790s^.
The diversity of the county's geology has given rise to 
three main physical regions. These are the high lands of the 
west, chiefly Exmoor with its outlier the Brendon Hills, and 
the Quantocks; the low-lying central Levels; and the northern 
sector composed of the Mendip Hills and the lands falling away 
to the county boundary at the River Avon. In a gross over­
- 60 -
simplification of this complex subject it may be said that the 
older and higher rocks of west Somerset are composed chiefly of 
grits and sandstones, which are also exposed in the loftier 
parts of the Mendip Hills where the old red sandstones show 
through the limestone cover at a height of over 1,000 feet. In
1 ficontrast, the Levels are moorlands of peat and alluvium .
Of these three regions the northern third, the subject of 
this study, contains the most variety. The Mendip Hills are a 
bleak and treeless plateau of carboniferous limestone, running 
approximately east and west for over thirty miles at a height 
of about 800 to 900 feet, and reaching the coast at Brean Down 
near Weston-super-Mare. Further west are the 'island-remnants’ 
of Steep Holm and Flat Holm. Between the Mendips and Bristol 
there are similar formations at Broadfield Down, and in the 
Failand Hills which run west from that city to the River Severn 
at Clevedon. Coal-bearing measures occur at the eastern end of 
Mendip, and around Nailsea. Lead and calamine were amongst the 
minerals exploited in the central plateau. In contrast to the 
sharp rise of its southern edge, the northern flank of Mendip 
falls away in undulating hills and valleys of agriculturally- 
rewarding sandy marls. In the north-east, Bath is cradled in 
the oolitic limestone downs at the southern end of the 
Cotswolds, of which Dundry Hill to the south of Bristol is a 
distinct and notable outlier of nearly 800 feet. Although the 
central Levels south of Mendip make up the largest tract of 
lowland at risk of flooding, parts of coastal north Somerset
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were also subject to this hazard. These include the North Marsh 
between Clevedon and Weston-super-Mare and the Gordano Valley, 
both so low-lying in relation to the surrounding hills and even 
to the sea-coast, that they were subject to serious inundation 
by rivers in flood unable to empty their waters into the sea 
because of incoming high tides.
The northern third of the old county stretches from the 
southern edge of the Mendips northwards to the River Avon, and 
lies between the mouths of the Rivers Avon and Axe on the west 
coast and the towns of Bath and Frome on the east. The waters 
of the westward flowing Axe originate in Mendip springs at 
Wookey, Draycot, Cheddar and Winscombe, and reach the Bristol 
Channel at Uphill. In contrast, those of the river Chew flow 
north to join the Avon at Keynsham. The Mendips are almost bare 
of settlement but on the southern edge of the region are the 
towns of Axbridge, Cheddar, Wells, and Shepton Mallet. In a 
series of lower undulations and pastoral valleys sloping to the 
north, settlements associated with farming, textiles, mining, 
and manufacture are to be found ranging widely in size and 
location. In 1801 the region of north Somerset covered 314,484 
acres and constituted 30 per cent of the old county. Its 
population was then 122,211 heads, comprising 44.7 per cent of 
the county total. In 1831 it was 188,860 heads, representing 47 
per cent of the total^.The application of the term 'region1 to 
this entity is fraught with difficulties, but the designation 
of north Somerset as such is not an arbitrary one for the area
- 62 -
has both historic credibility and economic cohesion. It was
defined by John Billingsley in the 1790s in his review of the
1 ftcounty for the Board of Agriculture^0 , and although it had 
links with both the rest of Somerset and the port of Bristol, 
it remained separate from each.
Bristol had become a separate county in its own right in
1373^, and for this reason and because it was for some
purposes like the census returns still reckoned a part of
Gloucestershire, its internal development is not included in
this study. To do so would in any case have changed the
balance of this study. However the relationship between Bristol
and north Somerset is of great interest, for the latter was an
important segment of the hinterland of the port. These links
have now been formalized through the creation of the modern
county of Avon, which attaches to Bristol the northern part of
old Somerset and the southern part of old Gloucestershire. It
comes as no surprise that the liaison can be a troublesome one,
for in 1867 some members of the Somerset Archaeological and
Natural History Society boycotted the annual meeting because it
was held in Bristol, and so the Society was 'stepping over its
borders'. The organizer responded by claiming that:
'they could not properly and completely discharge 
their functions, unless they took into their sphere
of operations, at least for once, a city which was
so closely connected with them..Some of the Bristol 
churches were essentially in their architecture, 
types of Somersetshire churches, and the Society 
could not complete its archaeological surveys with­
out inspecting these churches' .
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This balanced reply illustrates very well the position adopted 
in this thesis, that although north Somerset remains the focus 
of study, the survey of the process of capital investment could 
not be undertaken satisfactorily if the links with Bristol were 
excluded as a legitimate subject of research. North Somerset 
was part of its county in matters of civil and church 
administration, politics and justice, but the Mendip barrier 
which detached it from the traditional centres of government of 
Somerset, also exposed it to the growing economic power of 
Bristol.
To define north Somerset in terms of these relationships 
might seem to suggest that although it had an historical and 
topographical credibility, it did not constitute a recognizable 
economic unit. But unless it achieves an unlikely self- 
sufficiency any region must forge links, and here these 
flourished on the complementarity of north Somerset’s 
advantages of water power and Bristol's of foreign trade.
Again, if the quality of homogeneity is to be the touchstone of 
a region, then north Somerset is in danger of failing the test 
for the dominant feature of its economic development was the 
way different parts flourished at different times, in relation 
to developments in industry, agriculture, mining, and 
transport, and in response to the influence of Bristol and the 
rest of the surrounding area. However, far from constituting a 
disqualification for analysis such non-homogeneity has long 
formed one of the basic premises of modern intra-regional
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studies^. It is true that when the geographer analyses the 
uneven though related distribution of economic activity and 
population within a region, non-homogeneity is defined in 
spatial terms, with reference for example to the location of 
hierarchies of settlement, but the concept may also be used by 
historians in relation to the dimension of time and the 
historical perspective. It is indeed the non-homogeneity of 
change in this marginal part of the country, on the western 
seaboard and so able to share the world-wide and varied trading 
patterns of its neighbour Bristol, which makes north Somerset 
such a promising region to study.
iii Settlement Patterns and Population Change
By the mid-eighteenth century Somerset had long been 
regarded as a rich and populous county. In north Somerset this 
wealth was based upon agricultural produce; the manufacture of 
woollen cloth, brass and copper goods, and gunpowder; the 
extraction of lead, calamine, stone, and coal; and the flow of 
visitors to Bath, premier city if not county town. Defoe had 
observed the flourishing condition of agriculture in the 1720s, 
and the 'increasing and visible circumstance1 of the clothing 
trade. Lead mining had by then passed its peak, but its 
importance had been noted earlier by Camden who had also
o o
observed the presence of calamine in 'plenty' . Much of the 
pattern of settlement which supported this economic activity
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was established before the Norman Conquest, though the earliest 
evidence of human life in this region came from the two areas 
which were little inhabited in the early eighteenth century. 
These were the Mendips, which had housed some of the earliest 
settlers in the country in pre-historic times in caves like 
Wookey Hole; and the Levels where frequent flooding made later 
habitation difficult, although the wooden trackways linking 
islands of new Stone Age settlement are amongst the oldest
o o
known roads in the world .
Early developments of the economy are indicated by monuments 
of the Bronze Age on Mendip, and by Iron Age forts associated 
with transhumance as lowland villagers pastured sheep on the 
uplands. Lead mining was well established by Roman times as 
this, and the prospect of silver, attracted their attention 
soon after the invasion of Britain in A.D.43. The agricultural 
estates clustered mainly round Bath, whose hot springs inspired 
the urban centre there, give a further indication of the 
potential of the region which the Romans were quick to exploit, 
building a military and commercial highroad, the Fosse Way to 
improve accessibility. The continuing unsuitability of the 
Mendips and Levels confirmed a preference for settlement in the 
more favourable lands of north Somerset, where the Saxons were 
established from the end of the sixth century, their charters 
revealing settlements in valley clearings. Although much of 
the land was common wood or pasture, the existence of common 
arable land is confirmed by laws of the late seventh century
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invoking penalties on farmers who failed to fence their share. 
Villages were surrounded by woodlands, some of which climbed 
the scarp of Mendip and other high grounds. There were Royal 
Forests at Axbridge on western Mendip and Selwood on the 
eastern border. The watery lowlands provided fish and fowl, and 
the bleak plateaus offered rough grazing. On farming practice, 
the charters show for example that at Wrington in 902 a 
boundary ran by the 'wynter acres1, probably of winter-sown 
wheat and rye. Flax is mentioned at Pilton, and at Weston near 
Bath there was a dairy farm and cattle-shed in 946. There were 
deer here, rabbits at Marksbury and game enclosures at Mells 
and Bathampton, as well as quarries at North Stoke, a sandpit 
at Compton Bishop, and a landing place at North Wootton^.
A number of non-agricultural centres also began to gain or 
regain importance during this period, although in general towns 
such as Frome were few and small in number. In 676 a convent 
was founded at Bath, and a mint was established there and at 
Axbridge, both towns being listed among the fortified 'burhs1
o c
in the Burghal Hidage of c.910^. The comparatively late growth 
of Bristol began in this period, with the development of its 
cloth and trading interests. A reference in early laws to the 
operation of a slave trade from the port gives a preview of 
what was later to become a major source of wealth to both that
O  C.
city and north Somerset . The pattern of settlement was thus 
almost fully established in this region before the great 
Domesday Survey of 1086. It was to be adjusted later only as
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agricultural fortunes fluctuated, cloth-making, mining and
manufacture ebbed and flowed, and leisure preferences changed
27from spa to coast .
The Domesday Survey does more than confirm this outline of 
north Somerset*s development by the eleventh century, it also 
provides some basis for speculation about population numbers 
and values per acre. In both these respects the eastern part of 
the region ranked most highly, followed by the lands north of 
Mendip to the Avon, with the Mendips and coastal Levels coming 
last. From the Domesday evidence it has been suggested that 
after adjustments have been made for those not included in the 
Survey (women, children, the old, landowners, churchmen, and 
borough dwellers other than burgesses), the population of 
Somerset may then have been between 88,000 and 93,000^®. This 
would have been about one-third of that recorded at the first 
census of 1801, before which of course all estimations are very 
risky. Bath was the largest of the Domesday boroughs in the 
county, with 192 recorded burgesses. Its population may have 
been between 2,000 and 3,000 if allowance is made for the 
unrecorded. The 32 burgesses of Axbridge may have provided the 
base for a population of 400 to 500 persons. Frome was regarded 
as a borough but had no recorded burgesses, and despite its 
ecclesiastical connections Wells remained a village. Of the 
settlements mentioned in Saxon charters but omitted from the 
Domesday Survey (perhaps because recorded under larger units), 
Binegar, Dinder,and Wookey all had a later economic importance.
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Estimates in the Victoria County History suggest that at the 
time of the Survey only six counties in England were more 
densely peopled. In terms of comparative wealth however 
Somerset was not so well-favoured, though its rank as twelfth 
county may reflect the fact that many of its assets had not 
then been realised. In particular the potentially rich Levels 
were either ignored or, like the low moors at Wedmore,
9Q
described as having no value . Under the pressure of rising 
population in the thirteenth century however the drainage of 
these wetlands began. Land was reclaimed from the sea, as at 
Portbury on the northern coastal plains, or from the large 
river systems like the Axe. Walls and ditches were built and 
watercourses improved, especially by great ecclesiastical 
landowners such as the Bishop of Bath and Wells. In the upland 
wastes there was reclamation from the woods on the northern 
slopes of Mendip, as at East and West Harptree, and from those 
on the southern edge as at Cheddar. Inroads were made at 
Selwood Forest on the eastern border by settlers from Frome^.
This expansion was halted in the early decades of the 
fourteenth century by the problems of harvest failure and 
disease which culminated in the Black Death of 1348. The 
ensuing mortality is difficult to estimate but one-third of the 
inhabitants may have died. This check had a significant effect 
on the economy of the region, for as corn crops retreated from 
the margins of cultivation and the land was converted to grass, 
so sheep became increasingly important. Mendip became a great
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sheep walk, especially for the flocks of Glastonbury Abbey 
which grazed on its manors of Doulting, Wrington, Marksbury, 
Mells, Batcombe, and Pilton. By the end of the fourteenth 
century the county was leading all others in the number of 
woollen cloths produced, and most were made in north Somerset 
at centres such as Bath, Frome, Shepton Mallet, Beckington, and 
Pensford. By the middle of the following century there was also 
a thriving trade in the export of wool, particularly to Italy
O 1
and Flanders . This growing wealth led to the building of 
splendid churches as at Chewton Mendip. Less impressionistic 
evidence may be culled from tax assessments. An analysis of 
those for 1334 and 1515 shows that in terms of both lay and 
clerical wealth per acre, Somerset was twenty-third out of 
thirty counties in 1334 (when high assessments were associated 
with wheat growing), but rose to become second in 1515 (when
wealth was associated with other commodities such as cloth and
o o
wool) . A similar comparison of the relative positions in
1524/5 and the 1670s shows that for the county in general and
north Somerset in particular there was over this period a 
marked increase in the share of both taxable wealth and taxable 
population, perhaps explained for this region by the growth of 
mining on Mendip and the prosperity brought to farming by the 
rapid growth of Bristol in the late seventeenth century*^. At 
the Ship Money assessments of 1635-37, only Devon, Yorkshire, 
and London were rated more highly^.
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Figures assembled by Phyllis Deane and W.A.Cole show that at 
the beginning of the eighteenth century Somerset was one of six 
English counties with more than 200,000 inhabitants. By mid­
century its then total of 214,096 had risen to 222,526, and the 
county was ranked fifth. With a population of 282,487 in 1801, 
Somerset came sixth. The numbers had increased to 408,702 by 
1831, but its mixed economy was being outstripped by the 
industrial and commercial counties of the north and midlands, 
and it had slipped to eighth^ . In an attempt to improve on 
these totals Stephen Pole has suggested an estimated population 
of 186,660 in 1700 rising to 259,920 in 1801^ giving the 
greater rate of increase in Somerset's population in the 
eighteenth century of 39 per cent, and not 32 per cent as Deane 
and Cole's figures suggest, so the later decline may have been 
all the greater.
It has been noted that towards the end of the eleventh 
century there were possibly only six counties more densely 
populated than Somerset. In the later sixteenth century it was 
reckoned to lie third or fourth, rising on E.K.C.Gonner's 
calculations to rank second relative to other counties in 1700. 
But by 1750 it was fourth, and by 1801 it was ninth, or perhaps 
even twelfth according to Pole. This decline in rank accords 
with estimations of migration and natural increase which show 
that despite Somerset's doubling of population between 1700 and 
1831 there was a continuing net loss by migration, particularly 
during the three decades after 1751. Much of this wastage was
- 71 -
into or through Bristol, for the city was not only a rapidly 
growing industrial centre drawing labour from other counties, 
it was also a port from which free and indentured men embarked
• 3 7
for the colonies .
Revealing though they are, none of these generalizations can 
indicate with any precision the timing of the acceleration of 
population growth. However, Stephen Jackson1s detailed study of 
some parish records for north east Somerset shows it to have 
occurred there in the middle decades of the eighteenth century. 
Jackson notes a 'marked acceleration in the rate of increase... 
between 1745 and 1765', initiatiating steady growth until the 
mid-1780s. The rate of expansion was then 'relatively rapid' 
until the end of the century. Jackson relates these features to 
changing patterns of mortality as epidemics declined. He notes 
that 'the general trends in fertility in this area seem to have 
been of lesser importance', although 'in some parishes at 
least, there were very marked increases in fertility during the
o o
second half of the century' . As the area studied includes 
agricultural as well as cloth making and mining parishes, it 
may be that these results can be applied more widely to the 
rest of the region. But in seeking trends through Spectral, 
Cluster and Factor Analysis, and Symapping, Jackson's methods 
conspire to frustrate the reader by locking away rather than 
revealing specific information about particular parishes.
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For the early 1790s this deficiency can be partly remedied 
by reference to the population and housing figures for some 
seventy parishes in north Somerset, collected and published by 
C o l l i n s o n * ^ .  From this evidence it has been possible to 
calculate that the average number of persons per dwelling was 
then 5.4. Most crowded were the six clothing parishes to the 
south east, around Shepton Mallet, with an average of 5.9 per 
house. Least crowded, and averaging 5.0 per house, were seven 
largely agricultural parishes to the south and north west of 
Bristol, from which labourers may have been drawn away to work
in that city. In the thirteen parishes around Bath the average
was 5.5 per house, whilst in the single example for which this 
evidence is available between Bath and Bristol, the figure is 
5.25. In all the other groups, based on the Mendips but shading 
into the Levels in the west (19 parishes), into the mining and 
clothing villages in the east (10 parishes), and north to the
undulating farmlands (9 parishes), the average is that of the
whole area, 5.4. Although limited in its coverage, Collinson's 
evidence provides an invaluable introduction to the more 
comprehensive material in the Census Returns of the following 
decades. The distribution and density of population in the 
first thirty years of the nineteenth century can thus be 
compared with that for a number of parishes in the early 1790s, 
as well as with the general understanding of settlement 
patterns in the region.
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The Census Returns confirm first of all the importance of 
this region within the county, for although the population of 
Somerset increased by 47 per cent between 1801 and 1831, that 
of north Somerset rose by 54.5 per cent^®. The greatest 
increase was in Bedminster, where there was a three-fold growth 
of population in the parish which was to become a suburb of 
Bristol. Similarly with those which became part of Bath, though 
here the increase was the less dramatic average of 144 per 
cent. Collinson's account of one of these however, Bathwick, 
places this evidence in perspective, for although numbers rose 
by less than 50 per cent between 1801 and 1831, there had 
already been an eleven-fold increase in the previous decade, 
probably due to the development of the Pulteney Estate between 
1788 and 1792. The expansion of Bristol and Bath into nearby 
parishes was in the early nineteenth century at the expense of 
their old core of parishes, whose population in the case of 
Bath rose only 37.5 per cent between 1801 and 1831.
The clothing towns of Frome and Shepton Mallet showed a 
similar lack of vitality in these years, with rates of increase 
of 40 per cent and the very low 4.4 per cent respectively. In 
case there was here too the compensation of suburban growth, 
the population of adjoining parishes has also been calculated, 
but the resulting increases of 12.6 per cent and 20.6 per cent 
respectively show this was not so. Nor had later growth been 
forestalled by developments in the 1790s, for in Frome there 
was then a modest increase of 7.9 per cent, whilst Collinson's
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figures for Shepton Mallet suggest a dramatic drop of over 40 
per cent in that decade. On the southern edge of Mendip the 
growth of Axbridge was similarly restrained, with a rise of 
21.8 per cent between 1801 and 1831 doing little more than 
compensate for a loss of 18 per cent in the 1790s, whilst it is 
likely that the higher rate of increase at Wells of 47.95 per 
cent between 1801 and 1831 was ensured by its ecclesiastical 
rather than clothing importance. Other previously flourishing 
centres of the cloth industry like Beckington and Nunney 
underwent a long decline in the nineteenth century, although 
the population of the former had risen by an estimated 43.6 per 
cent in the 1790s.
The growing importance of coalmining between 1801 and 1831, 
and the late start of the major centres, are reflected in the 
rates of growth in those years of Radstock (128.8 per cent) and 
Camerton (123.2 per cent). Collinson’s figures allow Timsbury’s 
lower growth at this time (91.45 per cent) to be put into 
perspective, for it followed an increase of 185.6 per cent in 
the 1790s, probably associated with the sinking of the first 
pits on the outskirts of the village in 1791. These mining 
centres were all set in mixed rural economies, where despite 
the continuing importance of agriculture, small-scale mining, 
and manufacture, the rate of population growth (as measured by 
the Hundreds minus the mining towns) was on average the modest 
25.5 per cent. In the Hundred of Keynsham too, where as will be 
seen there were a number of manufacturing concerns on rural
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sites making especially copper and brass, the average increase 
was the similarly low rate of 33.6 per cent. In the Liberty of 
Mells and Leigh-on-Mendip where Fussell's iron works were 
making a substantial contribution to the economy of north 
Somerset, the population rose by only 15.3 per cent between 
1801 and 1831. It was thus not only the declining clothmaking 
industry but other still-flourishing forms of manufacture which 
seemed to have little impact on the rural communities in which 
they operated. The 1801 Census Return of eighty persons in the 
parish of Woolley where from the 1720s farming had co-existed 
with a successful gunpowder works, confirms that the forms of 
manufacture practised in north Somerset did not greatly swell 
the rural population.
Of the two areas previously little inhabited, the Mendip 
parishes showed an average population increase of 40 per cent 
in the first three decades of the nineteenth century, as the 
enclosed uplands were settled and farmed. At East Harptree for 
example, population grew at 48.8 per cent following a rise of 
only 11.2 per cent in the 1790s, and at Rowberrow an increase 
of 57.4 per cent replaced a fall of 17 per cent. The importance 
of renewed activity at the old Mendip lead works is shown by 
the increase of 70 per cent between 1801 and 1831 at Priddy, 
the only village on the plateau. Large scale drainage schemes 
in the northern Levels permitted farming and settlement on 
previously water-logged lands. At Weston-in-Gordano for 
example, where major drainage was undertaken between 1810 and
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1815, the population fall of 40 per cent in the 1790s was 
corrected by a rise of 37.8 per cent by 1831. The growing 
accessibility of the coast near Bristol began to convert 
fishing villages into resorts. At Weston-super-Mare a fall of 
1.4 per cent in the 1790s was followed by an almost ten-fold 
growth of population between 1801 and 1831. In those thirty 
years Clevedon grew by three and a half times, and the 
population of Portishead more than doubled. In the same period 
the glass making and coal mining parish of Nailsea almost 
doubled in size. Excluding these last four special cases the 
rise in population in the northern Levels was the same as the 
Mendip parishes, about 40 per cent. For agricultural parishes 
nearer the food market of Bristol, such as Backwell and 
Winford, the average rate of growth was the higher 54 per cent.
The growth of population in north Somerset by more than 50 
per cent over the years 1801 to 1831, with the highest 
concentration in suburban, mining, and some manufacturing 
parishes, was a matter of concern to the county magistrates.
The Commissions of the Peace will be examined later as a source 
of evidence on social structure, but it is appropriate to 
consider here some of the correspondence expressing a wish for 
more justices, which arose from fears about population growth. 
Most of the surviving letters are from the 1820s and they focus 
on the need for more resident magistrates, at Batheaston for 
example to keep 'the lower orders in good behaviour1, and at 
Freshford to maintain order in a parish of 600 persons, several
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factories and two public houses. But in general population 
pressures in parishes near Bath do not seem to have been felt 
so strongly as in those near Bristol. In 1820 for example the 
Justice's Clerk for Bristol wrote to his Somerset colleague 
about the need for more magistrates in the populous Divisions 
of Hartcliffe, Bedminster, and Portbury, where three of the 
parishes (Bedminster, Nailsea, and St.Georges) totalled nearly
15.000 people. In 1822 the case of Bedminster with its almost
8.000 people was presented again, and in response two names 
from the parish were in 1824 added to the Commission by Cold 
Seal. In the mid-1820s the growing problems of the Keynsham 
Division led to pressure on an unwilling clergyman to allow his 
name to go forward, despite the decline in the status of the 
magistracy likely to result from his plea that with a large 
family and a small house he had 'not the least room to receive 
common people on business'. The help of resident clergymen was 
also sought in 1825 to relieve the problems of the parish of 
St.Georges or Easton-in-Gordano, which included the piloting 
haven of Pill. Here the difficulties presented by a population 
of 3,000 with access to fourteen public houses were exacerbated 
by the fact that the many seafarers could escape punishment by 
taking to the Bristol Channel
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iv Conclusion
It has been argued in this survey that north Somerset 
constitutes a region worthy of study in its own right by reason 
of its geographical features, historical circumstance, and 
economic cohesion. From the days of its early settlement the 
features which were to help shape its future development were 
already in place, namely its agricultural advantages, mineral 
reserves, and proximity to a great port. By the mid-eighteenth 
century it was the most important third of a rich and populous 
county, and was thus well-placed to take part in the changes 
characterized as the industrial revolution. Its growing 
population was employed in agriculture, mining, small-scale 
manufacture, and urban occupations. This pattern was modified 
in response to changing economic circumstances, especially 
those relating to the decline of the cloth industry, the growth 
of coalmining, the changing fortunes of trade, and the 
development of Bristol and Bath whose influence spread into 
surrounding parishes. Upland enclosure and lowland drainage 
opened up new areas for farming and habitation and led to 
significant changes in the old settlement patterns. The capital 
investment underlying these changes will be investigated later, 
as will be the likely reasons for the failure of the economy of 
the region to develop in the way its background and advantages 
would seem to suggest.
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Chapter 3 The Social Structure and Stability of North Somerset
An analysis of the social structure and stability of north 
Somerset is particularly relevant to the study of investment, 
since it has a bearing on both the capacity of society to 
respond to economic stimuli and the sources of capital. A more 
detailed classification is outlined later (p.291), but as a 
starting point a simple distinction may be made between 
’gentlemen1 of wealth able to sustain themselves without 
labour, composed of the nobility and landed and urban gentry; 
those of ’middling status’ including the wealthy farmers in the 
countryside and the merchants, tradesmen, and professionals in 
the towns; and the ’lower orders’, sustained by their own 
labour but subject always to the threat of unemployment and 
poverty. Although much depends on the system of classification 
adopted, it may be said that the first group was the smallest 
and most select at probably less than 2 per cent of the whole 
in this period, whilst the last was the largest, rising on 
Stephen Pole's estimate in his study of crime and society, from 
under 50 per cent in Somerset in the mid-eighteenth century to 
nearly 70 per cent at its end^. The size of the middle group 
may be judged in relation to the other two.
None of the histories of Somerset contains a comprehensive 
account of the social structure of the county, so information 
on this matter has had to be sought from sources not hitherto 
used for this purpose. In particular material has been gathered
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from the fourteen Commissions of the Peace for Somerset for the 
period from the middle decades of the eighteenth century until 
1830^. These contain nearly 4,500 names which, from their 
cumulative nature, have been reduced to a register of about 
1,500. Less than 40 per cent of those named took the qualifying 
oath, and the level of subsequent activity then varied 
greatly^. For the present purpose however the degree of 
participation is immaterial, as the aim of the register is to 
discover the men of substance in the county, those able to meet 
a strict and jealously guarded property qualification who would 
thus have had the means to contribute to the development of the 
economy in this period^. This chronological coverage has been 
supplemented by material from the county history published by 
Collinson in the mid-1790s and amended by Richard Locke some 
fifteen years later. These volumes intersect with the 
chronological sequence at the vital period around the turn of 
the century, and provide detailed information which establishes 
the past history of individuals and their families on the basis 
of landownership within the parishes'*.
This evidence might seem to provide a deficient base, but a
determined probing of the material allows much more to be 
revealed than is at first apparent. Although presented as a 
long recital of names, each Commission was in fact composed of
two parts, an honorary list of national dignitaries, and an
effective list of Somerset worthies. The former included royal 
dukes, Privy Councillors, law officers, and premier bishops,
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inserted under the Lord Chancellor's Fiat. These were common to 
all counties, but a reminder to the Somerset Clerk of the Peace 
from the Lord Chancellor's office in 1820, that the list to be 
submitted should include 'such peers and persons of rank as are 
of the county', shows the importance attached to the 
territorial base of these dignitaries . Including younger sons, 
about twenty such persons are usually to be found listed, a 
number which changed so little over the years that it may show 
some decline in Somerset's standing, for as the honorary list 
grew in the period studied from under 100 to more than 200, so 
the relative importance of the county contingent within it 
declined. A few of the active justices were dignitaries, but 
most came from the effective part of the list. They included: 
baronets; gentry; senior professional men (doctors of medicine, 
lawyers, churchmen, and serving and retired officers); and 
increasingly, parish clergy.
Despite the attractions of Somerset only one noble family 
resided on large estates there. These were the Pouletts of 
Hinton St.George near Crewkerne in the south of the county, and 
they had held this solitary eminence since being created baron 
in 1627^. On a national scale their landed interests were not 
great, but they had proved adept at making rewarding marriages 
and had moved from simple beginnings in Pawlet near Bridgwater, 
first to Ken Court in the northwest of the county (where land 
was held in the parishes of Kenn,Yatton, and Walton-in-Gordano) 
and then to their main seat at Hinton. Royal service was
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rewarded by an earldom in 1706°, but thereafter the Pouletts 
chose to discharge their duties in Somerset rather than London. 
After succeeding to the title in 1743 the second Earl became 
Lord Lieutenant of Somerset and Custos Rotularum, fulfilling 
this dual role of supervising the militia and acting as 
principal justice of the peace for twenty years from 1744 to 
1764. Between 1792 and 1819 these offices were held for twenty 
seven years by his descendant, the fourth Earl Poulett^.
The pride of long-established rank and place felt by such a 
family can be seen in a letter from the second Earl Poulett to 
the Lord Chancellor a few months before the Commission of 1749 
was issued. William Pulteney, who had been created Earl of 
Bath only five years earlier, and whose estates in north 
Somerset (in Bathwick, Burrington, Wrington, and Ubley) had 
been purchased as recently as 1726, was now urging the speedy 
issue of a new Commission as there was ’such a want of Justices 
of the Peace in these parts of the County of Somerset where my 
estates lie'. Lord Poulett affected to find this the panic talk 
of an arriviste, commenting that 'I find nobody very impatient 
about it, but my Lord Bath who is but a newcomer and hardly an 
Inhabitant here'^.
Between the stints undertaken by the Pouletts there were two 
office holders whose county credentials were based on the 
lottery of distant kinship and marriage, and whose names there­
fore reveal the lack of eminent resident peers of whom the most
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notable absentees were the Seymours, Dukes of Somerset. Their 
wayward family history may have ruled them out of consideration 
and they made their home at Monkton Farleigh in Wiltshire, 
playing little part in the life of the county sharing their 
name. However between 1764 and 1774 the Earl of Thomond held 
office. Born a Wyndham of that old county family, he had 
inherited an Irish peerage through remote kinship and distant 
marriage. His successor as Lord Lieutenant and Custos in the 
years 1774 to 1792 was Frederick Lord North, second Earl of 
Guildford and Tory Prime Minister, whose links with Somerset 
were forged by his marriage in 1756 to the heiress Anne Speke 
of Dillington House. She had inherited this estate in 1753 on 
the death of her father, a landowner of wealth and influence, 
who had been active in county politics for nearly half a 
century, sitting most recently for the borough of Wells between 
1735 and 1747. The landed base he had built up did not however 
survive intact the change of ownership for the influence of the 
estate was diminished by sales such as that of the manor of 
Ashill to Robert Bryant of Ilminster, who long served as clerk 
of the peace for the county until his death in 1804. This 
suggests that although an illustrious marriage may bring a 
distinguished newcomer into a county community, the estates 
thus acquired were likely to be sold if they remained marginal 
to the interests of the new owner^. The last office holder for 
the period under review was Thomas Thynne, second Marquis of 
Bath, who held office from 1819 to 1837 despite living at 
Longleat in Wiltshire. However he had lands in north Somerset,
- 87 -
around Frome in the east and Backwell and Cheddar in the west 
of the region, and so his residence outside the county was 
overlooked as it had been earlier for an ancestor permitted to 
live at Longleat whilst sheriff, 1629-30^.
This survey does not exhaust the list of peers with lands in 
Somerset, but none of these upsets the generalization that the 
Pouletts were the only substantial resident peers. Perhaps the 
most notable non-resident in the early eighteenth century was 
the Duke of Chandos who undertook industrial developments in 
Bridgwater and housing schemes in Bath. His estates in north 
Somerset were very varied, encompassing for example: Twerton, 
soon to become a suburb of Bath; Saltford, an industrial centre 
on the Avon Navigation between Bath and Bristol; and the 
farming parishes of Compton Martin and Rodney Stoke on the 
northern and southern flanks of Mendip respectively. These 
properties had come to the Brydges in the mid-seventeenth 
century by marriage to a co-heiress of the Rodneys, five of 
whose sons had died without issue. After this demographic 
disaster which deprived Somerset of one of its richest 
families, the Chandos1 were themselves reduced to one heiress, 
who in 1796 married the Marquess of Buckingham. In 1799 he was 
created Earl Temple of Stowe and this title passed by the 
female line to a daughter who married William Gore Langton esq. 
of Newton Park near Bath. An element of the Rodney inheritance 
thus came to be associated once more with north Somerset, and 
with a family active in its political and economic life .
- 88 -
In the period under review there were three notable non­
residents who were important to the economy of north Somerset, 
for what they took out rather than what they put in to it. The 
Earls Waldegrave who possessed the lead-rich manor of Chewton 
and the coal mining parish of Radstock had been granted their 
main estate in the mid-sixteenth century, and acquired others 
by purchase and marriage, but apart from a brief period in the 
1820s when the Hon.William lived at Harptree Court (and was an 
active justice, qualifying in 1822), no member of the family 
lived in the region until the ninth Earl took up residence at 
Chewton Priory in 1898^. On a lesser scale there was a steady 
leaching away of coal mining profits from north Somerset 
through the ownership of the manor of Clutton by the Earls of 
Warwick, a property which had probably come to them through an 
early eighteenth century marriage of the then Lord Brooke to a 
daughter of the Thynnes .But the biggest diversion of property 
and income away from the county came with the annexation by the 
Crown of the lands of the Gournays following an attainder for 
participation in the murder of Edward II. These estates were 
chiefly in north Somerset,and were controlled by the Duchy of 
Cornwall for the Prince of Wales, perhaps the greatest of the 
absentee landlords .
It seems fair to conclude that in these years there was in 
Somerset little exercise of that strong leadership of an 
economic and political character by the peerage or nobility to 
be found in some other counties^. This was especially true of
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north Somerset for the Pouletts who came closest to fulfilling
this role lived in the south of the county. The neighbouring
county of Gloucestershire in contrast (with whom north Somerset
shared a common river boundary and interest in Bristol), was
dominated by three great families, the Berkeleys, Beauforts,
and Bathursts, whose powers were underpinned strongly by the
1 ftinfluence of others such as the Ducies and the Tracies . These 
families set the agenda for life in the county in a way which 
was unknown in Somerset, where influence was therefore 
necessarily dispersed amongst a large and active body of 
gentlemen of lesser status.
In order to discover more about these men and their place in 
the social structure of Somerset it is necessary to look at the 
effective parts of the Commissions of the Peace, where numbers 
rose from almost 200 in 1749 to over 300 in 1830, though with a 
sharp fluctuation upwards to about 500 in the first two 
difficult decades of the nineteenth century. Within these 
totals the arrangement of names shows a strong sense of status. 
Baronets always came first, followed by knights. Together these 
made about 6.5 per cent of the whole in 1749 as in 1830, though 
this proportion dropped to 4 per cent at the turn of the 
century. Doctors of divinity, law, and medicine, usually 
followed, rising from 1.5 per cent of the whole in 1749 to 5.6 
per cent in 1814 before falling to 4.5 per cent in 1830. 
Esquires came next, the gentry, providing the bulk of the 
names. But though numbers rose from 175 in 1749 to 206 in 1830,
- 90 -
their proportion within the Commissions fell steadily over that 
time from nearly 90 per cent to just over 60 per cent. 
Compensation came from the clergy, placed last in order of 
precedence in all the lists but rising in proportion from 4 per 
cent to 27 per cent.
Within each separate group there was the same sense of status. 
Until 1775 new names were added to the end of each section so 
the lists showed length of standing in the community, but were 
an alphabetical jungle. Then the names of the gentry and clergy 
were subdivided by letter, but the order of seniority was still 
observed within each, so that for example when John Acland 
joined four other members of his family on the Bench his name 
appeared at the end of the fA's, with other newcomers. It was 
common for the gentry to serve alongside relatives in this way. 
Fathers or uncles would write letters of recommendation to the 
Custos, as did Wyndham Goodden in 1820, a barrister living in 
Bath who served as a Commissioner on the Axe Drainage. He 
recommended his three sons, only one of whom was appointed that 
year because it was found the others were not of age^. The 
sense of cohesion generated by serving alongside relatives was 
matched by the capacity of these families for self-renewal.
When main lines failed, estates often passed by marriage or 
kinship into the hands of distant lines or connections by 
marriage, able to maintain family continuity. These shifts of 
fortune were signalled by a change or modification of name. In 
north Somerset for example, a marriage alliance between the
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Gore and Langton families led to the permanent harnessing of 
these names^, although one between the Coxes and the 
Hippisleys led eventually to the dropping of the former . A 
name changed to secure an inheritance can also mislead as when 
John Smith of Combe Hay who had qualified as a justice in 1759, 
became John Leigh of the same and qualified under his new name 
in 180322.
Behind these and similar manoeuvres in Somerset lay the wish 
to secure and extend landed interests, essential for status in 
the county. Membership of the Commission of the Peace signalled
an achievement beyond the reach of those unable to meet certain
requirements. Under the Justices Qualification Act of 1744/5 
estates had to have a yearly value of £100 clear of all
o o
incumbrances, a figure reviewed over the years . A letter of 
1820 from William Adair (a barrister consulted by one of the 
gunpowder companies about storage in Bristol), shows how a 
family might help meet this qualification. He recommended his 
son for inclusion in the new Commission on the grounds that 
although he had quit the legal profession through ill-health, 
this training left him ’better qualified to act as a Magistrate
than Country Gentlemen in general are1. He had 'lately
purchased a Freehold Estate in the County1, the yearly value of 
which he did not exactly know but, he added, ’if not sufficient 
to qualify Him as to Property,I will make up the deficiency'^ . 
Father and son were both named in the ensuing Commission.
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The steadily increasing number of clergymen included has 
been mentioned, and from the turn of the century they made up 
at least one quarter of the effective list. They were accept­
able because they helped provide resident supervision of the 
growing population, especially in north Somerset. But standards 
had to be maintained, and a clergyman holding the living of 
East Harptree was rejected in 1814 with the terse comment,
o c
'Vicarage, no other ppty' . Doubts were stilled in one case by 
the news that a rectory of Emmanuel College was probably worth 
£1000 per annum, though not all such livings were so well
O  fL
provided . The financial stringency experienced by some is 
revealed by Thomas Brown Simpson of Brislington near Bristol, 
vicar of Keynsham and Congresbury. He wrote in 1814 that he was 
likely to part with his small freehold estate in Keynsham, 
'finding the public funds a much more convenient source of 
income to a clergyman'. However should it be thought 'expedient 
under the circumstances to nominate me, I acquiesce’. The 
appearance of his name in the Commission of that year suggests 
that the needs of north Somerset were great enough for this
o 7
deficiency to be overlooked .
But if property already declared on oath was sold, the 
qualification was nullified. In 1814 Captain Lorraine Baker put 
Chewton Priory (later the home of the Waldegrave family) up for 
sale, and his sponsor Mr.W Dickinson said had he known he would 
not have recommended him for the Commission that year. 
Bankruptcy produced even greater disapproval.In notes preceding
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the Commission of 1820 it was observed that three justices had 
become bankrupt, and all were removed from the list. They were 
Edward Wright Band, and Matthew and John Brickdale esquires, 
all from important commercial families in Bristol and north 
Somerset, who had provided the region with members of 
parliament, sheriffs, commissioners of sewers, and turnpike 
trustees. Their financial ruin spelled an end to public works
o o
and the status and opportunities this conferred .
Justices were often consulted about the property 
qualifications of prospective colleagues, as in 1819 when 
Edward Strachey of Ashwick Grove near Shepton Mallet was 
dismissed as 'An East Indian. His property is merely a House 
and a few Acres of land - an intelligent Man*. He did not find 
favour with the Custos^. jn 1814 John Fisher esq. of Langford 
near Bristol replied to an enquiry, that Mr Croft and Mr Roworth 
were both well-qualified in location and property, being 
independent gentlemen living on their estates valued at about 
£3,000 and £1,500 per annum, respectively. He was careful to 
add that they practised no business or trade, an important 
qualification since active participation in either could spell 
ineligibility for the Bench. In response to an enquiry about 
Thomas Hassell in 1823 for example, Sir Abraham Elton said he 
had 'made his fortune in a wholesale trade of some respect­
ability in Bristol, although an inhabitant of many years 
standing in the parish of Bedminster'. He went on, 'the trade I 
am given to understand he is willing to decline, and thereby
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put himself out of the reach of bankruptcy if that is the only 
objection to his being in the Commission of the peace...My own 
opinion is, that he is a man of capacity & fully equal, if not 
superior to more than one Justice known to you and me*. Robert 
Phippen of Badgworth House near Axbridge, a grazier, had posed 
a similar problem in 1814, but after much correspondence his 
patron Mr W.Dickinson was able to confirm that he had taken 
steps towards retirement from business .
The case of Samuel Birch whose business and banking career 
ended under a cloud, illustrates the hazard of mixing such 
concerns with the administration of justice. Criticism was 
muted by the service he had rendered, but it was noted in 1824 
that this 'most excellent Magistrate has been unfortunate in 
life & has retired to Cheddar & does not interfere in the 
Affairs of the Public1. Samuel Birch had qualified for the 
magistracy in 1814 through the properties in Cheddar to which 
he later retired, and in securing which he had changed his name 
from New. But his business interests were centred in Bristol 
where this West Indian trader was managing partner of the Miles 
Bank from 1794 to 1808 and founding partner of the bank of 
Birch, Pitt and Company from 1808 until 1819. This firm had 
connections with a brass manufactory that ceased production in 
1820, and this may have been the source of his misfortunes^.
Another banker who became a justice in 1814 was John Charles 
Tuffnell of the Bladud Bank in Bath, marking a trend which made
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John Acland (chairman of the magistrates from 1804 until that
year) fearful that the independence of the Commission was being
compromised by such nominations. He noted that contrary to Lord
Poulett's principles many had been 'admitted to the Magistracy
during the Exercise of their professional Employments'. As if
to counteract this tendency he in turn nominated several 'fit
and proper Gentlemen', including Robert Freeke Gould of
Minehead, a clergyman brother of Lady Strafford, with an estate
of £500 independent of his living. The contrast between these
two nominees may exemplify a developing difference of attitude
between the northern third of the county, anxious to enrol
professional and business men as magistrates, and the rest of
Somerset which still clung to the idea of the independent
country gentleman. Time was on the side of the former,
especially as Mr Tuffnell was supported by both Wm.Dickinson,
county M.P.from 1806 to the 1830s, and George Edward Allen of
Bathampton, county sheriff in 1814, although in 1815 another
banker suffered rejection, despite being nominated by the
Bishop of Bath and Wells . He was Daniel Payne of the Wells
32-
Bank in that place and the Bladud Bank in Bath.
Attorneys were similarly unwelcome. In 1814 Robert Uttermare 
of Langport slipped into the Commission, but when this was 
discovered Lord Poulett took the view that he could not be both 
an attorney and a justice and wrote 'The name must be taken 
from the List of Attorneys'. The advice to Uttermare from 
Lincoln's Inn was that provided he did not take out a
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certificate entitling him to practise in the coming year he 
would be eligible to act as a justice. Lord Poulett remained 
adamant and Uttermare's name was removed from the Roll of 
Attorneys. He then served as a 'very useful magistrate1 until 
his death in 1824 when steps were taken to secure the services 
of his son. He was far more conventionally attractive to the 
Bench, for he was 'a young man of large fortune, educated at 
Cambridge, where he showed more than usual ability and 
application1. He was nominated and qualified in 1824^.
These strictures against the inclusion of still-active 
entrepreneurs and professional men in the Commissions did not 
apply to the main boroughs of Somerset, where justice was 
administered independently of the county. In north Somerset 
members of the corporations of Bath, Axbridge, and Wells served 
in this office by turn, so the duty was there performed by 
merchants, tradesmen, and professionals of middling status. The 
fact that some Somerset justices lived in these same boroughs, 
creating there a distinct class of magistrates who were 'urban 
gentry', must have made for difficult relations between town 
and county. In Bath in 1818 for example the city justices sat 
daily in the Guildhall, on a Bench drawn from ten active 
magistrates chaired by the mayor, whilst county justices acting 
for the division of Bath Forum (around Bath but excluding it), 
met at the same place every Tuesday under the retired county 
chairman now Sir John Acland. He could call on twenty nine 
active justices whose ranks included baronets, landowners, and
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eminent clergymen. Of the thirty, two-thirds including Sir John 
resided in Bath, despite their interests beyond the city^. 
There was little overlap between the groups, and in 1818 only 
four magistrates were active in both .
The administration of justice in Bristol was similarly 
separate from that in Gloucestershire, but unlike the Somerset 
boroughs a significant number of the ’middling sort’ of the 
city also served in county Commissions of the Peace. This may 
reveal both the greater riches and social standing of the 
merchants and professional men of Bristol in the eighteenth 
century, and the earlier familiarity with and acceptance of 
wealth from trade in Gloucestershire, where landowners and 
clothiers had long sat on the Bench together^. The 
acceptability of justices of lesser social standing may also 
have been a matter of political expediency. Correspondence 
about the Commission in 1750 referred to the need to retain the 
strength of the Whig element within it, and to this end thirty 
five names were submitted to Lord Berkeley, Lord Lieutenant and
*37
head of the Whig interest in the county '. The fact that almost 
half those named were Bristol merchants and professional men is 
a measure of the importance of the Whigs in that city.
In Somerset, political life was made more complicated by an 
attachment to losing causes, such as those of Monmouth and the 
Jacobites. The leading politician Sir William Wyndham was 
several times entangled with the latter before his death in
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1740, and in the first half of the century local Tory gentlemen 
were usually returned unopposed to the Commons, but the tide 
began to turn when the former Tory leader Lord Poulett went 
over to the Government, Nine of the Bristol Whigs named in the 
1750 Gloucestershire list had by 1775 been included in Somerset
o o
Commissions^ , possibly for political reasons, although as 
noted earlier, some Bristolians were by the end of the century 
becoming Somerset justices because of the need to cope with the 
rising population in the southern suburbs of the city. Whether 
for practical or political motives, this recruitment had the 
effect of further infusing the Somerset Commissions with men of 
entrepreneurial spirit who had built up their fortunes through 
enterprise, and who met the qualifications by purchase of 
property rather than inheritance. They formed a more promising 
source of investment capital than the traditional gentry of 
Somerset, although as will be seen not all of the latter can be 
ruled out in this matter as clearly as can the nobility.
Evidence on both the upper and middle groups is deficient, 
but less seriously so than for the 1lower orders', most of whom 
retain their anonymity. A few, perhaps small coal masters, rose 
from below and are known by name. Others enter the records only 
by infringements of the law, either as individuals, for example 
hard-drinking Mendip miners, or as groups, usually rioters. 
Although unlikely to provide a source of evidence on investment 
finance, these instances can be very revealing about the 
economy of the region. For example from the second half of the
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sixteenth century food from Somerset especially grain was 
supplied to Bristol, the surrounding counties, Ireland, and the 
army, but in times of scarcity such markets were held to 
worsen conditions in the county, and riots erupted. Fury was 
often focussed on badgers or corn traders, six of whom were 
shown in Returns of 1623 to be based in Hartcliffe and 
Bedminster for the supply of Bristol. These Returns also 
revealed a shortage of grain in the Frome Hundred, where many 
workers were employed in cloth making rather than agriculture. 
Trade depressions in the mid-seventeenth century led to rioting 
in the textile areas of the Somerset/ Wiltshire border as 
hungry mobs saw grain carried to Bristol^*
From the early decades of the eighteenth century the 
problems of these landless workers were brought into even 
sharper focus by the activities of the coal miners of 
Kingswood, on the north Somerset border. In 1709 they marched 
on Bristol to secure lower grain prices, reinforcing this 
intimidation over the years by rifling ships bound for Ireland, 
exacting protection money from villagers, and taking part in 
food riots. Their reputation was so great that in 1726/7 the 
Wiltshire weavers called for their help in an industrial 
dispute and in 1738 they fought their own battle against wage 
reductions. But it was with their violent opposition to the 
introduction of turnpike tolls on the Bristol roads in 1727, 
which they feared would limit their freedom to sell coal in 
that city, that their protests can be seen to be aimed not only
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at the subsistence struggle but also at the changing economic 
order itself. It might have been thought that the gentry would 
be united in their desire to quell this rebelliousness, but 
this may not have been so. Describing an attack by 400 colliers 
on Dyrham Park, home of William Blathwaite, a Somerset justice 
and defender of the turnpikes, his neighbour Sir William 
Codrington observed in 1731 that '...these wretches would never 
have been so impudent if they had not been prompted by men of 
some fortune and figure'. And in 1749 when the Bristol turnpike 
gates were again destroyed, by mobs with farming as well as 
mining interests, the attitude of the gentry was said to have 
increased the difficulties. Underlying these sympathies was an 
attachment to the old order, seen in Dr.Johnson's words copied 
into Mr.Wyndham’s diary over thirty years later, that 'by 
furnishing a market to each man's abilities, and destroying the 
dependence of one man on another', the new roads disrupted 
families and disunited society^. Perhaps exemplifying this 
distrust of the new world was the concern expressed at the 
forced embarkation for America in 1756 of the Somerset militia, 
previously only a force to defend the county^.
Whether the unrest in north Somerset in the middle decades 
of the eighteenth century was a lament for a passing 'moral 
economy' or a protest at the failure of the market structures 
replacing it, cannot be explored further here, but it serves to
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complete this picture of the social structure of the region. 
There was some dissent and disorder, but not enough to generate 
the uncertainty which might have inhibited economic change. It 
was in any case contained by justices drawn largely from the 
gentry and clergy, whose homes were widely distributed within 
the region (with the exception of the sparsely-populated 
Mendips and Levels), and by the burgesses in towns. Their power 
and position was enhanced by the almost complete absence of 
great noble families able to exert a strong influence for good 
or ill. This may seem an unlikely context in which to seek the 
dynamism needed to transform a traditional society into an 
entrepreneurial one, but as will be seen part of this impetus 
came from those gentry and townspeople within the region who 
saw the advantages of combining the pursuit of private profit 
with the performance of public service. Two further factors 
still to be explored are the proximity of Bristol which made 
this region more open to change than would otherwise have been 
the case, and enabled links to be forged between the 
entrepreneurs and economies of the two, and the presence of 
large bodies of professionals, especially lawyers and bankers, 
able to facilitate and promote economic change.
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Chapter 4- Interactions between North Somerset and Bristol
Bristol and north Somerset are close in terms of location, 
but the extent to which they were linked beyond the level of 
mere proximity, and the pattern which this relationship assumed 
at different times, has received little historical study. The 
traditional economy of the well-populated northern third of the 
county has already been outlined, with its wealth based on the 
long practice of agriculture; wool textile manufacture; and the 
mining of lead, calamine, and coal. Bristol in contrast owed 
its importance to the growth of commercial enterprise in the 
Middle Ages, before which it had been only a small settlement 
by the crossing of the Avon with neither Roman ancestry nor 
early ecclesiastical or administrative prominence'*'. It thrived 
instead on its natural endowment, which provided harbour 
facilities adequate for the ships of the time, and access by 
the River Avon to the Severn estuary, Bristol Channel, and 
western seas. Its rapidly increasing population was engaged 
successfully in regional trade and overseas enterprise. But 
these basic factors alone would not have produced the growth 
which led to Bristol outdistancing such early rivals as 
Southampton and Boston. For that, interaction with a close and 
active hinterland was required such as Bristol possessed 
especially in relation to north Somerset.
The importance of Bristol as a regional metropolis began in 
mediaeval times, with the city acting 'as entrepot and centre
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of distribution for a wide area ranging from the far west of 
England to the upper Severn basin and from Wiltshire to South 
Wales'. Into the port came goods from the region such as wool, 
hides, timber, and coal from Wales, and tin and fish from Corn­
wall, as well as imports such as wine from Gascony. These were 
consumed locally or sent out on inland or coastal trade routes 
together with the products of Bristol's own industries such as
o
soap and leather goods. Fine cloth was exported .
For the eighteenth century the developing pattern of 
Bristol's overseas commerce was shown by Walter Minchinton to 
depend on the continuing significance of the Irish and Spanish 
trades, the important though fluctuating Virginia and Africa 
trades, and the development of West Indian trade. It was the 
last with which Bristol's eighteenth century prosperity was 
mainly associated, with sugar the most important commodity, 
backed up by imports of rum and tobacco, and with the slave 
trade underlying the whole system. This concentration on one 
area of commerce proved dangerous in the long run, as other 
trades came to grow more rapidly. In the eighteenth century 
however, imports from the West Indies sustained such Bristol 
industries as sugar refining, distilling, and tobacco 
processing; and the demands of this and other markets promoted 
the growing manufacture of glass, brass, copper, iron, and
o
pottery goods, and brick making .
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Regional trade at this time depended in part on agricultural 
specialization. Barley, oats, and butter came from west Wales 
for example, and cheese from Cheshire, cider and perry from 
Devonshire and Hertfordshire, and vegetables from the Vales of 
Evesham and Glamorgan. Potatoes from south Gloucestershire were 
increasingly important in the eighteenth century. Industrial 
raw materials were also a significant part of the entrepot 
trade, and they included shipbuilding timber from the Forest of 
Dean and the Baltic; tin from Cornwall for works in South Wales 
or the Midlands; and both wool from South Wales and teazles 
from Somerset for the Cotswold woollen industry. For Bristol's 
own industries came copper from Anglesey; wood ashes and kelp 
for soap making from Somerset ports; and clay from Stourbridge 
for glass making. Despite the availability of coal from 
Kingswood, supplies from South Wales came increasingly into 
Bristol^. The city's success as a distribution centre depended 
on access to transport facilities, neatly summarized by a mid­
eighteenth century observer who noted that 'By the Severn and 
the Wye, the Inhabitants of this City have almost the whole 
Trade of South Wales; and by land-carriage they send goods to 
Exeter, Bath, Wells, Froome, and all the principal Townes from 
Southampton to the Banks of the Trent'-*.
Bristol's importance as a regional metropolis has thus been 
long recognized, but there are two disadvantages to these 
accounts. First, in establishing the extensive nature of its 
trading and commercial influence, the more intensive nature of
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Bristol's links with its immediate hinterland have been 
neglected. This deficiency can only be partly remedied by the 
present study, for this has north Somerset rather than the port 
as its focus, and the role of south Gloucestershire must be 
left for future research. Second, earlier accounts have 
concentrated on the distribution of food and raw materials, and 
of imported and locally produced goods, almost to the exclusion 
of other forms of interaction. These include the movements of 
people between the two, and also of investment capital and 
expertise. It is true that Minchinton draws attention to the 
importance of Bristol as a source of capital for metal and 
mining enterprises from the early eighteenth century, but his 
heavy reliance on the work of A.H.John on South Wales leads to 
the prejudiced conclusion that 'Outside south Wales Bristol 
investment was slight and scattered'. This shows an 
unfamiliarity with developments in north Somerset that is 
especially serious in relation to industries like gunpowder 
making which, although located at several rural sites^were 
dependent on the commercial and financial facilities of the 
port. Bristol's banks are treated in a similarly perfunctory 
manner, with attention paid to the connections with South Wales 
rather than those with the nearby hinterland .
However a close relationship between Bristol and north 
Somerset had been established early, on the basis of their 
specialized but complementary functions. Steps taken towards 
the growth of a money economy on some Somerset manors of the
- 1 1 0 -
thirteenth century permitted the purchase of luxuries such as 
wine, wax, silk, and fine cloth from Bristol, with funds raised 
by the sale of corn, cattle, sheep, and later of wool. From the 
fourteenth century young cattle were purchased at large markets 
in Bristol for re-sale there after grazing on Somerset's rich 
pastures, and as beasts on the hoof were increasingly brought 
ashore from South Wales at places like Uphill, they too were 
fattened locally before being sold in urban markets. The sale 
of corn to Bristol was also a regular part of the commerce 
between port and hinterland, though it has been seen that this 
practice caused great resentment in times of scarcity. This 
inland trade was subject to regulations, and badgers' licences 
in the order books of the Somerset Quarter Sessions show that 
Bristol was a valuable market for butter and cheese as well as 
corn. Grain was exported to Ireland through Bristol, by 
licence,and from the early eighteenth century ships in the 
Africa trade were provisioned with peas and beans grown in the 
region. Proximity to Bristol's growing urban market also 
encouraged the development of dairying and market gardening in 
parishes such as Long Ashton, from which fresh goods could be 
transported to the city
Bristol was an important market for labour as well as goods. 
Registers of the mid-seventeenth century for apprentices in the 
city and for indentured 'Servants to foreign plantations', show 
that more than 75 per cent of the former and 60 per cent of the 
latter came from withAta 40 miles radius of Bristol, with
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Somerset as the most important source of servants beyond that 
limit. It is David Souden's view that although for reasons of 
age-, sex-, and status-bias, apprentice migration may not have 
been representative of the general pattern, the movement of 
indentured servants into Bristol en route to the New World did 
reveal the general trend. And this shows that migrants from 
Somerset came particularly from the northern third, from 
pastoral settlements in the forest of Selwood on the eastern 
border, and from clothworking towns like Frome, Bath, and 
Wells. These moves were based less on population pressure than 
the need to seek opportunities away from marginal wood and
o
pasture land, and depressed trades .
Over 10,000 men and women passed through Bristol to the New 
World in the third quarter of the seventeenth century, but many 
others stayed and contributed to its growing size and economy. 
Souden speculates that the doubling of Bristol's population 
over two centuries to reach about 20,000 in 1700, may be due 
almost entirely to net immigration, given the prevailing levels 
of urban mortality. An important number of these migrants were 
women, whose movement into towns like Bristol was a response to 
the growing employment opportunities to be found in domestic 
work, inns, and shops, which reflected the increasing affluence 
of the city, especially amongst the households of its merchant 
and professional men. In general women found work through 
family links, but village, trade, and even county connections 
were important to all migrants. Like most leading cities
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Bristol had several well-established county societies, meeting 
convivially to help incomers. Substantial funds were raised for 
apprenticeship schemes, relief of the poor and the support of 
women in childbirth^. In 1776 Richard Hippisley Coxe of Ston 
Easton, county M.P.from 1768 to 1784, was President of the 
Society of Somerset Gentlemen in Bristol^.
W.K.Jordan's studies of charitable giving in the sixteenth 
and seventeenth centuries have been much criticised-^, but his 
account of the situation in Bristol and Somerset is useful 
because it provides further evidence of connections between the 
two. Some of the Bristol donors came originally from the county 
and made bequests to the parish of their birth. Others who were 
not necessarily born in Somerset purchased estates there to 
provide an endowment for Bristol charities. An example of the 
former is the merchant Thomas Jones of Stowey some eight miles 
south of Bristol, where his family were lords of the manor 
until the end of the eighteenth century. In the 1620s he 
established a fund valued at £380, arranging that the mayor and 
aldermen of Bristol should use the capital to finance loans to 
needy young men pursuing a lawful trade, and the annual income 
to provide gifts for the poor and quarterly sermons in Stowey 
church^. John Whitson who died in 1629 is an example of the 
latter. A native of Gloucestershire this great Bristol merchant 
purchased lands in Somerset including the manor of Burnett near 
Keynsham, which he entrusted to the Corporation of Bristol as 
an endowment for Red Maids' School there .
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The continuing significance of the charitable inclinations
of these and other benefactors is that it placed the
administration of a number of estates in north Somerset in the
hands of Bristol trustees. Not only did the Corporation hold
Burnett for the Red Maids’ School, it also held the manors of
Congresbury and Wick and the living of Stockland for Queen
Elizabeth's Hospital^. From the mid-sixteenth century the
Corporation also began to acquire lands in its own right. In
1616 it purchased the manor of Portishead where it held the
largest estate, inconveniently intermixed with land in Weston-
in-Gordano. The living was in the Corporation’s gift here as in
other cases, for example Kewstoke. The Bishop of Bristol, and
the Dean and Chapter, were patrons of at least another half
dozen livings in north Somerset, thus strengthening these
parochial links^. The Society of Merchant Venturers had vested
in it the properties acquired by Bristol's greatest benfactor,
Edward Colston, who died in 1721. He financed the Bristol
school bearing his name chiefly by settling upon it in 1708 the
manor of Locking near Weston-super-Mare, following its
confiscation after Monmouth's Rebellion. The Hall Books of the
Merchant Venturers show that the Society was concerned with the
enclosure of moorland at Locking in 1800, and with
presentations to the vicarage until this right was auctioned in
1813 for £665. In 1800 this was one of several parishes to whom
1 6donations for the poor were made . The Society owned other 
estates in its own right, for example the manor of Rowberrow on 
western Mendip, important for the extraction of calamine. Their
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interest in north Somerset extended to the construction of a 
church tower on Dundry Hill, and the support of a lighthouse on 
Flat Holme near the mouth of the Avon, as land- and sea-marks 
to help ships avoid danger^.
The exercise of trusteeship and patronage by these 
institutions enhanced the influence of Bristol within north 
Somerset, for it was common for lands to be leased to, and 
livings filled by, those associated with the city. For example 
in the second half of the eighteenth century the manor of 
Rowberrow was leased by William Swymmer and then his son, of 
the prominent Bristol merchant family, active from the end of 
the seventeenth century in the African and sugar trades, office 
holders in the city and Society of Merchant Venturers, and 
Justices of the Peace in Somerset . Samuel Day to whom the 
manor of Burnett was leased in the later eighteenth century 
came from a similar family, with Jamaican and slave trading 
interests^. Rectorial interests were also leased out, those 
in Congresbury having been granted to Samuel Worrall of another 
successful Bristol family, three generations of whom were stamp 
distributors there in the eighteenth century. An attorney by 
profession he was clerk to the Society of Merchant Venturers 
from 1757, and a partner in the Exchange Bank from 1766 until 
his death in 1804^.
It might be thought that the involvement of successful 
Bristol entrepreneurs would have speeded the modernization of
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the type of lease in use by these institutions, but this was 
not so. Sir Abraham Elton of Clevedon Court for example was 
familiar with the city's commercial practices, yet he held a 
traditional Somerset lease for lives on the rectorial manor and 
great tithe of the parish of Portbury from the Bishop of 
Bristol, as did Dr. Dennis Leman with his lease for lives of
the glebe and great tithe of Worle and Kewstoke, of which the
0 1
Corporation was the impropriator . Throughout the period 
studied the major part of the parish of Walton-in-Gordano was 
also held on an old-fashioned lease, again by a Bristol family 
who were no strangers to new practices. These were the Durbins, 
of whom Sir John was both knighted and married in 1761 to an 
heiress with a fortune of £10,000. But a lease for lives was 
the basis on which he held his estate and qualified as a
Somerset justice, in which service he was joined by four other
o o
members of his family in the years studied .These examples of 
men who were capable of negotiating the best deal for them­
selves and their heirs accepting leases for lives, suggests 
there may have been advantages to the lessee, perhaps in terms 
of a greater security of tenure with fewer restrictions, than
9 o
was the case with leases for years .
The close relationship between Bristol and north Somerset 
was further cemented by businessmen of the former acquiring 
estates in the latter, apart from these institutional links.
The Elton family are such a case, commercial magnates who from 
the later decades of the seventeenth century built up a great
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fortune, especially through the manufacture and trade of copper 
and brass ware, glass, and gunpowder. In 1709 an estate was 
purchased from the Earl of Bristol in northwest Somerset, with 
lands in Clevedon, Tickenham, and Failand. A baronetcy came in 
1717. This investment and elevation did not herald a retirement 
from the life of the city, for this or several other merchant 
families who followed a similar course. The fourth baronet was 
town clerk from 1753 to 1786, and it was only with his death in 
1790 that religion and the arts began to be more important than 
business. Even then the work of enclosure, drainage, and trans­
port was not neglected, and the family served with diligence on 
the Bench of their adopted county, fifteen being named in 
Commissions of the Peace over the period studied. And the 
interest of the younger branch in merchanting and manufacturing 
continued to flourish, with an added involvement in banking 
from 1750. Landed and business interests came together when a 
gunpowder mill was built on their estate at Winford^.
The Smyths were close neighbours of the Eltons, Bristol 
merchants who purchased the manor of Long Ashton in 1545 and 
later built their residence there. Other lands in north 
Somerset were also acquired, and a baronetcy was created in 
1661 though the title ended eighty years later through a 
failure of male heirs. A division of the inheritance amongst 
three surviving sisters might have dissipated the fortune, had 
not one of them married Jarrit Smith in 1732, an attorney 
closely involved with mercantile life in Bristol. A baronetcy
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came in 1763, and Sir Jarrit displayed a similar concern for 
business and the land as his Elton contemporaries. But the 
pattern of inheritance was more complicated, for the marriage 
of different heiresses established links with other families 
such as the Costers, closely involved in the copper industry in 
Cornwall and South Wales as well as Bristol and north Somerset; 
the Pigotts, early nineteenth century developers of Weston- 
super-Mare; and the Gores, whose association with the Langton
o c
family has already been noted .
The Dickinsons exhibit the same links, though their web of 
fortune grew from estates in Jamaica acquired in the later 
seventeenth century by a captain whose descendants chose 
Bristol as the appropriate place from which to conduct business 
with the West Indies. They married into the well-established 
Bristol families of Vickris, Prankard, Goldney, Harford, 
Barnard, and Reeves, all of impeccable mercantile credentials. 
The Dickinsons continued to be closely concerned with Bristol 
trade and industry, but also developed business connections 
with London, especially in relation to brass, copper, and 
sugar. A landed estate was purchased by Caleb Dickinson at 
Kingweston twelve miles south of Wells, which was home for 
three generations of Williams born between 1745 and 1820. Locke 
refers with approval to the agricultural improvements carried 
out on this 'maiden manor, so called because the whole of it is 
the property of one individual in demesne, who resides in an 
elegant modern built mansion near the church in the centre of
-118-
the parish*. In 1769 Caleb’s younger brother Vickris purchased 
Queen Charlton manor five miles south east of Bristol. The 
family continued to serve both the region and their business 
interests, in Bristol and London. They developed their estates; 
served on the Bench (six justices in the years studied); and
O £
represented the county in Parliament for thirty five years .
The suggestion that the investment in landed estates in
north Somerset of large fortunes made in Bristol, did not in
this period necessarily lead to a neglect of former business
interests, may be made also of investors on a smaller scale.
For example the purchase of the manors of Chew Stoke and
Butcombe near Wrington by John Savery did not signal his
retirement from the Bristol bank of Savery, Towgood, and Co. of
which he was a partner from 1792 until the business was given
up in 1828. Although living on Kingsdown Parade in the city at
his death in 1830, his home during his active years was at
Butcombe Court on the edge of Broadfield Down. Locke notes that
this was within sight of the turnpike road to Bristol, so that
transport into the city some eight miles distant may have
27presented little problem '. John Robert Lucas provides an 
example of a Bristol manufacturer who not only retained his 
business after acquiring landed property, but went on to 
develop both in harness. He was born in the mid-eighteenth 
century into a family making and exporting glass, for whom he 
at first worked in Bristol. In 1787 he began production in 
north Somerset, first at Stanton Wick near Chew Magna, at a
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concern associated with the Adams family, then in 1788 on a new 
site at Nailsea where he leased five acres of land. In 1816 he 
gave up his links with the former and concentrated on Nailsea. 
As business prospered Lucas first leased a Tudor mansion in 
Wraxall, and then bought a hunting lodge on Broadfield Down 
which he converted into a richly furnished mansion surrounded 
by a large estate. Some land was rented from the Marquess of 
Bath and some was bought, including common land at Nailsea and
o o
Backwell sold to finance enclosure in the 1810s .
The parish of Stanton Drew from which Lucas withdrew offers 
a microcosm of the close relationship between Bristol and north 
Somerset under discussion. The Lyde family, successful Virginia 
and West Africa merchants, purchased an estate here to which to 
retire from the busy life in Bristol. A church monument says of 
James Lyde who died in 1731 that ’He was bred to merchandise in 
the city of Bristol, and followed that employment near thirty 
years with great integrity, reputation and success...he retired 
to his estate in this parish, where he spent the remainder of 
his days in tranquillity of mind and general esteem... Also
in this parish is the manor of Belluton, earlier the home of 
the Becher family of whom Cranfield was part-owner of a Bristol 
privateer in the 1740s, slave trader in the 1750s, and investor 
in gunpowder works in the 1760s and 1770s. He was a frequent 
correspondent of the M.P. William Dickinson who undertook
on
financial transactions for him in London . But by the mid­
eighteenth century Belluton had become the home of the Adams
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family, glassmakers with a Bristol link, and coalmasters whose 
business success was sealed by marriage into the old family of 
Lyde. As they established themselves in the county the Adams 
began to appear in Commissions of the Peace, six being named as
O 1
justices between 1757 and 1820 .
An attempt has now been made to show the closeness of the 
long-standing relationship between Bristol and north Somerset. 
The fact that Stanton Drew is not directly in Bristol's orbit 
but lies between that city and Bath, and that a similar account 
could be given of other parishes such as Woolley which is even 
further distant, to the northeast of the latter, shows how 
widely Bristol's influence extended. And it also ran deep, for 
the examples in this survey are not isolated cases but have 
been drawn from those parishes forming more than 28 per cent of 
the whole in north Somerset, for which there is strong evidence 
of a connection with Bristol through institutional links, 
landownership, or shared commercial ventures. The remaining 
parishes were also linked to Bristol but through the less 
specific ties of the movements of migrants and the exchanges of 
trade. The significance of this link is that it was part of 
and reinforced the trend in north Somerset away from the 
formality and conservatism of the traditional country gentlemen 
towards a recognition of individual spirit and enterprise. 
Bridging this gap were men with impeccable merchanting and
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landowning credentials like Sir Abraham Elton, who was willing 
to defend the Bristol wholesaler deemed unworthy of the Bench, 
as being 'fully equal, if not superior to more than one Justice 
known to you and me1.
But the Bristol link must be placed in perspective, so other 
influences have to be mentioned briefly. Smaller urban centres 
like Bath exerted a power which mirrored that of Bristol, 
though to a much lesser degree. Here were markets for labour, 
food, fuel, and building materials, drawn from rural sources^ 
and wealthy townsfolk found investment opportunities in 
surrounding parishes. Ralph Allen built his great mansion of 
Prior Park looking over Bath but not within its boundaries, and 
purchased land at Claverton and Bathampton which provided him 
with both country estates and raw materials in the form of 
building stone; William Wiltshire crowned his achievements as a 
carrier by buying the estate of Shockerwick and building a fine 
mansion there; and John Hooper of Walcot in that city bought 
the manor of North Stoke from the profits of his work as a 
financial broker, three cases which provide examples covering
09
the whole period studied .
Although most famous as a resort for distant travellers, 
Bath also provided a meeting place for the gentry, merchants, 
and clergy of north Somerset and Bristol. Common concerns could 
be aired, especially in bodies like the Bath and West 
Agricultural Society, founded in 1777 and widely supported as
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its membership lists and journals show . Here progress and 
improvement could be discussed in both an abstract and a 
practical way in a forum attended by the gentry, clergy, men of 
science and medicine, and activists such as John Billingsley of 
Ashwick. This seemingly indefatigable 'improver1 had risen 
from humble dissenting origins to become a clothier, landowner, 
improving farmer, enclosure commissioner, turnpike trustee, and 
canal and coal proprietor, as well as writing the report to the 
Board of Agriculture already mentioned, evidence for all of 
which activities comes from the documents studied, as the later 
chapters will show.
As the seat of a great bishopric and venue for Quarter 
Sessions Wells performed a different function, but it also 
provided a forum where the county could gather and discuss 
issues unconnected with official business. As an institution 
the Church exerted great power through the persons of the 
Bishops of Bath and Wells and the Deans and Chapter of Wells, 
who held the patronage of more than fifty livings in north 
Somerset as well as administering land owned by the Church in 
such parishes as Cheddar and Shipham. Their influence was 
supplemented by that similarly exercised by the Dean and 
Chapter of Winchester, the cathedral of Salisbury, and Oxford 
and Cambridge colleges such as Oriel, Balliol, and Emmanuel. 
Charities like St.John's Hospital in Bath and Sexey's Hospital 
in Brewton were also important institutional landholders in 
north Somerset, as was the Duchy of Cornwall.
- 1 2 3 -
There were thus many influences at play in north Somerset, 
some of a conservative nature, some encouraging improvements, 
but it seems likely that those exerted by Bristol merchants 
were the most important from the point of view of this study, 
because they were the most used to entrepreneurial enterprise 
and the most geared to creating economic change. However the 
progressive influences within north Somerset must not be 
overlooked, for they helped to create the context within which 
capital investment could take place. Before studying more 
closely the sources and employment of capital, the expertise of 
the enabling agents in the legal and banking professions will 
be considered next.
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Chapter 5 The Legal and Banking Professions in North Somerset.
In the period under review, professional men from a number 
of specialisms played an important part in the process of 
capital investment in north Somerset^-. These ranged from the 
clergy and medical men who invested small sums in local 
undertakings and became involved in the administration of 
public bodies like the turnpike trusts and improvement 
commissions, to the surveyors who were closely involved in the 
work of planning and construction which formed such an 
essential part of economic change. In view of the importance of 
this practical contribution a register of surveyors working in 
the region has been drawn up, based largely on lists edited by
o
Peter Eden , supplemented by additional information from 
documents studied. This shows that in the years concerned, 50 
surveyors were at work in north Somerset and 37 in Bristol, 
though to these should be added some of the 109 based in the 
rest of Somerset, who may have worked as much in the northern 
third as in the rest of the county. But even more important 
than these were the attorneys and bankers who acted as enabling 
agents in the process of capital investment, functioning as 
financial intermediaries between the supply of and demand for 
credit and capital, and as advisors and agents to those 
undertaking economic developments. In this last chapter on the 
context of capital investment in north Somerset, the work of 
attorneys and bankers will be examined against the background 
of registers listing those engaged in these professions.
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Attorneys became established in Somerset from an early date 
in response to the legal business generated by its long­
standing wealth, and large population relative to other 
counties. As early as 1422, Somerset men acting for others in
o
the legal sense were described as attorneys . From this 
backgound there had developed by the second half of the 
eighteenth century a body of local attorneys large enough to 
meet the increasing demand for their legal services, and with 
enough professional awareness to form the first and third 
earliest provincial law societies, for Bristol in 1770 and 
Somerset in 1796^. Law Lists are not available for 1770, but 
that for 1777 reveals there were then 35 attorneys in Bristol 
and 32 in north Somerset plus 25 in the rest of the county. By 
1796 there were 73 in Bristol and 70 in north Somerset plus 101 
in the rest of the county^. These figures suggest a doubling or 
more of active lawyers in the busy port and its hinterland in 
the years when the provincial societies were being formed, and 
a quadrupling in the rest of Somerset.
Over the longer period from the 1770s to the 1820s the 
patterns for Bristol and north Somerset continued to be 
similar, suggesting that although in terms of population the 
former was better supplied with attorneys than the latter, if 
seen as an economic indicator the two appear comparable. But 
with a three-fold increase in Bristol and slightly more in 
north Somerset, the divergence from the rest of the county with 
its five and a half-fold rise had become greater. This is in
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part a reflection of a lower provision at the earlier date, but 
it also suggests that in the port and its hinterland the new 
demands for attorneys to act for commercial and manufacturing 
ventures as well as for public bodies and private individuals, 
may have been met by an increasing specialization of function 
rather than a simple increase in numbers. This crucial phase of 
development was captured by W.J.Reader when he observed that 
’Inside the eighteenth century attorney half a dozen later 
professional men - the accountant, the land agent, the company 
secretary, and others - were struggling to get out'^. Amongst 
these, the role of the financial intermediary was particularly 
important because this was the specialism which could nudge the 
attorney into becoming yet another type of new professional, 
the country banker.
The importance of investment channels for bringing together 
the supply of and demand for capital and credit has received 
growing attention since the pioneering work of L .S.Pressnell on 
country banks published in 1956, which traced their development 
through the specialization of financial techniques already 
practised by goldsmiths, industrialists, remitters of funds to 
London, and money scrivenors whose work was absorbed by 
attorneys in the second half of the eighteenth century^. Like 
this study, that by Robert Robson on the attorney in eighteenth 
century England, of 1959, has not been superseded, though it
o
has been complemented by later work . Both B.L.Anderson and 
Michael Miles have studied the developing capital markets of
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the eighteenth century for Merseyside and the West Riding 
respectively, but neither provides a satisfactory account of 
the attorney as a financial intermediary, for both argue from a 
few cases with no assessment of typicality especially in terms 
of the overall size of the profession, and little evidence is 
given of the provision of capital for business rather than 
private purposes. Anderson writes only of the mortgaging of a 
glasshouse 'presumably for the purpose of financing its early 
growth', and although Miles refers to 'money being borrowed for 
direct industrial investment', only one example is produced^.
The first deficiency can be remedied without too much 
difficulty for some information is available on the number and 
distribution of this budding profession. Regulation of entry, 
that mark of a profession, was introduced in 1729 by Act of 
Parliament which decreed that after a five-year apprenticeship 
attorneys were to be examined, take an oath, and be enrolled. 
'Lists of Attornies and Solicitors' presented to the House of 
Commons over the years 1730-31^® form a useful preliminary to 
the Law Lists compiled from the mid-1770s. But the Returns of 
1730-31 must be used with caution because of the problem of 
duplication which is evident when names are sifted to form a 
register. It becomes clear that the basis of compilation 
ensures over-counting, for lawyers could be enrolled separately 
in four Courts: the common law Court of Common Pleas, the 
King's Bench, the Court of Exchequer, and the equity-based
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Court of Chancery. In Bristol and north Somerset this gave rise 
to 226 entries by 114 attorneys in 1730-31.
Once sorted out this confusion is seen to hide a great 
opportunity not provided by the Law Lists, of discovering 
attorneys1 preferred areas of work. The Court of Common Pleas 
for example dealt with all kinds of disputes between citizens, 
and Birks has stated that the Returns of 1730-31 show that the 
majority of attorneys still belonged to it. But although in 
north Somerset 57.1 per cent did so, in Bristol the figure was 
only 15.4 per cent. In contrast 78.5 per cent of Bristol’s 
attorneys were enrolled at the King’s Bench which dealt 
increasingly with matters of commercial law (providing some 
evidence of the specialization already suggested). Yet Birk 
generalizes that numbers here were still ’relatively few’, a 
comment borne out for north Somerset by the lower rate of 28.6 
per cent. Of the other Courts, the Exchequer,formerly confined 
to disputes about royal revenue and now open to all common law 
actions, but unpopular because its proceedings were expensive, 
attracted the low enrolment of 18.4 per cent of north Somerset 
attorneys and 40 per cent of Bristol’s. In contrast 80 per cent 
of attorneys in north Somerset and 73.5 per cent of those in 
Bristol registered in the Court of Chancery, perhaps due partly 
to the new creation in 1729 of the title of solicitor in 
Chancery, and partly to the perception that equity business was 
conducted in a superior way by gentlemen of high ability and
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social standing, a view which led to the gradual appropriation 
of the title solicitor by attorneys^.
Amongst attorneys in north Somerset the most common 
combination in 1730-31 was the Courts of Common Pleas and 
Chancery, though sometimes only the former. James Wickham of 
Frome is an example of the unremarkable men who undertook this 
basic legal work and are interesting chiefly for the niche in 
local society filled by them and their families. The only 
evidence of his work comes from the enclosure award for 
Doulting and Stoke St.Michael for which he acted as clerk and 
agent in 1775-6. According to the Law Lists he had by 1777 been 
succeeded in Frome by John Wickham. By 1787 there was another 
James, partnered from 1790 to the end of the century by a James 
Anthony, who then practised alone until at least 1812. Clerics 
in the family were Justices of the Peace from the 1760s, in 
which decade the only unusual note is struck, for the Rev.John 
Wickham then made three loans to the Percival & Copper Company, 
totalling £1,000^.
Amongst attorneys of Bristol in contrast, the most frequent 
combination in the Returns was the Courts of the King’s Bench 
and Chancery, with four out of ten also joining the Court of 
the Exchequer. An example of the more ambitious men who 
developed their role beyond that of the prosaic general legal 
work is provided by George Tyndale. By 1730-31 he was already 
established as an attorney in Bristol. He became a partner in
- 1 3 3 -
the Exchange Bank when it was set up in 1764 as Bristol's third
such institution, in a move which marked not so much a change
as a development of his career. Evidence of Tyndale's
continuing involvement with his original business is shown by
sales of property in 1762, conveyancing in 1765, and complaints
on behalf of clients about quarrying in 1770. This association
with the affairs of local people must have made him a valuable
asset to the Bank where, by the terms of the partnership
agreement, both banking and conveyancing were undertaken. But
the Bank was more adventurous than this suggests, for in 1764 a
loan of £3,000 was made to the Percival & Copper Co. Tyndale's
association with the Bank had ended by 1775, and he does not
1 3appear in the Law List of 1777 . Unlike the Wickhams of Frome
there was no legal dynasty of Tyndales in Bristol.
As well as indicating the type of work undertaken, the 
Returns of 1730-31 also provide evidence on the distribution of 
attorneys in the region. In this respect they offer a valuable 
bench mark, for they reveal a pattern which can be observed in 
north Somerset throughout the period studied. About 75 per cent 
were based in the towns of Axbridge, Bath, Frome, Shepton 
Mallet, and Wells, with the remainder at smaller settlements.
Of the towns the old market centre of Axbridge had the smallest 
number, with two in 1730-31 rising to eight at the end of the 
century, falling to five in the 1820s. The woollen towns of 
Frome and Shepton Mallet had six each in 1730-31, but whilst 
the former had ten in in the 1820s, the latter showed no
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increase, perhaps confirming the decline already noted. Bath 
and Wells were also in comparable positions in 1730-31, the 
former having ten and the latter eleven attorneys. Despite an 
increase to fifteen in the first two decades of the nineteenth 
century the overall rise at Wells was to thirteen, suggesting 
that the judicial, church, and county business there had 
increased little. But the number in the rapidly-expanding city 
of Bath with its many wealthy visitors, had more than 
quadrupled to 44 in the early 1820s.
The position in the rest of north Somerset is more difficult 
to sum up, for at some time in the years between the 1730s and 
the 1820s, 45 settlements had resident attorneys, with only the 
manufacturing centre of Keynsham between Bristol and Bath being 
served over the whole period. The agricultural settlement of 
Wrington sustained two or three from the 1770s. Chew Magna, 
Leland's 'prety cloathing townelet', had an attorney briefly in 
1730-32 but then none until the revival of its fortunes on an 
agricultural basis, when it had one in the 1790s, two by 1817, 
and four in the 1820s. In the many villages ranking below these 
three ’ townelets' , changes in the provision of attorneys give a 
similar indication of fluctuating economic fortunes especially 
as the woollen industry declined in the east and the newly 
enclosed and drained lowlands in the west assumed a greater 
importance. Apart from an occasional service in later years, 
formerly-prosperous woollen cloth markets such as Beckington 
near the Wiltshire border lost their attorney after the 1770s,
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whilst newly-prosperous agricultural centres like the recently 
enclosed and drained Congresbury in the west of the region 
acquired this facility for the first time in the early nine­
teenth century. Another development was the acquisition of 
attorneys by villages near Bristol and Bath, such as Long 
Ashton and Batheaston respectively from the 1780s. The needs of 
mining centres were met belatedly, as at Midsomer Norton in the 
second decade of the nineteenth century, but perhaps the 
agreements on partnerships and access to land which underpinned 
mining concerns were drawn up by attorneys already employed on 
traditional estate business. Lastly, although the proportion of 
north Somerset attorneys at work in the countryside remained 
the same their numbers increased in response to the general 
growth in economic activity, with the result that double the 
number of villages served in the 1730s had this provision in 
the 1820s.
The recurrence of family names amongst these village attorneys 
shows that social factors as well as economic ones influenced 
their location. In the agricultural village of Ston Easton for 
example, where there was opportunity for work on enclosures, 
William and Thomas Miles were in partnership from 1789 to 1797. 
Having settled there the latter then continued on his own into 
the 1820s^. Insight into professional training in these 
circumstances comes from Robson's chance citation of a Somerset 
example of apprenticeship terms, set out in 1820 by William 
Leigh of Bardon near Taunton. The need for hard work, a good
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hand, membership of the Established Church and a premium of 600 
guineas are all stressed, as is the fact that the young man 
would enter an office consisting of a managing clerk, a writing 
clerk, and an articled clerk who was Leigh's son^. The 
organization of a legal practice in the Somerset countryside 
was thus no mean undertaking. The Law Lists show that at 
different and overlapping times Robert, William, and Henry 
James Leigh were attorneys in Bardon.
It has been suggested that the development by attorneys of
their non-court activities was a response to the success of the
Bar in excluding them from the more lucrative branches of legal 
1  c.
practice . But from the evidence studied it seems more likely 
that it was the small part played by the central administration 
in regulating the burgeoning economic activity in the regions, 
which created openings for local agents to organize the legal 
framework needed to accommodate the processes of change. This 
suggestion may be supported by reference to the many documents 
relating to schemes for enclosure and drainage, turnpikes and 
canals, and urban improvements, surviving for this region. 
Attorneys devised appropriate legal forms for those bodies 
requiring legitimation by private Acts of Parliament, and also 
developed the financial instruments through which they could be 
funded. Though not requiring the formalities of legislation 
both manufacturing and mining ventures depended on the drawing 
up of partnership agreements by local attorneys, for like the 
public undertakings noted above, the establishment of property
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rights was crucial to economic development. There is no 
indication that these newer functions were developed to the 
exclusion of more traditional work with private clients, which 
in any case brought its own advantages as attorneys were made 
privy to unrivalled information about the availability of 
private savings. In matching these to private and public 
demands for funds, attorneys became skilled financial 
intermediaries.
An effective combination of these private and public roles 
is to be found in the careers of a father and son whose work in 
Bath spanned eighty years. Philip George sr. was already active 
in the local capital market in 1781, when properties were 
conveyed to him in an effort to stave off the bankruptcy of 
John Wood. Philip George jr. was enrolled as an attorney in 
1806. Both then pursued a private practice harnessed to a 
public career based upon the town clerkship of Bath, held in 
succession from 1800 until 1860. Similar roles were
performed for the Bath Turnpike Trust and the Bath Improvement 
Commissioners. Their surviving correspondence reflects these 
varied strands for it concerns such matters as the letting of 
the Pump Room, the redemption of the Land Tax, and the 
exemption of Bath from the County Rate; as well as the affairs 
of for example the Elton, Day, and Dickinson families^. In 
raising funds from private clients for the institutions they 
served, such attorneys successfully extended the personal 
capital market. Even more importantly, by recruiting funds from
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unknown clients for investment in public utilities such as the 
turnpike roads, through the development of what will here be 
referred to as the institutional mortgage, they also helped to 
create an impersonal capital market before the advent of canals
1 o
promoted that facility .
The practice of financing enclosures in north Somerset by 
selling land was another important factor in the development of 
an impersonal m a r k e t ^ ,  in which local attorneys played an 
important role. Of the more than three dozen named in the 
enclosure awards, drainage plans, and associated papers, the 
majority, 42 per cent,came from small towns and villages in the 
region^. A further 28 per cent came from Wells, but none from 
Bath which suggests that the former was more important in 
county matters, whilst the latter was absorbed in the affairs 
of town and visitors. Bristol provided the remaining 30 per 
cent of those involved, for some of the land enclosed and 
drained was close to that city, the investment possibilities 
were attractive, and several institutions had an interest in 
the properties involved, like the Corporation of Bristol whose 
attorney William Diaper Brice acted for them in Congresbury and 
Portishead, 1809-23. Samuel Baker may be cited as an example of 
an attorney who prospered through enclosures. His career had 
begun in Bristol in the early 1790s, but by settling in 1798 in 
Blagdon some nine miles south southwest of the city, where his 
family had property, he secured a good base from which to take 
part in this work for over two decades. He was involved in at
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least twelve enclosures in that part of the region, in several 
of which he bought land for his clients or himself. He also 
worked on the Axe and Congresbury Drainage schemes. The pattern 
followed was a typical one, for by working with colleagues as 
clerk, umpire, witness, or even commissioner, Baker formed part 
of a self-sustaining network. When writing to the Parliamentary 
lawyer George White for example, Baker explained that he did so 
on the recommendation of his friend Mr Osborne of Bristol^.
Attorneys acting for long-established bodies sometimes had 
the difficult task of advising on the legality of new work not 
specified in the original terms of establishment. The advice of 
counsel was then sought,as in the early 1800s when John Conway, 
attorney in Wells from 1787 till 1819, and clerk to the Axe 
Division of the Court of Sewers, consulted Wyndham Goodden on 
such a point. This Barrister at Law of the Temple and Somerset 
justice from 1787, mentioned already in relation to his three 
sons, had a home in Bath where these consulations took place. 
The occasional presence of James Stephens shows the complicated 
context within which attorneys operated, for although Stephens 
had a house in Bath, his main residence was in Camerton where 
he was both lessor and partner in coalmining ventures, and one 
of his advisers on the legal aspects of coalmining from the
o n
1770s was George Tuson, Conway’s partner in Wells .
Although urban attorneys were less likely to be involved as 
here with drainage or mining developments, they were more
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influential in the promotion of bridges and canals and the 
growth of the building industry. Negotiations to improve 
Bristol Bridge began in 1758 and attorneys such as George 
Tyndale and Samuel Worrall were closely concerned with the 
Trust then set up. Bristol attorneys were also involved in 
canal finance, especially during the boom years of the early 
1790s centred on this and other cities. For some such as Isaac 
Cooke who established himself in Bristol in 1792, this helped 
launch a career connected not only with canals, but also with 
housing speculations and the Congresbury Drainage Scheme. J.R. 
Ward has pointed out that Bristol's canal mania coincided with 
a building boom in the city, and that both are evidence of 
surplus capital seeking a profitable market. As in Bath over 
the period studied, Bristol attorneys were involved in both the 
legal and financial aspects of building operations. Although a 
small number of attorneys went on to gain eminence as clerks to 
justices of the peace, religious and secular societies, 
corporate towns, and to the county itself, it is likely that in 
these prestigious roles they had less influence over economic 
developments than their less notable contemporaries, now known 
to us only through the Law Lists and the chance survival of 
documents. Yet it is these more anonymous attorneys who helped 
to bring a new vigour to economic life by devising both the 
legal forms that enabled developments to take place and the 
financial instruments that made investment possible.
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The view that the legal profession was one of the main groups 
from which bankers were drawn in these years has come to be 
widely held^. Attorneys were certainly well-placed to make 
this move, which entailed a development from the role of 
financial intermediary balancing assets and liabilities, to 
that of credit-provider, issuing notes and money which 
constituted claims upon the banker and could be used in the 
settlement of debts. They were also able to balance a 
familiarity with their own locality against their links with 
London, maintained through agents who are shown by the Law 
Lists to have had long-standing associations with their 
provincial clients. But on the evidence of this region at least 
these attorney-bankers have gained an attention out of all 
proportion to the numbers involved. Thus a register of bankers 
in this region and in Bristol, drawn from available evidence, 
and matched against the register of attorneys drawn from the 
Law Lists, shows that only a small proportion of the former had 
legal origins. Of 129 bankers in Bristol in the period of this 
study, 5.4 per cent were attorneys, and of 85 in Bath the 
figure was 15.3 per cent. For north Somerset as a whole the
o £
proportion was around 17 per cent .
Furthermore the influence of the few attorney-bankers was 
limited to a small number of banks. In Bristol all but one 
were partners in the Exchange Bank, set up in 1764. Henry 
Bengough was the exception,and he became an original partner of 
the City Bank in 1794 the year after establishing himself as an
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attorney in the city. Apart from the interest in conveyancing 
mentioned earlier, the work of the Exchange Bank did not differ 
noticeably from that of the other nineteen established in 
Bristol between 1750 and 1827 when a branch of the Bank of 
England was set up. Pressnell notes that apart from the 
accounts of the partners, their families, and business 
associates, most of their customers came from the city where 
many were merchants. By the later 1770s the Exchange Bank had 
connections with the West Indian trade, and in the following 
decade there was some lending on estates there. There were 
links with South Wales, for bills issued by a tin works in 
Cardiff were payable by them. In matters of banking practice, 
interest of 2 to 5 per cent was being paid at the end of the 
1770s on money deposited for different periods, and there is 
also evidence of a willingness to lend at that time without 
security or collateral. A mixed bag of securities was revealed 
in 1811 when a woolbroker sought to extend advances already 
made to him. But by that time the first partners had died, and 
with them any claim the Bank had to a special distinction^. 
Even the loans made by the Exchange Bank to the major copper 
company in Bristol do not show these attorney-bankers behaving 
differently from others, for each of the four banks established 
in the 1750s and 1760s made loans to Bristol firms working on 
manufacturing sites in north Somerset.
Many of Bristol’s bankers had a mercantile background, and 
although the contribution of industrialists, money scrivenors,
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remitters of funds, and goldsmiths to country banking has been
well-recognized, that of the merchant traders has been less
so^. Yet in the port city of Bristol they and manufacturers
provided the most significant part of the the necessary funds
to launch the banks, the financial expertise to manage them,
and the network of contacts to use the services provided. Their
business life would have already familiarized merchants with
systems of accounting, credit and i n s u r a n c e ^ .  The importance
of the West Indian trades in Bristol was reflected in the
30number of sugar refiners who became bankers , to whom must be
added distillers, drysalters, linen drapers, and partners in
31copper, brass and gunpowder works . Some were not averse to a
32little profitable privateering . Only three were goldsmiths, 
but they cover the period studied, for John Vaughan (the son of 
the ’Father of Bristol Banking') was a partner in a bank 
founded in 1752, Thomas Wigan in 1790, and Henry Browne in 
IP-11. In Bath's 14 banks attorneys were relatively more 
important, but as in Bristol most bankers came from other 
backgrounds. Unlike the port city the merchants were inland 
traders, dealing especially in wine and brandy*^. Others were 
described as linen drapers, clothiers, builders, ironmongers, 
grocers, and silver and goldsmiths, thus encompassing much of 
urban life*^. Though still not preponderant, attorneys were 
more important as a source of bankers in the rest of north 
Somerset, especially through families such as the Paynes of 
Wells and Axbridge, and the Messiters of Wincanton and Frome.
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The strength of Bristol’s economic life meant that most 
bankers came from within this community, and the banks they 
founded had a remarkable longevity and stability. This was 
especially so before the last decade of the eighteenth century, 
after which some more dubious and short-lived banks were 
formed^. Despite individual links with Bath banks, the Bristol 
banking establishment remained very self-contained until the 
Stuckeys of Langport formed a branch there in 1806, as part of 
a growing network which also included a branch at Wells in 
1814^. At Bath in contrast, the earliest banks of the 1760s 
and 1770s included partners from outside the city and had 
branches in, or were associated with, banks in the Wiltshire 
clothing towns of Bradford-on-Avon, Trowbridge, and 
Warminster^. In 1809 the Bladud Bank of Bath, founded in 1790 
by local professional and tradesmen and a supporter of the 
building industry there, was amalgamated with the Wells bank of 
Payne & Hope, founded in 1800 by a partnership which included
o o
attorneys of the Payne family-* . Despite this broader base the 
Bath banks displayed less continuity than those in Bristol, in 
both a personal and an institutional sense. None of those in 
Bath was associated with several generations of the one family 
as were for example the Miles and Harford Banks in B r i s t o l * ^ ,  
and although only one minor house out of eight in the port 
closed in 1793, two of the five in Bath failed then^.
These differences in stability may also reflect the 
contrasting roles the banks played in the local economy, for
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whilst those in Bristol drew upon the trading network of the 
port and gave financial support to businesses in the region, 
the basic task of those in Bath was that of serving local 
inhabitants and accommodating visitors to the spa. The Letter 
Book of a Newbury bank for example, shows that some visitors 
made preliminary arrangements to have sums placed at their 
disposal, whilst others like a Mr. Wroughton in 1790 were so 
credit-worthy they were 'very ready to Guarantee any Sum he may 
have occasion for during his stay'^. But this routine work 
must have made for dull banking, so some houses engaged in 
speculative support for the volatile local building industry 
and other uncertain ventures, which jeopardized their stability 
and led to the two failures of 1793. Both had had a well- 
established regional base, conveyed in the case of the Bath & 
Somersetshire Bank by its name. Founded in 1775 and known also
/ 9
as Messrs#Horlock & Anderdon , this was one of the chief 
correspondents of the Newbury bank mentioned. The title of the 
other, the Bath City Bank set up in 1776, suggests a greater 
insularity but a review of the partners shows this was not so. 
Two of the originals were the Bristolians Samuel Peach a linen 
draper and Benjamin Loscombe a sugar baker, both already 
founding partners of a bank established in Bristol in 1774. 
After they had dropped out of the Bath bank in the mid-eighties 
it became known as Cross, Son & Bayly, but a Bristol connection 
was maintained through Thomas Wells of Clifton. The partners 
also traded in Wells and Bridgwater^. The Bank was very 
successful in attracting small deposits and by 1789 these came
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to nearly £200,000^. But against this success must be set a 
naivety of management which allowed Cross & Bayly's position as 
claimants in a bankruptcy case to be compromised by the handing 
of a draught to another claimant^, and a lack of propriety in 
business affairs which led to one of the partners losing the 
Bank over £27,000 in the early 1790s before bankruptcy caused 
trading to cease^.
This survey has shown the network of professional expertise 
available in north Somerset in the period under review. 
Attorneys were well-distributed throughout the region, their 
numbers supplemented by those based in Bristol. For a study of 
capital investment their significance lies in their skill in 
devising both the legal forms that enabled economic 
developments to take place, and the financial instruments that 
made investment possible. They were enabling agents, and as 
such they played a particularly vital role in the development 
of a public capital market, as will be seen. Their connections 
allowed them to play a small but important role in the 
development of banks. They had useful links with London 
through their agents there, but even more importantly, they had 
an unrivalled knowledge of local society. It was said of Mr. 
Moulton Messiter of Wincanton in 1780 for example that he was 
both ’The most eminent attorney in this county and acquainted 
with all the monied people in it’^ .
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A survey of bankers has however shown that most of them were 
not lawyers, but came from a wide range of other backgounds. 
Many in Bristol were merchants, which was a source of strength 
that led to the development of links with manufacturing 
ventures, and later with public undertakings. In contrast the 
Bath banks were less supportive of sound business initiatives 
within the region, and also less successful in securing public 
work. It was for example Messiters, Payne & Hope of Wells who 
became bankers to the Axe Drainage Commissioners, and the 
Bristol banks of Ames, Bright & Co., and Miles, Vaughan & Co., 
who held that position for the Congresbury and Weston Drainage 
Commissioners respectively. And any account of the part played 
by banks in the process of capital investment must also take 
into account their entire lack of involvement in some aspects 
of economic life such as the financing of turnpike trusts, at 
least until the early nineteenth century.
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1 The term professional is used to signify those following a 
calling which required an expertise through training; conferred 
entry upon a restricted group; and distinguished its members 
from the leisured, trading, and labouring interests. Evidence 
is largely based on Returns for 1730-1 and Law Lists from 1777.
2 Peter Eden ed.,Dictionary of Land Surveyors and Local Cart­
ographers of Great Britain and Ireland 1530-1850, Part 1(1975), 
Part 11(1976),Part 111(1976),Supplement(1979).
3 Michael Birks,Gentlemen of the Law(1960),p.28; Harry Kirk, 
Portrait of a Profession. A History of Solicitors(1976).
4 Robert Robson,The Attorney in Eighteenth-Century England 
(Cambridge,1959),pp.36-8,166-7,App.4; Bristol Law Society,The 
First Two Hundred Years(Bristol,1970).
5 A Register of Attorneys for this region has been drawn up 
from copies of the Law Lists at the British Library. Coverage 
is good, though some volumes are missing and in some years they 
were not published. See Browne’s General Law List, 1777-97; 
Hughes’ New Law List, 1798-1806; Clarke's New Law List, 1806-.
6 W.J.Reader,Professional Men. The Rise of the Professional 
Classes in Nineteenth Century England(1966), p.27. Quoted by 
Victor Belcher,’A London Attorney of the Eighteenth Century: 
Robert Andrews',London Journal,12,1(1986), pp.40-50.
7 L.S.Pressnell,Country Banking in the Industrial Revolution 
(Oxford,1956),esp.’The Origins of Country Bankers Birks,Gent­
lemen of the Law,pp.82-5,shows how the work of scrivenors,in­
vestment brokers from the end of the sixteenth century, was 
taken over by attorneys and then bankers.The Stamp Act of 1804 
excluded the scrivenor from his craft unless also an attorney.
8 Like that by Philip Aylett,'Attorneys and Clients in Eight­
eenth-Century Cheshire: A Study in Relationships, 1740-1785', 
Bull.John Rylands Lib.,67(1987),pp.326-58.
9 B.L.Anderson,’The Attorney and the Early Capital Market in 
Lancashire',in Crouzet ed., Capital Formation in the Industrial 
Revolution, pp.223-55,esp.p.230; M.Miles,'The Money Market in 
the Early Industrial Revolution: The Evidence From West Riding 
Attorneys, Bus. Hist.,23,2(1981),pp.127-46,esp.p.133.
10 The Returns are in Sheila Lambert ed.,House of Commons 
Sessional Papers of the Eighteenth Century(1975),vol.13, ’Lists 
of Attornies and Solicitors Admitted in Pursuance of the late 
Act (2 George II, c.23)',pp.1-290. For brief accounts of this 
attempt at regulation see Robson,The Attorney,pp.8-12; Birks, 
Gentlemen of the Law,pp.135-40; and Kirk,Portrait of a 
Profession, pp.72-3
11 Birks,Gentlemen of the Law,pp.142-4.
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12 Collinson,History of Somerset,II,p. 373,with note by Locke; 
SRO,Enclosure Award,Q/RDe 58,1775-6; BRL,1 Committee Book of the 
Joseph Percival & Copper Company1,1762-9. The Rev.John Wickham 
made three loans: 1764, £400 for 12 months at 5 per cent; 1765, 
£100 and £500 for 3 months at 4 per cent.
13 Collinson,History of Somerset,I,pp.113-16; Cave,Banking in 
Bristol,85-9; McGrath,Merchant Venturers of Bristol,pp.188,194. 
McGrath spells the name Tyndall,but this confuses the attorney- 
banker with a Bristol merchant family;BRL,'Comte.Bk.Copper Co.'
14 SRO,Q/RDe, 81,1793-5; 23,1797-1800; 65,1794-6. William Miles 
purchased land in enclosures at Wells and Chewton Mendip, 
probably for clients,and Thomas was a witness at East Harptree.
15 Robson,The Attorney,pp.157-8; Law Lists.
16 Birks,Gentlemen of the Law,p.198.
17 Neale,Bath,p.164; BGA, papers of Philip George and son.
18 See Buchanan,'The Evolution of the English Turnpike Trusts' 
for the operation of the institutional mortgage.
19 See Buchanan,'The Financing of Parliamentary Waste Land En­
closure' for a study of land sales.
20 Most attorneys taking part in enclosures were based in 
Axbridge, Blagdon, Chewton Mendip, Frome, Long Ashton,
Portbury, Ston Easton, Wedmore, and Wrington.
21 From the late 1790s to 1820 Samuel Baker took part in enclo­
sures at Banwell,Clevedon,Congresbury,Dundry,Kewstoke, Locking, 
Long Ashton,Portbury,Tickenham,Uphill,Weston-super-Mare, Worle, 
and the combined parishes of Wraxall, Nailsea and Flax Bourton, 
purchasing land at the first four and last of these. WSS,L0235, 
S/W17/43,Samuel Baker's Letter Book, copy of letter to George 
White esq.,17 Nov.1792, on Kewstoke enclosure.
22 SRO,Axe Drainage,Box AD3,expences for journey to Bath,1808; 
Collinson,History of Somerset,III,p .331;Down & Warrington,Som­
erset Coalfield,pp.112-3; SR0,DD/MGG Box 2,contains a Declarat­
ion of Trust of 1773 that the purchase of land by George Tuson 
had been on behalf of Messrs John Mogg and others, coalmasters.
23 Pressnell,Country Banking,pp.39,374-5; BRL,Mins.of Bristol 
Bridge Trust; Aylett,'Attorneys and Clients',p.356; McGrath, 
Merchant Venturers,p.186,refers to the Society's approval in 
1792 of 'a change of plan for Mr. Isaac Cooke's crescent';J.R. 
Ward,The Finance of Canal Building in Eighteenth-Century Eng- 
land(Oxford,1974),pp.92-4,138-40,and his 'Speculative Building 
at Bristol and Clifton,1783-93',Bus.Hist.,XX,1 (1978),pp.3-18.
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the Soc.Merch.Vent.until enobled in 1757; Jarrit Smith was M.P. 
for Bristol from 1756 to 1768; and Samuel Sandelands Rogers was 
Clerk to the Dean and Chapter of Bristol in the later 1820s.
25 Pressnell,Country Banking,pp.36-44;Robson,The Attorney,p.112
26 Cave's Banking in Bristol provides an excellent base for the 
subject there; Philip Ollerenshaw's account of 'The Development 
of Banking in the Bristol Region,1750-1914',in Harvey & Press 
eds.,The Business History of Bristol(Bristol,1988),pp.55-82,is 
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they include a short article by A.G.E.Jones,'The Banks of Bath' 
Notes and Queries (1958), pp.277-83. Information on the rest of 
north Somerset has proved most difficult,though Pressnell & 
Orbell,Guide to the Historical Records of British Banking(1985) 
has provided clues.
27 The original attorney-partners of the Exchange Bank were 
Messrs.Tyndale,Swymmer,Worrall,Hale and Newman; Cave,Banking in 
Bristol,pp.85-9,126-31; Pressnell,Country Banking,pp.41-3,47- 
51,79-80,252,289-91, 299-301,307,501-2, App.7,520.
28 Pressnell,Country Banking, pp.12-14; see also,B.L.Anderson, 
'Financial institutions and the capital market on Merseyside in 
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries',in Anderson & Stoney 
eds.,Commerce, Industry and Transport. Economic Change on 
Merseyside(Liverpool,1983) pp.33-4.
29 Local sources from which Bristolians received advice includ­
ed. The_tlarchajit_^^ ed.McGrath(Harvard, 1957,1st pub. 
1589),and Jones' English System of Book-keeping,ed.B.S.Yamey 
(1978,1st pub.1796). Richard Brown,A History of Accounting and 
Accountants(Edinburgh,1905),observed that in 1793-4 there were 
25 professional accountants in Bristol, but only 11 in London.
30 Examples include: Edward Brice of Frenchay(1767-1833), 
original partner of Birch, Pitt & Co. 1808-1833; James Ireland 
of Brislington,original partner of Bristol City Bank 1794-1815; 
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31 Examples include: Levi Ames, drysalter, original and senior 
partner of Ames, Cave & Co. 1786-1800, when he retired and his 
son of the same name joined the Bank;Samuel Peach of Tockington 
(1715-85), linendraper, original partner of Peach,Fowler & Co., 
1774-1781, and original partner of Bath City Bank,1776-1784; 
Samuel New (later Birch,1763-1846), brass manufacturer, partner 
in Miles Bank 1794-1808, leaving to help set up new bank of 
Birch, Pitt & Co., from which he retired in 1819.
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32 The Tryall privateer was owned by Henry Bright and Jeremiah 
Ames in the 1760s, original partners in the Harford Bank set up 
1769.Bright was a West Indian merchant who died in 1777 leaving 
a fortune of £50,000;Ames was a partner in the Littleton powder 
works and died in 1776 leaving £70,000. See Minchinton,Trade of 
Bristol,pp.36-7,45; Cave,Banking in Bristol,pp.90-1; Latimer, 
Annals of Bristol,II,p.462.
33 Isaac de Vic,brandy merchant,1 openfd a Bank1 for remitting 
money between London and Bath,Bath Journal,Sept.24,1753. Other 
wine and brandy merchants included the following partners in 
the Bladud Bank,established 1790: Thomas Collett sr.1790-1809; 
succeeded by his son of that name;Samuel and Robert Fa(u)lkner, 
1820 to 1826 and 1835 respectively; and William Stroud 1809-15.
34 The bank founded by linen drapers Robert and William 
Clement in the 1760s became the High Street Bank in 1783, later 
to be known as Clement & Tugwell until almost 1830. Other 
examples include John Giles,builder and dealer; William Harris, 
tallow chandler and ironmonger; William Kemp,grocer and tea 
dealer; and James and William Evill,jewellers and silversmiths, 
bankers in Bath from 1814 until leaving the city in 1834.
35 These included Jane,Wigan & Heaven,1790-93;the Bristol Comm­
ercial Bank,1804;Lewsley,Webber & Wilcox,Spanish woollen trad­
ers , 1807-09 ; and a Commercial Bank of 1820 which sought to help 
the 'many merchants and tradesmen whose small accounts are not' 
welcomed by major banks in Bristol, Cave,Banking,pp.165-7.
36 Ollerenshaw,'Development of Banking, pp.58-9.
37 For example the Bath (later Old) Bank, established 1768 in­
cluded amongst its original partners the clothier Samuel Cam of 
Cam,Hilller & Bush of Bradford-on-Avon, and the attorney Daniel 
Clutterbuck of the same town.It had branches there and in Trow­
bridge. From 1796 the partners were joined by Benjamin Hobhouse 
(later knighted), son of the Bristol merchant John Hobhouse and 
son-in-law of Samuel Cam; the partners of the Bath & Somerset­
shire Bank set up 1775 included Isaac Webb Horlock of Ashwick 
in north Somerset and Joseph Mortimer of Trowbridge, both also 
partners in the Warminster bank of Horlock,Everett,Mortimer & 
Everett. Jones,'Banks of Bath1; BaRL, Sydenham Scrapbooks.
38 SRO,Wells Mus.MSS,DD/WM,1/351,Articles of Co-partnership for 
21 years in the business of banking,21 Sept.1809,between part­
ners in Bath and Wells. Dissolved in 1825 (DD/WM,1/441). The 
Wells Bank of Payne & Hope became bankrupt 1831 (DD/WM,1/438).
39 Edward Harford was an original partner of the bank founded 
in 1769, and the Miles family became associated with that 
taking their name in 1794. In 1820 they amalgamated as Miles, 
Harford & Co..In 1877 they joined the Old Bank,Bristol1s first, 
founded in 1750. Cave,History of Banking,pp.65-84,90-9.
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40 Chatham Papers PRO,/30/8/274. 7 March,1793: Mr.Cross,bank­
er of Bath, failed for more than £1,200,000; Messrs.Horlock & 
Anderdon, bankers of Bath, failed for more than £600,000; and 
Thos.Wigan, banker of Bristol, failed for more than £30,000.
41 PRO,Chancery Masters' Exhibits,C 171/20. Letter Books of 
Vincent, Bayly & Vincent, bankers of Newbury.
42 Neale refers to the involvement of this bank in the 
developmment of the Bathwick estate under the mistaken name of 
'Sherlock' & Anderdon, Bath,p .239 .
43 Cross & Bayly's bankruptcy papers refer separately to those 
accounts in the Bath books and those in the Wells, and meetings 
of creditors were held in both cities, BaRL, Sydenham Papers, 
p.323. In Nov.1791 Messrs.Cross & Baily had joined with other 
partners to form the Bridgwater Bank of Cross, Sealey & Co., 
which survived the failure of the Bath City Bank, Pressnell, 
Country Banking,p.337.
44 PRO,Bl/89/fol.53 & fol.220,1794. Small savers making claims 
against Cross & Bailey included widows and a glassmaker from 
Bristol; a grocer and shoemaker of Bath; and a Wiltshire 
farmer. All had made deposits of up to £800 @ 3%%.
45 PRO,Bl/82/fol.223,1792. Cross & Baily petitioned against the 
bankrupt Henry Mais to whom £400 had been loaned on a 
promissory note backed up by a plumber, Thomas Chilton of Bath. 
John Cooke the managing clerk had allowed the latter to present 
the draft to the Bankruptcy Commission, who then refused the 
Bank's own claim.
46 PR0,Bl/88/fols.ll3,114 & 295-7. In 1791 James Cross of Cross 
& Baily had entered into an agreement with James Rogers of 
Bristol, merchant and chapman, to deal in Manchester cotton. 
Their business was brought down in the mercantile crisis of 
1793, with Rogers owing the Bank £27205.19.lOd on the backing 
of 27 promissory notes dated 20 Feb.1793. Rogers failed for 
more than £500,000.
47 Robson,The Attorney,p.153.
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Part III Capital Investment in North Somerset, 1750-1830.
Chapter 6 Capital Investment in Agriculture
Within the context now established, the process of capital 
investment will be examined in the following chapters through 
cases drawn from agriculture, mining, manufacture, and 
transport in north Somerset. In the first of these, a study of 
agricultural investment, attention is focussed on the following 
three aspects of the subject: enclosure, by which the system of 
cultivation was transformed from the traditional and corporate 
method of farming in common to the modern and individualistic 
one of farming in severalty; drainage schemes, undertaken in 
the lowlands; and soil reclamation and farm making. These were 
all of economic significance for they led to a growth of 
physical capital in terms of space and time, in what was 
otherwise a fixed natural resource, the land. In the Mendips 
for example, enclosures enabled the rough wastes to be brought 
under the plough in the closing decades of the eighteenth 
century, and in the Levels enclosure and drainage schemes from 
the turn of the century extended the use of the previously 
inundated lands from half to possibly a full year. Through the 
re-organization of land holding and the re-forming of the 
physical assets of farms in terms of new walls, roads, and 
drains, enclosures in these and other parts of north Somerset 
also paved the way for an investment in improved methods and
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equipment which permitted a greater efficiency in agriculture, 
and an increased value in land.
To contemporary enthusiasts for improvement such as John 
Billingsley, enclosures were also seen as a way of working upon 
the human capital involved in farming. Farmers who had proved 
resistant to the spread of scientific methods, and who were as 
he wrote ’much bigotted to old customs'^, had to meet the 
challenge of the new framework for farming resulting from 
enclosure, for unlike the ideas propogated by agricultural 
societies and individual reformers, these procedures were 
legally authorized and could not be ignored. Opposition was 
expressed in petitions to Parliament and by the tearing down of
n
fences , but the enclosure of the north Somerset waste lands 
was less likely to lead to a class of landless labourers than 
that of the open fields, for many receiving allotments in lieu 
of common grazing rights were often already pursuing other 
crafts, so the few acres allotted were more likely to be an 
additional than a sole source of support for a family^.
Studies of the economic aspects of enclosures, like those of 
social costs, have tended to focus on the open arable fields^. 
In the contribution by Holderness to the Studies in Capital 
Formation for example, figures for the acreage of waste land 
reclaimed and enclosed in 1770-1860, and the unit cost of this 
investment, are based upon the area enclosed by Act of 
Parliament plus that reclaimed by private enterprise, with no
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allo\£tfance for the large Parliamentary drainage schemes which 
were separate from both-*. This suggests the exclusion of the 
three catchment areas of north Somerset, for which 
comprehensive drainage plans were authorized by Acts of 
Parliament. This neglect will be remedied by the following 
review of Parliamentary enclosure and drainage, and other post­
enclosure costs.
i The Financing of Parliamentary Enclosure.
In the period studied some 42,000 acres of waste land were 
enclosed in north Somerset, together with a relatively small 
amount in open fields, possibly 1,000 acres. The different 
farming areas have already been described: the uplands, 
especially the Mendips but also its outliers and the southerly 
extensions of the Cotswolds; the Levels, along the coast from 
Uphill towards the mouth of the Avon, and inland by the river 
valleys; and the undulating lands between the northern slopes 
of Mendip and the River Avon. In the mid-eighteenth century 
both uplands and lowlands were largely unenclosed commons or 
waste lands, the former used for sheep pasture and the latter 
for cattle grazing. But the fertile red marls and sandstones, 
the only area where the open field form of cultivation was ever 
extensively practised, were to a large degree already long 
enclosed and attuned to the market economy provided 
particularly by Bristol and Bath. The timing is difficult to
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dif f icuj^ t— tH3 determine, but by the sixteenth century the extent 
of enclosure by agreement may have helped prevent agrarian 
disturbances, and the resulting boundaries led to a call for 
caution in the Civil War, 'Lest we engage our body of horse too
L’
far into that enclosed c o u n t y .
The impulse to enclose was felt widely in the second half of
the eighteenth century under the stimulus of a rising
population and growing demand for food, but whereas in many 
counties the wastes remained common grazing ground until the 
intensification of pressures in the French Wars^, in north 
Somerset these were with some exceptions the only areas still 
to be enclosed. Attention therefore turned to them, first the 
Mendips from the 1770s and then the Levels, with interest here 
increasing from the 1790s. It seems likely that the enclosure 
of the uplands began first in response to wheat prices which 
fluctuated upward from the 1750s, because these lighter soils 
could be more easily adapted to tillage than the richer but 
heavier soils of the wet grasslands. But the conversion to 
arable was also eased by the declining use of Mendip for lead 
and calamine mining, and for sheep rearing for the local 
woollen industry. It had also long ceased to be a Royal Forest,
and with these changes the only remaining barrier was the
institutional one of common rights. The cost of extinguishing 
these in an area shown by the Proportion Roll of 1742 to be the 
poorest of the region must have seemed daunting, and the fact 
that Parliamentary enclosure came first in the Mendips suggests
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that in making such decisions existing prosperity was less 
important than future prospects. Drainage problems in the 
richest area, the Levels, meant that for most farmers grazing 
continued to be more profitable than tillage. Here the 
incentive to enclose came later with the significant rise in 
meat prices during the war years, which led to changes in the
Q
organization of land-holding if not in land use .
The legal and institutional changes associated with 
Parliamentary enclosure, and the new physical features 
contingent upon it such as roads, drainage channels, fences, 
and hedges, called for a considerable input of capital, but 
evidence on the financing of this investment did not at first 
seem promising. Commissioners' accounts are rare, thus ruling 
out a study of costs like those conducted elsewhere^. However a 
close study of the surviving awards revealed an alternative 
source of financial information concealed amongst the profusion 
of organizational details, which frequently record both the 
acreage sold to finance the enclosure and the capital sum thus 
raised. Land sales would normally be viewed as transfers not 
involving the creation of new assets but a special case is made 
when the expenditure of the capital raised enables agricultural 
potential to be realized. Commissioners were instructed by Act 
of Parliament to sell as much of the land to be enclosed as 
they judged would enable them to cover all costs, and the 
details in the awards indicate that they did so. Corroboration 
comes from the only set of accounts accompanying an award, for
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the sum realized by the sale of land recorded in the latter 
tallies exactly with the total cost of the enclosure accounted 
for in the former. This method makes the practice in north 
Somerset different from that of most other areas studied. To 
sum up: of the 41 Parliamentary enclosures in north Somerset 
between 1770 and 1830 for which awards survive, 37 were 
financed by the sale of land and only four by the levying of a 
rate^.
These different approaches would have been of limited 
interest were it not for their different effect on costs. It 
has been assumed that waste land enclosure costs were high 
because of the physical problems associated with difficult 
terrain, but a study of the practice of raising capital sums by 
land sales indicates that procedural or administrative factors 
may have been as important as topographical ones. This 
suggestion directs attention to the people involved with 
enclosures, all part of the regional network within which the 
process of capital investment took place. It included advocates 
of the change, many of whom became commissioners; lawyers and 
surveyors using their professional skills; landowners and 
tenants with an expectation of an allotment; and land 
purchasers at auctions, living within or outside the region 
(especially in Bristol), and seeking to consolidate an existing 
estate or to initiate a new one.
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The commissioners for each enclosure were named by Act of 
Parliament. They were usually three in number until the turn of 
the century, drawn from the 'improvement1 minded gentry. John 
Billingsley was the most active, serving on 11 commissions from 
the 1780s, including three at his death in 1811. This gave him 
an unrivalled expertise, but even those sitting on fewer might 
be active for several decades because of the long gestation of 
some enclosures. In the early nineteenth century this pattern 
changed as professional men were appointed to this role and the 
numbers were reduced to two or even one acting alone. One 
example is the surveyor James Staples of Bristol, who was the 
surveyor in four enclosures from 1798, commissioner in three 
from 1807 and held both offices at Weston-super-Mare in the 
1810s. Samuel Baker is an example of an attorney who was very 
active in this field, working on eight enclosures from 1798, as 
clerk, witness, umpire, and on three occasions, commissioner-^.
After the commissioners had assessed the situation and 
quality of the land to be enclosed, advised by the surveyors, a 
public auction was arranged. Due notice was given in the parish 
church and local newspapers, and it was held at some convenient 
inn. In the meantime a mortgage was arranged to allow work to 
begin. At the Wookey enclosure of 1782-86 for example, a 
mortgage of the moors and commons to be enclosed was executed 
to the Rev. Henry Harris, rector of the nearby parish of 
Binegar and a justice of the peace from 1757. £800 was '..paid 
into the hands of Mr. Robert Wright [commissioner] who is hereby
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appointed Treasurer1. Commissioners continued to hold this
financial responsibility until the 1810s when for example the
Bristol bank of Messrs. Elton, Edwards & Co. were appointed
12treasurers to the Weston-super-Mare enclosure of 1810-15 .
Decisions about the amount to be auctioned were complicated 
by two problems. First, the commissioners had to estimate the 
internal costs about which there was bound to be uncertainty 
because of the need for works such as drainage channels. How­
ever, unexpected and escalating costs could be met by further 
sales as in the Bleadon enclosure of 1788-91. Here two auctions 
were held in 1788, but when in June 1789 it was found 
'necessary to raise more money for finishing the several works 
made and to be made in the Inclosure...1, a third was 
ordered^. As an insurance against such delays experienced 
commissioners may have over-estimated the initial acreage to be 
sold, especially as they were not legally required to divide 
any surplus amongst the proprietors, but to invest it in 
lasting improvements. Second, the commissioners had to assess 
the external factors affecting the value of land, and again 
they might misjudge the sitation, the unexpectedly high prices 
realized at some auctions providing them with more funds than 
anticipated. At Weston-super-Mare the proprietors asked that 
the surplus be spent on improvements to walls, banks, and 
roads^. The possible significance of land sales will now be 
seen, for with the twin uncertainties of internal costs and 
external values they could lead to larger sums of capital being
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raised with greater ease, and therefore to more costly 
enclosures, than the method of financing by the imposition of a 
rate, sometimes grudgingly paid under threat of distraint, 
which could therefore result in cheaper enclosures.
Only in the case of the Yatton award of 1751 which confirmed 
a previous and uncomplicated agreement reached by ten 
proprietors, were the commissioners relieved of the task of 
dealing with a large number of people and an even greater 
variety of interests. These included the lord of the manor 
whose right of soil was usually met by an award one-twentieth 
in value of the land after sales; the few large proprietors who 
farmed or leased out land; the more numerous small freeholders, 
often owner-occupiers constituting what Billingsley called 'a 
most respectable yeomanry1; and a large number of small tenants 
and holders of common rights. There were on average about 60 
allottees per enclosure, but the number of allotments could be 
several times that figure because of the tangle of interests 
represented by claims based on tenancy agreements. These 
involved copyhold, or leasehold for years or lives, and were 
not limited by status for the most eminent peer in the county, 
Lord Poulett, held a manor in Yatton on a lease for lives. The 
Acts directed that leases at rack rent were to be declared 
void, but commissioners were to determine adequate compensation 
for tenants thus deprived. Other tenancy agreements were 
carried through the land reorganization but allotments were 
determined by the rights associated with the tenancy rather
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than its accrued value. Those in respect of old auster or 
ancient tenements were to be awarded ’amongst the Leaseholders 
and Copyholders share and share alike1. Where there was a right 
to stock different beasts on the commons, a sliding scale would 
relate the acreage awarded to the number and nature of beasts 
previously inter-commoned^^. Commissioners were also obliged to 
oversee the exchange of holdings. This was a feature of 31 
enclosures, and in two cases the number seeking to improve 
their position was over 200. Until 1811 these further surveys 
and exchanges were a charge on the enclosure, but after that 
costs had to be met by the interested parties .
Evidence on the financing of enclosures in north Somerset is 
shown in Table 6(1), where the information displayed has been 
derived from the awards. Column IV show the sums raised by sale 
or rate, and these are taken to constitute the total public 
cost of the enclosures listed. Historic prices are given 
throughout. Financial costs per acre are shown in column V. The 
three enclosures of the 1770s for which figures are available 
support the suggestion that the levying of a rate tended to 
keep down costs (Doulting and Stoke St.Michael,23.Os per acre), 
but that land sales led to higher costs (Compton Bishop,61.5s 
per acre, and Brislington,58. 5s per acre), for each case faced 
the physical problems associated with the waste lands, although 
these varied for individual enclosures, as did other factors 
such as acreage. In the only other rate-financed enclosure for 
which evidence is available (Portishead and Weston-in-Gordano,
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table 6^ 0
P a rliam en ta ry  E nclosure  In N o r th  Somerset, 1770-1830
1 II t i l I V V VI VII
Common Land Selling 
Price o f  
Land 
Per Acre 
shillings
r
Act
S R O  —  
Q /R D t Parish Award
Acreage
enclosed
Lowland Upland 
Waste Waste
Open
Fields
Land
Sold
Acres
Cost 0 /  
Enclosure 
£
Financial 
Cost per 
Acre 
shillings
Economic 
Cost. Per­
centage " 
Sold
117
130
27
134
132
18
22
71
21
SJ
74
72
73
133
•23
124
•35
119
24
C ran m o re  
U bley 
D oulting  
and Stoke 
St M ichael 
C o m p to n  
Bishop 
B rislington
(400)' M endip
M allet
W ookey
Blagdon
W est
H arptree
Bleadon
C o m p to n
M aran
W estbury
Rode and
W ingfield
Rodney
Stoke
C roscom be 
and D inder 
Wells (East 
H o rrin g to n  
and C htlco t) 
K ew stokc 
Wells (O u t 
Parish o f  
St C u th b ert) 
East
H arptree 
Pilton and 
N o rth  W otton  
Banwell 
C heddar
C h ew to n  
M endip 
Shipham  and 
W inscom be 
P o rtb u ry
C levedon
Locking
T ickenham
W orle 
Back well
Portishead  
and W cston- 
in -G ordano  
C o n g resb u ry , 
W eek St 
Law rence and 
P ux ton  
W eston- 
super-M are
W ring ton  and
Y atton  and
Kenn
C heddar,
P riddy  and
Rodney
Stoke
Long A shton  
U phill
W raxall, 
Nailsea and 
Hax B ourton  
Berkley and 
S tandcrw ick 
Portishead
113 D u ndry
•771-73 902 M endip 164 18.2
Rate
•775-76 1.200 M endip Levied 1,382 23.0
•777-79 275 M oors 28 845 6*-S 603.6 •0.2
1778-80 400 Brislington 20 1,170 58.5 1,170.0 5-0
C om m on
Rate
1782-85 724 M endip Levied
1782-86 •.•93 M oors M endip 4 1 • 4.338 72.7 211.1 34 5
1784-87 967 M endip 283 2,061 42.6 •45 7 29-3
•787-90 857 M endip 438 2.703 63 • 123.4 51.I
1788-91 1.194 M oors M endip 243 5.955 9 9 7 490 1 20.4
1788-91 (664I M endip 372 U.232) 67.2 120.0 J6.0
1788-91 841 M oors M endip 166 3.091 73 $ 372-4 •9.7
Rode
• 790-92 489 C o m m o n 53 10.8
•791-93 754 M oors 56 2.788 73 9 995 7 7-4
Rate
•792-93 603 M endip Levied
•792-94
•793-94
701
160 M oors
M endip 126
16
l ' . 449]
903
41 3 
112.9
230.0
1,128.8
1809
1811 
and
1816-21 (1.100)
1813-20 (690)
1813-18 388
348 acres ■
M endip
M endip
O u tlie r
M en d ip
644
65
7.570
1813-19 (1.617) M oors
1814-18 (300)
1814-23 703
M e n d ip
O u tlie r
1815-19 (23<S)
C om m ons Fields
403 300
acres acres
M endip O pen
O utlier Fields
Cotsw old  
O utlier
O pen
Fields
40
acres
O pen
Fields
O p en  96
Fields (21 acres sold for £1.279 : 
O pen
49 1.794
41 2.150 '
1376
1.218.1 per acre)
46 11.821 ]
119.6
106.7
*54-3
732 2 
I.O48.8
■ 8.0 
10.0
•793-95 4.343 M oors M endip 773 * 1.3 *9 52.I 292.9 •7 8
•794-96 «.033 M endip 255 2.580 49 9 202.3 24 7
M oors M endip
•794-96 961 882 acres 79 acres 62 3. 199* 72.5 1.031.9 7-0
•795-97 1.001 M oors M endip •38 4,060 81.1 588.4 • 3-8
1795-1801 (4.400) M oors M endip 400 587 8.119 36.9 276.6 •3-3
«— 4.000 acres —* acres
O pen
I797-•800 2,266 M endip Fields 345 5.567 49-• 322.7 •5-2
•797-99 1,072 M endip 550 3.129 58.4 113.8 51-3
1798-1806 962 M oors M endip
O u tlirr
244 5.393 112 .1 442.0 25 4
1799-1801 488 M oors
V/Ul lVl
M endip
O uflirr
52 1,762 72.2 677 7 •0.7
1800-01 ( • 6 0 M oors 3* 1.605 •99 4 •.035-5 • 9-2
1801-03 561 M oors M endip 57 1.658 59- • 581.7 10.2
O utlier
1801-03 211 M oors M endip 120 • .232 116.8 205.3 56.9
1807-12 (885) M endip 277 313
O utlier
T w o
M endip Rates
1807-09 (800) M oors O utlier Levied 3.430 85.8
and
1814-16 (820) M oors
M endip
O utlier
O p en
Fields 92 3.257 79-4 708.0 11.2
1810-15 993 437
acres
M oors
417
acres
M endip
•39
acres
O pen
Fields
72 4.972 IOO. 1 1,381.1 7-2
1810-13
1810-15
J  (3.650) M oors
M endip
O utlier
210 ]
345 J
15.2
58.5 
9 4
16.3 
10 2
Source: Enclosure aw ards as indicated.
No lei: 1 Parentheses indicate an estim ated figure, usually derived from the Act o f  Parliam ent. Square brackets indicate a figure arrived at by calculation, usually
from  inform ation w ith in  the aw ard, 
a C osts do  not refer to  the upland acres, as the M endip proprietors asked that they should pay their o w n  charges.
j  C osts do  not refer to  the open fields, whose proprietors bore a separate charge T his discretionary pow er was authorized in four o f  the later acts 
covering both w aste lands and open fields, but it appears to  have been exercised only in this case.
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1807-09), complications caused by the intermixing of two 
parishes may have raised costs, and over-ruled the contrast 
with contemporary cases financed by land sale.
Although land sales meant that proprietors had to meet no 
direct financial obligations, they did have to face a very real 
cost in terms of the reduction in the amount of land allotted, 
and the loss of the future stream of income otherwise 
received^. This economic cost may be measured by the 
percentage of land sold, as shown in column Vll. These economic 
and financial costs rarely bore with equal severity on the same 
parish. For example at Locking (1800-01) the financial cost 
averaged nearly £10 per acre but the economic cost in terms of 
land and income foregone was less than 20 per cent, whilst at 
Shipham and Winscombe (1797-99) the financial cost was less 
than £3 per acre but each proprietor lost over half the land to 
which he was otherwise entitled. An intriguing aspect of this 
relationship was the selling price of land, shown in column VI. 
A high price did not necessarily lead to a reduction in the 
financial cost of enclosure, but it was generally associated 
with a reduction in the economic cost. This inverse relation­
ship between the auction price of land and the percentage sold 
is shown in Table 6(2), where the enclosures for which this 
information is available are ranked according to the former.
This evidence also suggests there was not one but several 
land markets, each with its prevailing values subject to such
— I b5*—
TABLE b C7C)
North Somerset Enclosures Ranked According to Average Selling Price o f  Land
Per Acre
Average 
Selling Price 
Per Acre
Percentage 
o f  Lana
Cost o f  
Enclosure 
Per Acre
A ct Parish Shillings Sold Shillings
1810 Weston-super-Mare 1,381.1 7.2 100.1
1813 Wraxall, Nailsea, 
etc 1,218.1 5 9
No
Evidence
1778 Brislington 1,170.0 5.0 58.5
1793 Kewstoke 1,128.8 10.0 112.9
1814 Portishead 1,048.8 10.2 106.7
1800 Locking 1.035-5 19.2 199.4
1794 Pilton and North 
Wotton 1,031.9 7.0 72.5
1791 Rodney Stoke 995-7 7-4 73-9
1815 Dundry 791.7 195 154-3
1814 Berkley and 
Standerwick 732.2 I6.3 119.6
1809 Congresbury 708.0 II.2 7 9 4
1799 Clevedon 677.7 IO.7 72.2
1777 Compton Bishop 603.6 10.2 61.5
1795 Banwell 588.4 13.8 81.1
1801 Tickenham 581.7 10.2 59-1
1788 Bleadon 490.1 20.4 99-7
1798 Portbury 442.0 25.4 112.1
1788 Westbury 372.4 19.7 73-5
1797 Chewton Mendip 322.7 15.2 49.1
1793 Wells 292.9 17.8 52.1
1795 Cheddar 276.6 13-3 36.9
1811 Cheddar 235.1 58.5 137-6
1792 Wells 230.0 l8.0 41.3
1782 Wookey 211.1 34-5 72.7
1801 Worle •205.3 56.9 116.8
1794 East Harptree 202.3 24.7 49-9
1784 Blagdon 145-7 29-3 42.6
1787 West Harptree 1234 51.1 63.1
1788 Compton Martin 120.0 56.0 67.2
1797 Shipham and 
Winscombe 1138 51-3 58.4
Factors 
Influencing 
Price o f  
Land
Extra-
agricultural
value
Grazing
land
Proximity 
to markets
Grazing land 
but with value 
lowered by 
lesser quality 
moorland (salt 
wharves) or 
inclusion of 
uplands
(moors)
(moors)
Mendip 
Commons 
with values 
raised in 
two cases 
by inclusion 
of moorlands
Source: See Table b  (l).
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factors as the possibility of extra-agricultural development, 
or the relative demand for arable or animal products. It is 
these diverse opportunities which may have have led to the 
puzzling variations in financial costs per acre in this region, 
for there was here no simple chronological escalation as 
accounted for elsewhere in terms of war-time inflation and the 
leaving till last of the more complicated and costly cases. 
Table 6(3) allows these separate land markets to be seen more 
clearly, as it draws on the small number of awards sufficiently 
detailed to allow selling prices to be attributed to different 
types of land in each. It reveals several distinct and separate 
patterns, so that for example the price of Mendip land per acre 
moved generally though erratically upwards as the price of 
wheat also rose with fluctuations from the 1750s, whilst the 
low moorlands reached a high and sustained price level in the 
early 1790s when, after little change from the 1770s, meat
1 o
prices began their dramatic rise .
The pursuit of this line of enquiry gives the purchasers of 
land a special importance, for their judgement was crucial to 
the determination of prices within the different markets. Most 
lived in the region and had a close knowledge of the enclosures 
in which purchases were made, for over half received allotments 
in lieu of claims, in addition to the land bought. Amongst the 
exceptions, family links may sometimes be detected as in the 
case of William Papwell Brigstock esq. of the Albany, London, 
who purchased nearly 18 acres at the Wraxall enclosure
-(67-
t a b l e  6 ( 3 )
Variations in Land Value Within North Somerset Enclosures
Selling Price in Shillings Per Acre
N on-
Other Other agricultural
Act Parish Moors Mendips Lowlands Uplands Use
1777 Compton Bishop 603.6
1778 Brislington 1,170.0
1782 Wookey 671.6 89.2
1784 Blagdon 145-7
1787 West Harptree 1234
1788 Bleadon 807.8 266.0
1788 Compton Martin 120.0
1—
1 00 00 Westbury 904.9 197.8
1791 Rodney Stoke 995-7
1792 Wells 230.0
1793 Kewstoke 1,128.8
1793 Wells 1,240.0 225.3
1794 East Harptree 202.3
1794 Pilton and N  Wotton 1,031.9
1795 Banwell 1,0750 366.7
1795 Cheddar 1,129.8 129.2
1797 Chewton Mendip 322.7
1797 Shipham and 
Winscombe 113.8
1798 Portbury 667.7 244.8
1799 Clevedon 677.7
1800 Locking 10355
1801 Tickenham 581.7
1801 Worle 205.3
1809 Congresbury 2,800.0 347-2
1810 Weston-super-Mare 1,329.5 1,667.2
1811 Cheddar 235-1
1813 Wraxall, Nailsea, etc 1,218.1
1814 Berkley and 
Standerwick 732.2
1814 Portishead 765.9 3,624.6
N
H
00NH Dundry 791.7
Source: From additional evidence in the enclosure awards this Table develops the findings of
Table 66)column VI.
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(1813-19), in which a William Brigstock received an allotment 
in settlement of his claim. But most outsiders came from 
Bristol and many already had a close connection with north 
Somerset. Richard Bright esq. for example, an original partner 
in the Bristol bank of Ames, Cave & Co. lived at Ham Green and 
was entitled to an allotment in the Portbury enclosure (1798- 
1806) in which he also purchased land at a cost of over £1 ,000. 
Samuel Bryant, a Bristol butcher, bought land in the Clevedon 
enclosure (1799-1801),presumably to fatten stock for the city's 
markets as his trustee was a grazier. Bristol's long-standing 
interest in charity lands at Congresbury and Portishead led to 
the purchase of land in those enclosures by the Corporation.
And Bristol glassmaker John Robert Lucas and his partners 
bought land in the Nailsea enclosure to expand their works 
there. Perhaps the most purely speculative purchases by 
Bristolians were of land for house building at Weston-suoer- 
Mare, which was poised for development as a seaside resort.
Classification presents many problems (see Figure ljp.^l), 
but from the detailed analysis of each enclosure award it is 
possible to conclude that yeoman farmers were the main 
purchasers at 45 per cent of the whole. The gentry (including 
for convenience the only two noble buyers: the Marquis of Bath, 
101 acres at Cheddar; and Earl Waldegrave, 80 acres at Chewton 
Mendip) made up 35 per cent. Country dwellers not personally 
involved in farming formed 20 per cent of the total and 
included clergymen, medical men, and attorneys, as well as
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20rural tradesmen especially inn-keepers . The amount bought 
varied greatly, and according to financial resources and 
farming needs rather than social standing. An acre or less 
might round off an existing holding, 20 acres extend it 
significantly, and 50 to 100 acres establish a new farm. At the 
enclosure of Shipham and Winscombe (1797-99) for example one 
yeoman bought 3 and another over 100 acres. At Rode and 
Wingfield (1790-92) the lord of the manor made the largest 
single purchase of 50 acres, but a gentleman of similar status 
bought 2 roods and 14 perches on the bounds of land allotted to 
him. To sum up: 65 per cent of the land sold (to 18 per cent of 
buyers) was in units of 50 acres or more; 25 per cent of that 
sold (to 24 per cent of buyers) was in units of 20 to 49 acres; 
and 10 per cent of that sold (to 57 per cent of buyers) was of 
20 acres or less ,
In at least a dozen cases the purchasers had a close 
conne^ction with enclosures as commissioners, surveyors, and 
builders. Until the turn of the century (41 Geo.Ill c.101) 
there was no bar to the purchase of land by commissioners in 
enclosures with which they were actively concerned, and rising 
men such as John Billingsley, Richard Perkins and Gabriel Stone 
took full advantage of this situation. The highly experienced 
surveyors John Verry of Bristol and William White of Wedmore 
(later a commissioner), both bought land in the course of 
enclosures, as did the building contractors Thomas Curtis of 
Blagdon and Richard Parsley of Weston-super-Mare^. Some of
-170-
these transactions may have been made on behalf of others. The 
rural base of these and other purchasers, and their experience 
of the business of enclosure, imply a considerable degree of 
familiarity with the practice of farming in the region. It is 
likely their bids were made with an awareness of the 
possibilities of the land on offer, and a realization that it 
was marginal in the sense of being the next unit available for 
cultivation (should the cost of bringing it into production be 
balanced by the revenue it could then produce), rather than in 
the sense of being poor agricultural land.
The capital sums raised by land sales from the sources now 
described were laid out on: legal charges, largely incurred in 
obtaining an Act of Parliament; administrative and executive 
costs, largely solicitor’s and commissioners' fees; interest 
payments, on the loans raised by a mortgage of lands to be 
enclosed; and construction costs. This last item is of most 
interest for this study, since it concerns the physical 
restructuring of the land to be enclosed, and the new assets 
created thereby. Information on this matter is limited by the 
rarity of commissioners'accounts, but what is available has 
been analysed, and that relating to capital improvements can be 
seen in Table 6(A). It must be admitted that this evidence is 
too general (Billingsley’s examples) and too limited (three 
enclosures), but it relates to the critical years 1793T to 1815, 
and it has an internal consistency. In the three named cases 
the construction costs formed about 50 per cent of public
- 1 7 1 -
Table 6(4)
Analysis of Capital Improvement Costs in North Somerset
Enclosures
T o ta l
F ences G a te s C o s t  o f I m p r o i’t
S u r v e y o r an d D ra in a g e a n d C o n ­ CoStS P : ’
Fees R o a d s W a lls D itc h e s B ridges stru c tion Acre
£ £ £ £ £ £ S h i l l in g .
I M endip  E nclosures
m id - i 7 9 0 ’s 80 350 OO '-A O 56 i , 33<> 33-4
2 L ow land  E nclosures
m id - i7 9 o ’s 140 450 OO t-A O 140 1,580 39 <
3 Shipham  and W in scon ib e
E nclosure Included
1797-99 106 46 1,262 in Roads i , 4 U 26.4
4 W eston -su p er-M are
E nclosure
1810-15 399 2,448 including sea wall 2 ,847 57 - 5
5 C on g resb u ry , W eek  
St L aw rence and 
P uxton  E nclosure
1809-16 916 in clu d in g  road m aking 398 L 3 U 32.0
costs o f  £102 Bridges
Sources: i and 2 B illin g s le y , op  c it. pp  s s -6 2 .
1 SRO Q /R D c 13.
4 S R O  Q /R D c  12;; W S M  Rub R e f  L ib  L O O /S 3 ,  S /W 1 7 /4 3 .
5 SRO Q /R D c 133; BAO 3 2 W (2 i ) .  25642.
expenditure, and in Billingsley’s examples they are more nearly 
65 per cent, but perhaps his experience enabled him to prevent 
the loss of some improvement costs to other categories. 
Surveying was integral to the construction work, so the fees 
are included here.
The neat classification in this table belies the great range 
of provisions in the awards. The setting out of public roads 
was a first charge, but in seven enclosures between 1791 and 
1809, largely in the low moorlands, this was found not to be 
necessary. The provision of fencing also varied greatly. Its
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importance was lessened in the lowlands because the essential 
drainage ditches, deemed a public cost, functioned as 
boundaries. Before the turn of the century, particularly within 
the Mendip enclosures, it was not uncommon for the fencing of 
individual allotments to be a public cost, though not the sub­
divisions within farms. Afterwards this was less likely, but 
the outer boundaries (subject to negotiation with adjoining 
parishes), the public roads, and the land to be sold, were all 
still likely to be fenced. The allotments relating to special 
rights, for example those made frequently in lieu of the right 
of soil, or occasionally in respect of common rights attached 
to glebe, or rarely in lieu of tithes, were all awarded after 
the sale of land and therefore bore the economic cost of 
enclosure. Portishead (1814-23) was the only exception, and 
here the lord of the manor, James Gordon of the Bristol 
merchant family, secured his one-twentieth before any land was 
sold. Although important capital investments, these varied 
works were undertaken in the course of enclosures in which the 
main purpose was land reorganization and not reclamation. The 
large drainage plans in the Levels, and the process of farm 
making there and in the uplands must now be considered.
ii Drainage and Other Post-enclosure Costs.
The powers of the Commissions of Sewers to deal with 
floodwaters in the Levels were long-established^. They were 
authorized to survey walls, drains, sewers, and floodgates, and
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to order their reform and repair. Complementary to this 
oversight was the responsibility of individuals for ditch and 
wall work, an obligation arising from the ownership or tenancy 
of land, the failure to fulfil which was punishable by a fine. 
Local responsibilities were further emphasised by the 
devolution of the Commission's powers to separate courts, those 
in north Somerset meeting at Wells, Axbridge, and Wrington. 
Commissioners resident in the area took advice from juries made 
up of the owners or occupiers of lands at risk, who watched 
over banks, walls, rhynes (ditches), and clyces (sluice gates), 
recommending repairs and improvements where judged necessary. 
Costs were met by a rate, authorized by commissioners, and 
collected, spent, and accounted for by juries^.
The cost of this sharing of initiative and responsibility 
was a loss of executive momentum at the Courts of Sewers, 
accompanied by doubts as to their power to initiate major new 
works. This led to a legal impasse which only began to weaken 
when enclosure Acts incorporating provisions for drainage were 
introduced for the region. Although as shown, construction work 
within enclosures was usually financed as a public cost from 
the sale of land, the inclusion in some awards of assessments 
and rates for the making and maintenance of drains and bridges 
in the way that private roads were funded, demonstrated that 
new works could be financed by a rate on those benefitting^. 
Influenced by this, and by the growing awareness of property 
rights amongst individuals whose access to moorlands had
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hitherto been shared with others, pressures mounted for the 
Courts of Sewers to undertake new rate-financed comprehensive 
schemes for whole areas.
At the end of the eighteenth century plans were advanced by 
proprietors for the improvement of the drainage of the River 
Axe, to which the Commissioners of the Axbridge Division 
responded by seeking legal advice. They consulted Wyndham 
Goodden in 1800, and were assured they had 'full powers to 
carry [the scheme] into execution*, and that 'incidental to 
that Power... they can levy Rates on all those whose lands will 
be benefitted by it* . But they persisted with their queries, 
asking 'by whom the expences hitherto incurred are to be paid 
and if appeals shod be made agst the Rates and the same [i.e. 
the Rates] set aside Wher the Commissioners were at any risque 
and subject to costs thereon'? Counsel's opinion has not 
survived, but it failed to reassure the Commissioners and they 
decided not to put their powers to the test. The proprietors 
were advised instead to seek a Parliamentary Act . They did so 
and the Axe Drainage was undertaken 1802-10.
Evidence on the negotiations preceding the Weston Drainage 
of 1810-15 is lacking, but when the Commissioners of Sewers for 
the Northern Levels faced pressures to improve the Congresbury 
Yeo, they had similar fears about their powers. In 1812 advice 
was sought on whether in relation to clearing out rhynes, a 
distinction could be made between repairs, which were the
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subject of old obligations, and improvements, which may be 
charged to the whole Level. The opinion given was that they 
might make an order for improvement as well as maintenance on 
the owners immediately concerned and see if it were challenged. 
But such uncertainty was anathema to the Commissioners who 
feared that 'in the Event of any Proceedings agt them in the
Execution of their Office, the Expence of defending will fall
7 7upon them which will be very hard...'* . These worries spread 
to the professionals in their employ. After spending more than 
a year surveying the Congresbury area and drawing up a rating 
assessment, the Bristol surveyor Young Sturge wrote to the 
Commissioners’ solicitor in Feb. 1812 of the hardship of being 
accountable to those he employed whilst himself having no one 
to whom he could look. The opinion of Counsel was that a rate 
could be made to meet the expenses of those 'employed for
o o
carrying their orders into execution'*°, but the Commissioners' 
fears about personal liability were so great that eventually an 
Act of Parliament for the Congresbury Drainage of 1819-26 was 
obtained.
This fear of jeopardizing personal finances by initiating 
new works towards which those benefitting had no obligations by 
traditions of tenure, shows that in handling investment funds 
the Commissioners of Sewers were less well-protected than the 
Enclosure Commissioners or Turnpike Trustees, who were also 
engaged in the business of capital formation by the raising and 
investment of public funds but without the worry of personal
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assets being placed at risk. The difference lay in the legal 
provisions under which they operated, and it was this under­
standable caution on the part of the Commissioners which 
obliged proprietors to obtain Parliamentary authorization for 
the improvements they sought. The pattern adopted echoed that 
already established for land enclosures, in that commissioners 
were appointed with the power to finance and execute certain 
specific capital works. As with drainage work undertaken in the 
course of enclosure, the administration of the completed works 
passed to the Courts of Sewers.
The individuals appointed to execute these large-scale plans 
for investment in Parliamentary drainage were often those who 
were also engaged in Parliamentary enclosures. This applied to: 
the commissioners, whether of the gentry like Francis Edwards 
Whalley esq.of Winscombe, or the professions like Young Sturge, 
Land Steward to Bristol Corpororation (1810-44) and already 
mentioned; the main surveyors such as William White of Sand 
near Wedmore; and the attorneys for example Samuel Baker of 
B l a g d o n ^ .  jn contrast professional engineers of national 
standing like William Jessop and John Rennie rarely worked on 
enclosures, but they had great responsibilities in the drainage 
schemes, devising or approving the new works which were then 
constructed by local men of wide experience in the region.
Tables 6(5),6(6), and 6(7), provide an analysis of the 
drainage schemes, and give a further insight into the process
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of capital investment. Costs shown in the first three columns 
varied according to particular circumstances such as the number 
of commissioners and the timing of their activities. As the 
award came to be drafted by the clerk and deposited with the 
justices for example, the administrative expenses shown in 
column II rose. The interest figures of column IV were a 
feature of the first part of each scheme, for as assessments 
were drawn up and rates collected, the money borrowed on a 
mortgage of the rates was repaid. In the Axe Drainage three 
sums of £5,000 each were borrowed from Messrs.Messiter, Payne,
& Messiter of Wells, bankers to the scheme. In the Weston 
Drainage £3,000 was similarly raised, but as one sum in 1810 
from Philip John Miles esq. in his personal capacity, and not 
as a partner in Messrs. Miles, Vaughan & Co., bankers of Bristol 
and treasurers to the undertaking. This wealthy Bristolian had 
an interest in the scheme through lands in northwest Somerset, 
and he had earlier provided £564 (repaid in 1810) to initiate 
proceedings. For the Congresbury Drainage the attorneys 
concerned provided this facility and the treasurers, Bristol 
bankers Messrs. Ames, Bright & Co. allowed an over-draft which 
had reached £2,250 by 1821^.
Although the schemes as a whole were concerned with the
creation of capital assets, the costs listed in columns V to
VII concern the physical aspects most closely. Column V covers
the costs of surveyors and engineers, including the fees for
31assessments on which rates were based . The costs listed in
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column VI were for construction work done under contract . 
Those in column VII may appear less acceptable as investment 
costs, but if major new works were to be constructed then
c
interests in land and builcjrngs had to be bought out, and 
damages paid. These were more than transfer payments because 
they enabled land to become part of a drainage system capable 
of increasing the productive capacity of a territory larger 
than that immediately concerned. The annual expenditure in 
column VIII is doubly important. It shows that the levying of 
rates secured financial support for schemes long before their 
completion was seen in an increased productivity of land, and 
it also describes the case of fixed assets built over a period 
of time, which may be regarded conventionally as fixed capital 
formation, and not simply as work in progress. The calculation 
of annual costs as a proportion of total expenditure is shown 
in column IX.
Despite the common background of region and procedures the 
pattern varied considerably in the three schemes. In the case 
of the Axe, fed by south-flowing streams from the Mendips and 
and reaching the coast at Uphill, the problems had been much 
examined and debated before the scheme was embarked upon, and 
this is shown by the fairly even distribution of costs in the 
first years, seen in Table 6(5). Fees paid to the famous 
engineer William Jessop appear from 1803, and it was his scheme 
for a tidal clyse to keep out sea water at Hobb1s Boat, and 
major cuts in the meandering River Axe at Loxton, Rackley, and
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and Bleadon, which was carried out by William White in the
/f*
steady manner shown by the distribution of costs in Column VI, 
and reflected in column IX. 10,218 acres were rated.
The pattern of costs in the scheme to drain the isolated 
Weston-in-Gordano valley opening into the Avon estuary was 
determined by the problem of the tide mill at Portishead owned 
by Bristol Corporation. The tenant had the right to admit sea 
water to the main drainage channel, and to use that as a mill 
pond from which water was released to provide power rather than 
drainage. Table 6(6) shows that major expenses came in the 
first year when the tenant received £1,500 for his leasehold 
interest, and in the last year when Bristol Corporation was 
paid £1,114 for its freehold interest, reduced from £2,214 on 
the re-purchase of the buildings. In the intervening years the 
drains, a legacy of the Parliamentary enclosures, were improved 
and co-ordinated on a plan devised by Josias Jessop and
o o
implemented by William White . 1,537 acres were rated.
In the Congresbury Drainage the aim was to drain the moorland 
valley of the Yeo which flowed to the coast north of Mendip. As 
Table 6(7) shows, 67 per cent of the total accounted for was 
spent in the first two years of the scheme, in response to the 
enterprising plan put forward by the engineer John Rennie. The 
problems were common to the Levels, with inflows of sea water 
hampering the drainage of water from the moors and increasing 
the likelihood of flooding, but the solution was innovative.
Table 6 (fT) : The Axe Drainage Scheme, 1802-1810
I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX
Year
Legal-
Parliamentary
£ s d
Admin­
istrative
£ s d
Executive 
3 Com­
missioners
£ s d
Interest 
£ s d
Surveying-
Engineering
£ s d
Construction-
Improvement
£ s d
Land Purchase 
& Damages
£ s d
Annual
Expenditure
£ s d
VIII as prop­
ortion of 
total 
Expenditure 
%
1802 1,179 15 4 244 11 7 132 6 0 125 0 0 501 19 0 2,183 11 11 5.4
1803 158 12 8 198 9 0 250 0 0 399 10 0 900 0 0 1,906 11 8 4.6
1804 248 6 3 245 14 0 375 0 0 599 7 4 1,126 13 0 92 17 0 2,687 17 7 6.6
1805 294 5 7 66 3 0 500 0 0 304 3 0 2,200 0 0 113 2 2 3,477 13 9 8.5
1806 304 0 0 166 19 0 250 0 0 142 17 0 5,014 0 11*2 986 12 4 6,864 9 3*5 16.8
1807 181 19 1 103 14 0 247 0 0 198 14 0 3,583 8 0 843 10 O 5,158 5 1 12.6
1808 290 13 6 242 1 0 434 0 0 4,971 3 10 466 13 6 6,404 11 10 15.7
1809 438 9 4 349 13 0 190 6 0 4,736 6 3 1,620 13 2h 7,335 7 9h 17.9
1810 484 10 11 280 7 0 50 0 0 3,198 4 4 834 4 11 4,847 7 2 11.9
Total 1,179 15 4 2,645 8 11 1,785 6 0 1,747 0 0 2,820 16 4 25,729 16 Ah 4,957 12 lh 40,865 16 1 100.0
Sum­
mary
1802-
13
1,210 6 4 2,922 0 5 1,786 1 0 1,747 0 0 2,609 8 10 25,736 7 6 5,045 13 5 41,056 17 6
Plus balance in Treasurer's hands of £50 2s 7d therefore Total Cost = £41/107 
Sources: 1 S.R.O. D/RA, AD4. "Commissioners' Accounts" presented annually to the Wells Epiphany Sessions, 1803-1811.
Figures for 1802 are from July of that year to the following January. Succeeding years cover the period 
between the Epiphany Sessions.
2 S.R.O. D/RA, AD5. "Account Book" of the Drainage Commissioners, giving details of individual accounts 1802-1812.
3 S.R.O. D/RA, AD4. "Summary of Accounts" 1802-1813. This provides evidence for the total cost, and the
distribution of costs (last line of table above), as it includes bills settled after the Award had been drawn up.
4 S.R.O. D/RA,£D4"Mr Conway's Bills of Expences" 1800-1804.
5 S.R.O. D/RA, AD3"General Cash Account" 1812-1819.
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Table 6(6): The Weston Drainage Scheme, 1810-1815
I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX
Year
Legal-
Parliamentary
Admin­
istrative
Executive 
2 Com­
missioners
Interest
Surveying-
Engin­
eering
Construct­
ion - im­
provement
Land 
Purchase 
& Damages
Annual
Expenditure
VIII as prop­
ortion of 
total 
Expenditure
£ s d £ s d £ s d £ s d £ s d £ f? d .. £. S a £ S.. d %
1810 1,059 1 11 117 19 10 100 0 0 14 3 4 53 10 9 450 0 0 1,500 0 0 3,294 15 10 40.7
1811 181 15 8 58 3 0 160 14 3 142 16 0 600 0 0 1,143 8 11 14.1
1812 429 14 9 116 2 6 95 18 8 46 16 6 144 0 0 256 1 2
COCOorH 13 7 13.4
1813 88 4 3 95 1 9 105 2 11 5 5 0 103 8 5 67 16 7 464 18 11 5.8
1814 75 4 4 147 10 8 7 6 5 127 8 3 52 0 0 409 9 8 5.1
1815 399 12 11 116 13 7 21 0 0 1,159 0 0 1,696 6 6 20.9
Total 1,059 1 11 1,292 11 9 633 11 6 383 5 7 248 8 3 1,445 16 8 3,034 17 9 8,097 13 5 100.0
Plus balance of £611 14s lOd in Treasurer's hands therefore Total Cost = £8,709 8s 3d 
Sources: 1 S.R.O. D/RA, SW11. "Commissioners' Proceedings", 1810-1815.
2 S.R.O. D/RA, SW11. "Rate Book, August 1811, Assessor Wm White".
3 B.A.O. 01105(7). "The Commissioners of the Weston Drainage to Hall and Leman" 1809-1812.
4 S.R.O. D/RA, SW11. "The Comnissioners of the Weston Drainage to Hall and Leman" 1813-1814.
5 B.A.O. 04205. "Bank Pass Book. Weston Drainage Commissioners" 1810-1843.
6 S.R.O. D/RA, SW11. Items of correspondence including tenders, bills and receipts, 1810-1815.
7 B.A.O. 01101(2). Receipts 1814-1815.
8 B.A.O. 01101(3) and (7). Documents relating to the balance in hands of Treasurer.
Table 6 (7): The Congresbury Drainage Scheme/ 1819-1827
I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX
Year
Legal-
Parlia­
mentary
£ s d
Admin­
istrative
£ s d
Executive 
1 Com­
missioner
£ s d
Interest 
£ s d
Surveying-
Engineering
£ s d
Construction
Improvement
£ s d
Land Pur­
chase & 
Damages
£ s d
Annual
Expenditure
£ s d
VIII as Prop­
ortion of 
Total 
Expenditure 
%
1820 983 16 4 311 15 0 47 13 0 624 7 2 3,278 12 0 42 15 0 5,288 18 6 43.9
1821 110 15 0 95 11 0 68 3 2 2,180 13 7 302 2 7 2,757 5 4 22.9
1822 189 12 6 27 16 6 196 10 0 472 18 3 67 16 9 954 14 0 7.9
1823 53 19 6 100 0 0 16 9 10 69 5 0 771 14 5 145 16 0 1,157 4 9 9.6
1824 29 16 0 47 0 6 87 17 0 164 13 6 1.4
1825 13 7 6 14 1 3 27 8 9 0.2
1826 230 0 0 135 14 2 126 14 0 425 0 5 917 8 7 7.7
1827 417 17 11 114 4 0 155 7 0 84 8 4 771 17 3 6.4
Total 983 16 4 1,313 19 11 309 15 0 160 2 6 1,210 19 4 6,975 8 7 1,085 9 0 12P39 10 8 100.0
Plus balance in Treasurer's hands of £386 11s lOd therefore Total Cost = £12/426 2s 6d 
Sources: S.R.O. D/RA, SW11, with a second copy B.A.O., 09337. A single volume of "Proceedings Under
the Congresbury Drainage Act" contains both the deliberations of the Commissioner, pp 3-59, 
and a copy of his accounts, pp 60-80. Although the former records the payment of legal 
expenses with interest in July 1819, these do not appear in the latter until July 1820, for 
which year they are shown above.
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Rennie calculated that the lack of fall could be overcome by 
increasing the number of channels across the barrier of the 
coastal clay belt, so he recommended a new cut from the estuary 
of the Yeo to the inland moors, with major branches either side 
of the river which was to be crossed by a culvert. A new sluice 
called Sampson's Clyse was to be constructed at its seaward 
end. As column VI indicates, the bold scheme was quickly begun 
and the lower expenditure of the later years shows that 
problems were minimal*^. 2,651 acres were rated.
As the sum levied by rate was a contribution to fixed capital 
formation it would be reasonable to assume its payment was the 
responsibility of the landlord, for the traditional division in 
English farming has been between the landlord's provision of 
items of fixed capital, notably buildings and drainage, and the
o c
tenant's provision of stock and working capital . But in north 
Somerset the rate to finance capital investment in drainage 
schemes was by Act of Parliament shared between landlords and 
their tenants according to the different forms of tenancy. 
Landlords were to pay the full costs for rack rent tenants; to 
share them with rack rent tenants holding a lease for a term of 
years; and to have a lesser responsibility where other forms 
prevailed, for example tenants in tail or for life . The 
second case may have presented the most difficulty as can be 
illustrated from the following note inside a Rate Book for the 
Axe Drainage, 'Supposing the fee simple to be worth twenty 
eight years purchase, the rate imposed upon the land should be
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borne by the Rack Rent Tenant or the Landlord in the following 
proportions...', which are then related to the unexpired years 
of the lease^.
Correspondence amongst the Congresbury Drainage papers shows 
however that^landlords assumed their tenants would finance the 
scheme. A note of 1811 says, 'John Walter of Milton refuses to 
pay saying it belongs to his tenant Samuel Pearce to pay, he 
occupying the premises to which the common belongs', and in 
1812 the Bishop of Bath and Wells wrote that as the lands of 
his see were already well drained he hoped the tenants would 
not be subjected 'to any Part of the Expence attending the 
Improvement of the Congresbury Drainage, from which they can
O O
derive little or no benefit' .  But the many surviving 
assessments and rates (like those concerning property owned by 
Queen Elizabeth's Hospital, Bristol, where most tenancies were 
held on lives), show that commissioners apportioned the
o q
responsibility as instructed by law . The conclusion is there­
for that some tenants contributed to capital investment.
Lastly, it may be calculated from the available evidence 
that the cost of the Axe Drainage was on average 80.5s per 
acre, of which capital improvements (covering surveying, 
construction, land purchase and damages, crucial to the new 
work) accounted for 65.4s per acre. In the Weston Drainage the 
respective costs were 113.3s and 61.5s per acre, and in the 
Congresbury Drainage they were 93.7s and 69.9s per acre.
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Although it cannot be claimed that all the lands involved in 
these schemes had previously been the subject of Parliamentary 
enclosure, the overlap is great enough for them to be regarded 
in many cases as two aspects of the same process of capital 
investment. It has been noted that in the Weston Drainage some 
of the channels dug earlier in the course of enclosures were 
improved. This suggestion can be taken further with the Axe 
Drainage, for six of the parishes covered by that scheme of 
1802-10 included land which had been enclosed between 1777 and 
1801. The combined cost of enclosure (averaging 69.7s per acre) 
and drainage (80.5s per acre) was 150.2s per acre. This is so 
close to the estimated cost of 150.0s per acre for the 
Parliamentary enclosure of the waste lands in general in the 
years 1802-1815 calculated by Holderness^, as to suggest that 
the extensive drainage provisions included in those cases were 
undertaken in north Somerset not as an enclosure but a post­
enclosure investment.
The rare survival of extra-award documents for the 
Congresbury, Week St. Lawrence, and Puxton enclosure of 1809- 
16 which preceded the Congresbury Drainage of 1819-26, allows 
the complementary relationship between lowland enclosure and 
drainage to be examined in greater detail, especially in terms 
of capital improvements. The overlap applied to about one- 
third of the acreage drained; to the personnel, for Young 
Sturge acted as commissioner for the enclosure and surveyor to 
both schemes; and to the basic engineering concept for John
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Rennie's new cut from the sea back to the moors linked up with 
the channels dug during the recently completed enclosure. This 
close constructional relationship was reflected in the funding 
of the work, which provides specific evidence of the general 
case being made. Thus in terms of capital improvements the 
Congresbury enclosure and drainage costs of 32.0s and 69.9s per 
acre, were at a total of 101.9s per acre very close to the 
putative costs of 101.1s per acre for the years 1802-15, 
derived from Holderness1 estimates. Viewed in this perspective 
the north Somerset enclosures initiated the process of capital 
investment, and made possible the further works of drainage, 
soil reclamation, and farm making, by which waste lands were 
converted into productive farms.
Unlike the processes of enclosure and drainage, investment 
in farm making was a matter for individuals about whom little 
may be known. The lack of primary evidence means that great 
weight has had to be placed on contemporary writers, especially 
John Billingsley. This limitation is unfortunate but can be 
justified, for this Mendip landowner and farmer was an active 
member of the Bath and West Society and so in touch with 
private developments in the region, as well as being involved 
in public undertakings as a commissioner of enclosures and 
sewers. And his estimates have proved reliable when checked 
against alternative sources. For example, as Table 6(8) shows,
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his estimation of 48.8 to 50.0s per acre as the cost of Mendip 
enclosure, is very close to the average for that area of 48.5s 
per acre before the mid-90s (when the Agriculture of Somerset 
was written), derived from evidence assembled in Table 6(1). 
From this source too comes evidence that at Chewton Mendip the 
cost of enclosure at the end of the 1790s was 49.1s per acre. 
This is incorporated in Table 6(8) under the heading of Wigmore 
Farm, which was created by this enclosure and will be examined 
more fully later.
From Billingsley's generalizations, supported by evidence in 
the awards, it may be said that upon enclosure the Mendip 
farmer received land which was likely to have been fenced and 
provided with public roads, but for which the extra costs of 
farm-making had to be borne individually. Billingsley held that 
investment in buildings was of major importance 'for the 
purpose of creating a distinct farm'. Costs varied according to 
acreage, but on most Mendip farms of 100 to 200 acres, 'a farm­
house, barn, stable, stalling, barton, pool and pig-stye' 
would cost about 50.0s per acre. This and following estimations 
have been incorporated in Table 6(8). A second basic cost was 
that of fencing individual fields with limestone walls or 
hedges. Michael Williams has shown that Mendip fields varied, 
with more than half being less than 10 acres, nearly a third 
between 10 and 20 acres, and the remaining sixth over that 
figure. On a 100 acre farm with ten oblong fields (a shape 
recommended by Billingsley),it may be estimated that walls or
Table 6 (8) : Farm Creation Costs on Mendip (shillings per acre)
Soil Type Cost of Post-enclosure Costs Total
Farm Establishment Reclamation Total Post­ Farmox raj. xjLcunenuai.y
Location Enclosure
Buildings Costs - 
Fences, Roads
Costs enclosure
Costs Creation
Costs
Wigmore Farm.
Ston Easton 49.1 47.3 31.2 103.4 181.9 231.0
Series
Silty, well- 
drained soil.
48.5
48.8
50.0
50.0
36.0 - 124.5 - 210.5 - 259.0 -
Nordrach 56.5 132.0 238.5 288.5
Series
Peaty soil on 48.5 179.8 - 265.8 - 314.3 -
clay pan. 
Priddy Series
48.8
50.0
50.0 36.0
263.3 349.3 399.3
Sources: 1 Tables 6(1), 6(^\) .
2 Text pp. 187/1
3 Billingsley, "Culture of Potatoes" 1793; Agriculture of Somerset, 1795; "Bath and 
West of England Society" 1805; "Essay on Waste-Lands" 1807.
NOTES: These figures show a cumulative sequence of investment. Those for Wigmore Farm,
Chewton Mendip, cover the years 1797 to 1806. In the two general examples parliamentary 
costs are for the years to the mid-1790s, post-enclosure costs cover the following 
decade. Changing price levels constitute a difficulty for such an exercise, but this 
problem has been to some extent accommodated by the fact that the suggested investment 
would have taken place in sequence over the years indicated.
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hedges would cost 36.0s per acre. Billingsley himself created 
nearly 100 miles of fencing on between 3,000 and 4,000 acres of 
his own land in the years before 1805, at an estimated cost of 
56.5s per acre^.
Buildings and fences formed the background for what 
Billingsley described as ’nothing less than the process by 
which this comparatively barren soil is converted into fertile 
and productive land1. On the widespread soils of the Nordrach 
series, see Table 6(8), reclamation consisted largely of 
repeated ploughing, harrowing, and liming, at a cost of 124.5s 
per acre in the mid-1790s. Ten years later the cost was an 
estimated 132.0s per acre, though this included an allowance 
for clearing difficult ground. Billinsley followed these 
procedures himself, reclaiming the 3,000 to 4,000 acres noted 
above by ploughing four or five times and spreading 500,000 
bushels of lime. With the poorly drained and acid soils of the 
Priddy series however, a hard clay pan just under the surface 
had to broken up. Billingsley recommended the planting of 
potatoes and in the 1780s he reclaimed several plots this way 
at an average cost of 179.8s per acre, rising to 263.3s per 
acre by 1803. It was costly he said, for Scotch seed potatoes 
had to be purchased in Bristol, and wage rates increased to 
replace workers lured away by builders there and in Bath. The 
procedures followed at Wigmore Farm in Chewton Mendip, set out 
in Table 6(9), serve to confirm Billingsley’s account, although 
reclamation costs were lower, perhaps because the free draining
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Table 6 : Farm Making in the Mendips. Wigmore Farm, Chewton Mendip,
1797-1806.
Form of Expenditure Cost 
£ s d
Distribution 
of Costs
£ s d
Proportion 
of Total 
Cost
%
Cost per 
Acre
Shillings
Cost of Buildings 
Cottage 44 14 10
Farm-house & offices 480 0 0
Stable 106 O 0
Barn 160 0 0
Stalling etc lOO
890
0
14
0
10
Not yet erected are 
dairy-house, waggon-house, 
pig-styes 150 0 0 1,040 14 10 26.0 47.3
Establishment Costs
Stone & quick fences 287 19 0
Roads lOO 16 4
Four Limekilns 40 0 0
Future tending of fences 256 10 8 685 6 0 17.1 31.2
Reclamation Costs
Cutting-furze, levelling, 
hauling off stones, 
draining
r
183 19 2
Ploughing, dragging and 
manuring 380 acres with 
160 bushels of lime per 
acre 2,090 0 0 2,273 19 2 56.9 103.4
TOTAL £4,000 0 0 100.0 181.9
Source: Billingsley, "Essay on Waste-Lands", 1807, pp 45-47.
NOTES: The parish of Chewton Mendip was enclosed in the years 1797-1800,
S.R.O. Q/RDe 23. The 440 acre farm then created was improved in 
the course of the following years, as shown above. In 1806 its 
rental value was £420 per annum.
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and loamy soils of the Ston Easton series on the flanks of 
Mendip were easier to work^.
Despite the interest of contemporary farmers and writers such 
as Richard Locke of Burnham and Thomas Davis of Longleat, 
steward to the Marquis of Bath, Billingsley remains the best 
informant on farm making in the Levels. The costs of enclosure 
are shown in Table 6(10), where the figures of 60.0 to 62.1s 
per acre come from Billingsley's estimates^. That of 97.9s per 
acre for the clay lands, derived from Table 6(1), exceeds his 
figure, but that of 67.7s per acre from the same source for the 
rest of the Levels before the mid-90s comes close to it. In the 
course of lowland enclosure a network of channels were created 
which drained the land and separated farms, but the additional 
costs of Parliamentary drainage (where needed) and farm making 
still had to be met.
The boggy peats and clays of the Levels were a challenge to 
the improver, but the continuing profitability of the pastoral 
farming long associated with the lowlands blunted enthusiasm 
for reclamation and a change to arable. Farms were not large, 
those for dairying being usually 50 to 120 acres and for 
grazing somewhat more, but they were profitable. Billingsley 
wrote of dairy farming, 'There are few trades in which a small 
capital can be employed to greater advantage than this', and in 
T.D.Acland's view 'The graziers are generally a substantial 
body of men', requiring more capital to stock their land than
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dairy farmers. Locke summed up the general prosperity of both 
by claiming to know fifty farmers within a few miles, worth ten 
thousand pounds each, built up by themselves or their fathers 
over the last fifty years^.
Billingsley was curiously neglectful of buildings as part of 
the process of farm making in the Levels, and only one 
independent item of relevance has been found. This refers to 
the building of a new farm in the Northern Levels between 1808 
and 1810 at a cost of £970, but as there is no hint of the 
acreage concerned, average costs cannot be calculated. Although 
the rhynes built around farms as an enclosure provision were 
primarily for drainage, linking up with major channels, their 
depth of five feet and width of eight at the top also made them 
a formidable boundary. Field drainage however was the 
responsibility of individual farmers, and as with the uplands 
the estimation of this post-enclosure cost depends on the size 
of fields involved. Those newly enclosed were generally smaller 
than the 20 to 40 acre fields of the settled clay grazing lands . 
Williams has judged that they were from 5 to 15 acres, being 
commonly 10 acres, and he quotes a contemporary observation of 
'regular quadrilateral enclosures and moors intersected by 
rectilinear canals'. On the basis of 10 rectangular fields on a 
100 acre farm, and according to Billingsley's estimates for the 
work, the sub-division and draining of enclosure allotments 
would generally have cost 6.0s to 7.5s per acre, though more in 
the worst turf bogs See Table 6(10).
Table 6(10): Farm Creation Costs in the Levels (shillings per acre)
Cost of Post-enclosure Costs Total
Soil Type Parliamentary
Enclosure
Drainage 
Internal 
to Farms
Reclamation
Costs
Parliamentary
Drainage
Total Post­
enclosure 
Costs
Farm
Creation
Costs
Estuarine clay
Wentloog
Series
60.0
62.1
97.9
7.5
Manured by 
contents of 
ditches.
80.5 88.0 148.0 - 185.9
Red
Alluvium 
Compton Series
60.0
62.1
67.7
6.0
No extra
costs
given.
80.5 86.5 146.5 - 154.2
Black
Moory earth. 
Godney Series
60.0
62.1
67.7
6.0 94.0 80.5 180.5
240.5 - 
248.2
Turf Bog. 
Sedgemoor 
Series
60.0
62.1
67.7
6.0
plus
5.0
56.0
48?£f4.0
or
200.0
80.5
195.5 -
291.5
255.5 - 
359.2
Sources: 1 Tables b(t ) / b(5) •
2 Text pp. |
3 Billingsley, Agriculture of Somerset, 1795; "Essay on Waste-Lands" 1807.
NOTES: In this cumulative sequence of investment, parliamentary enclosure costs are for the
years up to the mid-1790s, and post-enclosure costs cover the period to 1810.
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Soil reclamation costs in the Levels varied according to the 
different problems faced. Clay lands could be kept in a state 
of 'unabating fertility’ by manuring with the contents of 
ditches, and only labour costs were involved. Such land could 
be rented for 40.0s to 60.0s per acre. On the red alluvial soil 
drainage was of chief importance. If tilled it was 'capable of 
bearing a variety of crops in the highest perfection’. Its 
value was 45.0s per acre. Even the 'black moory earth' could be 
made productive by the incorporation of a thick coat of clay or 
red earth, and Billingsley referred to the skilful management 
of his land by Mr. Lax of Godney in illustration of this claim. 
The land forming this recently enclosed farm had been purchased 
from the Commissioners for £15 per acre, and additional drain­
age and claying had cost another £5 per acre. The 35 acres were 
then able to support a herd of 20 cows and a bull, and the 
rented value was 20.0s per acre. If the cost of extra drainage 
was 6.0s per acre as already calculated, then the additional 
claying must have cost a further 94.0s per acre. This was high, 
but not as great as the cost of re-claiming the turf bog. The 
basic work of burning the vegetation, ploughing deeply, digging 
ditches, and manuring with the black mould which lay above the 
peat, would cost 56.0s per acre. The addition of clay or red 
earth would cost a further 48.0s to 64.0s per acre but the land
would then be worth 25.0s to 30.0s per acre^ Again Billingsley ^ 
sought to provide an encouraging example, that of Mr.William 
Moxham of Glastonbury who had advanced the rental of his land 
from 1.0s to 30.0s per acre. This had been achieved largely by
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draining, and earthing with some 100 to 150 cart loads per acre
U f)of red earth at a cost of more than 200.0s per acre . These 
estimates are also shown in Table 6(10).
iii Conclusions
This study of capital investment in agriculture in north 
Somerset has shown how the process was facilitated by the 
existence of a matrix of individuals acting in response to 
influences within the region as well as to their own concerns. 
This network included the agricultural interest, yeoman farmers 
as well as large landowners; professional men such as lawyers, 
bankers, surveyors and engineers; investors and speculators; 
and enthusiasts for change, who undertook public ’improvements’ 
as gentlemen amateurs, before the professionals asserted them­
selves. Amongst all of these the Bristol interest was well- 
represented, by professionals based in the city, or wealthy 
individuals and institutions who either already owned land in 
the region, or purchased it through the new opportunities 
offered. By the use of Parliamentary powers which established 
the right of commissioners to undertake new work, open lands 
were enclosed, and large-scale drainage works effected. The 
levying of a rate in the Levels had the advantage of enabling 
new works to be financed by instalments, but the practice of 
raising enclosure capital through land sales had more important 
consequences. It brought relief from the constraints of rate 
finance and allowed more capital works to be undertaken than
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might otherwise have been the case. But this resort to the land 
market did more than affect the magnitude of capital available, 
it also shifted the focus from the endogenously determined 
question of the demand for capital, to that of its supply. It 
therefore introduced an element of personal judgement (through 
commissioners' decisions about the amount of land to be sold, 
and purchasers' decisions about the price of land to be bought) 
which emphasizes that enclosures, drainage,and farm making must 
be viewed in the commercial context of expectations about land 
use and financial returns, rather than the disinterested 
setting of a belief in agricultural improvements, whose 
advocates were in any case not averse to taking advantage of 
the opportunities they had helped to create.
The task of determining the financial returns to this 
investment is daunting, especially as it concerns the 
interpretation of inadequate evidence for a specialist purpose. 
However an attempt will now be made to draw some conclusions, 
on the basis of the increase of rents and accruing capital 
value of the land concerned. By his analysis of developments at 
Wigmore Farm, Chewton Mendip, around the turn of the century, 
Billingsley provides some welcome information on the subject. 
The rent of the unenclosed and unimproved common land was 4.0s 
per acre, which gives the 440 acres to be enclosed a capital 
value at 25 years purchase of £2,300, if the contemporary 
practice of estimating this by a capitalization of rents is 
observed. By 1806 when the farm establishment analysed in Table
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6(9) had been undertaken, the rent had risen to 20.0s per acre 
and the capital value at 25 years purchase was then £10,500.
How far this increase reflected external factors such as the 
general price inflation we cannot tell, but the possible 
inclusion of an element of 'pure1 rent in the Ricardian sense 
is unlikely, for Wigmore Farm exhibits that conversion of 
marginal into productive land which itself increased the 
returns to longer cultivated acres. The choice of this example 
was a particularly happy one by Billingsley, for from the 
Chewton Mendip Award the further calculation can be made that 
the enclosure was undertaken at a cost of 49.1s per acre, 
financed by the sale of land at a little more than £16 per 
acre,Table 6(1). From its earlier price of £5.2s per acre 
unenclosed, the prospect of enclosure had thus raised the cost 
of land about three fold, which confirms Billingsley's views of 
the general effect of this process on land values^.
This dove-tailing of evidence from the Award and Billingsley 
can be used to make a more detailed study of the way the rate 
of return on capital changed in response to the investment 
made. If, as the result of the expenditure of 49.1s per acre to 
cover enclosure costs, the rent of land forming Wigmore Farm 
rose from the 4.0s per acre given by Billingsley to the 12.8s 
per acre derived from the selling price of £16 per acre, then 
this indicates a rate of return on investment in land re­
organization alone of 17.9 per cent which is within the range
48suggested by some writers . But in the Mendips this investment
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was not enough, and Billingsley described the fall in rents and 
in the rate of return to capital invested, when an enclosure 
was not followed by the close attention to buildings and soil 
reclamation described at Wigmore Farm. But there was a 
disincentive, for the returns to this further investment were 
not as great as those to enclosure itself. Thus at Wigmore Farm 
the 49.1s per acre which raised rents by 8.8s per acre and 
produced a rate of return of 17.9 per cent, was followed by a 
further investment of 181.9s per acre which raised rents a 
further 7.2s per acre and produced a rate of return of 3.95 per 
cent. Had this supplementary investment not been seen as a 
safeguard of the initial capital input, many would doubtless 
not have made it. As it was it contributed to a rate of return 
of 6.9 per cent on the investment of £11.55 per acre between 
1797 and 1806 in the enclosure and post-enclosure costs, 
reflected in the increase of rent from 4.0s to 20.0s per acre. 
This special case is borne out by further contemporary evidence 
of a more general nature, cited by B i l l i n g s l e y ^ .
In the only example in the Levels where the costs of 
enclosure and farm creation can be similarly distinguished, 
Billingsley noted that on a turf bog farm, rents had advanced 
from 1.0s to 30.0s per acre at a reclamation cost of 291.45s 
per acre. To this must be added enclosure costs of 67.7s per 
acre. Despite the higher overall investment figure of £18 per 
acre, the rate of return at 8.0 per cent was comparable to that 
in the Mendips because the relative increase in rents was
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greater. In the clay and alluvial soils of the Levels the rents 
rose higher and farm making costs were lower than in the turf 
bogs. The rate of return may have been from 13.0 to 16.0 per 
cent, but there is no specific case from which this may be 
argued-*^. To sum up, it seems fair to say that in the period 
of the 1790s and early years of the following century, covered 
by contemporary evidence, the rate of return on investment in 
enclosure and farm making was an estimated 7.0 to 8.0 per cent, 
though according to circumstances which cannot be explored here 
it could have been as low as 4.0 or as high as 16.0 per cent.
In Billingsley's judgement the profits at Wigmore Farm were 
'sufficient to satisfy any reasonable person', but although 6.9 
per cent was a good return on a safe investment, it does not 
suggest that the enclosure and reclamation of the waste lands 
was the very profitable use of capital it is thought to have 
been.
Billingsley recommended the adoption of mixed farming-^, 
but this advice was largely ignored as farmers followed the 
market and concentrated on lucrative grain crops in the uplands 
and pastoral farming in the lowlands. In these circumstances 
the further investment needed to capitalize on the procedures 
of enclosure and drainage was not readily forthcoming, because 
in the short run favourable returns could be secured without 
it. This is shown for example in William's analysis of the 
Property Tax of 1813, which led him to conclude that although 
rents within the county varied widely, the average rent of over
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30.0s per acre was amongst the highest in England at that time,
c o
being matched or surpassed only by six counties^ . By the mid­
nineteenth century however, Acland was lamenting that the ’Want 
of capital is the cause which most retards farming in 
Somersetshire’. He was particularly critical of Bristol 
landowners in this respect, finding lands administered by 
charitable trustees neglected, and those 'purchased as 
investments by residents..left unimproved..if their rent is 
paid regularly'^ . Sometimes the Bristol connection led to 
land being withdrawn altogether from farming stock, as magnates 
such as the Smythes of Long Ashton and the Eltons of Clevedon 
Court enhanced the setting of their houses by extending 
parklands, planting trees and creating walks on ground 
allotted, bought,or exchanged during enclosure^. For some, the 
returns to this investment were thus private and immeasurable 
as well as financial. But in general it was upon the last- 
named that expectations were focussed, and in this respect the 
enforced investment resulting from the raising of large capital 
sums by enclosure and drainage commissioners should not be 
underestimated, for the returns to these capital improvements 
suggests an economic rationality in the use of funds and not 
simply an institutional or topographical determinism.
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Chapter 7 Capital Investment in Mining
Investment in mining led to a growth of physical capital in 
terms of surface buildings and equipment, and underground 
shafts and tunnels, but the study of this process is made 
difficult by the fact that as Pollard has observed, few of the 
surviving records relate to capital formation itself. In 
pursuit of the subject he was able to consult over 600 colliery 
accounts, in 60 per cent of which most capital items could be 
identified. For north Somerset however, even these are hard to 
come by, and the evidence available consists largely of legal 
documents establishing the ownership of mining rights, their 
leasing out, and the formation of partnerships to work for 
minerals. Subject to close scrutiny however, these have proved 
to be informative on the process of investment in the mining 
not only of coal, but also of lead and calamine, two minerals 
neglected in national studies^-.
The need for a legal definition of mining rights, which 
extended the activities of attorneys into a further sphere, 
arose from the complications of ownership. The Crown’s right to 
gold and silver (and its associate lead), had on Mendip been 
granted since mediaeval times to four Lords Royal in an 
arrangement that was further complicated by the customary 
rights of free miners. Manorial lords had the right to minerals 
under commons, waste,and copyhold land, and this was upheld 
during enclosures by the inclusion in awards of clauses
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assuring their continuing or 'saving1 right to mine, or to 
lease out rights in return for a freeshare. Freeholders had the 
right to minerals under their land which they also could work, 
lease out, or sell in a separation of surface and subsoil 
rights. The papers studied (including the enclosure awards), 
show that this framework formed the legal basis for mining in 
north Somerset. The capital and mining skills to develop this 
resource came from the partnerships that were formed, even 
amongst free leadminers.
Although the region was well-provided with minerals, until 
the mid-eighteenth century mining was chiefly associated with 
the Mendips, where lead and zinc ores were found in the 
carboniferous limestone and dolomitic (keuper) conglomerate of 
the uplands, and coal was mined in the eastern valleys. It is 
on the subsequent development of these three minerals, here and 
elsewhere in the region,that this study will focus.
i The Mining of Lead and Calamine.
Calamine, the carbonate ore of zinc, was not worked until 
the second half of the sixteenth century, but the early 
exploitation of the ores of lead or galena with their small 
quantities of silver made Mendip possibly the most ancient
o
mining district in England . The centralized supervision of 
mining was established in mediaeval times by the division of
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the Royal Forest into four Liberties, each under the 
jurisdiction of a Lord Royal who profited from mineral duties 
or 'lot1, and from fines related to the laws and customs 
peculiar to Mendip. These revenues increased with the 
significant rise in output from the mid-sixteenth century, the 
lead mines reaching their productive peak between 1600 and 
1670. They then began to decline but there was a compensatory 
rise in the extraction of calamine which was in its prime in 
the middle decades of the eighteenth century .
The status of the freeminer was diminished by the creation of 
the Lords Royal able to assert their control through a right of 
soil rather than a local mining constitution, and although it 
was unlikely that a miner would be refused a licence to dig for
mineral ores, and mines and shares in them continued to be
I
regarded as assignable property with no time limit attafched,
i'1
these favourable conditions applied only on open common or 
wastes^. Elsewhere mining rights were granted for a specified 
period, in a pattern which was bound to resemble that operating 
elsewhere as Mendip commons were enclosed^. Despite these 
qualifications the independence of the miner was not illusory, 
and the mining field never became the monopoly of any one 
individual or firm. Most mines remained small scale ventures 
operated by free miners individually or with partners, although 
from Elizabethan times these came to include local gentry, 
tradesmen such as innkeepers, and Bristol merchants, as well as 
other free miners. Wage labour was employed. Rarely,
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capitalists from outside the region like Bevis Bulmer and 
Thomas Bushell in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries tried 
unsuccessfully to drain and extend the mines.
The decline in output by the end of the seventeenth century
was largely the result of the intensity of earlier work which
had exhausted the more accessible lodes, leaving only those
that were subject to flooding. Baling with leather buckets was
an inadequate answer to the problem, but it may be that the
introduction of effective drainage was hampered less by a lack
of funds than by the problem of their effective employment in
an industry dominated by free miners, who preferred to continue
a traditional way of life by seeking alternative outlets for
their labour, rather than by coming to terms with their capital
requirements. This attitude was fostered by the riches of
Mendip which led Gough to comment ’there is scarcely a parish,
from Bleadon and Hutton in the west to Binegar and Croscombe in
the east, where mining for lead or some other metal has not 
£
taken place’ . Faced with a drainage problem, miners could 
either open up new sites for lead or search for other minerals, 
both of which allowed the emphasis to remain on labour rather 
than capital.
Calamine was the most profitable alternative mineral. It can 
be alloyed with copper to produce brass, but that industry was 
unknown in this country before the sixteenth century when the 
government, anxious that England should produce its own raw
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materials for ordnance, encouraged German capitalists to invest 
in these untapped mineral resources. This encouragement led 
first to the mining of copper in Cumberland by the Mines Royal,
incorporated in 1565, then to the formation of the Society of
Mineral and Battery Works and the search for calamine. In 1566 
this was discovered at Worle Hill, a Mendip outlier to the west 
of the main lead-producing region. By the seventeenth century 
mines had also been opened up on Broadfield Down, north of the
main range, and at Shipham and Winscombe on Mendip itself. The
Mines Royal Act of 1689 which ended the previously inhibiting 
monopolies and allowed the development of private companies, 
set the seal on the significance of these mines. One of the 
most important customers was the Bristol Brass Wire Company, 
founded 1702, but there was also a continuing demand from 
Birmingham as Mendip calamine was held to be the best in 
England. By the later eighteenth century the mines on 
Broadfield Down above Wrington had been abandoned, and Shipham 
and Rowberrow in western Mendip had become the two most 
important mining villages^. But more easterly workings in the 
Liberties of Harptree and Chewton continued to function 
throughout the eighteenth century, and it is for these areas 
that some documentary material has survived.
The survival of papers for these Liberties, in contrast to 
Wells and the West, is due largely to the continuity provided 
by the Waldegrave family of Chewton Mendip who were not only 
the ancient Lords Royal of Chewton, but whose purchase of the
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Harptree estate in the early nineteenth century ensured the
o
safety of evidence for that Liberty too . A valuation of East 
Harptree in 1793 which emphasised that ’The principal part of 
the profits arise from Lapis Calaminaris which is found in 
pretty considerable quantities and a little Yellow Ochre which 
is found upon the common of Mendip. Some small quantity of lead 
has been found but these are very trifling...No coals have been 
found or worked here..1, would have applied equally to the 
Chewton Liberty at that time except that coal had been mined in 
the eastern valleys of Mendip from at least the fifteenth 
century^. The fact that lead was no longer an important source 
of profit for miners or Lords Royal made no difference to the 
relations between them, for by an order of 1773 calamine and 
ochre were made subject to the payment of lot in the way that 
lead was charged, showing that the ancient rights of soil could 
be adapted to meet new circumstances^. With the roles of the 
participants regulated by tradition, by what process were the 
capital investment needs of mining on Mendip met?
The Lords Royal were responsible for the provision and 
maintenance of buildings at the ’minery' or headquarters to 
which ore was taken for cleaning, weighing, and processing. It 
was to their advantage to provide these items of fixed capital, 
for the produce of an otherwise dispersed industry was then 
concentrated in one place under the supervision of the lead 
reeve, easing the task of collecting the lot. The location of 
the four mineries was determined largely by the availability of
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water on the dry uplands, for before the lead ore was smelted 
or the calamine calcined it had to be washed in 'buddies' 
which, judging by the work undertaken regularly at the Chewton 
minery, were more than simple troughs by the second half of the 
eighteenth century. In 1768 for example a wall was built around 
them; in 1771 a carpenter put in posts and a door of new oak 
and righted the 'Eyre Gate'; and an account in 1776 shows they 
were then substantial buildings with thatched rafters and 
locked doors, to which water was conveyed through elm 
conduits^. The absence of any mention of furnaces for smelting 
lead or ovens for calcining calamine suggests that both were by 
then being undertaken in Bristol where coal was cheap and 
accessible. This move would not have diminished the control by 
the Lords Royal, who continued to safeguard their lot by 
providing the items of fixed capital required for washing and 
weighing the ore.
Hidden behind their imposing title and hereditary rights of
soil were four representatives of the different influences upon
the economy and society of north Somerset. They included the 
or
Bishops^Bath and Wells, whose extensive lands gave influence 
over agricultural as well as mining developments; the Gores of 
the West Liberty, wealthy London merchants who bought the manor 
of Barrow Gurney in the mid-seventeenth century, and confirmed 
their position as Somerset gentry by marrying into the Smythe 
and Langton families; the Scropes of Harptree, representing the 
Bristol link, where their fortune was founded in the first half
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of the eighteenth century on law, politics, and merchant riches 
by marriage; and the Waldegraves, granted the manor of Chewton 
by the Crown in the mid-sixteenth century, but absent from the 
region in person and influence for the next three hundred 
years. All relied greatly on their representatives in the 
mineries, men such as George Pope who was an active mine 
partner as well as Scrope's agent in Harptree, and Robert
Wright who was an important freeholder in East Harptree and the
Waldegrave agent for six manors of which the most important 
were Chewton and Radstock. He is already familiar as a 
commissioner in seven local enclosures from 1775 to 1791 (twice 
as banker), in which he was able to ensure the continuity of 
mining rights for Lords both Royal and of the Manor. For over 
thirty years from 1764 he accounted at Michaelmas to the 
Waldegraves for the 'Rents,Issues and Profits’ of their lands, 
benefiting in the intervals from the use of these funds. 
Wright's accounts show the generally low returns from lead lot, 
though there was a rise from an average of £20 per year in the 
1760s to £30 per year in the 1770s, with an eventual decline to 
less than £8 per year in the 1780s. There was some compensation 
from calamine and yellow ochre, but the most dramatic growth 
was in revenue from the coal mines at Radstock for which the 
Lord's freeshare in the 1780s (when this revenue was first 
recorded), grew from £86 in 1780 to £700 in 1789, averaging 
£463 per year over the decade. All moneys were remitted by bill
to Messrs. Drummond in London .
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Evidence on the part played by miners may be found in a 
notebook for 1773-1810 kept by the lead reeve for the Chewton 
Minery, John York. He was both an active miner, named regularly 
in partnership with others, and a farmer to whom land was 
allotted in the Chewton Mendip enclosure award of 1800 in which 
he was described as a yeoman of that place . Information from 
this source is set out in Table 7(1), where column I shows how 
few asked 'leave to work and mine on the Forrest of Mendip 
within the manor of Chewton ....according to the Customs and 
Orders of the Forrest1 in the last quarter of the eighteenth 
century. But amongst those already licensed there was 
considerable activity. Column II reveals the number of claims 
registered. The way these clustered around particular sites 
such as Red Quar or Green Oar shows the need for a clear 
demarcation of rights. The intermixing of pitches led to the 
exchanges listed in column IV, to consolidate scattered 
holdings. Not all claims related to untried ground, and column 
III records those for old, abandoned grooves or gruffs, for 
example Tilt Gruff in 1778. Columns V and VI record agreements 
already made, some relating to partnerships of extreme 
complexity, such as one with 10 partners and 15 shares-^.
Evidence on the sale of rights to pitches and grooves in 
column VI provides interesting though limited information on 
the capital employed in mining. In 1785 for example a quarter 
part of a gruff and pitches at Drappers 'now working for 
Callamnie... Together with Callamnie Tools and everything
Table 7(1) : Lead and Calamine Mining in the Liberty of Chewton, 1773-1810
I II III IV V VI
Year Licences Claims to Claims to Exchange Partnerships Sale of Pitches
Granted Pitches Grooves of Rights Notified and Grooves
1773 3 ( 45) 1 5
1774 4 ( 80) 1 9
1775 3 ( 25) 1
1776 2 ( 8)
1777 2 3 ( 46) 1
1778 7 ( 70) 4 ( 6)
1779 5 (117)
1780
1781 3 ( 50) 2 ( 4) 1 5
1782 4 ( 19) 1 ( 2) 3 1
1783 1 5 ( 41) 4 ( 4) 1
1784 1 ( 12) 1
1785 1 3
1786 3 ( 60) 3
1787 2 ( 29) 1 1 4
1788 2 ( 8) 1 ( 1) 1 3
1789 1 ( 5) 1 ( 2) 1 1 7
1790 2 ( 31)
1792 5 ( 60) 2 ( 2)
1793
1794 3 ( 43)
1795
1796 2 (825) 1
1803 2 (105)
1810 Memo of 1803
affirmed
Source: S.R.O. DD/WG Box 15. "Mining Memorandum Book, 1773-1810",
a record maintained by the lead reeve.
NOTES: 1 Pitches were untried land, but grooves or gruffs were
mines once opened up but later probably abandoned.
The figures in brackets show the number of pitches or 
grooves to which claim was being made.
2 The table ends effectively in 1803, the entry for 1810 
being a confirmation of the Wells Mining Company's claim 
to lOO pitches, registered earlier. This had followed 
the claim to 800 pitches, made in 1796.
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thereunto belonging right title and claim whatsoever...' was 
sold for ten guineas, indicating a total value for this 
productive mine of 40gns. A clue to the relative value of the 
mine as against its equipment comes from a case tried before 
the Mineral Grand Jury of Chewton Liberty in October 1783. John 
Jacobs claimed he had been denied his quarter share in a 
calamine works near Green Ore, despite paying the partners lgn 
for the same, plus £11.12s.3^d for candles, timber, tools, and 
necessaries. The overall value of the venture was thus at that 
point £50.13s.2d, of which the mine itself and the right to 
work it represented 8.3 per cent of the total, and the working 
materials 91.7 per cent. As Mendip mines remained simple 
because the shortage of funds, it is likely that fixed capital 
always formed a small part of total outlay^.
John Jacob may be selected as an example of the men named in 
these records. In the 1780s he is noted simply as 'of Shipham1, 
but the enclosure award of 1799 for that Mendip parish refers 
to him as a gentleman entitled to an allotment, who also 
purchased nearly 100 acres in 6 lots for £465. He had either 
prospered in the intervening time or he had earlier been a non­
working partner in the mining venture. Either is possible for 
gentle and professional men were frequently included in 
partnerships as well as free working miners, especially towards 
the end of the eighteenth century. In two partnerships recorded 
in 1793 for example, working the Engine and 'all Eights' mines 
respectively, the former had four working miners out of nine
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named, and the latter had four out of ten. As the working
miners provided only one-quarter of the capital in the first
case, and one-eighth in the second, their contribution of small
funds and ancient rights had to be backed up by resources from
outside the mining industry. Of the gentry, professionals,
yeomen,and tradesmen named in the period from the 1770s to the
early nineteenth century, special mention may be made of old
colleagues associated in many undertakings, John Billingsley
1 6and Richard Perkins, and the attorney William Miles .
By the end of the eighteenth century even these mixed 
partnerships were finding it difficult to cope with drainage 
problems, especially as the solutions put forward like 
Billingsley’s scheme for a great level from Compton Martin to 
Wookey Hole would have required a large capital input^. Some 
attempt was therefore made to establish large enterprises on 
resources from outside the region. In 1796 George Watson and 
Philip George of Bristol, a North American merchant and the 
owner of a spelter works respectively, set up a partnership 
with some 30 others to work for lead and calamine at Small 
Pits; in the same year, and again in 1803 and 1810, the Wells 
Mining Company laid claim to 800 pitches; and in 1798 an agent 
of the Birmingham Company was seen prospecting at Rowberrow. 
These may have been attempts to safeguard Bristol’s supplies, 
sent directly for example to the brass works of Messrs. Champion 
in the 1760s. But although there are records of deliveries from 
the Harptree Liberty to Philip George’s works at Hanham from
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1804 and to the Baptist Mills brass works from 1805, mining was 
so badly affected by the reduction of import duties in the 
1820s that that on Mendip began to fail. One new venture in 
1822 is worth mentioning for it was at Wigmore Farm, a post- 
enclosure creation studied in the previous chapter .
Finally, what were the markets served? When lead ore was 
smelted on Mendip, customers from for example the cathedral at 
Wells, the parish church at Yatton, and the Corporation at 
Bath, bought direct from the mineries. But even then dealers
were active, buying and transporting lead to Bristol for
smelting before making up into sheets and pipes or other uses. 
Mendip lead was particularly suitable for lead shot and in the 
1780s an improved method of manufacture was pioneered in the 
city. Lead was also an important element in the making of 
pewter ware. When Mendip supplies failed lead had to be 
imported into Bristol, but local calamine continued to be used 
in the making of brass wire and domestic utensils^. In one 
respect lead and calamine made a similar contribution to the 
local economy, for as will be seen they were made into low 
grade barter goods for use in the Africa trade. The Bristol 
link has also produced a rare reference to a connection between 
mining and banks, for some of the Harptree Minery papers 
concern Messrs. Harford, 1802-09, and a later steward James
McMurtrie has added the note that 'The names of many of the
20mining partners appear1 .
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ii Coal Mining in North Somerset
Although the exploitation of this coalfield depended 
basically on its geology, which governed the availability of 
the mineral, the pattern of development was strongly influenced 
by factors described already in relation to the mining of lead 
and calamine. These are the system of landholding and mining 
rights that controlled access to the mineral, and the use of 
the partnership as a vehicle for the provision of mining 
capital and management expertise.
The coal-bearing measures are bedded on older carboniferous 
limestone rocks, and overlaid by newer sandstones and clays, 
and within this sandwich they are themselves divided into upper 
and lower measures, separated by pennant sandstone. The lower 
were exploited first as they were made accessible by the 
upthrust of the older rocks to form the Mendip and Clevedon 
hills, with an angle of inclination so severe in some parts
O 1
like the Nettlebridge Valley, that vertical seams were mined . 
This small-scale mining grew^with developments in the parishes 
of eastern Mendip in the mid-seventeenth century, and in those 
such as Clapton-in-Gordano, Nailsea, and Brislington near
Bristol, and Corston and Newton St. Loe near Bath, in the
22following years . In the centre of this north Somerset saucer, 
part of the upper series could also be worked with relative 
ease in an area south from Chewton and Keynsham, by Compton 
Dando, Publow, Pensford and Chelwood, to Bishop Sutton, Clutton
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and High Littleton, ending at Farrington Gurney. Further to the
southeast it was obscured by surface rocks but its existence
was long suspected, and explorations led to the sinking of the
Old Pit in 1763 and the development of the highly profitable
9 3Radstock-Camerton area .
For the main part of the coalfield where the upper series
was exploited there was growing prosperity in the second half
of the eighteenth century. This was in contrast to the Mendip
pits, which were in relative decline because although retaining
their markets in the southeast of the region (like Frome) and
in the nearer parts of Wiltshire and Dorset, they were not
well-placed to serve the growing needs of Bath. These were
instead largely met by the newer High Littieton-Farrington
Gurney and Radstock-Camerton pits, their coal carried on the
roads of the Bath Trust. The building of local canals in the
early nineteenth century further increased their advantages.
Despite the early stimulus noted, Bristol was not a good market
for north Somerset coal because of the close proximity of the
o /
Kingswood field . But there was a growing domestic market 
within the region, and coal was also in demand for agricultural 
and industrial purposes such as lime-burning, the drying of 
brewers’ malt, and iron- and glass- making. Later, coal was 
used for town gas.
Billingsley observed in the mid-1790s that the 26 coalworks 
in the main part of the field employed about 1,500 men and boys
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and produced 1,500 to 2,000 tons per week (78,000 to 104,000 
tons annually). This suggests an average annual output of from
3.000 to 4,000 tons per pit. The southern or Mendip parishes
employed 500 to 600 men and boys and produced 800 to 1,000 tons
per week (41,600 to 52,000 tons annually), which Billingsley
thought could be raised to 2,000 tons per week ’if sale could
be found'. The importance of markets is further demonstrated by
developments in the north west of the region. At Nailsea for
example the growth of mining at the end of the century was
associated with the establishment of glass works in 1788. These
pits produced 2,500 bushels daily (possibly 38,500 tons
annually), and if five or six were then in operation, as seems
likely, their average annual output probably exceeded that
elsewhere in north Somerset. At the nearby pit at Clapton the
average annual output of 3,700 tons was more in line with the
main part of the coalfield. Again there was a specific outlet
in addition to the domestic, in this case for lime burning in a
market which included Wales because of the proximity of 
2 5Portishead .These figures suggest an output for the north 
Somerset coalfield by the mid-1790s of between 160,000 and
200.000 tons per year, not including pits mentioned earlier but 
omitted by Billingsley, at Bedminster and Brislington near 
Bristol, and at Newton St.Loe near Bath.
Billingsley's views were those of a knowledgable local man 
with a practical interest in coal, for he was a partner in this 
as in lead mining. His figures are echoed by later estimates,
-222-
for annual outputs of 140,000 tons in the 1780s and and 210,000
O £
tons in 1800 were suggested by Nef and Flinn respectively 
Such calculations are important because output figures are used 
by Pollard as the basis for estimations of capital formation in 
coal mining, although the procedures adopted for this region 
are unclear as he moves without explanation from the figure of
147.000 tons for 1799 for Somerset and Devon, to that of
400.000 tons as a dee-adal average for the l^79).-*f for Bristol 
including Somerset. It has been noted that Pollard also uses 
the evidence of costs from 622 accounts to discover appropriate 
capital/output ratios, but little is available of this nature 
in Somerset. However the one account book uncovered by this 
research does provide rare evidence on original sinking costs 
which are acknowledged by Pollard to be understated in his work
o 7
as therefore are estimates of capital formation in new mines •
Before studying this evidence on capital investment it is 
appropriate to consider the organization of the industry in 
north Somerset. In the absence of great territorial magnates, 
landowners usually chose not to exploit coal reserves on their 
estates themselves, but to lease out these rights to local 
partnerships in which they were sometimes included. The 
partners bore the costs of investment and paid the landowner a 
free^jshare hasgd of the produce of the mine, usually l/8th or 
l/10th, based on either the coal landed or the money received 
from its sale. It was akin to the lot on lead as is shown by 
the Waldegrave accounts already referred to which record for
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the 1780s the payments of duties to the Earl - on coal as Lord 
of the Manor, and on lead as Lord Royal of Chewton Minery. The 
first known grant of exploration rights by the Waldegraves was 
in 1749 to James Lansdown and partners, but coal was not found 
in significant quantities until the Old Pit was sunk in 1763 
followed by the even more lucrative Middle Pit in 1779. The 
Waldegraves continued to benefit from freeshare whilst the 
partners, seven by 1776 including Robert Wright of Harptree, 
put up the capital and carried the risks. In the first year of 
nearby Ludlow’s Pit for example, 1782-3, this involved £900. As 
the mines became profitable the balance of advantage moved 
against the leasing of rights, but the adjustment implied was 
so much against the tradition of the coalfield it was not 
achieved by the Waldegraves until 1847, when the lessees were 
removed by court action. But this move to full ownership held 
dangers, for by the time the Pophams of Hunstrete House at 
Marksbury had assumed control of the Heighgrove pits at 
Farmborough in 1819, in the only other case known, the mines 
had ceased to be profitable^®.
Mining agreements and leases reveal some recurring names in 
different and interlocking combinations, as well as others to 
be found less frequently. Amongst the most familiar were 
gentlemen such as James Stephens of Camerton, Samborne Palmer 
of Timsbury, the Savage family of the Midsomer Norton-Paulton 
area, the James family of Welton, and most importantly the 
brothers John and Jacob Mogg of Farrington Gurney and High
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Littleton. All played an important part in mining developments, 
primarily as entrepreneurs and only secondarily or incidentally 
as landowners. Jacob Mogg was the outstanding coalmaster of the 
second half of the eighteenth century, but none of the ventures 
in which he was involved was on his own land, contrary to 
Flinn's generalization which links him incongruously with Lords 
Ferrers and Dudley in the development of mines on his estate. 
Instead, all were undertaken by a lease of mining rights from 
other landowners who may have lacked either the resources or 
the inclination to become a sole developer, though willing to 
join a partnership. In the mid-eighteenth century these were 
usually made up of five or six partners, though that number may 
be doubled in later decades, possibly as capital needs grew.
But for the Timsbury partnership founded in 1791 and the most 
successful combination of all, six was still deemed an 
effective number^.
An analysis of the partnerships is hindered by uncertainties 
about the totals involved, but from the sources consulted a 
register of some 132 partners has been compiled. 65 per cent 
were gentry, including a few yeomen; 15 per cent were tradesmen 
and professionals; 11 per cent were Bristol merchants; and 9 
per cent were working men of whom most but not all were miners. 
Colliers were particularly important in early partnerships like 
that of 1719 to explore land owned by John Strachey of Sutton 
Court in Bishop Sutton. This practical venture involved three 
yeomen, two coalminers, and a blacksmith, and the year the
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lease was granted the landowner published his own observations
inon the stratification of local rocks . The number of coal- 
min-e^ r partners diminished over the years (the last encountered 
being in a lease of 1793), but this may have been due to a rise 
in status as their practical skills became recognized, 
especially before professional surveyors were used. William 
Smith, for example, later to achieve fame as 'The Father of 
English Geology1, was not employed in the coalfield until 1792 
when he surveyed Mearns Colliery at High Littleton . The Bush 
and Crang families provide evidence of this rising status, for 
having started as miners they had become managers or managing 
partners by the 1760s and 1770s, and were then designated 
gentlemen. This development suggests an important difference 
between this region and those where mines were exploited by 
estate owners, where it was common practice for fixed capital 
to come from the landowner and his partners if any, whilst 
working capital was provided through the 'butty system' by a 
charter master who managed the mine. But in north Somerset 
where the landowner had no responsibility for the provision of 
capital, and the partners provided both fixed and circulating 
forms, mining was conducted by working partners or managers
o o
with practical coal mining experience .
In illustration of other non-gentry sources of capital around 
for example the decades at the turn of the century, the cases 
of a carpenter, brewer, apothecary, and surgeon may be noted, 
together with the surveyor Thomas Davis yr. from Longleat, and
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the attorney/bankers Uriah and George Messiter of Wells. The 
Rev.Alexander Adams of Belluton was one of the clergy involved. 
He succeeded to his father's interest at Mearns, and was also a 
Timsbury partner from 1793 with an 8/64 share under the will of 
his uncle William Bush. This illustrates the significance of 
connections in this region. Family ties have been mentioned, 
but links with other forms of economic activity were important. 
For example Jacob Mogg's work as a trustee of the Bath Roads 
had a direct bearing on the fortunes of mining, for he was 
responsible for the building of a much-needed new road. James 
Stephens of Camerton, landowner (with a concern for the Axe 
Drainage) and mining partner, was a leading promoter of the 
Somerset Coal Canal and its first chairman in 1794. The work of 
enclosure commissioners such as William Kelson of Midsomer 
Norton, a Welton partner from the 1790s, was also relevant, for 
they oversaw the 'saving' of mining rights in lands enclosed.
In the main part of the coalfield few partners came from 
beyond the region, but the Bristol influence was strong on the 
northern fringes. In 1754 land at Bedminster was leased for 
coalmining to Jarrit Smith, attorney, Job Charlton, merchant, 
and George Lewis, stationer, all of Bristol, in partnership 
with Richard Warren esq. of that parish, and William Harrington 
of Newton St.Loe, gent. In 1756 mining rights in Brislington 
were leased to a trio from Bristol made up of two merchants and 
a tiler. By 1763 Jarrit Smith was a baronet but his interest in 
business was undiminished, for in that year he corresponded
-227-
with Alexander Colston, landowner and descendant by marriage of 
the great benefactor, on the use of gunpowder in mines. Three 
years later Colston granted a coal lease in Clapton to Gabriel 
Wayne, active in the Bristol copper industry and associated 
with the adaptation of the coal-fired reverbatory furnace from 
lead to copper smelting. The focus of the Langtons, Bristol 
merchants, shifted towards Bath with the purchase of Newton 
St.Loe, and in 1772 they bought coal works from the Harringtons 
whose interests in Bedminster was noted above. By 1802 they had 
been leased to a partnership of five composed of Zachary Bayly 
and his son Nathaniel of Bath, attorneys and former bankers; 
Edward Spencer, leading tenant farmer of Newton; Moses Reynolds 
of Brislington; and Robert Bryant of Bath, malster. Here was a 
mix of entrepreneurial spirit, local roots, lands or mines in 
other parishes, and trade links, for Newton coke was used for
.an
drying malt . Although the Bristol connection brought in new 
sources of capital, the northern fringe resembled the rest of 
the coalfield in other respects, as landowners chose to lease 
coalmining rights to the members of interlocking partnerships, 
rather than to undertake the exploitation themselves.
It has proved difficult to value the shares held by 
different partners. In 1781 for example, before his Newton 
venture, Zachary Bayly had a 8/22 share in the Old Pit at 
Camerton, but unfortunately no figures can be attached to that 
proportion. However, access to the Timsbury Notebooks in the 
1950s enabled Bulley to record that the cost of original work
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at Upper Conygre, opened at Timsbury in 1791 and met by six 
shareholders, was £7,200. In the same year a partnership was 
formed to sink pits at New Tyning and New Grove in the Paulton 
basin. William Crang’s share, probably 1/8, was sold in 1801 
for £1,500, so £12,000 may have been invested in the two mines. 
In 1803 the Rev.B.D.Smith was assigned a 1/8 share in Hayeswood 
mine where a new partnership was at work from 1792. At £800, a 
subscription of £6,400 is suggested, but this may be an 
accumulated figure after a decade of development^. Similarly 
with a coal works in Radstock, whose estimated original capital 
costs of £6,048 had risen to £18,144 by 1792, when the share of 
one of seven partners was assigned .
Bulley concluded that between 1760 and 1830 the capital
required for a colliery undertaking in this region was between
£2,500 and £10,000. This accords with the framework of costs
devised by Griffin for the years 1780 to 1840, based on the
recognition that mines would differ by time and place rather
than by a precise chronological sequence. A simple bell pit
would need little capital, perhaps £40; a relatively shallow
mine with two shafts each 60 yards deep, drainage levels, whim 
r
gin and surface buildings may cost £1,730; with steam power for 
drainage and possibly winding, costs could rise to £3,200; and 
for large deep mines using steam power widely and with a range 
of buildings and transport network, costs could be between 
£6,000 and £50,000. Flinn notes a colliery in the north east 
where in 1755 total sinking costs including drainage were
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£2,160. Pollard’s classification into only three groups of 
undertakings is too broad to be useful, but his categorization 
of capital items found in accounts is more helpful, for it 
shows that some apparently trivial items were important in the 
larger scheme of investment. But it is to be regretted that 
gunpowder, important to coal mining in general and the economy 
of north Somerset in particular, is not listed there .
The process by which the partners' investment capital was 
incorporated in fixed assets in mining may be examined for this 
region only through the simple account book of the Farrington 
Pit for the years 1779 to 1790. This single entry running 
record shows items of weekly expenditure and income. Payments 
for rent and trespass enable the venture to be located by field 
names on a site northeast of the church at Farrington Gurney^. 
The proprietors were Jacob Mogg, the dominant coalmaster in the 
region at this time, and two sleeping partners, John Gaby and 
Ralph Hale Gaby from Wiltshire, respectively gentleman and 
attorney. They held a lease of coalmining rights dated 1779, a 
renewal of one of 1770. The first years at Farrington were 
unproductive but the mine survived and was not closed down 
until 1922, a family interest having been retained to the mid-
O Q
nineteenth century .
For Jacob Mogg the Farrington pit was only one of many 
interests in the coalfield, which had begun with a mine at 
Welton on a lease first granted by the Duchy of Cornwall in
-230-
1756. By the 1760s he was active in the manor of Timsbury. His 
interest in Farrington Gurney from 1770 has been noted. This 
was the family base, where in 1663 Richard Mogg, bailiff to the 
Duchy, secured a coal lease, in 166-3. In the 1770s Jacob Mogg 
also became established in High Littleton, as a leading partner 
at the Heighgrove Colliery. He had a 7/32 share in the nearby 
Mearns Colliery by at least 1783. The 1780s saw his interests 
extending south to the Nettlebridge Valley, where a lease was 
again negotiated with the Duchy of Cornwall. The shaft at Old 
Rock was probably sunk in 1786, and the mine was worked until 
the 1870s. By the 1790s the pattern of interlocking partner­
ships sustaining Jacob Mogg and his associates was becoming 
better defined. In 1792 mining activities in Welton, and in 
1793 those in Timsbury were consolidated by formal articles 
which pooled separately-held coal rights and created 'a Capital 
or Joint Stock'. But despite this suggestion of a new form, 
that of the partnership was retained, though more substantial 
and consolidated than b e f o r e ^ .
This diversity of interests in different partnerships and 
mines formed the structure which supported investors in the 
uncertain business of coalmining. At the Farrington Pit for 
example, the balance frequently read 'out this week' so that 
the monthly reckoning was often 'Book in Debt', and in spite of 
fluctuating gains throughout the period the enterprise had an 
accounting debt of £1,750 by 1790. However the evaluation of 
profit and loss was not a concern of these accounts, which
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simply recorded fully and unselectively the transactions 
associated with the undertaking. They were in fact an 
arithmetical exercise which would help a busy coalmaster to 
conduct his business in an orderly fashion, but not to assess 
its profitability.
Evidence from the accounts has been assembled in Table 7(2) 
and analysed in 7(3) and 7(4). Expenditure in the years 1779-90 
by the three partners totalled £3,677, but this does not 
represent fixed capital investment for both the freeshare and 
revenue from sales show that some coal was sold in that time. 
Fortunately there is enough detail to encourage an attempt to 
separate the fixed capital formation costs from those involved 
in extracting coal whilst the mine was being established. The 
outcome is shown in Table 7(4), which reveals the disposition 
of both the overall expenditure (£3,677) and the probable cost 
of sinking the mine (£2,000). In calculating the latter, 
payment for general day work has been excluded from the labour 
costs which then comprise the bargains (specific undertakings 
to sink shafts, drive levels and branches), and payments to 
masons, sawyers, and hauliers who carted raw materials and 
rubble but not coal. Materials like candles and powder are 
included in full because of the difficulty of distinguishing 
between their use in mining and sinking. Of administrative 
costs, rent and trespass are included because the venture could 
not have been undertaken without them. Miscellaneous costs are 
taken in full as they included assets like the winding drum.
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Table~7(2) Part I : Expenditure at the Farrington Coal Pit, January 1779 - November 1790
Labour Costs, Columns 1 - 5 Material Costs. Columns 6 - 1 5
Daywork Bargains Sawyer aiAie Total 
Cost of 
Labour
LlXJS ;skwood
(Trees,
boards)
Rods and 
Reed
Nail:
£ s d £ s d £ s d £ s d E s d E s d £ s d £ s d £ s d E s d £ s d £ s d
1779 92 17 6 59 16 6 0 18 8 0 6 0 153 18 8 6 17 9 19 7 0 O 1 0 0 16 0 O 12 1
1780 146 16 11 95 18 11 5 6 3*i 7 15 4 255 17 5S 3 4 IO 13 14 6 0 3 0 0 17 6 0 11 10
1781 110 18 0 131 0 4 6 13 5*i 16 2 4 264 14 IS 19 9 2 13 10 0 0 6 0 0 9 8 o 16 4 1 7 10*}
1782 136 8 9 130 7 2 4 5 4S 6 3 11 10 3 0 287 8 2*i 1 16 0 16 7 0 0 17 6 0 7 2 4 10 6 0 18 9
1783 120 2 1 105 10 1*1 5 13 11 5 7 2 9 1 0 245 14 3*i 4 1 8 2 18 0 0 9 4 1 17 10 2 12 O 1 5 0
1784 64 6 2 111 8 9 11 10 10 9 6 5 20 10 4 217 2 6 12 13 3*3 16 16 0 o 4 2 2 12 8 2 11 8 0 19 2
1785 39 14 5*i 99 19 2 3 3 1 16 6 3 159 2 11*1 2 3 8 25 16 8 0 8 0 0 4 7 4 2 0 1 5 11
1786 123 13 io 20 5 IO 1 10 0 145 9 8 5 17 6 18 4 0 O 7 8 0 9 0 0 8 OS
1787 136 5 5 93 17 7 5 19 2 1 0 0 237 2 2 2 19 O 11 4 0 0 6 0 0 4 10 1 5 3 0 18 l
1788 159 5 0 39 13 10 1 18 6 200 17 4 4 6 6 23 6 6 0 12 0 0 0 6 0 14 10
1789 132 9 4 28 17 4 2 11 0 2 13 3 166 10 11 3 0 O 15 16 0 0 9 2 0 1 0
1790 145 O 3 33 16 0 2 9 7 12 3 O 193 8 I O 7 5 O 0 17 2 o 6 6 o 16 6
Total
O
 
—
cd__ 17 C
D dr 950 11 6*i 24 1 1*1 51 9 6 93 7 3 2,527 7 1*1 73 14 4S 176 19 8 2 15 0 9 16 3 16 14 2 9 18 1
Table*7’(2) Part II
1 Material Costs Columns 6-15 Administrative Costs. Columns 16-19 20 Total
Year
12
Candles
£ s d
13
Powder
£ s d
14
Rope
£ s d
15
Iron
£ s
i
d
Total 
Cost of 
Materials 
£ s d
16
Rents and 
Trespass
£ s d
17
Poor Rate 
Tithes etc
£ s d
18
Audit
Fee
E s d
19
Freeshare 
at S
£ s d
Total Cost 
of Admin­
istration 
£ s d
Misc 
el lan 
eous 
Costs 
£ s d
Annual
Expenditure 
£ s d
1779 12 13 10 11 9 3 3 6 1 11 10 6 66 13 6 34 9 0 O 17 3 2 15 6 14 10 2* 52 12 11* 1 10 11 274 16 O*
1780 13 7 6 11 10 9 1 14 IO 21 12 8 67 7 5 15 9 0 1 1 0 21 5 9 37 15 9 16 7 11 377 8 6S
1781 14 0 0 24 18 3 6 13 8 17 19 3S 99 10 3 1 7 6 1 4 4 3 1 6 8 5 7S 13 18 U S IO 0 6S 388 3 loS
1782 18 15 0 5 9 4 3 14 0 13 8 9 66 4 0 16 7 0 O 10 0 2 12 6 10 5 2 29 14 8 8 12 8 391 19 6S
1783 13 5 10 11 6 6 6 15 2 30 0 6 73 19 10 8 18 8 3 3 0 15 9 11 27 11 7 7 4 9S 354 10 6
1784 14 13 0 5 18 0 5 11 2 20 9 8 82 8 9S 6 14 7 5 6 10 1 2 3 13 3 8 2 8 3 315 3 2S
1785 8 8 9 1 19 0 7 9 6 51 18 1 0 10 0 11 12 4S 12 2 4S 3 14 10 226 18 3
1786 11 7 0 6 13 2 43 6 4S 0 10 0 2 12 6 31 7 IS 34 9 7S 0 8 9 223 14 5
1787 11 18 0 3 17 0 4 8 8 12 2 11 49 3 9 0 5 0 2 12 6 30 8 7* 33 6 1* 0 9 9 320 1 9*
1788 18 14 0 2 9 9 7 0 2 57 4 3 4 16 0 2 12 6 41 18 8* 49 7 2* 5 4 4 312 13 1*
1789 11 9 0 1 19 0 5 14 9 38 8 11 1 3 6 2 12 6 16 4 11 20 0 11 4 10 11 229 11 8
1790 13 11 0 1 19 0 6 12 3 31 7 5 0 10 6 34 17 10* 35 8 4* 1 13 8 261 18 3*
Total 162 0 11 78 7 1 36 12 4 160 14 IS 727 12 7 91 0 9 3 12 7 27 9 4 237 8 7S 359 11 3S 62 7 4 3,676 19 4
Source: S.R.O. DD/MGG 3, 5R. "Account book of weekly wages and daily receipts, 1779-1790".
Table 7(3) ; Analysis of the Accounts of the Farrington Pit/ 1779-1790
II III IV
Labour Cost of Adminis- Miscellaneous
Costs Materials trative Costs Costs
(Cols 1-5) (Cols 6-15) (Cols 16-19) (Col 20)
VI VII VIII IX
Annual Annual Annual
Expenditure Revenue from Accounting
Coal Sales Debt (Expend- 
iture-Revenue)
Cumulative Cumulative 
Accounting Expenditure 
Debt
s d £ s d £ s d £ s d £ s d
16 0% 111 17 1*5 162 18 11% 162 18 11% 274 16 0%
8 6*5 158 3 4*5 219 5 2 382 4 1% 652 4 7%
3 10*5 74 4 1 313 19 9*5 696 3 10% 1,040 8 5%
19 6*5 98 5 2*5 293 14 4 988 18 2% 1,432 8 0%
10 6 135 5 6 219 5 0 1,209 3 2% 1,786 18 6%
3 2*5 11 14 1*5 303 9 1 1,512 12 10% 2,102 1 8%
18 3 92 19 1*5 133 19 1*5 1,646 12 0% 2,328 19 11%
14 5 250 17 5 +27 3 0 1,619 9 0% 2,552 14 4%
1 9% 243 12 1 76 9 8% 1,695 18 9 2,872 16 2*5
13 1% 336 0 4 + 23 7 2% 1,672 11 6% 3,185 9 4%
11 8 149 8 0 80 3 8 1,752 15 2% 3,415 1 0%
18 3% 264 1 2 + 2 2 10% 1,750 12 4*5 3,676 19 4
1779 153
1780 255
1781 264
1782 287
1783 245
1784 217
1785 159
1786 145
1787 237
1788 200
1789 166
1790 193
18 8 
17 5*5
14 1*5
8 2*5 
14 3*5
2 6 
2 11*5 
9 8
2 2 
17 4
10 11 
8 10
66 13 6
67 7 5
99 10 3
66 4 0
73 19 10 
82 8 9*5
51 18 1
43 6 4*5
49 3 9
57 4 3
38 8 11
31 7 5
52 12 11% 
37 15 9
13 18 11*5 
29 14 8
27 11 
13 3
2 
9 
6 
7
20 0 11 
35 8 4%
12
34
33
49
7
8
4*5
7*5
1%
2%
1 10 11 274
16 7 11 377
10 0 6*5 388
8 12 8 391
7 4 9*5 354
2 8 3 315
3 14 10 226
0 8 9 223
0 9 9 320
5 4 4 312
4 10 11 229
1 13 8 261
Source: As in Table ~7(2)
NOTE: This table is based on Table "7(2) and shows the distribution of the costs involved in this coal mining venture
(Cols I to IV); the annual (Col V) and cumulative (Col IX) costs borne by the partners; the annual revenue 
from the sale of coal (Col VI) ,’ and the annual (Col VII) and cumulative (Col VIII) accounting debt.
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Table 7(4)
Fixed Capital Formation Costs at the Farrington Pit, 1779-1790
Nature 
of Costs
Costs of Asset 
Creation plus Production Fixed Capital Formation Costs
Table 7(2) 
Columns £ s d %
Table 7^ (2) 
Columns £ s d %
Labour 1 - 5  2,527 7 Ih 68.7 2 - 5 1,119 9 5 56.0
Materials 6 - 1 5  727 12 7 19.8 6 - 1 5 727 12 7 36.4
Administration 16 - 19 359 12 3h 9.8 16 91 O 9 4.5
Miscellaneous 20 62 7 4 1.7 20 62 7 4 3.1
Total 3,676 19 4 100.0 2,000 10 1 100.0
Source: See Table 7(2) for source and evidence.
NOTE: This table attempts to distinguish between the general
costs of sinking and working a mine, and those of
fixed capital formation alone. It shows the distribution
of expenditure in each case.
The sum of £2,000 for fixed capital investment at the 
Farrington Pit is given some credibility by the estimations 
already referred to for the establishment of simple mines with 
shafts and levels. But this was not a finite sum, and as Flinn 
has pointed out 'an unending flow of capital1 would be needed 
to meet depreciation costs for example of machinery and horses, 
and to create new workings through 'running' investment^0.
The labour intensive nature of mining is shown in Table 7(4). 
Labour costs formed 56.0 per cent of the operation to sink the 
pit (68.7 per cent of general mining costs). Materials at 36.4
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per cent and miscellaneous costs at 3.1 per cent were both more 
important in sinking than in the general case (19.8 and 1.7 per 
cent respectively). About a dozen miners were named regularly 
in the accounts. Bargains were struck with those otherwise on 
day work with no hint of an auction, though the scale observed 
is not self-evident. For example, in the light of other costs, 
the 7s.Od per yard agreed in December 1781 seems a low reward 
for 'driving a Branch through a Fault', whilst 14s.4d per yard 
in May 1780 for 'driving carting and filling 18 yards of 
Dipple' seems a lot for a small connecting branch. In April 
1785 a bargain was 'let to Jas Payne & Co to sink a pit in 
Ruett to the Three Coal Vein for the Sum of Thirty one Pounds 
Ten Shillings', indicating the sinking of a second shaft in the 
field towards which earlier workings had been driven. A depth 
of 24 fathoms is later noted. The extension of the mine was 
combined with the winning of coal where possible, as column VI 
of Table 7(3) shows. When the accounts ended in October 1790, 
nine or ten men were then employed regularly on day work and a
calculation based on the freeshare paid and the price of coal
per bushel in the accounts, suggests that production then 
averaged between 120 and 150 tons per month.
Space does not permit the full account of the sinking of the
pit which the evidence provides, but viewed overall the details 
build up into a picture of a mine worked by the longwall method 
which was better suited to the thin, faulted, Somerset seams 
than the pillar and stall technique in general use in the
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northern coalfields. With the former nearly all the coal was 
removed from the working face, but the use of materials was 
correspondingly heavier. At Farrington these, with the 
miscellaneous items, made up nearly 39.5 per cent of capital 
costs at the pit, the expenditure on timber being particularly 
great. Purchased from surrounding estates, this was fashioned 
on site by the sawyer who made pit props or 'lugs' for roof 
support; lined shafts and passages with elm board; and made 
ventilation pipes or 'shides' from planks probably of oak. Rods 
and reeds were used to make baskets for the 'puts' which 
carried coal underground, and the 'wreath carts' in which it 
was hauled to the surface. The accounts carry no reference to 
winding equipment but the purchase of a drum, a blind horse, 
rope, and tarred yarn would have provided such a system^.
Gunpowder was purchased more regularly in early years than 
later, suggesting a greater use in sinking the pit than mining 
the coal. Payments for carriage were recorded, on nine barrels 
in 1781 for example, each customarily holding lOOlbs. The mill 
at nearby Littleton was the likely supplier, and the powder was 
probably stored at the 'Round House' mentioned in the accounts. 
Gough refers to similarly named buildings on Mendip, where 
security would also have been a priority following the use of 
gunpowder in lead mining there from the 1680s^. Candles were 
supplied by the Lansdown family of chandlers and coal 
proprietors, and workmen's tools were also provided locally. In 
April and November 1782, shovels and mattocks came from
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Fussells of Mells, iron masters and edge tool makers^. The 
supplier presenting the greatest problem is Decimus Durnell, 
who received 22.0 per cent of the sums spent on materials over 
the years, for an unspecified commodity. However an account 
book kept by Jacob Mogg for other collieries in which he had an 
interest refers to dealings in cast iron with Decimus Durnell, 
and the supposition that he supplied the same goods to 
Farrington has been acted on in Table 9(3). These may have been 
engine or replacement parts, but the absence of any record for 
the purchase of a cylinder for which they might be needed 
argues against this, as do the terms of the renewal of their 
lease in 1799 by which the partners had to agree to erect 'a 
proper... fire or steam engine for draining the said mines'^.
The introduction of steam pumping engines into the coalfield 
from the 1730s gives another example of Bristol's influence in 
the region, for as his account books reveal, the merchant and 
banker Thomas Goldney of that city was an agent for the Coal- 
brookdale Company, and instrumental in the delivery of engines 
and parts to several mines. Parts were delivered to Paulton in 
1736 and 1745, Welton in 1762, and Clutton in 1763. Old Grove 
and New Tyning Pits may have had engines from 1766 and 1791 
respectively, and the Middle Pit in Radstock had a Hornblower 
engine from the early 1780s^. If by 1799 the Farrington 
partners were still not draining by steam power, this may have 
been because the methods mentioned in the accounts (drainage 
levels, and pumping by 'Pot Wheels' or waterwheels with'cowles'
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or buckets), were adequate for the depths then reached. The 
initial cost of a level was high, but unlike Newcomen engines 
maintenance was then minimal, and wider areas and other mines 
could be served. For example in 1791-2 a level over \ \  miles 
long was built from the mines at Timsbury to Radford Bridge on 
the Cam Brook at a cost of £1,200, but other proprietors paid
A £
£350 the next year to link up with the system . The lack of 
references to steam power in the Farrington accounts may thus 
not imply the pit was unrepresentative of mines in the region, 
but that at certain stages of construction mechanical drainage 
was not necessarily the first choice.
The coalfield transactions underlying this work, involving 
regular contributions from partners and frequent payments for 
materials and labour (including as production got underway the 
need to finance such items of circulating capital as animal 
fodder and pithead stocks), must all have required a consider­
able handling of funds. Yet no reference has been found to 
links with a banking system, however rudimentary. Evidence may 
lie elsewhere, but the local nature of most of the transactions 
suggests a plausible explanation, for partners, suppliers of 
materials, and buyers of coal, may have maintained accounts 
with each other without recourse to financial institutions. The 
spread of investment costs which is so evident in the 
Farrington accounts would have helped this process, for the 
expenditure was built up slowly over the years. The buying of 
engines and parts would have added a new dimension to this
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otherwise close-knit network, for the Goldneys were active in 
banking in Bristol from the 1750s and Bath from the 1770s. But 
the Farrington accounts show no such links, and the maintenance 
of acceptable procedures and of probity amongst partners would 
instead have been secured by the annual scrutiny of accounts, 
recorded in Table 7(2) as the 'audit fee'. The auditors were 
named, but have not been found in any registers drawn up for 
the region including that for the attorneys, although these 
professionals were very active in drawing up coal leases and 
mining partnership agreements.
In some cases the attorney's professional interest gave way 
to personal involvement, as with Robert Blinman Dowling of Chew 
Magna whose career has been pieced together from the many but 
now scattered deeds relating to the titles, mortgages, and 
mining rights of the Bishop Sutton pit eight miles south of 
Bristol. Much of this land had been acquired on marriage by the 
Kemeys Tynte family, but over the years ownership had largely 
devolved upon small gentry and yeomen. This fragmentation of an 
estate, together with the need for farmers to raise funds by 
mortgaging land and selling or leasing mining rights, created 
the opportunity for an enterprising attorney to insinuate 
himself into the system. Coal had been mined in this area from 
the early eighteenth century, on a small scale until a 
substantial partnership was set up in 1805 which was probably 
responsible for sinking the Old Pit at Bishop Sutton^. As the 
Law Lists show, Dowling began work in nearby Chew Magna in
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1797, and evidence survives of the traditional legal work he
undertook on behalf of clients. But in the following years he
came increasingly to act on his own behalf, especially in the
matter of acquiring mining leases. Land purchased by him in
1807, 1811, and 1812 for example was subject to a range of
freehold, leasehold (determinable by three lives), and mortgage
interests, but after unravelling these complications he was
able to sell surface lands in 1811 and 1813, reserving the
4 8mining rights for his own use .
This phase of activity ended in 1824 with Dowling's purchase 
of the Old Pit at Bishop Sutton^. Though not strictly capital 
formation, the complicated transfer of assets of which this was 
the culmination may be regarded as contributing to this process 
for it enabled Dowling to consolidate an otherwise dispersed 
collection of buildings, shafts, and underground mineral rights 
into a more viable, productive, and profitable enterprise, with 
a resulting increase in its capital value. Indeed, the earlier 
acquisition over the years of coal rights vital to the working 
of the Old Pit probably meant that the £800 paid for it in 1824 
bore little resemblance to its capital value when all the 
assets were consolidated. The extent to which Dowling's 
professional position helped in these manoeuvres is difficult 
to judge, but the fact that he was privy to his clients' 
financial problems must have influenced his timing. For example 
as mortgagees pressed upon the Webb family, yeomen of Chew 
Magna, he offered relief by purchasing land from them in 1824
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despite being himself a trustee in whom a mortgage term was 
vested-^. Dowling’s legal self-serving continued as he 
consolidated his mining interests and raised funds by 
mortgaging both surface and mineral rights so that by 1845 for 
example, more than £17,000 had been secured from at least 12 
mortgagees in north Somerset and Bristol. On his death in 1853 
the colliery and mining rights were conveyed to a partnership 
including the attorneys John and William Rees Mogg, who 
represented the continuing interest of both the legal
51profession and the Mogg family in mining in north Somerset .
Dowling’s mode of operation in Bishop Sutton was made 
possible by the fragmentation of landholding there. But this 
was not a peculiar case as is shown by developments at Nailsea 
west of Bristol, where much of the land was also held by small 
freeholders. Here a mining partnership made up of a gentleman, 
surgeon, and coalminer was joined in 1788 by John Robert Lucas, 
a Bristol glassmaker already noted who was then establishing 
works in Nailsea. He acted in a similar manner to Dowling 
though on a smaller scale, buying land and leasing its coaling 
rights to the partners in a process which came to a peak in 
1823-4. As suppliers to the nearby glassworks the success of 
this partnership was assured, but others were not so fortunate 
in this area of poor transport. There was therefore strong 
support in 1811 for a Bristol to Taunton Canal, but as this was
not built transport problems continued to affect the growth of
5 2coal mining here .
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iii Conclusions
This study of the process of capital investment in mining in 
north Somerset has revealed the importance of a network of 
interests in mineral rights, some of very ancient origin, and 
all capable of surviving the changes wrought by enclosures. 
Minerals were exploited under lease and usually by partnerships 
composed largely of local men, which gave to the development of 
this industry many of the characteristics noted in relation to 
agricultural investment. Indeed, the same people were often 
involved, as landowners, entrepreneurs, and professionals. The 
composition of the partnerships ensured that mining investment 
capital was drawn from a similar range of sources within north 
Somerset to that raised by land sales, and once more some 
Bristolians found this a useful outlet for their funds, albeit 
a far more risky one. There was the same remarkable degree of 
personal involvement by partners as they undertook roles later 
assumed by professionals. However they relied as heavily on 
attorneys as did those overseeing changes in landholding, and 
for the same reasons, since whether the issue was enclosure or 
mining, it was important that rights and responsibilities 
should be set out in indisputable legal terms.
The limited amount of information available makes it 
difficult to draw conclusions about the process of investment 
and the returns to capital placed at risk. However it may first 
be said that in the absence of local magnates the cost of
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exploiting mineral reserves involving for example the 
investment of some £2,000 in fixed capital formation at the 
Farrington Pit during its first decade, could be better met by 
a partnership than by a single investor. Furthermore this 
support was most easily forthcoming where a mining venture was 
part of a larger network of activity. Losses could then be 
covered from profits generated by diverse and interlocking 
mining partnerships, as well as from other sources such as 
estate rents and professional fees. The skill of the 
entrepreneur was shown less by a commitment to any one scheme 
than by the ability to deploy financial resources within this 
network, so that capital was employed profitably overall 
despite the time taken for any one venture to mature. The 
mining of Mendip lead and calamine may have failed partly 
because the partners, many of then free miners and yeomen, did 
not have access to profits from other ventures to sustain them 
whilst investing in improved drainage.
Secondly, it seems likely that not just individual pits but 
coalmining itself was made viable in north Somerset by the 
general context of its operations. Transport facilities were of 
particular importance, and in their development the coalmasters 
played an active role. The perception that private profit could 
depend to a large extent upon the provision of public services 
may be seen most notably in the case of Jacob Mogg, but he was 
not alone in allocating to the building and management of the 
turnpike roads a good share of what was for a busy entrepreneur
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a most valued scarce resource, his own time and energy. The 
names of over 20 other coalmasters appear amongst the trustees 
of the Bath Roads alone, helping to determine policy by 
deciding where roads should be built, and then supervising 
their construction and continuing repair. At the end of the 
century the transport network was further improved by the 
construction of the Somerset Coal Canal. This was authorized in 
1794 to link up with the Kennet and Avon Canal, and ten coal­
masters sat on the first committee. Like the turnpike roads had 
achieved earlier, the canals allowed an extension of the market 
in the early decades of the nineteenth century.
The evident willingness of partners to invest in coal mining 
places the occasionally gloomy views expressed about profits in 
some perspective. In the mid-1790s Billingsley wrote of the 
main coalfield that profits were 'in the aggregate, by no means 
equal to the extent and risque of the adventure', but his view 
that they were 'to a few works considerable; to the majority 
very moderate', can be taken to support the suggestion already 
made, that investment in the newer or less viable pits could be 
sustained by funds derived from interlocking partnerships^. An 
example of this diversity of interests is provided in Table 
7(5), based on Jacob Mogg’s account of his management of the 
estate of his father-in-law George Hodges, landowner and coal 
master of High Littleton, after his death in 1761^. The 
account book shows that after legacies, annuities, and other 
commitments had been met, Jacob Mogg retained in his hands by
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1774 the sum of nearly £4,000. As the more substantial part of 
the income came from the landholding rather than the 
entrepreneurial interest, this would seem to question the 
wisdom of the latter. However some perspective is provided by 
the fact that in the years between 1762 and 1774 for which this 
evidence is available, mining revenue from freeshare and profit 
(described as 'cant' or gain and taken to be related to capital 
invested rather than output), approached £5,400, and averaged 
rather more than £400 per annum. And a closer study of the 
profit from Welton pit shows that between 1767 and 1774 Hodges’ 
account received an average annual 'cant' of £58, and as his 
share was 1/7 the overall profits must have averaged £406 in
c cr
this period^ . There is no evidence of the amount of capital
invested in the mine, but sinking began in 1757, and if the
Farrington procedures were followed then a sum of at least
£2,000 might have been called up in the first decade, perhaps
reaching £4,000 by 1774. Within these limits the returns to the
partners may have ranged from 2.0 to 25.0 per cent, perhaps
averaging 13.0 to 15.0 per cent, which would accord with Jacob
Mogg’s view expressed in 1796 that the Welton concern ’had
5 6been, and now is a profitable concern ’ J . As custodian of these 
profits and the freeshare seen in Table 7(5), plus those 
accruing to him in his own right as a proprietor at Welton, 
together with those available to him as his brother John's 
executor, and the returns from his own successful schemes such 
as the Mearns pit at High Littleton, Jacob Mogg would have been 
well able to carry his share of the early losses at Farrington.
Table ~7(5) : Coal Mining Revenue Received by the Estate of George Hodges of High
Littleton esquire, 1761-1774
Welton Heighgrove Mearns Timsbury Amesbury Total Revenue
Year Cant or Gain Freeshare Freeshare Freeshare Freeshare from
Coal Mining
£ s d  £ s d  £ s d  £ s d  £ s d  £ s d
1 7 6 1 9 1 4 Q h 5 4 1 9 5*3 6 4 1 4 2
1 7 6 2 5 9 7 1 4 5*3 5 9 7 1 4 5 *3
1 7 6 3 ■4— 6 9 1 9 6 6 9 1 9 6
1 7 6 4 ■+— 2 8 8 1 0 3 %  — 2 8 8 1 0 3 %
1 7 6 5 ■*— 2 2 9 1 5 9* 5  - 8 3 1 1 3 3 1 3 7 0*5
1 7 6 6 -f— 2 4 0 1 4  — 2 9 8 3 3 5 3 8 4 7
1 7 6 7 4 7 6 0 5 0  7 2  - 2 9 6 5 0 3 9 3 1 8 2
1 7 6 8 5 4 4 8 3 1 9 7 4 4 0 1 8 7 5 0 2 7 7 3 7
1 7 6 9 5 9 7 1 1 * 5 9 0 8 7 * 5 7 8 9 1* 5 1 1 4 9 6
CM
1 5 2*5
1 7 7 0 6 1 7 5 *3 6 1 3* 3 1 1 1 8 4 *5 6 7 1 3 2 4 5 1 8 4
1 7 7 1 1 3 3 0 33* 0 5 1*2 2 3 7 3 0% 9 8 9 3 7 9 1 7 3
1 7 7 2 1 8 9 4 *5 5 9 8 3 1 0 6 1 2 Q h 7 6 5 6 2 6 0 1 5
o
 
«—
1
1 7 7 3 7 9 1 8 4 1 5 3 1 7 5 8 7 1 3 7 * 5 3 2 1 3 9 2  1 6  3 4 4 6 6 1 0 * 5
1 7 7 4 1 2 5 1 1 1 5 4 1 4 6 * 3 2 2 4 7 4 *3 1 2 7 1 0 0 5 1 8 1 7 9 * 5
Source: S.R.O. DD/MGG Box 3. "Jacob Mogg's Act with the Estate of Mr Hodges" 1761-1776.
NOTES: 1 The term "cant" (which may be a corruption of "count", meaning the settlement
by a yearly transaction between landlord and tenant, Wright Dialect Dictionary) 
was from February 1769 replaced by the term "gain". Both are here taken to 
mean profit.
2 Payments were made on a one, two, or three monthly basis.
3 The table covers calendar years except for 1761, where evidence is available
for the last three months only.
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The only other evidence on the subject shows that the returns 
to General Popham on his share of l/3rd in the Heighgrove works 
between 1806 and 1819 averaged £20 per annum, giving a possible 
profit of 2.0 per cent. Between 1829 and 1842 the Camerton Old 
and New Pits were more successful, the average profit of £800 
per annum producing a possible rate of return between 5.0 and 
10.0 per cent-^. Uncertainty hangs over these rates as at 
Welton, but they serve to show that in the early decades of the 
nineteenth century this form of investment was subject to the 
fluctuating rates of return which made a supportive network all 
the more important. This included not only the partnerships 
already referred to but the local suppliers of essentials such 
as gunpowder and candles, and the coal merchants in centres 
like Bath. It may have been the frequent but small-scale 
exchanges in local markets which allowed funds to be handled by 
those involved and not by banks. After all the same or similar 
gentry were also handling enclosure and turnpike funds. With 
lead and calamine in contrast the market lay in Bristol, and 
this may have led to links with banks not so far observed
in coal mining. In other ways however their position was very 
similar to that with coal, as capital and mining needs were met 
from largely local sources. Partnerships accommodated non­
workers as well as free miners, and there was an overlap of 
personnel including influential men like John Billingsley and 
Robert Wright. But these developments may have been rendered 
ineffective by the archaic structure of the industry which was 
fundamentally inimical to the growth of the entrepreneurial
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spirit that enabled the coalmasters to support their own mines, 
and the industry, by a diversification of interests.
It must be admitted that the activities of the attorney R.B. 
Dowling and the glassmaker J.R.Lucas sit oddly with these 
conclusions for they were concerned with the acquisition of 
mining rights in areas of fragmented ownership. But these legal 
operations have a general as well as a particular interest, for 
although the evidence is not always so ample, most mining 
depended to a large degree on the purchase or lease of access 
to mineral veins, drainage channels and air vents. But it is 
unlikely surviving documents will cover all transactions, which 
may be further complicated by the sale or lease of surface 
rights, and the value of the whole may in any case be greater 
than that of the parts. It is these problems which make 
attempts to estimate accumulating capital value on the basis of 
assets acquired as well as those created,so risky. Lastly, it 
is difficult to distinguish between the costs of fixed and 
circulating capital, and those involved in working for lead, 
calamine and coal, but all were met by a regular, usually
c o
monthly, settling up amongst the partners . During 
construction, or unproductive times, they would have to draw on 
other sources of funds available to them.
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Mearns colliery, where coal was ’landed by a machine turned by 
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42 Gough,Mines of Mendip,p .176,speculates that these may have 
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43 Griffin,British Coalmining Industry,p.100, believes iron 
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of Farrington Gurney.
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(Bradford-on-Avon,1976),pp.41-7. Rogers also notes undated 
references to deliveries at two other collieries mentioned 
earlier, Nailsea Heath and Bedminster.
46 Bulley,'To Mendip for Coal',I,pp.70-4.
47 Down & Warrington,Somerset Coalfield,pp.56-8; SRO, DD/FS Box 
30 0B 1, 'Covenant for Coaling, 12 October 1805'.
48 Information on Dowling comes from: BA0, 21779, Lovell MSS, 
Deeds and papers of Bishop Sutton Colliery 1762-1917; SR0,DD/RM 
Box 9 and DD/FS Boxes 15, 16, 30.
49 SRO,DD/FS Box 30 0B 3, Henry Fisher of Bath esq.,Lieut.in HM 
Royal Navy, to Mr Robert B Dowling of Chew Magna gent., 24 June 
1824. Release of a messuage, lands, coal works, and premises at 
Bishop Sutton in the parish of Chew Magna, including two 
coalpits or shafts, 5 \  acres of land, and a cottage, for £800.
50 SR0,DD/RM Box 9, Abstract of title to land in Bishop Sutton 
purchased in 1691 by Thomas Webb yeoman, concluding with 
details of Dowling's purchase in 1824.
51 BAO,21779, 28 deeds labelled ’Bishop Sutton Colliery 1844- 
55' and SRO, DD/FS Box 30 OB 4, OB 55. The Rees Moggs were from 
the late 1830s associated with coalmining on the estate of the 
Earl of Warwick at Clutton.
52 Thomas,'Agriculture & Industry in Nailsea',pp.45-50,63-4; 
Andy Bowman,'The Nailsea Coalfields 1500-1890',Jnl.Som.Mines 
Res.Group,1,3(1982),pp.46-63.
53 Billingsley,Agriculture of Somerset,p.27; Bulley,'To Mendip 
for Coal',II,pp.28-30.
54 SRO, DD/MGG Box 3, 'Jacob Mogg's Acct with the Estate of Mr. 
Hodges',1761-1776.
55 SRO, DD/MGG Box 2, Duchy of Cornwall lease of 1756 renewing 
one of 1732 at Welton. The partners were John Mogg, the 
trustees of George Hodges, Thomas Bush, Jacob Mogg, James 
Moore, William Savage, John Bush. Each partner was entitled to 
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56 SRO, DD/MGG Box 3, 'Case for Mr.Romilly's Opinion',1796
57 Bulley,'To Mendip for Coal',II,pp.29-30.
58 The method of settling up on Mendip is shown in the 'East 
Harptree Minery, Grooving Accounts’, SRO, DD/WG Box 14, where 
for example in December 1792 the monthly account for calamine 
works was met by three partners according to their share: 
Thomas Wright, brother of Robert, 3/8; George Pope, agent for 
Scrope the Lord Royal, 3/8; and William Hare,land surveyor,2/8. 
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in coalmining comes from 'Mr Mogg's Account Book 1779', SRO, 
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Chapter 8 Capital Investment in Manufacturing.
By the mid-eighteenth century a wide range of manufacturing 
concerns were already established in north Somerset. Although 
to a large extent operated by water rather than steam power, 
the existence of this network meant that far from being a rural 
backwater the region provided a fertile context, stimulating a 
demand for coal (for processing as well as power) and other 
products, and producing the funds needed for investment. It is 
not possible to provide a comprehensive list of all locations, 
but at a conservative estimate there were over this period at 
least three hundred water-powered sites at which corn, grist, 
and logwood were ground, beer brewed, timber sawn, wool and 
silken textiles woven, leather tanned, paper milled, edge and 
other tools ground, brass and copper ware fabricated, glass 
fused, pottery baked, and gunpowder incorporated.
Within this range, three distinct types of enterprise can be 
distinguished. First there were concerns serving the needs of 
local consumers. At the domestic level these included millers, 
brewers and distillers, whilst producers’ needs were met by 
those serving the agricultural and mining industries. Amongst 
the former were the breweries, clustered in Bath or dispersed 
in small settlements like Oakhill. Examples of the latter are 
provided by the edge tool works of the Fussell family, who 
operated at six sites centred on Mells between the granting of 
the first lease by the Horner family in 1744 and the take-over
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by a Worcester company in 1880; and by William Evans’ foundry 
at Paulton on the Somerset Coal Canal, which from 1810 to its 
decline in the 1890s was the only major firm in the coalfield 
supplying winding and pumping engines and other machinery. Both 
tool firm and foundry were based on local capital, and both 
suffered eventually from competition from outside the region^-.
Next, other industries such as woollen textiles and paper 
making also drew on local resources, but their products were 
sold widely outside the region, of which they were an important 
source of prosperity in the mid-eighteenth century although 
declining in importance thereafter. In the former the wool was 
initially provided by Mendip sheep^ and spun and woven on a 
domestic basis until these processes came to be undertaken at 
centres such as Pensford, Chew Magna, Wells, and Mells before 
becoming concentrated on the eastern border, especially at 
Bath, Frome, and Shepton Mallet. The cloth was finished with 
Fullers Earth mined chiefly around Combe Hay south of Bath; 
teazles cultivated on Mendip's northwest slopes in such 
parishes as Wrington and Harptree; and dyes like woad, still a 
profitable crop in Keynsham at the end of the eighteenth
o
century . But by then the region had fallen from its pre­
eminence of the 1720s when Somerset was described as ’the most 
intent' of any county on woollen manufacture, and Defoe had 
noted 'The increasing and flourishing circumstances of this 
trade....the increase of buildings and inhabitants.... and the 
wealth of the clothiers' in towns such as Frome^. Like fulling,
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paper making depended on pure water from the Mendip limestone. 
The early seventeenth century mill at Wookey Hole was followed 
by others on the Axe and the Cheddar Yeo south of the Mendips; 
at Banwell, Compton Martin, Chew Magna, and Pensford to its 
north; and at Batheaston, Bathford, and Monkton Combe in the 
northeast^. Both industries declined from the end of the 
eighteenth century relative to developments in areas less bound 
by manufacturing traditions, but both remained successful 
producers of specialist goods, for example bank note paper and 
livery and riding cloth.
Lastly there were industries which although located in north 
Somerset to take advantage of the readily available water 
power, timber, charcoal, and coal, were essentially an 
extension of Bristol's commercial interests, part of the 
shipping and credit network through which raw materials were 
imported, finished goods distributed, and capital requirements 
met. Examples are provided by the gunpowder, copper, brass, and 
glass industries, whose fortunes were closely linked to those 
of the port and its merchants. In general they were founded in 
the early decades of the eighteenth century when Bristol ships 
traded widely and profitably, and they flourished in the middle 
period when although Bristol was declining in importance 
relative to Liverpool, the informal network of trade and credit 
still existed to support the manufacturing ventures. Their 
decline after the turn of the century was perhaps not only the 
result of the growing industrial competitiveness of the north
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and midlands, but also a reflection of the loss of vigour by 
the port and its merchants.
Detailed information from which conclusions may be drawn 
about the sources and investment of capital is available for a 
few cases in this third category, and these will be examined 
later. It is possible that the documents which make this 
possible were written and have survived because the port-based 
manufacturers were better able to run their ventures in a 
'Shipshape and Bristol fashion', than the rural industrialists. 
Certainly, little evidence on local concerns has survived, and 
no ledgers or balance sheets have been found. On the major 
supplier of agricultural tools for example, the only material 
available is from a government enquiry of 1803 which shows that 
at James Fussell's works in Mells there were nine water wheels 
with forge hammers and other machinery, 25 pairs of bellows, 24 
anvils and 140 grindstones. In addition to these items of fixed 
capital there were stocks of raw materials which included two 
tons of steel, 28 tons of bar iron, 80 tons of old iron, 150 
quarters of coal, and 25 tons of ash timber. Finished goods 
comprised 1,700 dozen scythes and 500 dozen reaphooks. This 
tantalizing glimpse of the structure of the firm was repeated 
though on a smaller scale at the works of John Fussell, where 
there were two water wheels with forge hammers and machinery,
12 pairs of bellows and 12 anvils; 30 tons of bar iron and 60 
quarters of coal; 12 dozen spades and shovels, 12 dozen hooks 
and axes, and 60 dozen spade and shovel sterns^.
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Evidence on paper mills is also very limited, but that
relating to the mortgaging of Dulcot Mill near Wells between
1741 and 1787 is of interest for it indicates the value of the
mill at that time, and also reveals some of the financial links 
£
with Bristol . A paper of 1756 declared that the mill complex, 
including 'a drying house lately built1, was 'not equal to the 
sum1 of £1,800 for which it provided security, although when a 
'bridging' loan between long-term mortgages was arranged for 
two years from 1767, this was for £1,900 at a rate of interest 
of 4 per cent. It was supplied by three Bristolians of whom 
Thomas Blagdon remains an unknown gentleman, but Michael Miller 
sr. was a merchant trading in wines and spices from 1731 and in 
slaves from the 1750s (named as a Trader to Africa in 1755, and 
funding eight voyages there in the 1760s), and a partner in 
Miles Bank from 1752 until 1785. The third mortgagee, his son 
Michael, was from 1768 to 1779 a partner in the Woolley Powder 
Works to which his father loaned £1,000 between 1768 and 1772.
Even closer links were demonstrated by the major glassworks 
in north Somerset established at Nailsea in 1788, for the 
leading partner was J.R.Lucas, the successful Bristol merchant 
and manufacturer already noted, who owned a beer and cider 
warehouse and a third share in a glass bottle works in the 
city. His family links with north Somerset show yet another 
aspect of the ties between Bristol and the region for in 1781 
he married Anna Adams of the family based at Stanton Wick some 
eight miles south of Bristol, long-associated with coalmining
-259-
and glassmaking. Lucas rented the glassworks there until the 
lease expired in 1815, but in the meantime this experience had 
encouraged him to seek a new site on which he could expand 
outside Bristol, and he chose Nailsea Heath. Here there was a 
good supply of cheap coal from a newly-opened colliery, stone 
for industrial building and domestic housing, lime and sand for 
processing, and clay for crucibles. Transport by road was 
difficult but business thrived, and bottles and window glass 
were sold widely around the Severn estuary, across the 
Atlantic, and to the Baltic and west Mediterranean countries.
By dint of borrowing, and re-forming the partnership over the 
years, the capital was built up to £72,000 in the 1820s, when 
Nailsea became the fourth largest glassworks in the country^.
The opportunity for a fuller study of capital investment in 
manufacturing is provided by the following three cases. For 
reasons already suggested all are Bristol-financed enterprises.
i The Gunpowder Mills at Woolley
Gunpowder makers were active in Bristol from at least the 
1630s, but the hazards of this operation caused them to look 
outside the city limits for sites which could offer seclusion 
and accessibility. The valleys of north Somerset met this need, 
as well as being able to provide water power and charcoal from 
the local woods. Links with Bristol were vital, for into the
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port came the saltpetre and sulphur that were with charcoal the 
ingredients of gunpowder, and from it the finished product 
could be shipped both coast-wise and abroad. As well as 
supplying such practical facilities, the merchant community of 
Bristol provided a credit network for the trade and helped to 
meet the capital requirements of the undertakings. The Woolley 
works were built in the 1720s near the village of that name in
o
the deep valley of the Lam Brook three miles north of Bath . 
They were part of a group which flourished in the eighteenth 
century at Littleton, Chew Magna, and Moreton, with possibly 
other sites at Winford, Long Ashton, and Dead Mills near 
Woolley. It may seem unfortunate that the best documented firm 
in the region manufactured such a specialized commodity, but if 
its importance is unrecognized in this period, that is largely 
because this subject has been so neglected.
Evidence about the Woolley Mills is displayed in Table 8(1), 
which shows a remarkable continuity of information from the 
1740s to the early years of the nineteenth century, based 
almost entirely on papers of the Strachey family of Sutton 
Court, encountered already in relation to coalmining. Their 
links with the Woolley works began with a marriage into the 
family of John Parkin, iron merchant of Bristol and original 
partner in the firm. When he died in 1733 control of part of 
his share fell to his son-in-law Hodges Strachey (a name which 
shows that the Stracheys like the Moggs were linked to the 
Hodges). The family association with gunpowder continued until
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the death of Sir Henry Strachey in 1810. Leases and partnership 
papers were kept from the 1720s, and balance sheets and 
correspondence from the 1740s. Membership of Parliament and 
residence in London meant that the problems at Woolley and the 
news of lobbying at Westminster were communicated by letter^.
In Table 8(1), columns I and II show the fixed and 
circulating capital of the firm as valued in the balance 
sheets. The former comprises buildings and utensils, and the 
latter raw materials and finished goods. Their relationship is 
expressed in column III, where fixed capital is shown as a 
percentage of the combined assets. Pollard has suggested that 
only in the cotton industry was fixed capital the major 
component, and in seven examples from the metallurgical 
industries the proportions ranged from 8.8 to 33.2 per cent^. 
The proportions at Woolley were so much higher, from 32.0 to 
86.2 per cent, as to raise the question of whether the 
buildings may have been over-valued or the stocks and stores 
under-valued. On the former proposition it is impossible to say 
conclusively whether the figures in column I represent a fair 
valuation, but their slow increase over the years gives some 
verisimilitude, and when for example a 'New Magazine’ was added 
to the value of the buildings in 1751, accounts with a mason, 
carpenter, tyler, smith and 'plomer' confirm construction was 
then underway. A close study of the balance sheets has revealed 
the processes which took place at Woolley, and the special 
buildings and utensils that would thus be required there.
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Table 8 (1 ) : Analysis of the Woolley Gunpowder Works, 1746-1807
i 11 III IV V VI VII VIII IX X XI XII XIII
Fixed Circu­ Fixed Trade Credit Balance Adminis- Circu­ Fixed Loans Partners1 DividendI Rate ofYear Capital
£
lating
Capital
(1)
£
Capital 
as per­
centage 
of I+1I 
%
Debtors
£
Creditors
£
of
Trade
Credit
E
trative
Balance
£
lating
Capital
(2)
H+VI+VII
£
Capital 
as per­
centage 
of I+VIII 
%
to the 
Partners
£
Capital
£ £
Return on 
Partners’ 
Capital
%
PART I
1746 2,200 3,559 38.2 5,194 676 4,518 215 8,292 21.0 9,000 1,492 16.6
1747 2,200 2,846 43.6 5,336 892 4,444 479 7,769 22.1 9,000 969 10.8
1749 2,200 3,665 37.5 5,872 1,766 4,106 506 8,277 21.0 9,000 1,478
Account
16.4 
for 2 yrs.
1750 2,200 4,089 35.0 3,994 1,748 2,246 316 6,651 24.8 9,000 Account incomplete
1751 2,700 4,240 38.9 4,166 520 3,646 566 8,452 24.2 1,500 9,000 652 7.2
1753 2,700 3,905 40.9 7,163 3,648 3,515 448 7,868 25.5 1,500 9,000 67 0.7
1754 2,700 4,540 37.3 9,185 6,050 3,135 590 8,265 24.6 1,500 9,000 465 5.2
1755 2,700 4,572 37.1 10,461 6,202 4,259 292 9,123 22.8 1,500 9,000 1,324 14.7
1756 2,700 5,743 32.0 11,566 8,233 3,333 175 9,251 22.6 1,500 9,000 1,450 16.1
1757 3,000 3,953 43.1 12,128 8,254 3,874 1,519 9,346 24.3 1,500 9,000 1,845 20.5
1758 3,000 2,543 54.1 14,169 7,266 6,903 343 9,789 23.4 1,500 9,000 2,290 25.4
1759 3,000 2,676 52.8 12,303 5,947 6,356 460 9,492 24.0 1,500 9,000 1,993 22.1
1760 3,000 1,712 63.7 12,307 5,938 6,369 939 9,020 24.9 1, 500 9,000 1,520 16.9
1761 3,000 1,020 74.6 11,151 3,540 7,611 924 9,555 23.9 2,100 9,000 1,455 16.2
1763 3,000 1,746 63.2 10,119 3,306 6,813 210 8,769 25.5 2,100 9,000 669 7.4
1764 3,000 2,010 59.9 7,980 426 7,554 645 10,209 22.7 3,600 9,000 609 6.8
1767 3,000 1,965 60.4 9,568 590 8,978 - 56 10,887 21.6 3,500 9,000 1,388 15.4
1768 3,000 2,313 56.5 8,224 171 8,053 -416 9,950 23.2 3,500 9,000 450 5.0
1769 3,000 3,140 48.8 7,798 287 7,511 -221 10,430 22.3 3,500 9,000 929 10.3
1771 3,000 1,559 65.8 9,298 294 9,004 - 55 10,508 22.2 3,500 9,000 1,008 11.2
1772 3,100 2,235 58.1 8,513 226 8,287 506 11,028 21.9 3,500 9,000 1,628 18.1
1773 3,100 3,634 46.0 7,607 185 7,422 - 78 10,978 22.0 3,500 9,000 1,579 17.5
1774 3,100 2,118 59.4 9,318 318 9,000 -175 10,943 22.1 3,500 9,000 1,544 17.1
1778 3,100 4,508 40.7 5,440 111 5,329 -145 9,692 24.2 3,500 9,000 292 3.2
PART 11
1780 3,100 2,811 52.4 8,483 161 8,322 -493 10,640 22.6 3,500 9,000 1,236 13.7
1784 4,000 2,075 65.8 8,154 161 7,993 -435 9,633 29.3 3,500 9,900 234 2.4
1788 4,000 2,402 62.5 9,455 110 9,345 -655 11,092 26.5 3,500 9,900 1,691 17.1
1789 4,000 3,058 56.7 9,077 167 8,910 -465 11,503 25.8 3,500 9,900 2,102 21.2
1790 4,000 1,731 69.8 10,346 98 10,248 -806 11,173 26.4 3,500 9,900 1,791 18.1
1792 4,000 1,414 73.9 10,862 116 10,746 -422 11,738 25.4 3,500 9,900 2,338 23.6
1793 4,000 1,366 74.5 11,102 242 10,860 -846 11,380 26.0 3,500 9,900 1,980 20.0
1794 9,900 1,740 17.6
1795 4,000 3,409 54.0 9,052 200 8,852 -255 12,006 25.0 12,000 4,007 33.4
1796 4,000 638 86.2 8,480 91 8,389 9,027 30.7 12,000 1,541 12.8
1797 4,000 729 84.6 10,748 114 10,634 11,363 26.0 12,000 3,677 30.6
1798 4,000 6,779 37.1 3,284 3,284 10,063 28.4 12,000 3,541 29.5
1799 12,000 3,370 28.1
1800 12,000 2,411 20.1
1801 4,000 449 89.9 10,275 369 9,906 10,355 27.9 12,000 2,355 19.6
1802 12,000 997 8.3
1803 12,000 1,379 11.5
1804 21,000 2,945 14.0
1805 21,000 3,177 15.1
1806 18,000 3,645 20.2
1807 18,000 2,573 14.3
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Table 8(1): Analysis of the Woolley Gunpowder Works, 1746-1807
Source: SRO, DD/SH Box 27.
With the exceptions listed below the sources are the 
annual balance sheets, usually drawn up on 30 June when 
work was likely to be at a standstill due to lack of 
water. Information was also derived from letters dated: 
June 1794, 29 March 1799, 29 January 1800, 5 December 
1800, 28 January 1803, 27 September 1803, 18 August 
1804, 30 July 1805, 23 July 1806, 30 July 1807.
Notes: The division in the table marks a change in accountancy
practice. The balance sheets of Part I were written in 
an older style hand with liabilities on the left under 
the Dr. heading and assets on the right, Cr. side. From 
1780, see Part II, the balance sheets were written in a 
more modern hand, with assets on the left under the Dr. 
head and liabilities on the right, Cr. side. The switch 
may have been made to conform to contemporary practice, 
see Hamilton's Introduction to Merchandise(1788),p.286 
(quoted by Yamey, Edey & Thomson,Accounting in England 
and Scotland 1543-1800(1963),p.133) which says, 'The 
Dr.of the balance-sheet contains every kind of property 
belonging to you, and every debt owing to you; and the 
Cr. contains every debt owing by you: Therefore the 
difference of the sides exhibits your nett estate'.
The contents of the columns are discussed in the text.
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Of the three ingredients of gunpowder^, only the charcoal 
was bought locally. It was already charred, but had to be 
crushed in a mill. As the stocks held at the annual casting up 
could amount to 1,500 to 2,000 bushels, some form of storage 
would be required. Saltpetre came from the Baltic and India, 
and sulphur from the Mediterranean, especially Sicily and 
Italy, and both were refined at Woolley, for the annual 
inventories record the quantities of each in a rough and a 
refined state, showing that some had been already processed and 
some awaited treatment in special buildings and plant. In the 
early 1760s advice was received from the Board of Ordnance on
1 o
how the refining techniques could be improved . The prepared 
ingredients were then ground and mixed under pressure, by edge 
runners weighing 2 \  to 3 tons, housed in incorporating mills. 
According to the Memorandum of 1747/9 there were then four such 
mills at Woolley each able to grind 251bs in 2 hours. The 
resulting ’serpentine' powder was prone to separate into its 
distinctive ingredients when transported, but this disadvantage 
was overcome by the additional processes of corning, glazing, 
and pressing, that served to consolidate the grains. There is 
evidence that this seiving, polishing, and compacting took 
place at Woolley for the powder stored was listed as F, FF, or 
FFF, showing that not only discrete grains but pellets of a 
specified uniform size were produced there. Finally the powder 
was dried in a building of which it was said in the 1740s, 'The 
Stove drys from 70 to 80 Barrels at a time and that in 48 
hours'. The powder was then stored in a magazine for security.
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This account cannot demonstrate beyond doubt the accuracy of 
the figures for fixed capital in column I, but by showing the 
range of procedures undertaken at Woolley and the buildings and 
equipment required, it can be claimed that they may reasonably 
be assumed to be correct. In addition, costs may have been high 
because these buildings were different from the usual mills of 
the countryside for they had to combine flexibility with 
strength, stout structures with a flimsy roof or wall which 
would give way easily if there were an explosion. Further costs 
were incurred by the need to secure a good supply of water for 
processing and power, which led to the construction of a system 
of leats, conduits, and mill ponds, referred to in the leases 
and substantial enough to survive today. These efforts to 
increase and store water supplies in order to ensure continuity 
of production on a relatively small stream must have formed a 
part of the high fixed capital costs recorded in the balances.
The possibility of an undervaluation of raw materials and 
finished goods must next be considered. It might be thought 
that the assessment of the former would fluctuate with the 
uncertain arrival of supplies by sea, but such variations were 
lessened by the inclusion of stocks on board ship and in the 
warehouse in Bristol (rented from the Corporation), with those 
at Woolley. For example, the records show that in June 1759 
casks of saltpetre to the value of £1,131 were stored at the 
warehouse in the Fryars, and in 1760 a comparable amount valued 
at £1,093 was listed as still on board the Henrietta Constantia
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bound from Dantzig. In 1795 when no refined petre was recorded 
at Woolley, and only two hundred weight was being processed, 
they were clearly awaiting the arrival of the Partridge with 
100 bags of saltpetre at £826, and the Chard with 200 bags at 
£1,948. In addition, accounts were held with merchants in 
Bristol and London handling cargoes of saltpetre and sulphur, 
which further mask the raw materials in transit that might 
otherwise have figured in the annual inventories. They form the 
main part of column V, as sums owed to the partners’ creditors.
The inventories also listed stores of gunpowder held at the 
works, at the magazine in Bristol, and between 1751 and 1759 at 
Liverpool where sales were handled by Arthur and Benjamin 
Heywood. The last item disappeared from later statements but 
this outlet was not abandoned for the partners valued it so 
highly that when wartime prohibitions meant that supplies could 
not travel coastwise in the early 1760s they sent waggons over­
land at a cost of 10s to 12s per barrel, and a letter of 1800 
about the lease of the Liverpool magazine shows the partners 
still maintained stores of gunpowder there. If these were not 
itemized in the inventories, how were they accounted for?
Column IV of Table 8(1) holds the key. The debts owed to the 
partners shown there were until 1757 mostly recorded under the 
general heading ’By Debts outstanding’. This was then reduced, 
and a compensatory item appeared, 'By Baugh Ames & Co their 
Ball as p their Accot Currt to this day...£7944'. The Heywoods 
still had a balance representing the Liverpool stores, valued
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in 1757 at £2,227, but in 1759 this too disappeared from the 
accounts and the debt owed by Baugh, Ames & Co. had risen to 
£11,674. It seems that these Bristol merchants (the former a 
partner at the Woolley Powder Works, the latter at Littleton), 
had taken responsibility for marketing the gunpowder and that 
the figures in column IV represent stores held in the magazines 
as well as small unsettled debts to the Woolley partners.
Further evidence of this undercounting of the circulating 
capital comes in 1799 when the partners were concerned with the 
assessment for the new income tax, to be based upon profits, 
with allowances for fire insurance, magazine rents, and out- 
standing debts'- . To establish the first claim, the buildings 
and utensils were valued for the year 1798 at £4,000 and the 
stocks and stores at £6,779 (made up of raw materials at £1,220 
and powder in Bristol and Liverpool at £5,559). Outstanding 
debts totalled £3,284. This suggests that over 60 per cent of 
what in other years appeared in the credit network was in fact 
part of the stocks and stores. This makes it likely that the 
1798 figure of 37.1 per cent as the proportion of fixed to 
fixed and circulating capital provides a good estimation of 
this relationship over the years, especially as it indicates a 
return to the ratio in the period before 1757 when Baugh & Ames 
took charge of merchanting, and a substantial part of the 
capital was lost amongst the trade credit figures.
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These difficulties suggest that for an historical analysis 
the narrow definition employed so far is unrealistic. If
circulating capital were defined more broadly as a balance of 
all assets turned over in the course of business this would 
have the advantage of allowing for items in different
categories from those ordained by modern practice, as well as
some which might otherwise escape altogether. This broader 
definition may owe more to accountancy than to economic 
theory^, but by allowing for an assessment of all assets of 
single use available to the firm in a particular time, it may 
provide a picture of greater historical accuracy, though lesser 
economic purity. Column VIII shows this revised figure for 
circulating capital based on stocks and stores, the balance of 
trade credit, and the small and sometimes negative 
administrative balance which is nevertheless important because 
it included items like rent, which secured the right to 
waterpower, and insurance, which underwrote materials in 
transit. It is not unreasonable to suggest that on this broader 
definition, fixed capital represented about 25 per cent of the 
total assets of the firm, see column IX#
Despite this re-valuation the proportion is still high, per­
haps due to the varied stages of manufacture requiring a range 
of buildings and utensils; or to the fluctuations in demand, 
due for example to bouts of privateering, which may have led to 
an over-provision of plant for use at busy times. Even more 
importantly these relative proportions may reflect the origins
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of the firm, for having been founded by and remaining 
associated with Bristol merchants there may have been less 
difficulty in financing such works than would otherwise have 
been the case. This lack of financial stringency is shown in 
another aspect of the asset structure of the firm, for over 
this long period a positive balance of trade credit was 
maintained since the partners did not need to use this as a way 
of acquiring capital^ : instead, they were able to support a 
trading partnership in Bristol, thus helping to sustain the 
merchant activities from which they came rather than to 
stimulate new economic activity in north Somerset.
The four original partners in the Woolley works, founded 
1722, were all well-established in the Bristol trading network, 
members and officers of the Society of Merchant Venturers, 
shipowners and traders in linen, iron, and sugar. Three were 
also engaged in the slave trade: Abraham Hooke financed 23 
voyages from the beginning of the century, and John Parkin and 
Edmund Baugh became involved in the years before the setting up 
of the Woolley mills. The network extended beyond Bristol to 
include trade and government circles in London. The site at 
Woolley was leased from the London merchant William Parkin, 
brother of John and a partner himself in the 1730s, with whom a 
trade balance was maintained until 1747. The Stracheys were 
north Somerset landowners (with property in Bristol from the 
1720s ), whose political contacts were of great importance to
the partnership. As a young man the later Sir Henry was already
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by 1762 lobbying for the partners and suffering 'tongue and 
foot fatigue1 as a result. He had a Parliamentary seat for over 
40 years from the 1770s, and served as Keeper of His Majesty's 
Stores, Ordnance and Ammunition of War in 1783^. The Dyer 
family network also provided links with London, an account held 
with James Dyer there continuing from 1764 until the last 
available balance sheet of 1801. The commodity dealt in was 
probably saltpetre, and although the balance shifted greatly 
the debt to the partners in for example 1788 was £2,500. Robert 
Dyer of Bristol became a partner in 1780, and introduced a new 
format for the accounts when he took charge of them that year. 
George Dyer was a London broker who became a partner in the 
1790s. Lastly, William Wansey, a partner from 1753 to 1767, 
served not only Woolley but also other Africa traders in 
Bristol. He was admitted to the Merchant Venturers in 1749 'in 
consideration of having given a long attendance in London about 
the Africa trade and done all in his power for the service of
1 o
the trade' . He was himself a trader, involved in eight 
voyages between 1745 and 1763, and named in the 1755 List.
From the earliest extant agreement of 1733 the partners' 
capital totalled £9,000 until the new partnership of 1784, when 
it became £9,900, rising in 1795 to £12,000 until after the 
turn of the century as shown in column XI of Table 8(1). A 
consolidation with the Littleton works in 1803 then resulted in 
a joint capital of £21,000, reduced to £18,000 on the death of 
a Littleton partner in 1806. John Parkin's share passed to his
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two daughters, through whom one part came to the Strachey 
family whilst the other was retained by a spinster known as Mrs 
Elizabeth Parkin until her death in the mid-1760s. It was then 
inherited by the Worgan family, of whom Matthew succeeded his 
father John as manager from 1747 until his death in the early 
1790s, by which time he had made loans to the company totalling 
£3,500. In the early 1780s he held 20 joint stock shares in the 
Bristol Brass Wire Company by purchase and inheritance, valued 
then at £5,000. Edmund Baugh's share passed to his son Isaac 
who managed affairs in Bristol until his death in 1786 and who 
was included in the 1755 List of Africa traders. Abraham 
Hooke's executor Joseph Houlton held this share in his own 
right from 1740 to 1753. He came from a family of prosperous 
clothiers on the Wiltshire/Somerset border who had bought the 
manor of Farleigh Hungerford in the early 1700s. Of later 
partners, mention may be made of: the younger Michael Miller 
(encountered already in relation to Dulcot mill) who engaged in 
eight slaving voyages from 1760 until 1768 before joining the 
Woolley works that year; John Vaughan jr, a founding and 
managing partner of Miles Bank in 1752, who became a Woolley 
partner in the 1770s after he and his father had engaged in 
four slave voyages from 1759 to 1764; William Elton who became 
a partner in 1778, some half dozen of his family if not he 
himself having engaged in numerous slave voyages in the first 
half of the eighteenth century; and James Jones, a substantial 
shipowner who became a partner in the mid-1780s at a time when
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he was said to have nine vessels on the coast of West Africa 
and at sea, capable of carrying 3,520 slaves-^.
As the partners' capital rose towards the end of the century 
their number declined, this concentration in fewer hands being 
achieved by the Articles of Partnership of 1783 which stated 
that shares could not be disposed of by will but were to be 
taken by surviving partners on payment of compensation. The 
determination to increase their share of profits at every 
opportunity was eventually to Sir Henry's disadvantage, for he 
in turn fell victim to this aim despite appeals to moral
n r\
principles, sentiment, and good business sense . On his death 
in 1810 his heir was excluded. Even the capital sum of £3,000 
paid for the Strachey share was less than hoped for, as in 1799 
Sir Henry had suggested hopefully that,'considering the Profits 
of our Trade..ought not the sale of his share to his Partners 
to be in some Proportion to the average Profits as the fairer
O 1
Estimate of its real Value'? .
The 'Profits of our Trade' were the reason for this 
reluctance to allow the association with the powder works to be 
ended. The sums shared annually amongst the partners were based 
on the difference between assets (buildings and utensils, 
inventory of stock, and debts owing to them) and liabilities 
(debts to be paid, both trade and financial, and a sum equal to 
the partners'capital which might be called upon at dissolution 
or death). This arrangement is contrary to Pollard's experience
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that ’all liabilities, except for the original partners'
o o
capital, were deducted' . However the partners at Woolley did
fail to allow for the cost of their capital, either by setting
aside a 5.0 per cent rate of interest to be met by earnings
before profits were declared, or by drawing up a balance sheet
in which this figured as a distinctive element in the dividend.
Instead it merged with profits to produce an annual return to
the partners' capital which was great enough to stifle any
concern about its composition. However the partners remained
aware of this distinction, as is shown by calculations made by
Henry Strachey in 1798 when he deducted a sum representing a
5.0 rate of interest from the dividend received each year over 
2 2the past decade . A greater cause of worry was the conveyance 
of the dividend. In 1796 Henry Strachey was sent £513 in seven 
bills with the note, 'it is a matter of the greatest difficulty 
to secure any sort of London paper here'. In 1797 the problems 
grew worse, for the 'very considerable sales of Gunpowder at 
Liverpool' had been met by 'Bills at a long date' on which 
proprietors were offered interest until they became due. The 
return on capital was then 30.6 per cent. In 1795 it had been 
even higher at 33.A per cent and discretion was urged for 'the 
dividend is so great that the utmost secrecy is necessary'. 
Strachey's account was credited with £1335.12.6d, since a 
letter was not trusted^.
Why were the profits at Woolley so high that over the period 
covered by the balance sheets the average rate of return was
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15.5 per cent? The advice of the Board of Ordnance in the 1760s 
to try 'different Compositions different times of grinding etcr 
by which means we may hit on the right method as others have 
done 1^ , makes it unlikely that these were a return to an 
innovative technology. Nor were capital and entrepreneurship 
so scarce in that context as to have monopolistic elements 
reflected in high rates. The Woolley partners raised loans at
4.5 and 5.0 per cent, column X, with an ease which reveals the 
availability of funds in Bristol, the shortage of speculative 
opportunities there, and the confidence felt in the concern.
For example from 1751 until he died in 1757, £1,500 was loaned 
by Onesipherous Tyndall, at 4.5 per cent until 1755 and then
4.0 per cent. He was a West Indian merchant, drysalter, and 
major slaver, in which trade he was involved as both shipowner, 
and slave factor in partnership with Isaac Hobhouse and Richard 
Assheton. Thus well-provided, he became the senior founding 
partner in the Old Bank, set up in 1750 as the first in Bristol 
under a proper deed of partnership. The career of Michael 
Miller sr., wealthy merchant and partner in the rival Miles Bank 
founded in 1752, followed a similar path as already seen. He 
loaned the partners £1,500 at 5.0 per cent between 1768 and 
1772. As to entrepreneurship, although the initial decision to 
allocate resources to this use at Woolley led to the stream of 
high profits, their maintenance came to depend less on this 
attribute than on the skills of the merchant and political 
lobbyist, neither of which was in short supply in Bristol and 
London.
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Perhaps more significant in terms of profits was the special 
niche occupied by the north Somerset powder mills. Earlier 
sites dating from the mid-sixteenth century were chiefly in 
Kent and Surrey, producing powder largely for military and 
naval use. Later ones such as those in Westmorland and Furness 
were founded towards the end of the eighteenth century, and 
made powder chiefly for mining. For much of the intervening 
period therefore the mills of north Somerset played an 
important role in the geography and chronology of powdermaking, 
supplying it for mining, musketry and commerce in the immediate 
region, the western seaboard, the Africa trade and the American 
colonies. Its early use for blasting in this region, in lead
O C
mining from the mid-1680s and coal mining in the mid-1710s ,
must have been a consequence of and stimulus to the setting up
of local mills, especially as its employment in this industry
elsewhere came in general only slowly in the second half of the
27eighteenth century . The proximity of Bristol allowed the
market to be extended to Wales and Cornwall, and as late as
1804 the managing partner set out for the latter with
expectations 'of doing something with the miners which will be
2 8very beneficial to our concern' . Another distinction to be 
drawn was between 'Guinea powder', sold to the Africa merchants 
as a barter good and 'Merchant powder', sold abroad or carried 
as an armament. The former was inferior but may have been made 
in larger quantities, for in 1762 for example the partners held 
6381bs of Merchant and l,1441bs of Guinea powder^, though 
there may have been other reasons for the discrepancy.
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Lastly it must be asked whether the level of profits owed
anything to specific events rather than general circumstances.
Column XII shows that the most profitable periods co-incided
with wars, but the relationship was not a simple one for
despite their best efforts in the early 1760s for example, the
partners failed to gain a government contract, and had they
been more successful later this would probably have emerged in
the documents. Indeed such failures worsened their position,
for licences for coastal trade were in wartime limited to
government suppliers . In addition war years were difficult
ones for Bristol traders, and the port generally declined as
markets closed and ships came under attack from warships and 
11p r i v a t e e r s . The Woolley partners suffered particularly from 
restrictions on the Africa trade at those times, and from the 
loss of the American market between 1776 and 1783. These 
circumstances combine to make the high wartime profits all the 
more puzzling. An increasing demand for metal goods may have 
stimulated both the copper and coal mining industries, with a 
rise in the use of gunpowder, but privateering may offer a more 
likely answer. This has been called ’a favourite pursuit of 
speculative Bristolians' during the eighteenth century. In the 
1740s there were 49 privateers with about 20 guns each, and in 
the later 1750s there were over 60 with up to 36 guns each. In 
1746 for example the Southwell was fitted out by a partnership 
including Michael Miller sr., and the other Africa traders, 
Thomas Deane (partner in the Littleton powder works), James 
Laroche, and Cranfield Becher. In the Independence War however
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the Americans seized the advantage by prying on Britain’s west 
coast and although some 21 Bristol privateers retaliated the 
response was muted for these were such disastrous years for the 
city's trade and manufacture that there may have been few funds
o o
available for privateering^ .
The circumstantial evidence thus supports the suggestion that 
the high profits were due less to monopolistic returns to 
capital and entrepreneurship, than to the favourable conditions 
of timing and location, which made the initial entrepreneurial 
decision a continuingly profitable one for the next eighty 
years. The partners exploited these favourable market 
conditions by ploughing back very little of their profit into 
the powder works, which therefore remained a rewarding but 
slow-growing concern. Between 1746 and 1801 when the partners’ 
capital rose slowly from £9,000 to £12,000, the annual rate of 
increase of gross fixed capital may be.estimated tentatively at
1.1 per cent. However this generally low rate obscures the 
pattern of investment which may have led to the following 
annual rate of growth of gross fixed capital: 1746-51, 4.2%; 
1752-57, 2.1%; 1758-72, 0.2%; 1773-84, 2.3%; 1785-1801, 0%. 
There is no evidence on depreciation, which may in any case 
have been less important for mill buildings and heavy long- 
lasting machinery than for steam-powered factories. The sources 
of the capital invested were mixed, coming as much from outside 
loans as from partners increasing their shares or diverting 
their dividends. After 1785 even this modest investment ceased,
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suggesting that a major internal reason for the decline of the 
company was the partners’ failure to invest in productive 
assets which led not only to a lack of growth but also a 
failure to diversify. Unlike some powder makers such as the Du 
Pont company in Delaware, the Woolley partners failed to seize 
the opportunities available to develop the industry.
The north Somerset powder mills were also adversely affected 
by changes in the world economy. The Africa trade in slaves was
o o
in decline by the end of the eighteenth century , at the same 
time as the North American market had become vulnerable. Trade 
with the United States had revived after hostilities, but for 
items like gunpowder the setback continued as home-produced 
goods replaced those previously shipped across the Atlantic.
The urgency of the situation may be judged from two documents. 
The first, the memorandum of 1747/9, stated that the Woolley 
works then produced 2,000 to 4,000 barrels of powder each year. 
The second, a paper of 1802 setting out the position at the 
Woolley and Littleton mills, stated that in the past eight 
years the former had produced 8,846 and the latter 8,942 
barrels, the partners' capital employed at both being the same, 
£12,000. These figures suggest that for each of those eight 
years the mills had together been producing only as much as and 
possibly less than, Woolley alone in the 1740s. The decline in 
overseas markets had thus left the mills with a productive 
capacity which not even the war had caused to be fully used. In 
1803 therefore the Woolley partners entered into an agreement
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with the proprietors of the Littleton works 10 miles south of 
Bristol, by which the two firms were to be 'consolidated1. As 
the Woolley lease was close to expiry but the Littleton site 
was freehold and owned by the partners, it was decided to 
concentrate production at the latter, although buildings and 
machinery at the former were to 'remain as they are, to be 
empld in case of emergency'^ . The firm thus lost its separate 
identity only a few years before Sir Henry's death in 1810 led 
to the exclusion of the Stracheys, and brought to an end this 
supply of documentary evidence.
Much less is known about the Littleton works, but the 
partners shared the same background as those at Woolley. From 
the mid-eighteenth century they included the following 
representatives of Bristol's mercantile, slave trading and 
banking worlds: Levi and Jeremiah Ames, Thomas Deane, Isaac 
Elton, William and Philip John Miles, William Miller, William 
Fowler and Samuel Shute. In addition to Littleton the partners 
operated on sites in the nearby parishes of Winford, Chew Magna 
and Chew Stoke, until the business was taken over by the 
national firm of Curtis and Harvey in the 1830s, shortly after 
which production ceased in the Bristol region. These closures 
may have had a greater effect in the city than the countryside 
because whilst the mills were not great employers of labour (12 
men at the Woolley works in 1747/9, for example), most of the 
partners and merchants were based in Bristol, as were the 
coopers, braziers, plumbers, and carpenters named in the
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Woolley accounts (and checked in the Bristol Directories), 
presumably because men skilled in the specialist port trades 
like barrel making, were employed in preference to rural 
craftsmen.
The need to consolidate the works shows how little the 
dividend can tell us about the efficiency of the capital 
employed in the physical assets, or indeed the future prospects 
of the firm. It was the partners’ realization that high profits 
at the end of the eighteenth century showed not a thriving firm 
but only one faced with occasionally exceptional conditions 
iryhn otherwise contracting market, that led to the 
'consolidation' of the companies.
ii The Joseph Percival and Copper Company of Bristol
This company was like the powder works in that it operated on 
rural manufacturing sites in north Somerset, and was part of a 
larger network encompassing in this case the mining of copper 
in Cornwall and its smelting in South Wales. Its origins lie in 
the growing industrial activity at the start of the eighteenth 
century, associated with the wartime demand of those years, and 
with the adapation in Bristol in the later 1680s of the new 
coal-fired reverbatory furnaces from lead to copper smelting^. 
The role of John Coster and Gabriel Wayne in this development 
led them across the Bristol Channel to work at smelting 
concerns set up in the 1690s at Upper and Lower Redbrook near
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Tintern. Smelted copper was then shipped to Bristol, for the 
brass and copper works there and in north Somerset.
Whilst continuing his links with Upper Redbrook, John Coster 
also established a family partnership which became the Joseph 
Percival & Copper Co.in the 1740s and the John Freeman & Copper 
Co.in 1764. Their first water-powered site was a former fulling 
mill at Swinford on the River Avon, two miles upstream from 
Keynsham. It was leased in 1708 and converted into a rolling 
mill for sheet copper, thought to be the first to use this 
method in the area. By 1713 another mill had been leased eight 
miles to the south, Bye Mill on the River Chew flowing north to 
the Avon. This had been used for iron battery work, and the 
Costers were able to adapt it for use with the copper sheets 
produced at Swinford, hammering or battering them into hollow 
ware. John Coster died in 1718 but the business was carried on 
by his three sons who took over two more mills on the Chew.
That at Pensford continued as a grist mill and may have been 
leased only to protect water rights or to ease river transport, 
although its warehouse was adapted for the storage of copper, 
but that at Publow was developed for refining, rolling, and 
battery work. A fifth mill at nearby Woollard was rented at the 
end of the eighteenth century. This expansion indicates 
success, and it has been suggested that they produced a large 
part of the copper battery ware sold in Bristol, valued for 
example in 1727 at £15,000^.
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During the 1720s the Costers' copper supplies were secured by- 
having one brother in Cornwall and Devon, and by maintaining an 
association with the Upper Redbrook works. But two brothers 
died in the early 1730s, and the Upper Redbrook lease was taken 
over by the rival Bristol Brass Wire & Copper Co., to be 
studied later. To regain control over their resources the 
partnership set up a copper smelting works near Swansea. This 
was the White Rock Copper Co. which A.H.John described as 
having been set up in 1737 'by some of Bristol's leading 
merchants.... engaged in the slave and West Indian trade', whom
*3 7
he named as 'John Hoblyn and Partners' 7. The surviving Coster 
brother Thomas, M.P. for Bristol from 1734 until his death in 
1739, was indeed engaged in the slave trade, undertaking six 
voyages in the 1730s as a shipowner; and in 1734 he had 
acquired as a new partner with a 1/3 share the slave trader 
Joseph Percival who long-continued in that business, appearing 
in the 1755 List of Traders to Africa. But who was John Hoblyn? 
No reference to a merchant of that name has been found, but in 
1739 Thomas' daughter Jane inherited his fortune of £40,000, 
and in 1741 she married Robert Hoblyn, a Cornish tin mining 
attorney who became a partner in the firm and M.P.for Bristol 
from 1742 to 1754. Jane/John Hoblyn may therefore be a 
composite figure. Nevertheless the generalization about links 
with the Africa trade holds good, especially as these went 
beyond the provision of capital for this manufacturing concern 
to include the representation of these interests in Westminster
*3 Q
in the mid-eighteenth centuryJ°.
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Limited evidence on the finances of the firm is provided by a 
Committee Book covering January 1762 to June 1769. Joseph 
Percival was no longer able to attend the monthly meetings, and 
until he died in February 1763 Isaac Hobhouse acted as the 
senior partner. Hobhouse has the distinction of having been 
selected by Minchinton as an example of the typical Bristol 
merchant who unlike his London counterpart functioned as 
wholesaler, factor,and shipowner, and by Latimer as one of the 
slave traders who should not 'be judged by the higher moral
on
codes' of a later dayJ . The investigation of his background 
which this apology invites reveals that Hobhouse pursued the 
trade with vigour. By 1747 he had conducted 72 voyages in the 
previous quarter century, and the 1755 List shows this activity 
continued. He held four of the Copper Company's shares. These 
were valued at £1,000 in 1764 and as each was one-thirtysixth 
of the whole it may be inferred that the capital stock 
subscribed by the partners was £36,000^. The Committee Book 
contains evidence of the firm's growth on both sides of the 
Channel. For example at White Rock in 1750 there were eight 
calciners in which ore was heated until friable and 26 furnaces 
in which it was then smelted, whilst by 1762 there were 15 and 
31 respectively. In 1764 it was decided to erect buildings for 
making brass in order to safeguard their position, for other 
firms (especially the William Champion & Warmley Co., near 
Bristol but in south Gloucestershire) had recently entered the 
market, and the partners feared this 'may in time probably 
lessen our sale'. This further vertical integration must have
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increased the overall provision of fixed capital, and may have 
led to some of the borrowing from external sources described 
later. There was also expansion at Publow Mill where a new 
furnace was installed in 1761 and a new clay house in 1762, and 
at Bye Mill where a new oven was established in 1762. And from 
September 1762 the partners were able to meet in ’our 
Countinghouse in Small Street’ instead of the Three Tons in 
Corn Street^.
Information on circulating capital is no easier to come by 
than that on fixed capital despite the elaborate Metal Account 
Books for the years 1756-98 and 1824-55, for these dealt in 
quantities only. However as the price of copper per ton was 
recorded for the years 1752 to 1760, see Table 8(2), column 4, 
it has been possible to value the stocks held at the annual 
count, column 3, in the period of overlap from 1756. The value 
of the stock held, shown in column 5 and averaging more than 
£69,000, gives some idea of the magnitude involved in this mid­
eighteenth century case. Indeed, compared with several big 
firms in the metallurgical industries on evidence provided by
Pollard, the value of raw materials alone at White Rock was
/ o
greater than figures covering stocks and stores elsewhere . As 
the White Rock figures pre-date Pollard’s earliest by 25 years, 
the Warmley Co.founded in 1746 may provide a closer comparison. 
Here stocks and stores were valued in 1767 at £102,000 and 
fixed capital at £105,000^. These figures suggest that on 
balance the raw materials held at White Rock may have been
Table 8(2) : Value of Stocks of Copper Ore at the White Rock Copper
Refinery of Joseph Percival and Copper Company, 1756-1760
1 2 3 4 5
Year
Copper Ore 
Delivered 
Tons
Copper Ore Copper Ore 
Smelted On Hand 
Tons Tons
Average Annual 
Price of Copper 
Ore Per Ton 
£ s d
Value of Stock 
of Copper Ore
£ s d
1752 2,689 96 18 0
1753 2,617 95 17 0
17 54 2,871 92 O 0
1755 2,904 91 14 0
1756 3,228 653 86 0 0 56,158 0 0
1757 3,396 3,272 111 84 4 0 65,423 8 0
1758 3,513 466 84 11 0 39,400 6 0
1759 3,422 2,908 981 80 2 0 78,578 2 0
1760 3,301 2,960 1,322 80 1 8 105,870 3 4
Source: B.A.O. 12171(1). "Account and Memoranda Book of the White
Rock Copper Refinery, Llansamlet", 1749-1798.
NOTE: 1 The metal account was drawn up annually on June 30th.
2 Cols 1 and 2 show the ore delivered and smelted in the 
course of the year.
3 Col 3 shows the stock of copper ore on June 30th.
4 Col 4 shows the "average annual price" as calculated 
on June 30th.
5 Col 5 shows the value of stocks of copper ore held on
June 30th. Over the five years for which this information 
is available, these raw material stocks averaged £69,000 
in value.
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greater in relation to the whole than at Warmley, perhaps due 
to differences in the structure of the firms for whilst Warmley 
was planned as a comprehensive factory smelting copper, making 
brass, producing zinc by a new method, and fabricating copper 
and brass goods in the one unit, the Percival Copper Co. had 
grown in a pragmatic, organic way, its fixed capital dispersed 
amongst scattered locations. The need to carry materials around 
these sites may have placed a greater emphasis on circulating 
capital than would otherwise have been the case.
The validity of this interpretation depends on the extent to 
which the north Somerset mills formed an integral part of the 
company's operations, and fortunately the Committee and Metal 
Account Books allow the matter to be examined more fully, see 
Tables 8(3) & (4). First, the importance of the Publow Refinery 
grew during this time, for in 1750 it produced 13.0 per cent of 
the firm's output of copper smelted, and White Rock 87.0 per 
cent, but by 1756 the proportions were 19.3 and 80.7 per cent 
respectively, and in 1762 they were 21.0 and 79.0 per cent. But 
Publow could not supply all that rolled and battered in north 
Somerset, so some had to be shipped from White Rock. Allowing 
for some double counting if that rolled at Swinford Mill went 
on to the battery works, the north Somerset mills would still 
have taken 15 to 30 per cent of the refined copper from White 
Rock, making them probably the largest outlet at the time. The 
rest would have gone to merchants in the Africa trade, for the 
Metal Account Book commonly included barter goods such as
-£2b-
Table8 ( 3 ) : Copper Smelting at the White Rock Refinery, Output and Costa 1750-1762
From Copper Ore Copper Coal Used Smelting Mages and Ore Cost of Wage Other Within Above «
a
June Smelted Made Charges Sallerles smelted Coal per per ton Charges our our
M
V
1749 in all Weekly ton of of Ore per ton Scheme Scheme 3
m3
to
July Tons 0 2 Tons 6 2 Wey Carts 8ths £ s d £ s d Tons
of Ore 
s d s d
of Ore 
£ s d s d s d
c
1
o
<0
u
1750 2,566 16 2 343 0 3 1,559 14 O 6,695 4 7 1,735 7 0 12 9 13 4 l 5 4 7 4 - 26 8
1751 2,747 3 0 360 12 1 1,529 0 O 6,503 18 2 1,667 4 4 4 11 4 12 4 l 3 4 12 4 - 28 8
1752 2,688 18 O 368 14 O 1,602 21 O 6,668 9 2 1,719 12 9 4 12 6 12 4 l 4 4 10 4 - 26 8
1753 2,617 2 2 403 1 o 1,608 O 0 6,535 15 0 1,728 19 5 4 12 4 13 4 l 3 4 10 4 - 26 8
1754 2,871 17 3 389 7 0 1,541 21 O 6,546 6 8 1,814 7 5 4 11 4 12 4 l 1 4 14 5 - 26 8
1755 2,903 12 1 423 3 1 1,584 O O 7,315 18 0 1,969 18 3 4 11 4 13 4 l 5 4 9 4 - 26 8
1756 3,227 15 3 389 16 2 1,689 7 0 7,877 8 2 2,121 5 5 62 lO 4 13 4 l 4 4 11 4 - 26 8
1757 3,271 lO 1 421 8 3 1,839 19 3 8,069 12 9 2,129 9 9 63 11 4 13 4 l 4 4 lO 4 - 26 8
1758 3,513 2 O 453 7 0 2,053 3 7 8,778 4 8 2,296 5 10 4 12 4 13 l l 4 4 10 4 - 31 14
1759 2,907 15 2 364 9 3 1,815 17 4 7,437 19 O 1,999 11 2 56 12 4 13 9 l 4 4 8 4 - 31 14
1760 2,959 15 1 398 4 1 2,057 6 0 7,903 14 1 2,318 9 4 57 14 4 15 8 l 3 4 6 7 - 31 15
1761 2,858 1 o 488 6 2 2,164 18 6 8,545 18 1 2,316 11 10 4 15 7 16 4 l 8 0 0 4 - 31 15
1762 2,666 7 3 399 9 1 1,932 9 5 8,034 14 3 2,243 7 5 “1 14 11 16 4 l 8 4 - °4 31 15
Source: B.R.L. B 4771. "The Committee Book of the Joseph Perclval and Copper Company", 1762-1769.
NOTES: 1 This table is reproduced from the Coaxnittee Book, 6 December 1762.
2 «  » 1 hundredweight,
2 « 1 quarter.
Table 8(4): Output and Cost at the North Somerset Mills of the Joseph Perclval and Copper Company, 1750-1766
Source: B.A.O. 12171(1).
Publovr Refinery Bye: Mill Publow Mill Publow Trip Hammer Swinford Mill
From
June Copper Wast Cost of Copper Wast Cost Copper Wast Cost Copper Wast Cost Copper Wast Cost
1749 Laded Meltg Batter'd per Bat'dI per Bat'd1 & per Roll’d per
to per lb e e Roll,'dI e e
June
30 e 2 lb e 2 lb d e 2 lb e 2 lb s d e 2 lb e 2 lb s d e 2 lb e 2 lb s d e 2 lb e 2 lb s d
1750 1,028 0 2 22 O 8
I
8
801 2 11 5 3 7 12 4 628 1 18 6 2 1 16 4 647 3 1 17 3 7 11 4 1,312 O 20 42 3 17 11 2t
1751 942 3 8 14 1 13
3
8 714 3 8 9 2 19 12 4 632 1 16 5 3 24 14 6 652 2 4 9 1 8 11 8 823 1 21 24 O 25 13 4
1752 1,182 2 24 22 2 23
3_
8 558 2 14 7 0 5 14 11 583 0
4 7 3 15 14 10 818 1 27 12 1 11 9 o | 878 2 9 25 3 19 12
1753 923 1 21 6 1 21
3
8
bare
613 2 26 7 3 18 11 4 634 O 26 7 0 27 9 11 742 0 4 16 3 21 11 *8
882 3 2 33 1 23 12 4
1754 l,6t)9 1 2 13 2 9
3
8
near
868 O 3 7 O 4 9 5 773 O 2 9 3 12 10 4 1,001 O 27 17 3 5 9 11 662 1 18 33 0 18 14 4
1755 1,710 O 5 27 0 3
3_
8 1,047 1 27 9 O 6 8 4 887 3 14 12 0 16 10 1 1,059 O 2 3 3 12 9 4f 824 O 15 33 0 O 11 4
1756 1,860 2 22 7 3 8
2
8 1,011 O 16 11 2 9 9 2 746 2 27 7 1 20 14 u i
1,199 O 18 35 3 18 lO llf 919 O 27 45 2 0 13 1
1757 1,569 0 15 11 1 22
2
a 947 3 5 7 2 25 9 2 788 3 16 5 0 24 12 e 1,079 2 17 30 2 23 10 lf 957 0 4 36 3 20 12 iei
1758 1,508 3 17 3 3 9
2
a 892 3 3 19 3 3 lO 10t739 3 25 4 1 18 10 710 1 7 5 3 13 14 4 700 2 23 25 2 22 14 6
1759 1,868 2 1 11 2 27
2
8
902 0 6 11 1 22 lO 4755 2 5 11 0 2 11 41,108 3 21 19 2 7 9 4 1,092 2 24 46 0 24 12 9|
1760 1,790 1 21 . . . I§ 915 3 13 11 1 7 8 4717 0 13 8 3 8 9 41,062 0 13 30 1 17 lO 4 987 1 26 35 O 24 12 6 8
1761 2,350 3 8 —
netr
1,004 O 11 13 2 1 9 108914 1 14 21 3 8 11 41,372 1 16 46 O 7 lO 41,197 0 23 34 1 2 10 4
1762 2,113 0 5 25 1 17 1,016 3 5 15 1 23 lO 7t 831 3 12 15 3 11*3 11 0 1,309 3 14 14 2 16*i 7 u i 1,468 1 25 34 2 25 9 7f |
1763 1,738 0 13 17 3 18
& n^re 
8 1,215 3 19 27 3 6 8 4 688 0 22 16 2 23 12 41,106 2 24 20 1 O 9 4 1,157 O 7 24 1 4 8 4
1764 1,690 3 2 15 2 19
1 m^re
a 853 0 9 21 1 17 12 4783 0 9 17 2 lC* 14 4 1,012 1 23 23 2 16 9 i°e 1,063 2 14 26 3 21 10
1765 1,794 2 21 12 016 & m^re 8
& more
831 0 2 22 0 19 10 4962 3 25 16 1 16 lO 4 1,118 1 3 28 3 4 9 4 1,071 2 13 7 3 O 8 4
5
1766 1,677 1 1 25 1 27 18 1,084 2 4 25 2 21 9 10 926 1 15 9 2 1 12 4 1,542 3 21 37 3 27 9 4 1,354 0 14 34 0 16 10 °8
x more.
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'manillas', and to brass works at White Rock, Bristol and the 
Midlands. Carrying Cornish copper to White Rock, and the 
refined product to dispersed works and customers, provides a 
good reason for high inventory stocks.
This scattering of interests also presented the Bristol- 
based company with problems of management and organization. In 
1768 for example the managing partner Thomas Dymock had to 
travel to Cornwall to appoint a new assayer, the previous one 
having been 'exceedingly deficient in attention to our 
business'^ .There were problems at White Rock too, for it came 
to the partners' attention that smelting charges for the year 
ending 30 June 1762 were nearly £1,400 higher than the 
comparable period in 1753, when similar work had been carried 
out. As a result of the detailed calculations made, shown in 
Table 8(3) already referred to, the manager John Phillips was 
recalled to Bristol to explain the deficiencies and to take a 
salary cut of £50 per annum till the earlier position was 
restored^. It is curious that in their close analysis of the 
situation no mention was made of the new items of fixed capital 
noted earlier and shown in the last columns of Table 8(3), 
neither to seek from these a possible reason for the increase 
in costs, nor to draw attention to the little if any increase 
in the amount of ore smelted weekly. It seems the partners were 
not concerned with maximizing production but with minimizing 
costs, and so did not consider the possibility that by 
increasing the number of calciners and furnaces without
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increasing the raw materials worked, cost efficiency may have 
been impaired through higher overheads, wages, and fuel bills.
a /:
There may have been similar problems at Swinford Mill for in 
1763 one of ’two Thompsons' employed there was dismissed. But 
the analysis of production costs for the years 1750 to 1766 
seen in Table 8(4), shows that on their own terms the position 
in north Somerset must have been better than at White Rock, for 
although the quantities handled had increased, unit costs had 
in all cases decreased.
Although both the Percival company and the Woolley works were 
based largely on Bristol finance, there were important 
differences between them. In the mid-eighteenth century the 
joint capital and number of partners of the former was three to 
four times greater than the latter, and far from allowing power 
to be concentrated in fewer hands as at Woolley, the Copper Co. 
sought to limit holdings, especially after Joseph Percival's 
death in 1764 when it was agreed that no partner should hold 
more than 6 shares. On the sale by Mrs.Elizabeth Percival of 
her husband's 12 shares, the old partners (John Freeman and son 
John, John Hobhouse, John Heylin, Thomas Dymock, William 
Philips, and Thomas Rous) were joined by 6 new ones, with more 
substitutions later in the decade as shares changed hands.
Apart from Thomas Rous, a Gloucestershire gentleman and father- 
in-law of one partner, and Dr. Abel Moysey, a Bath physician, 
the partners were all Bristol merchants, many of them involved 
in the slave trade. John Freeman sr. was in the 1755 List, as
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were John Hobhouse,son of Isaac, Thomas Dymock, James Bannister 
a sugar-baker, and Samuel Munckley, the West Indian merchant 
whose ships the Iris and Culloden traded to Africa in the 
1740s. Of all the partners traced, nearly 40 per cent had been 
engaged in the Africa trade.
t l x a r
It has already been recognized^for the copper industry in 
general the record of external finance was greater than for 
other industries, and that for South Wales in particular much 
of the industrial capital came not only from outside the firm 
and also from outside the region^. As a copper company with an 
interest in South Wales it was therefore likely that loans from 
external sources would be significant in the financing of the 
Percival Copper Co.,and this has proved the case. The available 
evidence has been summarized in Tables 8(5) & (6), and an 
account of the system of classification follows in Figure 1. 
Borrowings over the period 1763-69 totalled £78,738, of which 
about 1/3 each came from banks, women, and other private 
sources. But these loans were not cumulative, only those from 
Mrs.Elizabeth Percival carrying no record of repayment. In her 
case they came to £16,495 at 5.0 per cent in the given years, 
and formed a long-term investment in the company with which her 
late husband had been closely connected. But most were short­
term, taken up to ease the finances of the firm. Bank loans 
were the most rapidly repaid, being held for an average of 4.4 
months at 5.0 per cent. Other loans were held for an average of 
46.8 months, at 4.0 per cent, with the exception of one of £650
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Table 8 (5): Classification of Loans Borrowed by the Joseph Percival and Copper Company 1763-1769
showing the total sum from each source, and the proportion this represented of the 
borrowing for the year.
Capital Raised I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X
Year Total
£
Sources
other
than
Banks
£
Peers
£
Gentry Yeomen Capit­
alists
£ £ £
Manu­
facturers
£
Trades­
men
£
Profes­
sionals
£
Clergy Women 
£ £
Institutions 
Parishes Banks
£ £
1763 14,730 9,950 loo
0.7%
2,000
13.6%
(1,100)
7.5%
6,600
44.8%
150
1.0%
4,780
32.4%
1764 25,218 18,218 4,100
16.2%
2,160
8.6%
( 900) 
3.6%
433
1.7%
500
2.0%
9,945
39.4%
180
0.7%
7,000
27.8%
1765 4,490 4,490 1,360
30.3%
(1,200)
26.7%
200
4.5%
500
11.1%
1,000
22.3%
230
5.1%
1766 10,570 3,270 3,000
28.4%
270
2.5%
7,300
69.1%
1767 1,330 1,330 1,000
75.2%
330
24.8%
1768 12,350 11,350 3,000
24.3%
8,350
67.6%
1,000
8.1%
1769 10,050 2,650 2,000
19.9%
( 150) 
1.5%
500
5.0%
7,400
73.6%
Total 78,738
100%
51,258
65.0%
4,200
5.3%
9,520
12.1%
5,000
6.3%
3,350
4.2%
633
0.8%
1,000
1.3%
26,395
33.5%
1,160
1.5%
27,480
35.0%
Source: B.R.L. B 4771. "The Committee Book of the Joseph Percival and Copper Company", 1762-1769.
NOTES: 1 See Appendix I for the system of classification.
2 Brackets indicate a classification which is probable but not certain. Some of the tradesmen 
of Column VI may have been merchants, although this is unlikely in view of the absence of thei 
names from merchanting records.
3 Column VII includes salaried employees of the firm rather than attorneys and medical men as
was more commonly the case.
Table 8(6): Bristol Banking Partnerships Making Loans to the Joseph Percival
and Copper Company, 1763--1769
1750 1750 1752 1760 1764
Messrs. Matt. Messrs. Lloyd, Messrs. Goldney, Messrs. Bright, Messrs. Tyndale,
Hale & Co. Elton & Co. Smith, Champion Dean, Ames & Co. Swymmers & Co.
& Co.
(Old Bank) (Old Bank) (Miles Bank) (Harford Bank) (Exchange Bank)
£ £ £ £ £
1763 1,600 3,180
1764 1,000 3,000 3,000
1765
1766 6,300 1,000
1767
1768 1,000
1769 4,000 3,400
Sources:
NOTES:
1 B.R.L. B 4771. "The Committee Book of the Joseph Percival and Copper Company", 
1762-1769.
2 Cave, Banking in Bristol.
1 Columns are headed by the probable date of foundation of the bank partnership,
the name by which it was referred to in the Committee Book and, within brackets, 
the name by which the bank was later known.
2 The table shows that the original partnership of the Exchange Bank was formed 
by at least 1764 and not 1766 as Cave suggests.
3 An Indenture of Partnership (B.A.O. 28048, P/83(l)) shows the Harford Bank to
have been founded in 1760 and not, as Cave suggests, in 1769.
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Figure 1: A Note on the Classification of Sources of Capital
in North Somerset, 1750-1830
I Peers
II Gentry, including baronets, esquires and gentlemen living 
at rural addresses who may have been raining proprietors or 
clothiers as well as landowners.
III Yeomen, farmers, graziers and rural tradesmen such as 
blacksmiths, butchers and victuallers.
IV Capitalists, taken here to include substantial merchants, 
bankers and rentiers or urban gentlemen.
V Manufacturers, including brewers, maltsters and distillers 
because of their economic function, and because they were 
so classified by P.Colquhoun, A Treatise on the Wealth. 
Power and Resources of the British Empire(1814), pp.124-5.
VI Tradesmen, including wine merchants, victuallers and 
craftsmen such as upholsterers, carpenters and saddlers.
VII Professional men including attorneys, surgeons, 
apothecaries, architects, musicians and salaried 
employees.
VIII Clergymen.
IX Women, including widows, daughters, spinsters, lodging 
house keepers and servants, and therefore not strictly 
speaking a social and economic group.
X Institutions, a term covering municipal corporations, 
parishes, hospital trustees, banks and associations of 
artisans.
Investors have been classified by a cross-referencing of the 
documents studied, supplemented where possible by information 
from directories and legal material like property leases.
The system of classification is substantially that used by J.R. 
Ward for canal investors, The Finance of Canal Building in 
Eighteenth-Century England(Oxford,1974)t pp.18-26, but with 
modifications to meet the needs of a study of one region over a 
period of time. For example, institutions have had to be 
accommodated, and the definition of professional extended, and 
it has seemed appropriate to classify some such as brewers as 
manufacturers. Also, allowances have been made for changes of 
status over time. An earlier occupation may have remained the 
source of income, but the designation of a maltster or wine 
merchant as esquire by his contemporaries indicates a change of 
the scale of operations which suggests a classification in IV, 
rather than V or VI as previously.
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in 1764 at 4.5 per cent. It is difficult to generalize on the 
relationship between the size of the loan and its repayment, 
for although many of the longer-held ones were small sums of 
£100 or £250 lent by women, three totalling £5,360 at 4.0 per 
cent in the years 1764 to 1768, not repaid until 1776, were 
from Thomas Jones, master of slave ships in the 1750s, named in 
the 1755 List, and a slave merchant in the 1760s. Bristol
banks making loans to the Copper Co. appear in Table 8(6). It 
can be shown that of their partners nearly 60 per cent had 
associations with the slave trade. They were: Jeremiah Ames, 
Henry Bright, Thomas Deane, Isaac Elton, Matthew Hale, Michael 
Miller, William Miller, James Read, Morgan Smith, William 
Swymmer, John Vaughan, and Thomas Whitehead. In addition, four 
were associated with gunpowder and five with brass works.
The limited information on the finances of the firm has been 
set out in Table 8(7), with explanatory notes. In the period 
covered interest at 5.0 per cent was paid on the shares, each 
valued at £1,000. This rate plus the annual net profits 
expressed as a percentage of the partners1 capital of £36,000, 
together make up the dividend. It is notable that in the years 
1765 and 1767 when profits of 15.1 and 8.0 per cent were 
declared, exclusive of the rate of interest, fresh borrowings 
were in each case less than £5,000, with nothing from the 
banks. In 1764 however, when despite a balance of £616 in the 
Profit and Loss Account a net loss of £207 was declared 
because £823 was allotted to the 'Accot of Dubious Debts' to
- Z 9 Z  A -
Table 8 0 ) : The Finances of Joseph Percival and Copper Company, 1762-1769
1 2 3 4 Returns to Partners ' Capital
Year Capital
Borrowed
£
Cash
Balance
£
Profit and 
Loss Account 
£
Net
Profit
£
Profit
%
Interest
%
Dividend
%
1762 No infor­
mation
2 , 2 2 1 1 , 1 8 4 1 , 4 6 2 4.1 5 . 0 9.1
1763 1 4 , 7 3 0 352 665 604 1 . 7 5 . 0 6 . 7
1764 2 5 , 2 1 8 844 616 -2 0 7 - 0 . 6 5 . 0 4 . 4
1765 4 , 4 9 0 2 , 1 3 6 6 , 8 5 4 5 , 4 4 0 15.1
o
•
LO 20.1
1766 1 0 , 5 7 0 1 , 4 3 5 527 - 1 , 3 5 3 -3  . a 5 . 0 1.2-
1767 1 , 3 3 0 1 , 2 2 4 4 , 7 1 1 2 , 8 9 5 8 . 0 5 . 0 1 3 . 0
1768 1 2 , 3 5 0 3 , 3 1 6 4 , 6 2 7 2 , 8 8 2 8 . 0 5 . 0 1 3 . 0
1769 1 0 , 0 5 0 594 No information
Source: B.R.L. B 4771. "The Committee Book of the Joseph Percival and 
Copper Company", 1762-1769.
NOTES: Col 1 These figures show capital borrowed during the calendar
year.
Col 2 The cash balance was recorded at each monthly committee 
meeting. Shown here are those for June, chosen because 
the accounts were balanced on the 30th of that month, and 
the Profit and Loss Account then declared 
Col 3 Unfortunately the Committee Book contains only extracts 
from these several accounts, but their calculation, 
especially the Profit and Loss Account, indicates a 
greater degree of accounting skill than was required for 
the annual balance of assets and liabilities.
Col 4 Net Profit was what remained after all costs (including 
interest charges) had been met. These figures do not 
agree with the Profit and Loss Account because a further 
sum was usually debited from this to the Account of 
Dubious Debts to cover possible losses not yet accounted 
for. Net losses in 1764 and 1766 were met by partners 
according to their respective shares.
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meet any further claims, the partners had to raise more than 
£25,000 to ease their difficulties. This borrowing requirement 
may have been due in part to the building of the brass mill at 
White Rock, following closely on investments at Publow and Bye 
Mill. The Metal Account Book shows that by 1765 copper was 
being delivered to the new brass works and the high profits 
that year may reflect its activity. Why then the loss the 
following year? Perhaps this was due to a shipwreck, for in 
January 1766 an extra-ordinary committee meeting was held at 
which the partners discussed the possible recovery of the 
Pendarris, stranded on the Glass(?) Sands^. Even if eventually 
recovered, or insurance received, the delay in receiving raw 
materials may have caused the losses of that year in an episode 
which provides some justification for the large stocks of raw 
materials normally held by the firm
As the John Freeman & Copper Co. the firm continued to 
operate to the 1860s, when legal battles between descendants of 
earlier partners led to a dissipation of resources and sale of 
assets.
iii The Brass Industry of the Bristol Region
Brass is an alloy of copper and zinc and its manufacture in 
this region was encouraged by both the better copper becoming 
available from the beginning of the eighteenth century, and the 
proximity of good supplies of calamine, the carbonate ore of
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zinc which was discovered on the Mendips in 1566 and then mined 
in the way already discussed. The technology of this new 
industry, its development on water-powered sites in the region 
in the pattern now familiar from the gunpowder and copper 
works, and the relations between this industry and its 
competitors in copper and brass production elsewhere, have been 
outlined in the earlier study by Joan Day. To this general 
account can now be added an analysis of the financial structure 
of the main firm, the Bristol Brass Wire & Copper Co., based 
largely on net? evidence from the papers of the Dickinson and 
Harford families. The former were sugar merchants and West 
Indian plantation owners, holding joint stock in the Brass Co. 
from 1747 until bought out in 1787 by a partnership composed 
largely of members of the Harford family, sugar and iron 
merchants, and bankers, with an interest in the company from 
1748. Both families were Quakers from a rural background in 
Somerset and Hertfordshire respectively. Both married into 
successful Bristol merchant families, the Prankards and 
Goldneys in the case of the Dickinsons, and the Battersbys and 
Scandretts in that of the Harfords. Even with the discovery of 
these papers our ignorance might have remained, for some were 
written in a cypher which has had to be broken^.
The origins of the Brass Co.^^ lie early in the eighteenth 
century when Abraham Darby and three Quaker colleagues set up 
the works at Baptist Mills in Bristol. In 1706 their numbers 
doubled, and an unchartered joint stock company with transfer­
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able shares was formed. The existing capital stock of £5,836 
was increased to £8,000, with provision for a further rise to 
£12,000. But Darby became more interested in cast iron and 
withdrew to a foundry where one of his partners was the Quaker 
Graffin Prankard. By 1708 the company had acquired a mill on 
the River Avon at Keynsham, initiating the links with north 
Somerset. In 1709 there was a juncture with the Brass Wire 
Works at Esher, which increased the 64 shares in the Bristol 
Brass Co.to 80. The joint stock was to be allowed to reach 
an upper ceiling of £50,000. By 1720 it was feared that the 
company might be contravening the recently passed Bubble Act, 
but the advice of the Prime Serjeant at Law was that they 
should be allowed to maintain their status but with no further 
increase in the numbers taking part.
Under the leadership of Nehemiah Champion further mill sites 
were acquired along the Avon in the 1720s, the decade in which 
the river was made navigable. In 1721 copper works were built 
at Saltford, four miles above the brass works at Keynsham, 
although the company's main smelting site continued to be at 
Crew's Hole on the Avon at Bristol. By the late 1720s a brass 
battery mill had been set up at Weston just west of Bath, and 
other mills were leased for this purpose at Woodborough and 
Chew, on the River Chew where the Coster brothers were already 
established. In the 1730s the company took over the Upper 
Redbrook works (as noted in relation to the Percival & Copper 
Co.), and took the name of The United Brass Battery Wire &
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Copper Co. of Bristol, Esher, Upper Redbrook, and Barton Regis. 
Copper supplies were further safeguarded by the acquisition of 
the Elton & Wayne works at Conham two miles upstream of Bristol 
Bridge, on the bankruptcy of Sir Abraham Elton in 1745. A 
report of 1754 reveals the scale of operations in Bristol, with 
66 furnaces producing copper for the brass works. But the 
Warmley works of William Champion & Co. posed a growing threat, 
especially in the 1760s when they looked to incorporation as a 
way of solving their pressing capital requirements. This move 
was opposed by 10 companies (including the Bristol Brass Co. 
and the John Freeman & Copper Co.) on the grounds that the 
planned growth at Warmley, where the proposed new capital was 
£400,000, would deprive them of their trade. Despite his great 
resources as a Bristol merchant and shipowner, trading to 
Africa and named in the 1755 List, William Champion had 
overreached himself with this scheme. He was bankrupted, and in 
1769 the Warmley Works were bought by the Bristol Brass Co.
A local difficulty had been overcome but the Bristol company 
then found its position challenged by outsiders, as mining 
developments on Anglesey led Birmingham manufacturers to form a 
Metal Company to provide cheaper brass from copper mined there. 
In Bristol these problems were met by a re-formation of the old 
company in which the joint stock was purchased by a small 
partnership, made up largely of members of the Harford family 
and known as the Harford & Bristol Brass & Copper Co.. Despite 
such a fundamental change in its legal and financial base the
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company remained traditional in output and method, and so less 
flexible in response to new demands than the Birmingham firms. 
It therefore gradually declined, and mills were sold off or 
rented out until by 1833 only three were left on the Rivers 
Chew and Avon, and these were leased out to a partner. The 
company itself was no longer a manufacturing concern.
This account raises but does not answer a major question.
If from the 1770s the company was under the pressures 
described, why were the Harfords, astute and successful 
merchants and bankers, so eager to take it over? Is it possible 
that the external challenges were less serious than generally 
thought, or that the company was more profitable than later 
writers have indicated?
There is little doubt that by the 1780s the company’s 
fortunes were felt to be declining. This is shown by changes in 
that useful barometer of joint stock well-being, the value of 
its shares. In the 1740s these had changed hands at £170 as 
Table 8(8) shows, rising in the course of the 1750s to £250. 
This produced a capital gain of nearly 36.0 per cent on his 
original purchase when Caleb Dickinson sold 5 shares in 1759, 
and a putative gain of 12.4 per cent for Edward Harford when he 
transferred details to a new ledger at the end of 1768, noting 
’To Profit and Loss for the value more than they cost...’. His 
gain would have been greater but for later purchases at a 
higher price. Shares reached £260 in 1771 when Caleb Dickinson
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Table 8(8): The Changing Value of the Shares of the Bristol Brass Wire
and Copper Company, and the Returns (profit plus interest) 
to the Shareholders' Capital, 1747-1787
Year Dickinson 
Shares 
£
Harford
Shares
£
Dividend
%
Year Dickinson Harford 
Shares Shares 
£ £
Dividend
%
1747 170 1771 260
1748 170 5.3 1777 250
1749 170 5.3 1780 238.50 4.0
b)(250)
1750 205 5.3 1781 a) 225 c) 218.75 4.4
d) 228.60
1751-55 4.9 1782 230 4.5
1756 220 1783 4.6
1757-58 4.6 1784 (250) 4.9
1759 250 4.6 1785 230 4.9
1760-64 5.3 1786 210 4.5
1765 250 5.3 1787 4.0
1766-67 4.9 1787-■92 Remaining shares bought
out for £306.
1768 250
Sources: Dickinson Shares: S.R.O. DD/DN, 405 Ledger A; Bundles 240, 241,
243, 247, 253, 255, 256, 259, 264.
Harford Shares: B.A.O. 28048, Ledger Fl/1, Journal F5, Ledger
F 2/1, Journal F 6/1.
NOTES: 1 Brackets indicate an inheritance of shares and not a purchase.
2 The range of values for 1781 show a) market price, 
b) inheritance value, c) and d) ledger evaluation.
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bought two each for his brother Vickris and son William. But
when Edward Harford inherited 16 shares from his father in
1781 he revised his initial valuation of them in his journal of
£250 each, to £228.12s.Od each for his holding of 32 shares.
This was a realistic move for shares were sold in Bristol that
year at £225, and at £230 until the mid-1780s. By 1786 Barnard
5 2Dickinson was selling at the even lower price of £210 . The
influence of the low rate of return to shareholders' capital 
will be left aside for the moment in pursuit of external 
factors, but it is worth noting from this table that for much 
of the period the dividend of interest and profit was below 5.0 
per cent.
The early 1780s were a bad time in which to find purchasers
of shares in Bristol. Advertisements in local papers produced
enquiries but no buyers. Letters to William Dickinson noted a
'dullness' of trade and scarcity of money, at a time when the
closure of American markets brought some Bristol merchants to 
5 3bankruptcy . But trade in general recovered at the end of 
hostilities and Bristol shared in a prosperity which makes it 
difficult to blame economic conditions in general for the 
continuing decline in the company's fortunes. Instead, this may 
have owed more to trade competition, of which the shareholders 
were made aware in the annual reports for 1779-1784.
The problems revealed are reminiscent of the situation faced by 
the powder makers who saw their future threatened by the loss 
of the American market and of the Africa trade for which barter
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goods were made, but in the brass industry the competition of 
other firms was felt more strongly, as the Bristol company 
found itself consistently undersold by others in relation to 
the East India Co., the navy, and home customers, despite fixed 
price agreements designed to prevent this^.
The balance sheets accompanying these reports to the General 
Meetings form the basis of Table 8(9). They confirm the gloomy 
story, especially in terms of the dividend in column XV, and 
the rate of return to share capital in column XVI (Part A). 
There are small discrepancies between these percentages and 
those in Table 8(8), as the returns in the latter were related 
to the individual holder’s evaluation of his stock, whereas 
they are here related to the General Joint Stock, see column 
XIV. In 1782 the Bristol Committee (with five Harfords out of 
nine members) claimed that business was 'carried on with such 
great fatigue, and requires such constant attendance that your 
Committee can hardly go through with it', and indeed had a 5.0 
per cent rate of interest had been counted as a cost it would 
have been in the shareholders' interest for the firm to have 
stopped trading. Yet within a few years the Harfords had 
purchased the firm, presumably because their private analysis 
of the situation led them to conclude that the brass and copper 
industry, producing goods in great demand in an industrializing 
nation even if overseas markets had become uncertain, had 
sufficient potential to accommodate both newer competitors and 
the old Brass Co., provided it was re-formed and re-organized.
Tableft(9), Parts A, B, C : Analysis of the Changes in the Structure of the Bristol Brass Company, 1779-1792
I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X XI XII XIII XIV XV ^.XVI XVII XVIII
Fixed Circu­ Fixed Trade Credit Balance Financial Assets Admin­ Fin­ Fin­ General Dividend Rate of Number Number
Year Capital lating Capital of Held by istrative ancial ancial Joint (Interest Return of Shares of Share
Capital as per­ Debtors Creditors Trade Bristol Bankers Govern­ Reserve in Balance Liab­ Balance Stock + Profit) on Share on Which Holders
centage Credit Treasurer ment Brofit & Loss ilities Capital Dividend
of I+II Stock Account Paid
E £ % E £ E E E E E £ £ E E £
PART
1779 15,318 141,697 9.8 64,199 41,841 22,358 3,959 (+ 5,000 -606 23,311 -4,693 156,895 7,505 4.8 790 93
10,265 with London cashier)
1782 15,412 105,436 12.7 87,321 32,854 54,467 763 3,936 3,185 5,000 9,983 2,901 160,180 7,900 4.9 708 90
1783 15,444 100,920 13.3 68,902 36,356 26,546 946 8,978 5,000 -462 1,336 13,126 143,862 7,434 5.2 708 87
1784 15,387 108,609 12.4 68,147 36,668 31,479 414 4,435 2,974 5,000 -1,939 3,893 6,991 142,215 8,364 5.9 697 86
PART !i Compensation
1788 27,935 57,054 40,679 16,375 3,476 14,008 12,186 29,670 73,980
pej.
1787-
1738-
1 CH. C 
- £100 
- £110
618 66
1789 8,661 23,300 7,056 16,244 10,207 13,082 -3,000 452 13,149 7,592 32,497 £ 60 618 N°information
1790 1,598 6,357 1,515 4,842 243 1,410 11,675 11,756 1,572 8,013 E 20 586 35
1791 2,373 2,373 551 539 8,204 -316 2,984 5,994 8,366 - 303 34
1792 196 184 7,822 21 3,032 5,191 6,704 £ 16 No information
PART c Financial Admin­ Financial Liabilities Fin­ Partners 1 Net Rate of Number Number
of
Partners
Assets. 
Shares of
istrative 
Balance Partners1 Borrowed Executors Bristol
ancial
Balance
Capital Profit Return to 
Partners1
of
Shares
Old
Company
£ £
Loans
£
Stock
E
& Trustees 
£
Fire
Office
£
Capital.
Profit
%
1789 16,758 58,413 22.3 30,603 9,610 20,993 750 -353 6,779 4,025 4,752 10,006 -25,165 71,000 10,792 15.2 71 9
1790 18,200 55,439 24.7 41,433 6,109 35,324 300 -369 16,511 10,225 1,045 10,112 -37,962 71,000 8,875 12.5 71 9
1791 18,572 73,054 20.3 45,704 10,795 34,909 3,031 -406 28,154 10,225 9,668 10,112 -55,534 71,000 4,118 5.8 71 9
1792 18,788 69,085 21.4 55,835 8,016 47,819 2,363 -919 56,494 - 9,643 - -64,693 71,000
17,750 25.0 71 9
Sources: S.R.O. DD/DN, Bundles 238, 240, 241, 242, 243, 247, 253, 255,
256, 259, 264.
B.A.O. 28048, P/83/7, P/83/9.
NOTES! A The Bristol Brass Wire and Copper Company before its sale 
in 1787.
B The winding up of the old joint stock company.
C The establishment of the new partnership, the Harford and 
Bristol Brass Company.
For both companies balance sheets were drawn up to March 31st 
and presented to general meetings at the end of June.
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Figure 2: Balance Sheet of the Harfords & Bristol Brass & 
Copper Company, 31 March 1789
Balance sheets for the years 1789 to 1792 and notes on 
manufacturing costs have been found amongst the papers of 
John Scandrett Harford (1754-1815), son of Edward Harford 
(1720-1806), BAO, 28048. The numbers are written in a cipher, 
and as no explanation of the code accompanies the documents, 
the following key has been devised by trial and error.
n / v
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  ditto
l is (r n  y x h
(to repeat number 
preceding)
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The evidence analysed in Table 8(9) shows how this capital 
re-formation was achieved. Part A dealing with the joint stock 
company has been mentioned. Part B covers the running down of 
its circulating capital, settlement of trade debts, and payment 
of compensation to shareholders. Part C shows the structure and 
organization of the new venture. This analysis suggests that 
the recipe for success involved replacing the cumbersome joint 
stock company with its large body of share-holders and dead 
weight of slow-moving stocks and stores, by a small partnership 
employing its more limited resources in a profitable relation­
ship between fixed and circulating assets, and able to raise 
funds from external sources to supplement its own capital.
In 1779 there were 93 shareholders in the old company holding 
790 shares. Both then dwindled, for the Bristol Committee felt 
obliged to buy unpurchased shares put up for sale, adding these 
to the Honorary or Maiden ones on which no dividend was paid. 
The grand total was 1,200. The joint stock varied from £140,000 
to £160,000. The Bristol Committee managed the company, but 
there was a similar body in London, lobbying and negotiating 
there'*-*. Although not a monopoly, the size of this joint stock
company and the dispersal of its resources on many sites might
have led it to be faulted for showing some of the worst
features of the exclusive bodies that were so criticised by the
Bristol clergyman Dean Tucker in this period-*^*. Yet it was not 
the large number of shareholders who wanted to be rid of poor 
managers, but the small managing committee who wished to slough
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off the bigger body, even though that meant losing the large 
joint stock and the privilege of transferable shares. In Feb. 
1787 the company's buildings were put up for auction^.
Who were the shareholders the Bristol Committee were anxious 
to jettison? By the 1780s many were far distant from the 
original sources of capital, though their names provide 
information about those earlier investors. The women in 
particular, forming at this time 28 per cent of those listed 
and holding 15 per cent of the shares, can often be identified 
with the earlier merchant investors. Elizabeth Parkin for 
example, daughter of the Bristol iron merchant John Parkin, had 
inherited 18 shares from him as well as her 1/6 share in the 
Woolley Powder Works. In 1779 the former were held by her 
executors but by 1782 they had become the property of her 
nephew Matthew Worgan, managing partner at Woolley, adding to 
the two Brass Co. shares he already held. A similar family 
network is seen in the case of Elizabeth Noble whose shares 
were inherited from John Noble I, a Newfoundland trader and 
supplier of brimstone to Woolley, whose son and grandson also 
held shares in the Brass Co. Shares were also conveyed by 
marriage, those of Martha Farrell for example becoming listed 
in 1783 under her married name of Eaton. Both Joseph Farrell 
and Thomas Eaton, progenitors of the now united families, were 
in the 1755 List of Traders to Africa. Indeed in 1779, 14 per 
cent of persons, holding 17 per cent of the stock, can be 
associated with the List, suggesting that given the dilution
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over time,a significant part of the earlier capital must have 
come from this source.
Henry Tongue combined many of the most important features of 
the shareholders. He was based in Bristol, a merchant who had 
engaged in the Africa trade, undertaking at least five slaving 
voyages in the mid-eighteenth century. He was named in the 1755 
List. His 64 shares formed the largest single holding, but such 
concentrations were not rare, for groups of 20 shares or more 
made up about one-third of the total and were held by 7.5 per 
cent of shareholders; groups of 10 to 19 formed another third 
and were held by 20.4 per cent; and groups of less than 10 
formed the last third, held by 72.1 per cent. And by the end of 
the 1780s Henry Tongue was dead, a condition affecting nearly 
one-quarter of those named in lists of shareholders in that 
decade. The frustration of carrying a large number of family 
and executor shareholders, without the stimulus provided by the 
original entrepreneurs, may have been what finally influenced 
the Harfords to act as they did, especially as they were in 
contrast very active on behalf of the company. By the 1780s 
eight of them held nearly one-quarter of the shares, most 
notably Mark Harford, a linen and spelter merchant, with 50.
Shareholders not in the confidence of the Bristol Committee 
like Ezekiel Dickinson and his nephew William ( M.P.for Rye and 
later for the county of Somerset) were perplexed by the coming 
sale. After commenting on their business in Jamaica, ‘..we cant
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expect in this swampy soil to keep up our Number of Slaves...', 
the former went on in a letter of 1787 to question the motives 
of their colleagues, for 'Tis beyond my Comprehension - what 
our Committee in Bristol have in view by buying up...1. They 
consulted the balance sheets, but to no great effect, Ezekiel 
remarking that they were 'very much in the dark respecting the 
value of the dead and quick Stock..1'*®. In February 1787 the 
fixed capital of the old company was purchased by a partnership 
of ten, of whom seven were on the Bristol Committee and six 
were H a r f o r d s * ^ .  Even in this new form and under the leadership 
of the Quaker Harfords the association with wealth generated by 
the Africa and plantation trades continued, for of the non­
family partners, Captain Walker had been a ship's master in the 
slave trade and John Fisher Weare was a sugar merchant. The 
£16,000 paid for buildings and equipment was a fair price 
according to the valuation of fixed capital in Table 8(9)A. But 
the morality of the manoeuvre was questioned. A Bristol 
correspondent told William Dickinson, '..with respect to the 
B W Comte their shameful Conduct relating to the sale of the 
Works is severely and deservedly censured by all ranks of 
People here'^.
Over the next three years the remaining stocks and stores 
were bought by the partnership, on such good terms that by July 
1790 even poorer goods 'as must in part be remelted' had been 
purchased. Outstanding debts were also collected in, so that by 
June 1792 the old company's affairs had been 'redused into a
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very small Compass’. As assets were realized, the sum of £306 
per share was paid to remaining shareholders in 13 instalments. 
This was in excess of market value at the time of the take-over 
but given the overlap of membership it was a safeguard for the
fit
interests of old shareholders and new partners alike '.
The streamlined partnership which emerged is shown in Part C 
of the table. Column II shows the trimmed-down circulating 
capital. Not only was the fixed capital now a greater part of 
the whole, column III, but a smaller total capital was employed 
and that more productively because less of it was bound up in 
stocks and stores. Column V shows that the partners were less 
indebted to others in the trade than the old company had been, 
again implying a reduction of liabilities. But the most 
significant change was in the financial balance of column XIII. 
Drawing on a large joint stock^the old company had needed to 
raise few loans and the borrowings in column XII of Part A were 
for all except one year of those shown, more than offset by the 
reserve fund of £5,000, plus deposits with their bankers 
(Harfords & Co.) and holdings of Navy Bills. The new company 
however was based on the partner' capital of £71,000, less than 
half that of the former concern, so the success of the re­
structuring depended on their ability to raise supplementary 
funds. Their achievement is shown in the four columns grouped 
under 'Financial Liabilities' in Part C. In the first years 
funds were raised most substantially from the Bristol Fire 
Office , these ceasing as loans from partners, executors, and
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trustees grew in importance. Loans from Thomas Deane, included 
in column X of Part C, deserve a special mention. This Bristol 
merchant and shipowner had engaged in privateering in the 
1740s, and in the Africa trade from 1746 until at least 1764, 
being involved in 32 slave voyages in that time, and appearing 
in the 1755 List. He became a partner in the Littleton Powder 
Works in 1753 and in the newly formed Harfords Bank in 1760, 
continuing with both until his death in 1798 aged 81.
The stages by which capital was raised from the partners are 
revealed in the ledgers of Edward Harford, established in 
business by his father in 1748 with the sum of £4,000. He had 
become a founding partner in the Harford Bank in 1760, and by 
the early 1780s his flourishing interests included 32 shares in 
the Brass Co. Over the two years from the beginning of 1787 his 
investment in the new brass partnership was built up by 
instalments to £10,000, made up of 10 shares of £1,000 each, 
with interest at 5.0 per cent. Then in 1790 and 1791 he made 
long-term loans of another £10,000, this time at 4.5 per cent. 
In 1792 the pattern evolved further with 5 short-term loans at
4.5 per cent concerning £7,500 in all, and averaging 2.4 months 
each. 1794 is the last year for which this evidence has been 
collected from the ledgers, but by May the short-term loans at
4.5 per cent already amounted to more than £3,000, plus one at 
5.0 per cent of £457 for 94 days^. These large loans made by 
Edward Harford privately, and not through his bank as the 
ledgers show, together with those made by other partners and by
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Thomas Deane, suggest that this outlet for their surplus funds 
may have provided a further incentive for the take-over of the 
old company.
But even this attraction would not have been enough to 
persuade the partners to place their reputations and finances 
at risk. They are likely only to have entered upon this re­
structuring because of their perception that a new framework 
would allow the company's potential to be realized. Viewed in 
this way the soundness of the move is confirmed by the evidence 
in columns XV to XVIII of Part C, which show net profits and 
their distribution amongst nine partners rather than tenfold 
that number of shareholders. The rates of return were even 
higher than here indicated, for in contrast to the joint stock 
company the cost of the partners' capital was paid separately 
at the rate of 5 per cent as the Harford ledgers confirm. The 
overall return in these four years was thus between 10 and 30 
per cent, a financial reward so much greater than that paid to
the shareholders of the old company, that it must have been
seen to justify the manoeuvres of 1787. In the following years 
the rate of return (interest plus profit) was 21.5 per cent in
1793, 8.0 per cent in 1794, and 12.5 per cent in 1795^, as
wartime needs off-set the decline of other trades especially 
that in slaves. It is an irony of Bristol life that a Quaker 
family such as the Harfords, of whom Edward became in 1789 the 
chairman of the first provincial committee against slavery^, 
should have been closely connected to the trade they abhorred,
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through the use of some of their products for barter, and the 
financing in part of their businesses by profits made through 
the trade in slaves or their labour.
There is some evidence that the new company was not seen 
simply as an investment opportunity, for contemporary with the 
balance sheets of 1789-92 are documents on manufacturing 
techniques which like them have had to be decoded. They give 
details of the production of ingots, brass plates, battery, and 
wire, but the emphasis on 'savings made' suggests the cost- 
minimizing noted in the Percival & Copper Co. rather than the 
innovatory approach needed to overcome the competition faced. 
But in the meantime the partners had revived the fortunes of 
the firm. Although it can be argued this was a matter of 
capital re-formation rather than formation it can also be 
claimed that as the greatly improved returns to capital show, 
this was not simply the same company with a new name but a 
different firm with newly productive assets.
iv Conclusions
The evidence investigated has concerned enterprises that 
were outposts of Bristol's trading network, located in north 
Somerset because of the accessibility of water-powered sites. 
They were dependent on the port of Bristol for the handling of 
raw materials and finished goods, and on the merchants of that 
city for investment capital, loans, and credit. There was thus
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a close integration at several levels between merchanting and 
manufacturing in the region, which is less evident in 
indigenous industries such as woollen textiles and brewing. 
These have not in any case been studied in comparable depth 
because evidence of a similar continuity has not been available 
for such concerns. Although geographical factors were critical 
in determining location, the familiarity of many Bristol 
merchants with the county must have influenced their readiness 
to invest in these rural sites. The Dickinson family for 
example strengthened their links with the region by the 
purchase of land at Congresbury, and Queen Charlton near Bath, 
as well as their main estate at Kingweston. Other successful 
merchant families like the Parkins and the Eltons leased out 
land they had already purchased to manufacturing partnerships 
of which they may or may not have been members.
To the suitability of sites and familiarity with the region 
must be added another reason for investment in manufacturing, 
the expectation of future returns. The evidence which has been 
analysed suggests the possibility, however unsatisfactory, of 
maintaining a distinction between the capital invested by the 
partners and that employed productively, and so on the basis of 
the contemporary evaluation of assets two questions will be now 
be discussed - the financial returns to the partners1 capital, 
and the profitability of the physical capital employed.
- 3 1 2 -
Contemporary practice with regard to the former has been
criticised by Pollard on the grounds that an arrangement
whereby interest is seen as a return to capital and profit a
reward for risk and innovation is heretical, because it treats
capital as 'an auxilliary to entrepreneurship instead of the
h 7central motive force behind the firms' . Quite apart from the 
practical point that the Usury Laws drew attention to the cost 
of capital and made it reasonable to provide a distinct 
allowance for it, the view of interest as the cost of retaining 
capital in some use is in accord with economic theory and not 
heretical at all. Profits in the economist's sense are what is 
left when all costs, including interest, are balanced against 
business earnings. It would be a more fundamental criticism of 
contemporary practice to suggest that where the cost of capital 
was treated as neither an item to be met before the dividend 
was declared nor as part of it, a trading loss could be hidden 
as with the old Bristol Brass firm. In the case of this joint 
stock company however the possibility of capital gains through 
the transfer of shares may have overcome the usual view that 
dividends should comprise interest plus profits. It may of 
course be argued that if partners were prepared to regard their 
investment capital as an equity holding there is no reason why 
it should receive a fixed rate of interest, but this would be 
to assume an attitude towards capital holdings not borne out by 
the historical evidence.
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Table 8(10) records the attempt that has been made to 
compare the returns to partners' capital in various ventures. 
The lowest were to the joint stock holders in the Bristol Brass 
Co. at about 5.0 per cent. Of the three partnerships, returns 
to the Percival & Copper Co. partners were nearly 10.0 per cent 
in the 1760s. Those at the Woolley works were lowest in the 
1740s at 11.0 per cent and highest in the 1790s at nearly 24.0 
per cent, when partners in the re-formed Harford and Bristol 
Brass Co. were receiving an average of 16.7 per cent. These 
returns were not too different from those in banking, for 
Edward Harford received from 20.0 to 25.0 per cent on the 
£2,000 invested thus in the 1780s and 90s. On a fixed interest 
loan to the bank rising to £18,000 he received 4.5 per cent 
from the early 1780s to at least 1793^®.
Secondly, although there is no evidence that the partners 
considered the question of the profitability of the capital 
employed, they must have had some notion of this if only to 
persuade themselves when it should be increased. But its modern 
measure as the ratio of net trading income to net capital 
employed requires some modification in the light of historic 
circumstances, especially as there is no firm evidence in 
eighteenth century documents of a depreciation allowance for 
fixed capital assets. Profitability is therefore defined for 
present purposes as the ratio between gross trading profits 
(the balance between the revenue from sales and the costs of 
production, derived from the dividend minus cost of partners'
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capital and without the label ’income1 as the physical assets 
were used only for production) and the gross capital employed 
(fixed assets, stocks and stores). Comparisons are hazardous, 
especially with uncertainties about the valuation of fixed 
assets, but the findings are summarized in Table 8(11).
At the Woolley Works the profitability of the capital 
employed in those years for which there is a reasonable 
certainty of the value of the circulating capital as narrowly 
defined, was greatest in wartime - the 1740s, the second half 
of the 1730s (when the average was nearly 15.0 per cent), and 
the 1790s. Despite the low rate in the early 1750s, investment 
in fixed capital was not postponed by the partners, but they 
chose to borrow at 4.0 to 5.0 per cent rather than increase 
their own commitment. In 1798 wartime profits were high enough 
to counteract the effect of the stock appreciation associated 
with inflation on the rate of profitability. By then the 
partners had already decided they were overprovided with 
productive capacity, and had embarked on the consolidation with 
the Littleton Works which was to cut the combined assets by a 
half. The rate of return in 1798 of 27.3 per cent on capital 
employed and 29.5 per cent on that invested by the partners, 
probably helped delay this move until 1803.
With few figures for the physical assets of the Percival & 
Copper Co., estimates of profitability are very tentative. For 
the 1760s, figures for circulating capital have been
Table 8(10): Summary of Average Annual Returns (profit plus interest)
to Partners' or Shareholders' Capital, 1746-1809
Years
Woolley
Powder
Works
%
Joseph 
Percival and 
Copper Co.
%
Bristol Brass 
Wire and 
Copper Co.
%
Harford
Bristol
Co.
%
and
Brass
Harfords
Bank
%
1746-49 10.95 (4) 5.29 (2)
1750-59 13.98 (8) 4.82 (9)
1760-69 11.14 (7) 9.77 (7) 5.05 (8) 10.57 (1)
1770-79 13.42 (5)
a)
b)
4.80 (1)
1780-89
1790-99
13.60
23.73
(4)
(9)
4.47
5.30
(8)
(3)
20.20
16.71
(1)
(6)
21.67 (10) 
25.53 (4)
1800-09 15.38 (8)
Sources: See Tables £(1) , 8(7), 8(8), §(9) and text.
NOTES: 1 Brackets indicate the number of cases studied.
2 For the years 1780-89, a) relates the return to the 
stockholder's valuation of his holding, whilst b) 
relates it to the general joint stock.
Table 8 (11): Profitability of Capital Employed in Industrial
Enterprises in North Somerset, 1746-1799
Years
Woolley
Powder
Works
%
Joseph 
Percival and 
Copper Co.
%
Bristol Brass 
Wire and 
Copper Co.
%
Harford and 
Bristol Brass 
Co.
%
1746-49 12.76 (3)
1750-59 6.85 (6)
1760-69 3.80 (7)
1770-79 -0.21 (1)
1780-89 0.37 (3) 14.35 (1)
1790-99 27.28 (1) 12.24 (3)
Sources: Tables 8(1), 8(2), 8(3), 8(7), 8(8) and 8(9). 
NOTE: Brackets indicate the number of cases studies.
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estimated from the Metal Account, and those for fixed capital 
have been reached by relating the number of mills, furnaces, 
and calciners of this company to those of the old Brass Co.. In 
a year of low estimated profitability and so of inefficiency in 
the use of physical assets like 1766, stores of copper ore were 
three times higher than for other years in the decade, but the 
same relationship does not hold good for the other year of low 
returns, 1764, nor is the converse true for a year of high 
returns, 1765. Therefore although the size and value of stocks 
and stores was an important factor in the productive use of 
capital, the external influences governing trade generally were 
also clearly influential.
The least profitable use of capital in the limited examples 
available concerns the old Bristol Brass Co., whose poor rates 
of return reflected both the large stockpiles of raw materials 
and finished goods, and the fact that a deduction from the 
dividend of the cost of the partners' capital rendered the 
profit negligible. The figures for the newly formed Harford & 
Bristol Brass Co. in contrast, provide clear evidence that the 
re-formation made economic as well as financial sense. The 
sloughing off of the cumbersome stocks and stores of the old by 
the new company, made for a more efficient and profitable use 
of the capital employed.
Although these estimations cannot provide a precise measure 
of profitability, they do suggest that the rates of return were
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highest where there was a specific effort to make a more 
efficient use of assets (the Harford & Bristol Brass Co.), or 
when market conditions were exceptionally favourable (the 
Woolley Works), and lowest when either the form of legal 
organization and asset relationship (the Bristol Brass Wire & 
Copper Co.), or the dispersed physical structure of the firm 
(Joseph Percival & Copper Co.), led to inefficiency in the 
employment of capital. In general these conditions were also 
reflected in the returns to the partners' investment, although 
as the evidence from Woolley shows, a high level of financial 
reward did not necessarily lead to that investment in new fixed 
assets which may have further increased the profitability of 
the firm by allowing for the introduction of technological 
change and diversification in an otherwise static industry.
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Supplement ary information on merchants in the text comes from 
documents relating to their business interests, or works by the 
following authors listed in the bibliography: Cave, Latimer,
McGrath, Minchinton, Richardson. The '1755 List of the Company 
of Merchants trading to Africa from Bristol* is from 
Richardson, 'Bristol Slave Trade in the Eighteenth Century'.
1 Robin Atthill 'Industry' in Atthill ed.,Mendip: A New Study 
(Newton Abbot,1976),pp.145-79; also his Old Mendip(Newton Abb- 
ot,1964),pp.55-94;Down & Warrington,Somerset Coalfield,pp.87-9.
2 Billingsley,Agriculture of Somerset,pp.68-72,110-115;Walker, 
Bristol Region, pp.169-176,206-211; V.C.H.Somerset,II,p.354.
3 A Brief Deduction,p.6, quoted in V.C.H.Somerset,II,p.416; 
Defoe,Tour Through England and Wales,p.280.
4 Atthill.Old Mendip,pp.55-67; See also the survey of paper 
mills, BIAS Jnl.,111(1970),pp.11-21.
5 SRO, Hylton of Ammerdown MSS Box 36. 'Live and Dead Stock 
Returns, Frome Division', 1803.
6 SRO, DD/FS Box 27. In particular 'An assignment of a Lease­
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Chapter 9 Capital Investment in Transport
Investment in transport in this region was so closely 
associated with the developments in agriculture, mining, and 
manufacturing already described, that it is difficult to 
determine the extent to which it was a stimulus or a response 
to these changes. It may therefore be judicious to see it as 
part of the general development of the regional economy, based 
on both the need to carry goods and people more rapidly and 
conveniently, and the availability of surplus funds arising 
from the profits being made. The timing and location of these 
developments must also be taken into account. It is notable 
that the first roads to be turnpiked in the early decades of 
the eighteenth century were those serving the woollen textile 
centre and popular spa of Bath and the growing port of Bristol, 
and that the improvement of the River Avon from the 1720s 
allowed waterborne transport between the two-*-. But the growing 
importance of the regional economy, in addition to that of the 
port and resort, is made clear by the network of transport 
facilities which developed in north Somerset from the mid­
eighteenth century.
In support of this view reference may be made to the founding 
of the Wells and the Shepton Mallet Trusts in 1733, the Frome 
Trust in 1757, the Buckland Dinham Trust in 1768, and the 
Harptree Trust in 1793. On the fringes of the region with some 
roads entering it were the Warminster and Frome (Black Dog)
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Trust of 1732 and the Bruton Trust of 1756^. This activity was 
enhanced by the increasing vigour of the Bath and Bristol 
Trusts as the former’s renewal Act of 1756/7 removed its 
administration from the county justices and handed it to local 
trustees (often business men and professionals with a stake in 
the improvement of the roads), and the latter’s amendment Act 
of 1748/9 reduced the opposition of colliers and farmers^. All 
this led to the growth of a road system that was one of the 
densest in England in the second half of the eighteenth 
century, and of which Billingsley was able to claim in the mid- 
1790s, 'Publick roads pretty good, considering the traffick 
upon them’^ . Much of this traffic was of national significance 
as passengers, post, and goods were carried between London and 
Bath and other provincial centres like Exeter, but the 
importance of bulky local goods such as grain, coal, and stone 
should not be under-estimated as they were vital to the region.
Most of these improved roads were in the two-thirds of the 
region east of the Bristol Trust's road to Bridgwater (now the 
A38), and the Mendip enclosures which began in the 1770s were 
undertaken subsequent to the work on most of them. In contrast 
the water-logged lands of the western third were badly served 
by turnpikes until the drainage schemes of the early nineteenth 
century had by their control of flooding made possible a more 
intensive agricultural use of the land. The Wedmore Trust was 
founded in 1827 to serve the hitherto isolated area between the 
River Axe and the Bridgwater road near Shipham. But there was a
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continuing lack of good roads in the coastal area of north 
Somerset. The Bristol Trust road through Long Ashton authorized 
in 1749 petered out in the parish of Yatton, and that to 
Portishead through Abbots Leigh authorized in 1779 was not 
constructed beyond the bridge at Pill, a creek on the estuary 
of the Avon and home to many Bristol Channel pilots^. Coastal 
trade provided little compensation for this neglect. Some grain 
and cider was sent to Bristol from the fishing village of 
Portishead, but further south the rocks at Clevedon and sandy 
muds at Weston-super-Mare deprived the coast of good harbours 
until the small port of Uphill is reached at the mouth of the 
River Axe, the southern limit of our region and of the 
jurisdiction of the Collector of Customs at Bristol. But this 
ancient harbour from which Mendip lead was reputedly shipped in 
Roman times, and whose wharf was secured for trade by the 
enclosure award of 1818, was more important for the import of 
coal and cattle from South Wales, than for the transport of
c.
goods within the region .
After the improvement of the River Avon in the 1720s there 
were no comparable schemes until the 1790s when three were 
launched, for the Kennet and Avon, the Somerset Coal, and the 
Dorset and Somerset Canals^. Investment in waterborne 
facilities will now be examined briefly before attention is 
focussed on the sources of capital and its investment by the 
Bath Turnpike Trust.
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i Capital Investment in River Navigation and Canals
The River Avon was made navigable before the period covered 
by this research, but its financing is worthy of some 
consideration because of the continuing importance of the 
Navigation. Efforts to improve the river had been made since 
the beginning of the s^w^teenth century, at the end of which the 
issue was renewed by the Mayor and Corporation of Bath. In 1712 
they secured an Act which allowed them to make the river 
passable from Bath to ’the Hannams-Mills and Wear' above 
Bristol. The preamble said this would promote the transport of 
'Persons of Quality' to Bath and the 'Carriage of Freestone, 
Wood, Timber, and other Goods', as well as aiding the poor 
through the benefits to trade. But the poor were not grateful, 
fearing this breach of their little monopolies. As late as 1738 
a mob of Kingswood colliers demolished the lock at Saltford 
because of the Shropshire coal being brought into Bath.
Farmers, maltsters, and road carriers were also afraid of 
competition, millowners were apprehensive of the effect on 
water-power, and those dependent on the resort thought the 
ensuing 'great Concourse of People' would be detrimental to 
health. This continuing opposition, and the unwillingness of 
riverside landowners to part with property, delayed work for 
another 13 years. The improvements were eventually undertaken 
by a private body of 32 proprietors made up largely of Bristol 
merchants, Bath business and professional men, and country
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gentlemen, which gives a foretaste of the way economic change
o
was to be achieved in this region .
The Bristol group was led by John Hobbs, a timber merchant 
with an eye to the housebuilding market in Bath, who contracted 
to provide timber for the locks in 1725. It included: two 
copper manufacturers, Robert Coster of the company already 
discussed, and Dr John Lane a lawyer with works at Swansea;
John Hickes an African trader; Thomas Tyndall an haberdasher 
and shipowner; and James Hardwick who negotiated with river­
side landowners and may have been an attorney. On Hobbs' death 
in 1735 his share was taken over by Joseph Jones, another 
timber merchant, who later worked for the Woolley partners. The 
Bath interest included members of Parliament, General Wade and 
John Codrington, and professionals like Dr Charles Bave, but it 
was dominated by Ralph Allen, an increasingly successful 
entrepreneur^. In 1720 he had gained control of all mail by­
passing London for an annual fee of £6,000. To this profitable 
business must be added stone quarries whose market stood to be 
extended beyond Bath by the improved navigability of the Avon. 
Shares were initially limited to one per proprietor, but Allen 
overcame this restriction by a move not previously remarked on. 
He enrolled his wife Elizabeth, mother Gertrude, nephew Philip, 
sister-in-law Sarah Hudson, and brothers-in-law Anthony Rodney 
Buckeridge and Charles Holder. When the last-named withdrew, 
the share was taken over by Ralph's brother Philip, and on his 
mother's death her share went to his father^.
-328-
Ralph Allen was appointed senior treasurer, and it was agreed 
at the first meeting of the co-partners on 1 January 1725 that 
a newly-purchased iron chest be 'lodged in ye poste offis or in 
ye dwelling hous of Mr Ralph Allin as he Shall find moste 
Convenient1^ . The 'iron chest' deserves mention for it 
exemplifies the way finances were handled in this region for 
much of the eighteenth century. When the proprietors answered a 
call for funds in September 1725 for example, £420 was 'put in 
the Chest' as part of the sum of at least £12,000 which passed 
through Allen's hands in the first ten years of the venture^. 
But his public spiritedness did not end there, for by the 1730s 
he was regarded by Bath Council as their banker, and in mid­
century he played an important part in the raising of capital 
by the Bath Turnpike Trust. The image of Allen's private and 
public affairs being funded from many coffers is not fanciful, 
for the architect John Wood's fears about the financing of the 
great mansion of Prior Park planned in the mid-1730s, were said 
to have been lulled when 'Allen led him into the room where he
kept his money and opened chest after chest full of guineas'.
His biographer felt the story 'not a little improbable', but 
the evidence suggests the contrary-^. In addition to the 
capital sum mentioned, Allen also had responsibility for 
revenue from the Navigation tolls, averaging over £700 per year 
in the 1730s^. The reward for handling such funds was the
opportunity to put them to private use, and though there is no
suggestion of malpractice by Ralph Allen, others had lower 
standards. Thus it was discovered in 1786 after the deaths of
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joint treasurers Leonard Coward, linen draper, and Richard 
Attwood, plumber, that they had appropriated interest amounting
1 c
to over £1,700 on the cash balance they held .
This experience notwithstanding, tolls levied on users of 
the Navigation provided a steady source of income, above £1,000 
per year in the second halves of the 1760s and 1780s and early 
1790s. But although efficiently run the concern remained a 
local one, with the proprietors deaf to pleas for an extension 
towards London which surfaced intermittantly, promoted 
especially by Bristol merchants. They had no success until the 
early 1790s, when perhaps due to the easier investment 
conditions of those years and the contagion of the 'canal 
mania', the Kennet and Avon, Somerset Coal, and Dorset and 
Somerset Canals were all promoted. It is of interest to this 
study of investment that in their promotion and execution these 
schemes were so different.
The promotion of the Kennet and Avon to ease transport 
between Bristol and London, was from late 1792 largely in the 
hands of merchants and capitalists of the former, who tried to 
monopolize the shares. Public opinion forced them to become 
more open, but it has been calculated that even then 80 per 
cent of subscriptions remained Bristol-based, boosted by the 
tradesmen there. This enthusiasm was part of the general 
speculative activity in Bristol at that time, which extended to 
building in Clifton as well as to some promotions which failed
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to secure Parliamentary sanction, such as the Bristol and 
Western Canal for which there was so much zeal that in 1792 a 
meeting in Wells chaired by John Billingsley had to be kept 
secret as the subscription list was already full. Bristol’s 
role in the Kennet and Avon lessened after the financial crisis 
of 1793, and as new shares were created the importance of 
Londoners grew in a project for which £950,000 had been raised 
by the time it opened in 1810^. As Bristolians grew wary of 
speculations so they also ceased to support ventures seen as 
offering primarily economic rather than financial rewards. Only 
17 of the 171 proprietors of the Somerset Coal Canal authorized 
in 1794 came from that city, and only one of those of the 
Dorset and Somerset Canal authorized in 1796. But institutional 
support remained firm, and in 1797 the partners of the Exchange 
Bank, attorney Samuel Worrall and Thomas Blatchley, loaned 
£6,000 to the proprietors of the Kennet and Avon. When Harfords 
Bank became treasurers after 1801, an overdraft reaching 
£60,631 was maintained until 1816^.
The accessibility of the nearby Kingswood coalfield may have 
reduced Bristol interest in the Somerset Coal Canal, but it was 
the economic prospects which secured the support of others, 
especially the coal masters who were the main promoters of this 
scheme to engineer a link with the Kennet and Avon. An initial 
meeting was held in 1792 with Billingsley in the chair, and an 
Act was secured in 1794. He was joined on the committee of 
management by John and William Crang, Jacob Mogg, Samborne
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Palmer, Richard Perkins, James Savage, James Tooker, and 
Francis Whalley. James Stephens, squire of Camerton and like 
the rest a coal master, became chairman. With this scheme there 
was a coming together of many strands: the attorneys were 
Richard Bowsher of Bath who was closely involved in building 
projects there, and Edmund Broderip of Wells who acted in the 
Axe and Congresbury Drainage and the Wookey and Wells 
Enclosures; the treasurers were the Old Bath Bank of Messrs 
Hobhouse, Clutterbuck, Phillott & Lowder who had very strong 
roots in the region; and the surveyors and engineers included 
John Rennie and William Smith who had worked on drainage and 
mining in north Somerset. The Act had authorized the raising of 
£80,000 plus a further £40,000 should this prove insufficient, 
but engineering problems meant that in 1802 authorization was 
sought for an additional £20,000, plus a separate, shared Lock 
Fund of £43,000. As their treasurers refused to advance any 
money on the security of the canal, the committee became 
indebted to Eleazer Pickwick, the wealthy proprietor of the 
White Hart Inn in Bath, who lent £10,000 on mortgage for five 
years, with further loans in that time of £11,000. He was made 
treasurer in a move reminiscent of the earlier dependence of 
the Avon Navigation on the support of a wealthy Bath 
entrepreneur. By the time the scheme was operating fully in 
1815 expenditure totalled over £160,000, but the difficulty of 
establishing what proportion of this concerned capital invest­
ment is shown by the report of the chairman, 7 December 1799, 
that 'Aggregate expences1 had then reached £76,000 from which
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nearly £10,000 covering matters such as legislative costs and
interest payments to subscribers had been deducted to leave
’the money actually expended in cutting and forming the Canal'.
This sum however still included the cost of land, salaries, and
1 8committee expenses .
By 1798 the completion of the first section of the canal to 
Dunkerton Wharf had already reduced the price of coal in Bath, 
and with the link to the Kennet and Avon Canal in 1805 a large 
part of south central England was opened up to Somerset coal. 
When finally completed in 1815 the arm to Radstock had become a 
tramway rather than a canal, but this did not detract from the 
success of the venture for the returns to that date averaged
10.0 per cent per annum, a figure very close to the projected 
rate of 11.25 per cent which may be calculated from notes found 
amongst the Company's early papers, relating to the tonnage 
produced, transport charges levied, and capital invested. The 
returns to the Kennet and Avon in the same years however 
averaged only an annual 2.5 per cent. The few Bristolians who 
had invested in the canals of the South Wales coalfield 
(chiefly Harfords because of their family business interests 
there) did much better, for both the Neath and the Swansea 
Canals produced average annual returns in the years to 1815 of
15.0 and 14.0 per cent respectively-^.
In contrast the Dorset and Somerset Canal scheme to provide 
transport for the southern part of the coalfield was a failure.
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Authorized in 1796, the branch built from the Nettlebridge 
collieries to Frome was only part of an over-ambitious scheme 
to link the Bristol and English Channels from the Kennet and 
Avon near Bradford, to Poole on the south coast. When projected 
in December 1792 there had been much support for a canal that 
could carry coal into Dorset in exchange for potter’s clay for 
the Midlands. Richard Messiter the attorney and banker played a 
crucial role, supported by his three brothers and operating 
through his bank partnerships at Frome and Wincanton. The 
committee set up to secure the Act was a judicious mix of the 
landed interest, including the Earl of Ilchester who had 
experience of other canals; representatives of the gentry such 
as Harry Edgell of Standerwick, and of the clergy such as the 
Rev.Samuel Farewell of Wincanton, both of them justices; and 
practical improvers such as coalmasters John Billingsley and 
Samuel Kelson, both actively engaged in the promotion of other 
canals. The Act authorized a capital of £150,000 with reserve 
powers for £75,000 more, but in the changed circumumstances of 
the later 1790s, only about £58,000 was actually raised. The 
largest shareholder, subscribing £8,500, was Richard Perkins, 
whilst Billingsley's share was £3,500. Both were brewers in 
Ashwick, but whilst the latter's roots were in the region, the 
former's connections were with Bristol, with distilling and the 
Africa trade. There were also minor shares, like that of Uriah 
Messiter, brother of Richard, for £300. When the Royal Assent 
was received in 1796 the brothers became clerks and treasurers. 
After preliminary surveys by Robert Whitworth, William Bennet
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of Frome became the engineer, the two having worked together on 
the Axe Drainage. Engineering difficulties and shortage of 
funds caused problems in the early 1800s, at a time when 
attention was diverted by the war effort. Work was halted and 
never resumed as money remained tight and supporters died (John 
Billingsley in 1811), or became bankrupt (Richard Messiter in 
1819)20.
The isolation of the western third of the region has already 
been noted, as has the enthusiasm in 1792 for a Bristol and 
Western Canal to remedy this. But the project fizzled out in 
the course of the decade and not till 1810 was the idea revived 
as the Bristol and Taunton Canal. This brought to the surface 
the conflict of interests in this part of the region between 
the Commissioners of Sewers who feared for their drainage 
schemes, and the coal masters, glass makers, and farmers who 
welcomed the prospect of an easier distribution of their 
produce. A survey by William Smith confirmed that coal reserves 
were sufficient to make the scheme worthwhile and an Act was 
secured in 1811 which authorized a capital of £420,000 plus a 
contingency of £130,000. The proprietors were confident enough 
to purchase 20^ acres of land in the Nailsea enclosure of 1813- 
19 at a cost of £1,279. But the scheme foundered, despite the 
skills of their clerk Isaac Cooke of Bristol, an experienced 
canal promoter. Not till the opening of the Bristol and Exeter 
Railway in 1841 was this isolation banished and the development
O 1
of the area, particularly its coastal resorts, made possible .
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ii Capital Investment in the Bath Turnpike Roads
Attempts have been made in recent years to estimate
aggregate capital formation in the roads, but there has been no
22study of the process of investment other than this enquiry 
The reconstitution of the finances of one trust cannot make 
good this deficiency, but it can provide a way to look beyond 
the generalizations to the sources of capital and pattern of 
investment.
In a general sense the Bath Trust was representative of its 
2 3kind . It was established in 1707 and is therefore an early 
trust, but it was substantially reformed in 1757 and so may be 
included in the 'turnpike boom' of the 1750s and 1760s. Its 
administrative arrangements span the divide between earlier and 
later bodies for until 1757 it was a Justice Trust with a small 
number of commissioners, who were then replaced by a large body 
of men representing the economic life of the area rather than 
the county administration. In its road layout too the Bath 
Trust straddles the usual classifications. It was one of the 
'town-centred' trusts of the west country rather than part of 
the system of 'linear' trusts serving London, but these roles 
were not mutually exclusive. Although the turnpiking of seven 
roads into the city was authorized, it was the London Road that 
was of outstanding importance as part of one of the great 
routes from the capital to the provinces. In 1707 this section 
represented 40 per cent of the Trust's total mileage, and 
although this proportion declined as Bath developed as a
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regional centre and its other roads were extended, so that by 
the 1820s it formed only 10 per cent of the total, it retained 
its importance in terms of revenue. In the later 1820s as in 
the 1800s and 1750s, roughly one-third of the annual income 
from the tolls came from the London Road. Comparisons of 
mileage are difficult, for trusts varied in their different 
phases, but in this too it was fairly typical. Controlling 
about 50 miles when fully formed the Bath Trust was neither one 
of the few large trusts of over 100 miles nor one of the small 
number of 10 miles or less.
In terms of the region, a good reason for concentrating on 
the Bath Trust lies in the superiority of the documentary 
evidence relating to it, especially the mortgage deeds which 
can be interpreted to produce a reasonably comprehensive 
account of its finances that bears comparison with the 
continuity of evidence analysed in other cases in this study.
In contrast virtually no documents relating to the Bristol 
Trust have survived and some others fare little better, 
although from the 1820s information can be found in the Quarter 
Session and Parliamentary Returns beginning then. From the 
former comes useful evidence on the trustees in the region, for 
in 1820 an attempt was made to discover how many had met the 
qualifications required of them as landowners, and how many
ry i
through personal property . The reply from the Frome Trust, 
centred on the clothing town and covering nearly 44 miles, was 
that of the 68 then living, 32 had qualified on the former
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grounds and 36 on the latter. This suggests a balance of 
interests between town and country which was probably echoed by 
the Bath and the Wells Trusts though neither was able to give 
this information, the form of oath taken making no distinction. 
The more rural Buckland Dinham and Harptree Trusts appear to 
present a different case for their trustees qualified 
overwhelmingly as landowners, all 41 in the former and 57 out 
of 60 in the latter. But far from revealing how different they 
were from the Bath trustees, a study of their names is a 
reminder of the extent to which the local gentry and landowners 
were widely involved in many aspects of regional activity.
The Harptree Trust for example, founded in 1793 and 
maintaining 27 miles along the northern edge of Mendip to link 
the main roads crossing it, included the following amongst its 
original subscibers: John Band the paper manufacturer; John 
Billingsley with his wide interests; Matthew Brickdale of the 
Bristol merchant and political family with old lands in West 
Harptree; William Miles the attorney; Caleb or William Parsons, 
who provided mortgage funds for the East Harptree enclosure; 
Henry Strachey of nearby Sutton Court; Francis Edward Whalley, 
coal proprietor; and Frederick B. Wright, son of Robert, with 
his extensive lead and coal mining concerns. And a special 
branch of this road was built to coalworks in Sutton. This 
interlocking of interests is found also in the Buckland Dinham 
Trust, re-named the Radstock in 1830 in recognition of its 
importance to coalmining. Even the Bristol Trust about which so
- 3 3 8 -
little is known had in its Act of 1749 (22 Geo.II c.28) some 63 
trustees who appear also in the 1753 List of Traders to Africa, 
as well as others like Henry Strachey whose estate was served 
by the Harptree Trust but whose Woolley Works depended on the 
carriage of goods by the Bristol Trust. So the Bath Trust was 
not distinguished from others in the region by differences 
between town and country, instead all were linked by the 
underlying and shared economic interests of many trustees.
This network achieved a physical reality as the roads of the
/
trusts began to link up. Through a succession of renewal and 
amendment Acts those of the Bath Trust were gradually extended 
from the 12.5 miles authorized in 1707 (6 Anne c.42) to 14.75 
miles in 1721 (7 Geo.I c.19), 20.15 miles in 1739 (12 Geo.II 
c.20), 31.2 miles in 1757 (30 Geo II c.67), 41.05 miles in 1759 
(32 Geo.II c.51), and 47.9 miles in 1761 (1 Geo.Ill c.31). The 
length then fluctuated around 50 miles, for the Acts of 1793 
(33 Geo.Ill c.144) and 1829 (10 Geo.IV c.cx) concerned the 
building of new roads as major deviations. Surveys by the Trust 
show an estimated 48.25 miles in 1776, and measured lengths of
52.0 miles in 1787, 47.7 miles in 1791, and 49.19 in 1813. 49.4 
miles were measured in the early 1820s and 48.47 miles at the
o c
end of the decade . Two years after the expiry Act of 1876 
(39/40 Viet, c.39) the authority of the Trust ceased.
These Acts also contained provisions allowing funds to be 
raised in a financial market and tolls to be levied on users of
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roads. As the practice of the trustees shows, the former 
provided the long-term capital of the Trust (invested in new 
and improved roads with their Parliamentary and legal costs), 
and the latter its current revenue (covering repairs, 
administration, and interest payments). In Table 9(1) this 
evidence is classified accordingly, from the mid-eighteenth 
century when it becomes available, to the early 1830s when the 
problem is eased by the collection of national statistics. 
Column 1 confirms the growth of the fund-raising powers of the 
Trust, for it shows the increase in the permitted level of 
borrowing from £12,000 in 1757 to £19,000 in 1759, £25,000 in 
1793, and £30,000 in 1810. Before the 1750s the limit was 
£3,000. After the General Turnpike Act of 1822 (3 Geo.IV c.126) 
all limits were removed.
Evidence on the implementation of these financial powers is 
hard to find. Account books for the period are difficult to use 
because of confusion between capital funds and current revenue,
2 Aconstruction and administrative costs . For the Bath Trust not 
even this unsatisfactory source is available, but fortunately 
its mortgage deeds have survived in such rare profusion as to 
allow a reconstitution of its finances. This shows that long­
term capital was raised largely on the security of its assets 
by a process which helped to develop the concept of the 
’mortgage1 beyond its landed origins. There were essentially 
two forms of the mortgage deed of the Trust. Before 1793 the 
tolls formed the only security, and these were assigned to
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three landed trustees. Each mortgagee had ’all the Right Title 
and Interest in and to the said Tolls'. After 1793 (33 Geo.Ill 
c.144) the security offered was extended to include the toll­
houses and turnpikes, of which the mortgagee was now promised 
the same proportion as the sum advanced bore to the whole sum 
subscribed. Also,the tolls were now assigned to any seven 
trustees, amongst whom local townspeople became dominant. The 
fact that in both cases mortgagees had equal rights against the 
securities offered regardless of the date of individual deeds 
facilitated the raising of capital, for it meant the trustees 
could borrow at any time without creating a special mortgage, 
and new lenders had equal status with earlier investors. The 
funds assumed a permanence associated with share capital rather 
than a loan, but this concealed a flourishing exchange of deeds 
in a secondary market alongside the primary one.
The mortgage deeds survived because when paid off they were 
stored in bundles according to their final ownership. But 
within these each deed carries its own distinctive history, 
details on the face showing its nominal value, date of issue, 
and name and style of the first purchaser, whilst endorsements 
record details of subsequent changes of ownership. From this 
evidence, supplemented by minute books, registers of mortgages
o 7
of tolls, and lists of creditors , it has been possible to 
trace back through the network of transactions in the secondary 
market to the primary holdings of these financial instruments, 
and so to establish the stages by which the Trust met its
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capital requirements from the mid-eighteenth century to the 
early 1830s. The evidence set out in Table 9(1), columns 2 & 3, 
confirms that the financial powers given by the renewal and 
amendment Acts were implemented, but it also shows that for 
most of the period the process was a gradual one. This gap 
between authorization and implementation may have owed more to 
the factors affecting the supply of capital than the timing of 
demand, for although the trustees could launch their calls at 
propitious times, the supply of capital was beyond their 
control. In particular the ’disinterested1 character of many 
investors seeking financial rather than economic returns, and 
the vitality of the secondary market which deflected funds from 
primary investment, may both have served to delay the raising 
of new capital.
In trying to establish the sources of investment capital,
the limited involvement of the trustees should first be noted.
Only 5 per cent of those elected and 10 per cent of those
9 ftqualified played any part in the financing of the Trust . 
Although they provided about 80 per cent of the capital raised 
at the mid-eighteenth century reorganization of the Trust, and 
during the difficult first decade of the nineteenth century, 
they contributed much less at other times, especially in 1773 
when only 23 per cent of the £4,500 then invested came from 
trustees. Their involvement was also generally shortlived. For 
example, 70 per cent of the capital sum of £12,000 raised in 
the late 1750s had been sold in the secondary market within
Table % )T h e  Long-term C apital and Current Revenue o f the B ath Turnpike
Trust, 1757-1833
Year Capital Capital Long-term Current Year Capital Capital Long-term Current
authorized raised capital revenue authorized raised capital revenue
£ £ £ £ £ £ £ £
1757* 12,000 1,262 1808 350 21,450 8,107 net
1758 12,0001 1,683 1809 600 22,050 8,131 net
1759 19,000 J 12,000 1810* 30,000 2,300 22,100
1762 800 12,800 l8l I 150 23,876 10,480
1764 12,000 1812 450 23,834 9,840
1770 4 ,45 i 1813 500 23,872 9,954 net
1771 4,524 1814 750 24,135 9,740
1772 500 12,500 4,470 1815 300 23,905 10,600
1773* 4,500 17,000 4,261 1816 100 23,457 10,960
1774* 4,365 1817 200 23,108 10,968
1775 4,520 1818 22,552 11,880 net
1776 4,872 1819 2,000 23,901 11,810 net
1779 2,300 17,000 1820 24,129 11,989 net
1785 17,000 1821 too 23,629 11,999 net
1790 200 17,200 5,859 net 1822* limit removed 23,029 11,999 net
1791 800 18,000 6,889 net 1823 900 23,579 12,240
1792 7,151 net 1824 4,850 28,279 14,530
1793* 25,000 1,000 19,000 1825 28,279 14,119
1798 7,415 1826 28,279 14,498
1801 1,100 20,100 1827 24,679 13,764
1802 100 20,200 7,556 net 1828 23,929 15,870
1803 7,935 1829* 23,379 15,030
1804 7,794 1830 6,500 29,779 io ,935
1805 100 20,700 7,850 1831 13,700 43,079 11,101
1806 600 20,200 1832 2,800 45,629 11,625
1807 500 21,100 8,520 net 1833 1,200 46,679 10,869
S o u r c e s a n d N j o V&s  O il fe llOiO >A.j
f  a i € '
T a b led  CO
Sources: Acts of Parliament and papers of the Bath Turnpike Trust especially the following: S.R.O.
D/T/ba, 5, Trustees’ Subscription Book to Oaths of Qualification, 1793-1851; 6-12, minute books for 1757-
1854; 15, Proceedings of sub-committee for the London Road, 1757-62; 18, Register of Mortgages of Tolls,
1760-82; 19, Register of Mortgages of Tolls, 1801-16; 20, Abstract of Title to Mortgages o f Tolls, 1857;
26-40, administrative and financial records relating to receipts from tolls and expenditure on roads; 41,
Lists o f Creditors for 1785 and 1805; 42, Deeds of mortgage, assignment, declaration etc., 1758-1849.
S.R.O. Q/R Turnpike Trust Returns for 1820 and General Statements of Account, 1822-50.
Nous:
Year: The Trust’s accounting system was irregular and therefore figures in Col. 4 cover calendar years
(1770-6, 1803-5), years ending in spring (1757-8, 1798-1802, 1807-9, 1816-22), and in autumn 
(1790-2, 1811-6, 1823-33). Ail other figures in the table are for calendar years.
Col. 1: Capital authorized by Act of Parliament, here shown cumulatively.
Col. 2: Capital raised on the security of the tolls. Figures before 1823 have been reconstituted from
mortgage deeds, minute books, and financial papers. Later figures are from the annual General 
Statements o f Account. Unsecured loans from the Trust’s bankers after their appointment in 
1808 are not included.
Col. 3: The cumulative mortgage debt. Figures before 1823 have largely been calculated from additional
borrowings minus repayments (undertaken on a regular basis by ballot after 1810, when 5% of 
the tolls was reserved annually o f this purpose). The incorporation of firm evidence for 1772, 
1806, 1810 (minute books), 1785, 1805 (lists o f creditors), and 1820 (Quarter Sessions records), 
show the calculations are of the right order. Figures from 1823 are from the annual General 
Statements of Account.
Col. 4: Income received for the use o f the roads, including tolls, payments for overweight, and
compositions. These are gross sums, including costs of collection (about £250 p.a. in the 1770s, 
£400 p.a. in the early 1800s) except when tolls were farmed, and a net figure is then shown. 
Changes in the scope or rate of toll (shown by an asterisk) had an uncertain effect. In 1829 for 
example, the imposition of multiple tolls on certain roads, and of charges on draught animals 
individually instead of on vehicles as a unit, was followed by a sharp fall in the revenue.
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twelve years, reducing the participation of the trustees from 
the 80 per cent already noted, to 40 per cent. This was a 
continuing pattern, for the secondary market was dominated by 
non-trustees to the extent that they purchased 73 per cent of 
the securities sold in the period studied. The outcome of this 
reluctance to invest and subsequent disinvestment may be seen 
in two lists of creditors assembled by the Trust. From these it 
can be calculated that in 1785 the qualified trustees formed
28.8 per cent of creditors, holding 33.8 per cent of the debt, 
and in 1805 they formed 33.3 per cent, holding 36.7 per cent. 
The hybrid nature of this evidence, which blends together 
holdings built up in the primary and secondary markets, may 
limit its usefulness in some ways, but not in relation to the 
important concept of the capital which sustained the 
undertaking. The trustees held only about one-third of the 
continuing capital of the Trust.
This feature is puzzling until it is recognized that the 
financial option involved certain disadvantages illustrated by 
the case of Ralph Allen, one of the wealthiest trustees and 
successful Avon Navigator. In 1759 and again in 1761, he 
offered £1,000 on the security of the tolls provided £700 could 
be earmarked for the road convenient to his estates, which 
included the stone mines at Combe Down as well as the great 
house at Prior Park. But investment in a public undertaking did 
not ensure control of the use of funds, and when it was ruled 
that new capital must first be applied to projects specified by
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Act of Parliament, the offer was withdrawn 7. Other trustees
found their economic interests were better served by a direct
involvement with the roads, as may be seen from the success of
Jacob Mogg, a justice of the peace from 1757, landowner and
prosperous coalmaster, already encountered in relation to the
Farrington Pit and Somerset Coal Canal. He made no financial
investment, but after taking the oath in 1761 he was for 45
years responsible for the construction and maintenance of a new
road between Bath and Rush Hill, where it linked up with the
30Wells and Bristol Trusts . For an entrepreneur with better
uses for his capital, this input of time was in lieu of a
financial investment. It also produced a real economic return
for it enabled coal from his land-locked mines to be carried
more easily to the market in Bath. More than 20 other coal
31masters also found it worthwhile to be active trustees . The 
second group whose financial involvement was limited (and 
declining) was the landed interest, who, contrary to the usual 
generalizations, held only 27.4 per cent of the debt in 1785, 
forming 28.8 per cent of the creditors, and 6.5 per cent of it 
in 1805, forming 17.5 per cent of t h e m ^ .
In the absence of a sustained interest by these groups, the 
role of the small urban saver became crucial. The term 'small* 
is used advisedly because in 1785, 86.5 per cent of the 
creditors had holdings of £500 or less, forming 52.3 per cent 
of the whole in value; in 1805, 80.7 per cent held £500 or less 
forming 39.9 per cent of the whole. In both years only some 7.0
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per cent held £1,000 or more, representing one-third of the 
total sum. The main difference between the two periods was that 
the proportion of middling investors holding more that £500 but 
less than £1,000 increased from 5.8 per cent in 1785 to 12.3 
per cent in 1805, and the value of their holdings rose from
12.9 per cent to 23.9 per cent of the whole. The relative 
importance of the urban savers can be judged from Table 9(2) 
which deals with the primary capital market; Table 9(3), which 
concerns the secondary market; and Table 9(4) in which cross- 
sections for particular years summarize the results of 
participation in both markets. The system of classification has 
already been set out in Figure 1, p.291. and its debt to that 
devised by J.R.Ward for his analysis of the financing of canals 
explained. One modification relates to changes of status, for 
whilst the present analysis deals with investment over time, 
Ward was concerned with original shareholders. The problem has 
been met by incorporating these changes so that a
porter brewer like William Clark has been moved to the category 
of capitalist when his designation as esquire by contemporaries 
has indicated both a change in the scale of operations and an 
accumulation of private assets, although the earlier business 
may have remained the source of income .
The first three columns in each table comprise the rural 
interest. Ward's categories have been extended to include 
country-based mining proprietors and clothiers with the country 
gentry (col.2), and rural tradesmen such as victuallers with
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the farmers (col.3). The rest (cols.4-10) make up the urban 
interest, mostly in the case of the study of the Bath Trust, 
resident in that city. They include capitalists or urban 
gentlemen (col.4) whose ranks were increased by the infusion of 
successful men from other spheres; tradesmen (col.6),including 
upholsterers and saddlers as well as the grocers, ironmongers, 
and lesser merchants of Ward’s lists; and professional men 
(col.7), including architects and musicians as well as Ward’s 
attorneys, surgeons, and apothecaries. The contribution made by 
all of these groups may be seen in the three tables. The low 
profile of manufacturers (col.5) with other uses for their 
funds is not surprising. But they and clergymen (col.8) were 
briefly important in the 1770s and again after the turn of the 
century, when there were also occasional contributions from 
smaller tradesmen such as butchers and coal merchants, and from 
artisans investing individually or through friendly societies 
(col.10). Women deserve a special mention, especially as their 
role has been described elsewhere as ’marginal'^ . They were 
important in volume of subscriptions as well as numbers, 
especially in the 1770s when they provided 46 per cent of the 
capital then raised. They covered a wide social and economic 
range including gentlewomen, widows and daughters of 
professional and tradesmen, lodging housekeepers pursuing a 
vigorous economic life of their own, and occasionally servants, 
identified in relation to those employing them.
Table ^ Q-jCapital Raised on the Mortgage Deeds of the Bath Turnpike Trust,
1758-1833: An Analysis of Investors
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Year Capital Peers Gentry Farmers Capitalists Manufacturers Tradesmen Professionals Clergy Women Institutions
raised
£ £ £ £ £ £ £ £ £ £ £
1758-9 12,000 200 5,300 1,000 5,000 500
1762 800 500 300
1772 500 250 50 200
1773 4,500 250 500 500 100 750 2,400
1779 2,300 600 250 500 950
1790 200 200
1791*5 1,800 1,400 100
1796-1800
1801-5 1,300 200 400 100 too 200 100 100
1806-10 4,350 100 700 600 1,500 450 1,000
1811-5 2,150 200 150 900 250 450 50 50 100
1816-20 2,300 700 500 100
1821-5 5,850 1,300 900 500 100
1826-30 6,500 2,500 1,000 2,000
1831-3 17,700 300 2,100
Sources: See Table 9 C 0 
Notes:
1 See the text for an explanation of the method of classification. In later years some investment remains unclassified, due to lack of evidence.
2 After 1790 the years have been grouped, since capital could then no longer be raised as required. Easier conditions began to return in the 1820s, and in 
1830 an advertisement for £6,000 at 4% produced offers totalling £21,000 (S.R.O. D/T/ba, Min. Bk. 12, 3 July 1830).
-
5
4
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Table 96)The Secondary Market in the Mortgage Deeds of the Bath Turnpike
Trust, 1759-183$ * An Analysis of Purchasers
/ 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Year Securities sold Peers Gentry Farmers Capitalists Manufacturers Tradesmen Professionals Clergy Women Institutions
£ £ £ £ £ £ £ £ £ £ £
1759-60 1,250 50 150 1,000 50
1761-5 7,750 2,000 100 1,000 2,000 1,700 950
1766-70 2,300 2,300
I77I-5 3,150 500 1,000 900 100 150 500
1776-80 7,900 600 850 500 400 2,000 500 850 2,200
1781-5 5,650 700 650 450 1,600 1,000 500 750
1786-90 2,650 1,000 200 700 50 200 500
I79i *5 4,200 1,300 900 1,550 450
1796-1800 5,450 200 1,500 2,850 900
1801-5 3,400 200 150 1,350 100 400 400 700 100
1806-10 2,400 250 I >450 450 50 100 100
1811-5 1,750 350 1,000 100 100 50 150
1816-20 1,400 200 50 300 300 550
1821-5 1,500 1,100 400
1826-30 700 300 400
1831-5 2,000 1,000 1,000
Sources: See Table 9 C 0
Year
1785
1805
Table^OffThe Long-term Capital o f the Bath Turnpike Trust: An Analysis of 
Creditors in the Years 1785 and 1805
Mortgage debt 
£
Value of deeds held: 
£17,000
1
Peers
£
2
Gentry
£
2,700
15.9%
3
Farmers
£
L 950
H -5%
4
Capitalists
£
4,300 
25 •3%
5
Manufacturers
£
6
Tradesmen
£
3,000
17-6%
7
Professionals
£
950
5.6%
8
Clergy
£
400
2-3%
9
Women
£
3,700
21-8%
10
Institutions
£
Number of 
creditors: 52
5 10 6 6 2 3 20
Value of deeds held: 
£20,700 including 
£500 with
unspecified creditors
800
3.9%
550
2-7%
6,750
32-6%
5,450
26-3% O' 
~
o vO
Wl
0s 
0 600
2-9%
4,500
21-7%
300
1-5%
Number of specified 5 5 12 7 4 3 17 3
creditors: 56
Sources: See Table96)ln  particular S.R.O. B/T/ba 41, Lists of creditors for 1785 and 1805
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through the adaptation of their role from a former emphasis on 
matching the financial needs of known clients in a personal 
capital market, to that of soliciting funds from unknown 
clients (through notices on turnpike gates and later by news­
paper advertisements) for investment in public utilities with
o A
which the savers had no close economic concern . For the Bath 
Trust the attorneys at the centre of these developments were, 
Richard Roberts from 1757, Walter Chapman from 1772, Philip 
George from 1782, and his son of that name from 1809. Their 
rewards came from the salary paid for routine administration, 
and from the additional legal work which included drafting 
bills, assisting their conduct through Parliament, consulting 
counsel on the trustees’ powers, determining ownership and 
conveying property, and creating financial instruments for 
raising capital. The importance of the last named is shown by 
the fact that the fee for executing institutional mortgage 
deeds rose from 2s.6d in 1760 to 15s.Od in 1782, whilst the 
clerk's salary remained the same, at £35 per annum.
The market operated by the Bath Trust did not exist in 
isolation, but was part of a general pattern in the area. By 
the mid-eighteenth century borrowing at interest by the 
Corporation of the city of Bath was already well established on 
the security of bonds given under the Common Seal, and in the 
twenty years from 1757, during which the Trust raised £17,000,
o 7
the Council borrowed a very similar sumJ '. Between 1778 and 
1786 a total of £10,700 was raised by the Corporation, largely
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on a new form of bond made out in units of £100 instead of 
being determined by the sum offered. But there was little 
Corporation borrowing at the end of the decade, probably 
because the newly formed Bath Improvement Commissioners raised 
£25,000 in the years 1789-91^ A classification of investors 
in this urban renewal scheme on the basis described earlier 
shows that 9.2 per cent of the capital subscribed came from the 
landed interest, 50.2 per cent from the urban gentry and 
substantial merchants, 6.0 per cent from tradesmen, 13.2 per 
cent from the professions and 21.4 per cent from women. 
Manufacturers and clergy made no contribution. The rural 
interest thus played an even smaller part than in funding the 
roads, but the urban capitalists were more important.
Meanwhile, and more slowly, the Bath Trust had increased its 
total capital raised from the £17,000 already mentioned for the 
1770s to £20,300 by 1791, at a pace that suggests its funding 
was dovetailed with, and delayed by, the activities of the 
other two institutional borrowers. To the saver however, this 
network gave the advantage of alternative opportunities, and 
encouraged familiarity with the mechanics of the market.
The mortgage deeds of the Bath Trust were attractive 
financial instruments because they were relatively risk free, 
available in small units of £50 (though with some of £100, 
especially from the turn of the century), and capable of 
holding their nominal value. They could be sold with ease when 
assets had to be realized. The highest proportion of turnover
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in the secondary market to which this gave rise was between 
1761 and 1765, see Table 9(3), when deeds to the value of 
£7,750 changed hands out of a mortgage debt of £12,000. Sales 
were even higher between 1776 and 1780, but so was the mortgage 
debt. The vigour of these exchanges suggests that this 
secondary market may have been limited in other years, not by a 
shortage of funds but by a lack of deeds for sale. Possibly 
one-fifth were held as long-standing investments, devised by 
will or coming on the market only when sold by executors, for 
over 20 per cent of the £12,000 raised in the later 1750s was 
disposed of in this way, and the list of creditors for 1805 
shows a similar proportion of the capital sum then held by 
executors. But most deeds circulated more rapidly, held for a 
short time before being resold, perhaps by a tradesman ’having 
an occasion for the said £50' as some endorsements said. The 
period of greatest velocity was the decade from the early 1790s 
when the various financial securities of the Trust, the Bath 
Corporation, and the Improvement Commission changed hands with 
great rapidity, even several times in one year. This activity, 
see Table 9(5), at a time of difficulty in raising new capital, 
suggests that the marketability of the deeds may have deflected 
savings from investment in new works.
The negotiation of terms on which investment capital could 
be raised also tended to cause delays. For example after an 
initial offer of 3.5 per cent in 1757, the trustees were less 
than a year later obliged to settle on 4.0 per cent in order to
- 36>  -
Tab\eH(!*)The Secondary Market in Institutional Securities in Bath,
I 7 8 9 - 1 8 0 4
/ 2 3 4
Bath Bath Bath Total
Year Corporation Turnpike Improvement stans
Trust Commission involved
£ £ £ £
1789 100 100
1790 900 900
I791 800 500 1,300
1792 250 2,500 2,750
1793 500 2,700 3,200
1794 17,400 300 17,700
1795 1,000 2,650 1,100 4,750
1796 7,000 200 2,150 9,350
1797 4,150 100 4,250
1798 1,300 M oo 2,100 4,800
1799 900 2,850 400 4,150
1800 600 1,000 2,000 3,600
1801 2,700 1,850 400 4,950
1802 2,250 500 2,750
1803 900 500 M oo
1804 1,050 100 1,150
Sources: As for Tabled (iljln addition, B.G.A. Minute Books of Bath Corporation, 1757-1834; Book of 
Account of the several Sums o f Money borrowed by the Corporation of Bath, 1765-1803; Account Book 
of the several Bonds made out in the nature of East India Bonds, 1778-1803; Order Books of the Bath 
Improvement Commissioners, 1789-1832 and Bond Book of the Improvement Commissioners, 1789-1823.
Notes: The table covers the years from the first sale of a deed of the Bath Improvement Commission to 
the last available evidence on the deeds o f the Bath Corporation. The secondary market in the latter did 
not necessarily cease at this point, for after a similar absence of evidence a decade earlier the registration 
of transactions totalling the unusually high sum of £17,400 in 1794, suggests that this was probably a 
retrospective figure covering sales from the preceding years.
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secure £12,000. Between December 1760 and June 1764 the rate 
had to be raised to 4.5 per cent, and in the course of this 
period (in 1762) the trustees had to pay 5.0 per cent on a 
further £800 in order to start work on the new road to be built
O Q
by Jacob Mogg already mentioned . Rather than showing caprice 
on the part of investors these negotiations reflect the general 
financial conditions of the time, and so provide further 
evidence that savers were influenced by these more than by 
economic motives. The offer of 3.5 per cent in 1757 represented 
both the going local rate (Bath Corporation had just negotiated 
a loan of £600 at that price) and the return on long-term 
London securities as shown by yields on Bank stock and the 
Funds^. The rate in the London and provincial markets then 
fluctuated upwards in a trend associated with the Seven Years 
War (1756-63), with Bank stock approaching a yield of 5.0 per 
cent in 1762. It is therefore not surprising that potential 
investors held back until the Bath Trust also offered higher 
rates to secure the capital required. The Trust rate was 
reduced to 4.0 per cent from June 1764 until December 1778, 
when an increase to 4.5 per cent was associated with the need 
to raise £2,300. The London rate also fell from the mid-1760s, 
rising again during the War of American Independence (1776-83), 
especially in the years from 1778 when it reached 4.5 per cent 
and then fluctuated around 5.0 per cent. From the mid-1780s to 
the mid-1790s it fell again, reaching almost record low levels 
in 1792. From 1788 the Bath Trust tried similarly to lower the 
rate. They achieved this briefly in 1792/3 with a reduction to
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4.5 per cent, as the Corporation and Improvement Commissioners 
did too, but were then thwarted by their creditors who 
threatened withdrawal unless the rate returned to 4.5 per cent. 
The trustees had to agree and the rate remained at 4.5 per cent 
until December 1796 when they sought £1,300 for a new road, and 
it was raised to the legal limit of 5.0 per cent. The rates of 
the Bath Corporation and Improvement Commissioners were 
similarly raised to 5.0 per cent in 1796-7, and the London 
yield was also then rising, fluctuating around the 5.0 per cent 
level during the French and Napoloeonic Wars. Not till the 
early 1820s were the rates in Bath reduced to 4.5 per c e n t ^ .
These similarities of movement may suggest that Bath was 
metropolitan in character rather than provincial, but there is 
evidence to show that despite its importance as a fashionable 
spa it remained very much a part of its region. The financing 
of the Bath Trust for example was almost completely detached 
from the speculative and building activity in the city, so that 
only some 7.5 per cent of those funding it can be found in the 
pages of Neale's comprehensive study of the making of Bath, and 
then perhaps in lists of councillors granting permission for 
building works. Lewis Clutterbuck, attorney and town clerk from 
1757 to 1776, provides an example of the separation of these 
markets, for although he loaned speculative funds to John Wood 
the younger, he only did so after divesting himself by twelve 
separate transactions between 1759 and 1764, of an earlier 
investment of £5,000 in the Bath Trust. There were differences
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in timing too, for after the major investment of the later 
1750s, fund raising by the Bath Trust did not coincide with the 
building booms identified by Neale and described as 'embedded 
in the national money market'. Some capital was raised in the 
two periods singled out, 1762 to 1771 and 1785 to 1792, but
/ 9
borrowing by the Trust was heavier in the intervening years .
No evidence has been found of institutional links between the 
Trust and the metropolis for most of this time, other than in 
pursuit of Parliamentary business, or through consultations 
with counsel on such matters as compulsory purchase. No use was 
made of the developing banking system until 1808 when Messrs 
Clement and Tugwell of Bath (both qualified trustees) became 
treasurers. Before that funds were handled by local business­
men, for example linen drapers and wine merchants, holding 
annual balances of over £1,000 by the end of the eighteenth 
century. Nor has any overlap emerged between metropolitan and 
provincial savers, for investors in the Trust were largely 
residents not visitors. In the absence of a causal connection 
however, it may be that these financial markets were similarly 
but independently influenced by the comparable motives of 
investors, and that the disinterested provincial savers were 
close in attitude if not in scale of investment to the 
merchants, professionals, tradesmen and women of London seeking 
financial returns from government and related stock^.
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Turning from the sources of capital to its employment in the 
roads, it can be said that the life cycle of this asset is 
unusual enough to qualify for inclusion with Feinstein's 
'Really awkward cases'^. Once built, roads appear to be ever­
lasting, yet require constant maintenance whilst never being 
completely renewed. One answer to this problem is not to 
capitalize all expenditure, but to include improvements (for 
example road widening, the removal of difficult corners, and 
lowering of hills), with new construction (alternative lines as 
well as new roads) as gross capital formation. The costs of 
construction encompass professional and legal fees (including 
Parliamentary costs) and land purchase, for without these items 
the work could not have been undertaken. Unhappily, evidence on 
expenditure to which these principles could be applied with 
confidence is lacking. However the documents from which 
information on the sources of finance was derived have been 
similarly used to reconstruct the employment of capital. The 
general problem of distinguishing between new works and 
improvements on the one hand and repairs and maintenance on the 
other remains. The trustees occasionally felt the need for this 
distinction as is shown by a resolution of 1796 that the 
accounts for improvements and repairs be kept separately, but 
not until 1825 in the annual returns to be referred to later, 
was this aspiration actually achieved^.
Before studying the rare items of more detailed information, 
some generalizations can be made from the figures in Table 9(1)
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which provide the only evidence covering the whole period.
First it would be fair to say that until after the turn of the 
century the cost of new work and improvements including 
Parliamentary and legal expenses, came largely from capital 
raised on the mortgage of tolls, whilst repairs and 
maintenance, salaries and administrative costs, and the 
interest on the debt, were met from the current revenue, 
chiefly the tolls. Secondly, with the growth of traffic and 
higher tolls, current revenue increased in importance as a 
source of funds, both in absolute terms and also relative to 
the capital raised. From an annual figure of below £2,000 in 
the 1750s the tolls had more than doubled to £4,500 in the 
1770s, increasing to £7,000 at the turn of the century and 
doubling again to more than £14,000 in the 1820s, when they 
constituted one-half of the debt then outstanding in contrast 
to one-sixth in the 1750s. Thirdly, expenditure on repairs did 
not increase in proportion to the increase in current revenue. 
In 1776 the sum of £4,069 spent on the repair of the roads 
represented four-fifths or the income from the tolls, but this 
proportion had been reduced to three-quarters by 1791, and when 
J.L.McAdam was appointed general surveyor in 1826 he contracted 
to sustain the roads for £7,500 in the coming year, which was
A A
about half the current revenue from the tolls .
Fourthly, the growing surplus after covering repairs meant 
that some capital works could be financed from revenue, giving 
the trustees a degree of independence from delays in the
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financial market. By distinguishing between repairs and 
improvements, the accounts for the years 1825 to 1833 (but with 
the exception of 1829) allow this matter to be taken further.
As Table 9(6) shows, expenditure on repairs in this period 
always fell short of revenue from the tolls. But the surplus 
was not invested immediately in new works. It was built up into 
a balance-in-hand of over £8,000 which then formed a vital 
supplement to the capital sum of £24,000 raised towards the 
cost of the major new works authorized in 1829. Altogether 
nearly £28,000 was invested in the surge of construction in 
these years, and when legal costs of £3,000 are added to this 
sum, the full importance of the part played by surplus revenue 
in McAdam's schemes becomes clear. This deferred investment is 
one of the hazards encountered when rescuing capital from 
revenue. A second is illustrated by the career of Benjamin 
Wingrove, appointed in 1817 as the Trust's first professional 
surveyor, and McAdam's predecessor. His commitment to sound 
construction in the Telford tradition meant that much work of 
improvement, especially of the foundations of the roads, was 
undertaken as routine along with the repairs, and financed from 
revenue in anticipation of the trend towards funding investment 
from income.
The distribution of costs is the next aspect of this subject 
to be considered, and the evidence available has been assembled 
in Table 9(7). This shows that in the 1770s the Trust spent on 
average 77.7 per cent of its income on the repair of the roads
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Table c\ (6): The Expenditure of the Bath Trust on Repairs and Improvements,
showing the proportion of road costs spent on each, 1825-1833
V o a  v -
Current Expenditure on the; Roads Cost of 
Repairs 
per mile 
£
X ear Kevenue 
from tolls 
£
Repairs 
£ %
Improvements 
£ %
Total
£
1825 14,119.2 10,261.1 97.3 282.0 2.7 10,543.1 207.7
1826 14,497.9 8,578.4 98.2 155.9 1.8 8,734.3 173.6
1827 13,763.8 7,826.1 92.1 671.9 7.9 8,498.0 158.4
1828 15,870.4 7,501.6 90.2 817.8 9.8 8,319.4 151.9
1830 10,934.9 7,076.0 61.5 4,438.5 38.5 11,514.5 143.2
1831 11,101.0 7,072.3 35.3 12,950.3 64.7 20,022.6 143.2
1832 11,624.8 7,156.5 47.8 7,815.7 52.2 14,972.2 144.9
1833 9,949.8 7,223.9 74.3 2,503.7 25.7 9.727.6 146.2
Source: "Abstract of the General Surveyor's Expenditure" 1825-1833. 
NOTE: At this time the Trust controlled 49.4 miles of road
General Notes on Tables 9(6), 9(7), 9(8)
1 Information comes from SRO, Q/R Turnpike Trust Accounts 
1822-50. 'General Statements of Income and Expenditure of the 
Bath Turnpike Trust' 1823-33 and 'Abstracts of the General 
Surveyor's Expenditure' 1825-33.
2 Expenditure on the roads covers labour;rent of quarries;cost 
and carriage of materials;damages;building and maintenance of 
houses,bridges,gates;incidentals including drawing plans.
3 Administrative costs cover salaries (clerk,treasurer,tolls 
inspector,gatekeepers);printing;stationery;advertisements.
4 Surveyors' salaries were included in 'General Statements' as 
an administrative cost,and in 'Abstracts' as a road making cost.
5 The 'General Statement' and 'Abstract' for 1823 cover Jan.l 
to Sept.30,which thereafter marked the end of financial year.
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Table 9(7): The Distribution of Costs of the Bath Turnpike Trust 1770-1776 and
1825-1833, showing expenditure as a proportion of the income from tolls
Current 
Year Revenue 
from tolls 
£
Expenditure
Repair of Roads 
£ %
Interest pay- Administrative 
ments costs
£ % £ %
Total expend­
iture under 
these heads 
£
PART A
1770
1771
1772
1773
1774
1775
1776
4,451.0
4.524.5 
4,470.2
4.260.6
4.364.6
4.519.7
4.871.8
3.242.5
3.481.5 
3,744.8 
3,594.0 
3,103.2
3.219.6
4.068.7
72.8
76.9 
83.8
84.4
71.1
71.2
83.5
480.0 10.8
480.0 10.6
500.0 11.2
680.0 16.0
680.0 15.6
680.0 15.0 
680.0 14.0
(373.0) 8.4
(373.0) 8.2
(373.0) 8.3
(373.0)
(393.0)
(393.0)
392.8
8.8
9.0 
8.7
8.1
4.095.5
4.334.5 
4,617.8 
4,647.0 
4,176.2
4.292.6 
5,141.5
PART B
1825 14,119.2
1826 14,497.9
1827 13,763.8
1828 15,870.4
1830 10,934.9
1831 11,101.0
1832 11,624.8
1833 9,949.8
10,261.1
8.578.4 
7,826.1
7,501.6
7,076.0 
7,072.3
7.156.5
7,223.9
72.7 1,297.2
59.2 1,396.6
56.9 1,205.9
47.3 1,172.3
9.2 
9.6 
8.8
7.4
64.7 1,212.1 11.1
63.7 1,417.1 12.8
61.6 1,905.4 16.4
72.6 2,073.6 20.8
654.7 4.6
823.5 5.7
265.9 1.9
1,157.9 7.3
1,450.2 13.3
(932.5) 8.4
(400.0) 3.4
(184.1) 1.9
12,213.0
10,798.5
9,297.9
9.831.8
9,738.3
9.421.9
9.461.9
9,481.6
Sources:
NOTES:
Summary of Accounts 1770-1776; "General Statements" 1825-33; and
"Abstracts of the General Surveyor's Expenditure" 1825-1833.
1 New works and improvements have been excluded from Part B to 
allow a comparison with the 1770s.
2 Brackets indicate estimated figures. Those in Part A were 
made on the basis of the general administrative costs (salaries, 
printing, oil and ink etc.) having remained constant, but the 
total wages paid to the toll gatherers having increased from 
1774 when a tenth gate was opened.
3 In Part B the surveyors' salaries have been deducted from the 
administrative costs because they were already included under 
repairs. However, because they were not specified in the 
"Abstracts" for 1831-1833 an estimation has been made for those 
years based on the total for the previous year of £1,180.
4 In Part A the sums spent servicing the debt have been calculated 
on the basis of the known mortgage debt and interest rate.
Table (8); The Resources Available to the Bath Trust and their Disposition, 1823-1833
Resources Available Disposition of Resources
Year Balance 
in hand
£
Current
income
£
Capital
raised
£
Total
£
Roads 
(repairs and 
improvements) 
£
Legal
Costs
£
Capital
Repaid
£
Interest
Payments
£
Administrative
Costs
£
Reserve
Fund
£
Total
£
1823 976.8 8,908.0 900.0 10,784.8 8,069.7
74.8%
500.0
4.7%
1,105.1
10.2%
1,052.2
9.8%
57.8
0.5%
10,784.8
1824 57.8 14,827.0 4,850.0 19,734.8 16,728.3
84.8%
1,118.5
5.7%
1,817.4
9.2%
70.6
0.3%
19,734.8
1825 70.6 14,453.4 14,524.0 11,249.1
77.5%
1,297.2
8.9%
901.6
6.2%
1,076.1
7.4%
14,524.0
1826 1,076.1 14,839.6 15,915.7 8,840.5
55.5%
1,396.6
8.8%
1,174.2
7.4%
4,504.4 
28.3%
15,915.7
1827 4,504.4 13,771.1 18,275.5 7,762.7
42.5%
3,600.0
19.7%
1,205.9
6.6%
1,300.7
7.1%
4,406.2 
24.1%
18,275.5
1828 4,406.2 15,878.2 20,284.4 7,952.8
39.2%
750.0
3.7%
1,172.3
5.8%
2,190.7
10.8%
8,218.6
40.5%
20,284.4
1829 8,218.6 15,588.9 23,807.5 13,519.2
56.8%
1,601.2
6.7%
550.0
2.3%
1,177.5
4.9%
2,420.0
10.2%
4,539.6
19.1%
23,807.5
1830 4,539.6 11,427.6 6,500.0 22,467.2 13,212.8
58.8%
765.0
3.4%
100.0
0.5%
1,212.1
5.4%
2,632.3
11.7%
4,545.0
20.2%
22,467.2
1831 4,545.0 11,285.5 13,700.0 29,530.5 19,506.4
66.1%
427.7
1.4%
400.0
1.4%
1,417.1
4.8%
2,112.5
7.1%
5,666.8
19.2%
29,530.5
1832 5,666.8 11,624.8 2,800.0 20,091.6 14,593.6
72.6%
250.0
1.2%
1,905.4
9.5%
1,579.5
7.9%
1,763.1
8.8%
20.091.6
1833 1,763.1 10,162.1 1,200.0 13,125.2 9,184.0
70.0%
241.9
1.8%
150.0
1.1%
2,073.6
15.8%
1,364.1
10.4%
111.6
0.9%
13,125.2
Ihro ' - ■ ! / ^ &  ‘J. trtjo C\~ tf\c dP U vJUaV* iQcV^ tcl Oi) iV\£_ SvTv.I'^ .^a'c!^  >
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(plus 13.3 per cent on interest payments and 8.3 per cent on 
administration), whilst between 1825 and 1833 the comparable 
proportion was 62.3 per cent (plus 12.0 and 5.8 per cent). The 
fact that the Trust does better in this scrutiny (based on 
Albert's attempts to assess efficiency^), in the earlier than 
the later years suggests that the use of these three criteria 
alone may reward those uncomplicated trusts that emphasised 
repairs, and penalize the possibly more efficiently managed 
ones whose expenditure also covered some improvements. An 
attempt has been made to test this suggestion by exploring the 
wider financial context of the Bath Trust for the years for 
which this evidence is available, 1823-33. Table 9(8) shows the 
resources of the Bath Trust and their disposition. As the 
former included the balance-in-hand and borrowed capital as 
well as current income from tolls, fines, and rents, the term 
'income' has been avoided, as has that of 'expenditure' for a 
major item in the later 1820s was the building up of a reserve 
fund. Legal costs and capital repayments were further claims on 
resources in addition to the items which formed the basis of 
the earlier analysis: spending on the roads (now including 
improvements), administration (now including the surveyor's 
salary according to the conventions of the 'General State­
ments'), and interest payments. The average expenditure of 63.5 
per cent on the roads,7.9 per cent on interest,and 8.9 per cent 
on administration are very similar to the previous results, but 
the greater detail allows other items to be revealed,especially 
the reserve fund built up to finance future road investment.
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Lastly it is worth noting that the two parts of Table 9(7) 
represent respectively the earlier years when the trustees 
managed all activities (including riding on the roads to over­
see construction, assisted by surveyors who were little more 
than foreman), and the later years when professionals assumed 
these tasks. This transition from control by disinterested 
gentlemen to that by salaried officials was not accomplished 
smoothly. In the course of and accelerating the change there 
was a curious decade from about 1807 to 1817 when the trustees1 
supervision of finance and organization weakened. There were 
problems with investors wishing to withdraw their capital and 
place it to advantage elsewhere, labourers and carters asking 
for increased wages, travellers evading tolls, sometimes in 
collusion with collectors, and coach proprietors and passengers
A O
complaining of the condition of the roads . Although to some 
extent victims of the general economic conditions of the time, 
the trustees’ failure lay more fundamentally in their inability 
to cope with the problems posed. Faced with rising costs and a 
general indebtedness they suffered a collective loss of nerve, 
for their amateur approach was no longer equal to the 
situation. But instead of turning then to the professionals, 
the trustees took the backward step of reorganizing the roads 
on the basis of the parishes and statute labour, which solved 
none of the problems.
Their reluctance to deal with professionals, although such 
appointments were familiar from the 1790s for coal mining,
-366-
canal building, and land drainage projects in the region, was 
probably due to the fact that despite the accumulation of 
capital invested in the roads over the years, the actual work 
of construction and maintenance was highly labour intensive and 
therefore thought to need only the supervision of gentlemen 
used to handling workmen in their businesses or on their
estates. The evidence assembled in Table 9(9) on the relative
sVoul'b
costs of labour and materials in the decade from 1823,^the 
former accounted for almost 65 per cent of the total. The 
accompanying figures for 1791 suggest that labour costs then 
represented only 45 per cent of the total but this is an under­
valuation for stone was then generally taken from common or 
private ground with payment only for damage done, and it should 
therefore be a charge on wages rather than materials. On re­
adjustment, the labour costs can be shown to have been very 
similar to later years, at 59 per cent. The practice of 
obtaining materials in this way remained well-established, for 
despite a small expenditure on the rent or purchase of good 
quarry ground from the 1780s, not until 1807 was the buying of 
road stone even considered^.
The Bath trustees' attempt to abrogate their duty by handing 
responsibilities to parish highway surveyors, paying each a 
fixed sum, aroused such opposition that in 1816 they turned for 
advice to the recently appointed general surveyor of the 
Bristol Trust John L.McAdam, whose work was proving to be both 
efficient and economical. McAdam studied the Bath roads and
Table 9(9): The Relative Cost of Materials and Labour, The Bath Trust 1791 and 1823-1833
Year
Total Cost 
of Materials 
and Labour 
Accounted For 
£
Cost of Materials Cost of Labour
Stone
Quarried
£
Land bought 
for 
Quarrying 
£
Cart Hire 
£
Paper and 
Sundries
£
Total
£
Labour
£
Stone
broken
£
Carpenters 
& Smiths
£
Masonry
£
Total
£
1791 4,966.7 713.3 24.7 1,974.8 20.0 2,732.8 1,771.1 304.9 103.1 54.8 2,233.9
Total Cost 
of Materials 
and Labour 
Accounted For
£
Rent of 
Quarries & 
Cost of 
Stone 
Purchased 
£
Land 
Purchased 
and Damages 
Paid
£
Repair and 
Building of 
Houses 
Gates and 
Bridges 
£
T o t a 1 Day
Labour
£
Team
Labour
£
Contract
Work
£
T o 1t a 1
£ % £ %
1823 7,693.7 1,432.1 1,485.4 34.9 2,952.4 38.4 1,006.1 1,736.4 1,998.8 4,741.3 61.6
1824 15,614.0 2,163.1 3,871.5 982.9 7,017.5 44.9 1,457.8 3,014.4 4,124.3 8,596.5 55.1
1825 10,303.7 2,007.5 102.1 858.7 2,968.3 28.8 1,305.1 2,758.6 3,271.7 7,335.4 71.2
1826 8,316.2 2,117.1 293.3 177.6 2,588.0 31.1 1,389.9 1,937.3 2,401.0 5,728.2 68.9
1827 7,303.1 1,725.4 79.6 61.6 1,866 .6 25.6 1,247.7 2,206.7 1,982.1 5,436.5 74.4
1828 7,393.0 1,647.3 202.4 234.3 2,084.0 28.2 1,461.2 1,593.8 2,254.0 5,309.0 71.8
1829 12,653.4 1,830.1 1,575.6 146.1 3,551.8 28.1 1,764.9 2,373.8 4,962.9 9,101.6 71.9
1830 12,362.9 1,660.9 1,957.4 1,506.6 5,124.9 41.5 1,679.8 2,008.3 3,549.9 7,238.0 58.5
1831 18,651.1 1,796.1 4,091.9 2,468.9 8,356.9 44.8 1,672.8 2,302.6 6,318.8 10,294.2 55.2
1832 13,065.3 1,664.7 2,289.7 1,787.1 5,741.5 43.9 1,792.9 2,210.0 3,320.9 7,323.8 56.1
1833 8,809.1 1,464.6 2,191.3 56.5 3,712.4 42.1
______ i  i i  i  r
1,474.8 1,344.9
_____3 I I  "A r
2,277.0
-  j _____. _  „  -fr
5,096.7 57.9
Sources: S.R.O. D/T/ba Vol. 8, 5 November 1791, "General Statements" 1823-1833 and "Abstracts of the General
Surveyor's Expenditure" 1825-1833.
NOTE: In 1791 the cost of materials accounted for 55 per cent of the expenditure on the roads, and the cost
of labour 45 per cent. Between 1823 and 1833, however, the average proportions were 36 per cent on 
materials and 64 per cent on labour.
-I
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presented his report in February 1817^. His strongest 
recommendation was that the Commissioners should resume control 
of the roads, establishing an adequate executive for their 
management and appointing salaried surveyors able to give that 
’constant zealous and unwearied attention which a proper dis­
charge of this duty require1. The identification of the problem 
in these terms is significant for it emphasizes that the 
investment of capital measures intention not achievement in the 
matter of the standard of the roads. He acknowledged that the 
trustees had not been miserly for the roads were 'over loaded 
with materials', but the lack of executive control and 
professional standards had prevented the efficient utilization 
of the capital outlay.
The trustees took these criticisms seriously. They rescinded
the orders placing the roads in the hands of the parishes and
51appointed their first professional surveyor . Not McAdam who 
received 53 votes, but Benjamin Wingrove who secured 55. An 
experienced surveyor and land steward, the latter was also a 
trustee (elected in 1793, qualifying in 1810), and this may 
have told in his favour for as one of their number he presented 
less of a break with the past. But he proved a costly choice on 
two major counts. First, he was a strong supporter of weighing 
engines, justifying in a pamphlet of 1821 the ten then on the 
Bath roads at a cost of nearly £2,000, as a necessary 
protection against an otherwise excessive weight of coal and 
stone brought daily into the city. But he overlooked the fact
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that since their introduction in 1768 they had been a constant 
source of trouble requiring frequent adjustment, repair, and
c o
replacement . Their cost stands out all the more as apart from 
the toll houses and gates they were the only major items of 
fixed capital expenditure. Secondly his road building and 
repair was in the expensive Telford tradition with good 
foundations and sound drainage, but the latter*s work was 
financed substantially by government contract whilst the Bath 
Trust had to struggle to meet these heavy costs from its own 
resources. Meanwhile the Bristol Trust was benefitting from the 
economies of McAdam who claimed that foundations were of less 
importance than the method of applying the road materials which 
should bond together to form a mass resilient to the heaviest 
weights-'J.
Wingrove began to lose the confidence of the trustees, 
especially after he had been joined in 1823 by his intemperate 
son Anthony who referred to members of a committee daring to 
criticise as * Blackguards *. The trustees decided to test the 
validity of the claims of the rival schools by having one of 
their districts maintained on McAdam's system, its accounts 
kept separately to allow an assessment to be made. At this 
challenge to their professional competence the Wingroves 
resigned in January 1826 and McAdam was approached by the 
trustees. His offer to maintain good roads for £7500 per year 
over five years was accepted, for this was an attractive 
economy on the Wingroves' expenditure on repairs of about
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£10,000 per year^^.This reduction was reflected in a fall in 
the cost of repairs per mile from over £200 in 1825 to an 
average of £148 between 1827 and 1833, see Table 9(6). These 
economies relieved the trustees of their immediate worries and 
the surplus, together with the capital raised in the local 
financial market, enabled them to embark on the new and large- 
scale construction work planned by McAdam to provide a better 
eastern approach to the city than the hilly descent from 
Kingsdown. With McAdam the Trust came to adopt a more positive 
approach to investment in the roads.
iii Conclusions
The gap between this detailed reconstitution of the sources 
and investment of capital by the Bath Trust, and the more 
general comments on roads, rivers, and canals made earlier, may 
seem too great to allow any general conclusions to be drawn.
But if viewed within the unifying theme of the developing 
economy of north Somerset, then a general interpretation 
becomes possible in terms of the interlocking web of interests 
of entrepreneurs who had a business interest in the 
construction of transport facilities, and the disinterested 
savers and speculators seeking primarily financial returns, 
although these groups were not of course mutually exclusive. 
Representatives of the former included for example Ralph Allen, 
John Billingsley, Jacob Mogg, and John Thomas, all of whose 
involvement in the region was so wide-ranging that it is
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difficult to pin upon them the simple appellation of landlord, 
quarry owner, brewer, coal master, or Bristol merchant. But it 
was their investment of time and energy, and sometimes funds, 
which launched and managed schemes designed to produce personal 
and public returns. Playing a vital but supportive role in this 
network were the professionals, attorneys like William Miles 
and surveyors like William Smith, whose range of activity 
matched that of the entrepreneurs, although the surveyors came 
late to the scene perhaps because their skills were thought 
earlier to be those possessed by any gentleman improver.
The inclusion of McAdam in this catalogue of local names may 
seem incongruous as he is more usually thought of as the 
archetypal Scotsman who came south and quickly made a national 
name by providing qualities (in this case scientifically-based 
surveying and road making skills, and efficient management 
techniques) in short supply south of the border. But in fact 
after some disastrous business ventures in Scotland McAdam 
lived a life of obscurity in Bristol for 15 years from 1801 
about which his biographers remain silent-^. He may have been a 
merchant, for when the Bristol Commercial Rooms were opened in 
1811 as a coffee house and club for merchants he was the first
C £
president .He became a trustee of the Bristol Turnpike Roads, 
and by 1816 he was well-enough established to become their 
surveyor. It was thus the hinterland of Bristol (especially 
north Somerset where that Trust then controlled some 70 miles 
of road), that became McAdam1s nursery. Within a year his work
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on the line towards Shepton Mallet (the A37) had brought him to 
the attention of Sir John Coxe Hippisley, who recommended him 
to the Postmaster General for the excellence of his work on the 
road which passed his house at Ston Easton-^. Sir John was a 
Bath trustee and so may have been influential in the invitation 
to McAdam to report on their roads. On the basis of his 
experience in this region McAdam began to extend his activities 
by working for other trusts. But however widely his influence 
spread, his professional and personal network continued to be 
based in the west country through his association with the 
Bristol, Bath, Shepton Mallet and Frome Roads in north 
Somerset, and the Black Dog, Bradford-on-Avon, Devizes,
Melksham and Westbury Roads in west Wiltshire.
Although it has been possible to make a detailed analysis of 
the finances of only one body, it is likely that the practice 
of the Bath Trust was not exceptional within the region. The 
development of the institutional mortgage by attorneys was of 
high significance, because it allowed investment capital to be 
raised from disinterested small savers; helped fuel the growth 
of a primary and secondary regional capital market; and freed 
entrepreneurs from the need to tie up their own resources this 
way. The reward was a rate of interest whose movements were 
similar to those at the national level, but this may have been 
due less to the exertion of influence by the centre, than the 
operation of similar financial motives and conditions in the 
region.
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The consideration of the more general question of the social 
rate of return to this investment is hampered by a lack of 
evidence on matters such as changes in transport costs, the 
generation of incomes for all associated with undertakings, and 
the widening of the market served. Tolls paid by road users 
provide the only accessible information and there are problems 
in their use, especially that of the degree to which increases 
in total revenue came from an extension of the rate rather than 
a growth of traffic. In Table 9(1) an asterisk marks the years 
in which tolls were changed, usually with an unpredictable 
effect on the total revenue of the Bath Trust. The extension of 
1793 appears to have been less rewarding than that of 1810; 
that of 1829 was followed by a great reduction in the volume of 
tolls; whilst the changes following the General Act of 1822, 
which in one respect contracted the rates allowed by removing 
the right to weigh single blocks of stone, confounded the fears
c o
of the trustees by the ensuing increase in the total received . 
Extensions of toll were thus not without effect, but the 
revenue was probably increased more effectively by the growing 
use of the roads, which was one of the social returns to this 
investment.
The value of transport dues as indices of economic growth 
was demonstrated by Wilson, who showed the effect on those in 
the West Riding of the fluctuating fortunes of the local 
woollen i n d u s t r y - ^ .  But for the Bath Trust the totals are an 
unsatisfactory instrument for economic analysis because in
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general the use of the roads was more varied. Nevertheless,
since passengers and goods were to some extent associated with
particular routes, an examination of the revenue from different
gates is of interest. In his analysis of building booms in the
city Neale suggests a peak in 1769-70, breaking in 1770-71
because developers had over-estimated the growth of demand for
houses^. The returns at individual gates are available for
this period and they do show some echo of this pattern, for
there are signs of a decline in the coaches and waggons
entering the city in 1771-2 (the London gate), followed by a
fall in grain coming in (the Lansdown gate on the northern road
from the vale of Gloucester) and a decline in the same years of
stone from the southern quarries (the Claverton, Wells and new
Wells gates) through the last two of which (plus the Marksbury
gate) came coal from the north Somerset field^. The use of the
roads by other traffic means that too much should not be read
into these suggestions, but they may provide some evidence of
the changing economic fortunes of Bath. The need for caution is
underlined by Ward's attempt to relate the toll receipts of the
Avon Navigation to demand in Bath, for the lower revenue of the
1770s and early 1780s may not have been due entirely to the
fall in house building as he suggests, but to the dishonesty of
6 9treasurers already noted .
Lastly there is the question of the management of the Trust, 
which had a great influence on investment in the roads. From 
about 1807 came the difficult years which led to a change from
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gentlemanly control to that by salaried professionals. These 
events have already been described, but their interpretation
-few'*
remains a challenge, 1ly-as the trustees had survived
similar difficulties before, especially in the years 1792 to 
1801. Then they had met the cost of a renewal Act; two 
increases in the rate of interest; two wage increases; and 
faced the demands of six creditors for the repayment of sums 
totalling £8,350, emerging from all this with their executive 
authority intact. With economies such as dispensing with the 
surveyor for the eastern roads, and positive actions such as 
the appointment of a supervisor to keep a check on the gates, 
they had even been able to embark on the construction of a new 
line of road, the first land purchases for which were made in 
1801, when the coming of easier times was confirmed by the 
reduction that year of carters’ wages, the price of provisions 
having fallen^.
In neither case was the chief problem falling revenue, for 
in the first period the tolls collected rose slightly from 
£6,786 in 1791 to around £7,000 at the turn of the century (the 
£7,415 of 1798 being a gross figure), whilst in the later 
difficult period they rose from £8,520 net in 1807 to nearly 
£11,000 in 1816. The rising cost of capital and labour was more 
serious, especially the latter, for it has been shown that the 
undertaking remained heavily dependent on manpower in these 
years. Any rise in grain prices was therefore serious for the 
Trust's economic well-being, but again this was a problem in
both times^. Possibly the only advantage of the 1790s was
that the trustees entered that decade with a balance of £1,147
in the treasurer’s hands, whereas by 1808 they were much in
6 Sneed of subsidies from their newly appointed bankers . Apart 
from this it can only be suggested that the later difficulties 
were survived less successfully than the earlier ones because 
of failures of management and a loss of the entrepreneurial 
skills of resource allocation which made inevitable the 
employment of professionals. It may be no coincidence that a 
number of leading businessmen trustees died in the early 1800s 
and were succeeded by men without this experience. Jacob Mogg 
is a case in point for when he died in 1806 six of his family 
were trustees, but as clergymen, surgeons, and attorneys they 
lacked the entrepreneurial skills of their coal master 
progenitor, able by his choices to advance both public good and 
private profit. This chapter thus concludes by re-affirming the 
importance of the individuals committed to capital works in the 
region, and of the networks within which they operated in order 
to create developments in river, canal, and road transport.
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Part IV Conclusion : Capital Investment in North Somerset
Chapter 10 The Process of Capital Investment in North Somerset,
1750-1830
This study has been concerned with the process of investment, 
a subject which has received little attention in work on 
capital formation where the emphasis has been on measurement 
rather than explanation. It has been argued that such a stress 
is regrettable because the documentary evidence relating 
especially to the crucial years of the British industrial 
revolution is too insubstantial to bear interpretation by the 
quantitative method alone, and because such an approach hides 
the regional and sectoral changes which were so important in 
the early stages of industrialization. It is in any case 
unacceptable that this concept should be viewed in aggregative 
terms alone, for it also has a narrative dimension which is 
concerned with interpreting the course and procedures of 
capital formation. In an attempt to remedy the deficiencies of 
the 'mainstream’ approach, the process of investment has here 
been studied through an analysis of the sources and productive 
employment of capital in the region in the years 1750 to 1830.
The difficulties of an historical approach are readily 
acknowledged, especially those arising from a paucity of 
primary material of a sufficient standard of continuity for a 
sustained analysis of capital investment over time. But this
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problem and that of generalizing from possibly untypical 
evidence is likely to be no greater than that faced in the 
aggregation of data on a statistical basis, and the extent of 
the generalization will remain clear. The fact that much of the 
surviving material is not in a form capable of yielding easily 
the information being sought calls for an ingenuity which can 
produce new insights, into for example the importance of land 
sales as a way of financing enclosure of the waste and the 
effect this may have on costs, and of the institutional 
mortgage deed as a means of recruiting funds from small savers 
and the secondary market to which this may give rise. The 
constraints of timing also have some compensations, for 
although this study begins in the mid-eighteenth century in 
part because the evidence required starts to accumulate from 
that time, signs of an earlier economic activity may be found 
amongst this later material. For example the balance sheets of 
the Woolley powder mills can be consulted from the later 1740s, 
but partnership papers show that the works were founded in the 
1720s. Evidence on other manufacturing and mining concerns also 
suggests the importance of the 1720s and 1730s in this region, 
especially as these years saw the founding of the Bristol 
Turnpike Trust (1727) and the construction of a tramway (1731) 
for the transport of Bath stone to the newly navigable River 
Avon(1727). These references suggest that a stage of readiness 
for more rapid economic development was by then being reached.
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The geographical and historical context of the region are an 
integral part of this thesis, and not just a formal background. 
It has been argued that Somerset had long been regarded as a 
rich and populous county, with the prosperity of the northern 
third resting on agriculture, mining, and manufacture, and its 
population living in a broad scattering of villages in the 
region as well as in towns like Bath and Wells. But there were 
tensions within this apparently settled society, as was shown 
by an examination of the successive Commissions of the Peace 
which were so strongly imbued with the sense of status. The 
Pouletts may have been the only resident noble family through­
out the period, but their influence and that of others charged 
with the stability of the county meant that representatives of 
the changing economic order like business men and attorneys 
were long excluded from the Bench, which was chiefly reserved 
for country gentlemen of independent means. But contrary 
influences were building up, partly because in north Somerset 
many of the resident governing gentry were becoming engaged in 
the promotion of mining and manufacture, partly because in the 
separately administered boroughs like Bath businessmen were 
already in positions of authority, and partly because of the 
number of successful Bristol merchants who had established 
themselves as landowners in the region. A systematic study of a 
number of different sources, including contemporary writers and 
research on charities, has enabled these links with Bristol to 
be established to a degree not previously recognized. The 
appointment of self-made men to the Somerset Bench (especially
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after the turn of the century in view of the problems posed by
a growing and sometimes restive population), marked a move away
from formality and conservatism towards individuality and 
enterprise which helped reinforce the entrepreneurial spirit 
already found in many of the gentry and townsfolk. And at the 
very least, civil order, a pre-requisite for investment, was 
maintained.
Within this society the idea of progress and the spirit of 
improvement began to take root, especially as institutionalized 
in the Bath and West Agricultural Society, founded in 1777 and 
widely supported as its membership lists and journals show. It
provided a forum for the gentry, clergy, and men of science and
medicine, as well as for activists such as John Billingsley who 
rose from humble dissenting origins to become a clothier, 
landowner, canal and coal proprietor, and public servant in 
many offices as well as writing the county report to the Board 
of Agriculture. It is because of this involvement with so many 
aspects of the region's economy that it has been possible to 
place great weight on Billingsley's writings. But he was only 
one of many activists as the lists of commissioners and 
trustees compiled in the course of this research show. Such men 
are not usually thought of as 'enabling agents' in the process 
of capital investment, that term being more commonly reserved 
for financial intermediaries like attorneys and bankers. But 
the evidence from north Somerset suggests that in view of their 
function in matters like enclosures, when in fulfilling their
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commission they also provided a channel through which funds 
could flow, this description could be extended to include them. 
Similarly, the exercise of their skills in public ventures like 
the turnpike roads can be termed entrepreneurial although their 
private funds were not placed at risk. Again, this may seem an 
unwarranted extension of the meaning of a term, but crucial 
choices involving the allocation of scarce resources amounting 
to large capital sums were made over this period by busy men 
like Jacob Mogg, investing time in undertakings from which the 
returns would be to both private gain and public good.
It can be argued that this spending of time on the creation 
and management of public works delayed the advent of the 
professional in this region, especially in relation to the 
labour intensive turnpike roads where the expertise of the 
trustees appeared adequate until the early nineteenth century. 
Even the surveying and engineering skills needed in coal 
mining, canal building, and drainage schemes were not employed 
until the 1790s, and then perhaps only because these developed 
from the estate surveying with which the gentlemen amateurs 
were familiar. Some of the professionals then came to spend 
their whole career in the region, like William White of Wedmore 
and Young Sturge of Bristol, whilst others like William Jessop 
and John Rennie were brought in as outside consultants. The 
most consciously professional of the early civil engineers was 
J.L.McAdam, active in the area after his appointment to the 
Bristol Trust in 1816. The shift from the control of roadmaking
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by gentlemen to that by professionals was doubly important 
because it led not only to the introduction of better 
techniques but also to an improved estimation of costs, so that 
sound investment decisions could be made. Indeed engineers such 
as McAdam so prided themselves on the effective utilization of 
the capital employed, that for them the professional began to 
border on the executive function.
Exhibiting a similar duality of status were the managers of 
undertakings. The coal mines of the region customarily had a 
managing partner, who was likely to have started as a miner and 
become a working proprietor. One result of this was that unlike 
most other coalfields, both fixed and circulating capital were 
here provided by the partners. The Woolley powder works also 
had a production manager, but the importance of the trade 
through Bristol made it necessary to have a marketing manager 
there too. Although receiving annual remuneration both were 
partners, unlike the position with the Percival Copper Co. in 
the 1760s. They employed a salaried site manager, susceptible 
to discipline if his efficiency were called into question, and 
clearly expected to minimise costs rather than maximise 
production as a dispute in the early 1760s showed.
In contrast to these still-emerging professions were the 
attorneys, long established in Somerset and Bristol where two 
of the earliest law societies were formed. An analysis of the 
Law Lists has for the first time allowed their numbers and
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distribution within this (or any) region to be established, and 
their early specialization within the port of Bristol to be 
established. It matters little that few personal documents have 
survived, for the evidence of their activities abounds in the 
leases, agreements, minute books, and official correspondence 
relating to the individuals and institutions they served.
Their importance depended in general upon the devising of an 
appropriate legal framework within which bodies could operate, 
referred to later, and in particular upon the development of 
the mortgage as a financial instrument through which savings 
could be channelled to investors. The raising of funds on the 
security of land was a long-established way of easing financial 
constraints but even when this was extended to land including 
paper mills as at Dulcot, it is likely that these transactions 
continued to take place within a personal market in which the 
needs of their clients were matched. But from at least the mid­
eighteenth century the importance of attorneys in north 
Somerset extended beyond this, for they promoted the growth of 
an impersonal capital market by what has here been described as 
an institutional mortgage, as funds were recruited from unknown 
clients for investment in public utilities through advertise­
ments on turnpike gates and later in newspapers. This helped 
the building of the infrastructure and also led to the growth 
of a local securities market, for these instruments were in 
small easily sold units. The volume of transactions and the 
number of deeds held for short periods suggest that this 
financial market may have performed a quasi-banking function.
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Although the banking system in Bristol and north Somerset was 
becoming well-established in the second half of the eighteenth 
century, not only were the needs of small savers neglected but 
there was also little contact with most of the major economic 
developments in the region. Until the turn of the century the 
role of treasurer or banker in both limited schemes like 
enclosures and longer undertakings like the turnpike roads was 
performed by voluntary amateurs. It may be that at this time 
banks were not well-placed to fulfil this function because 
although large sums were involved on a cumulative basis, daily 
transactions were small and local, and took place within a 
well-established network of contacts in the region. The limited 
involvement by banks stands in contrast to that of attorneys, 
perhaps because so few of the latter went on to contribute 
their expertise to banking, as can be be shown from the lists 
of bankers which have been drawn up for the first time for this 
region and Bristol. Banks in Bath were to a large extent 
concerned with servicing visitors to the spa, and with some 
risky speculations which were their undoing. The merchanting 
background of many Bristol bankers not only gave more stability 
and stronger roots,it also provided contacts with manufacturing 
concerns, especially those working on sites in north Somerset 
to which bankers as both private individuals and as partners in 
their institutions were able to give short-term financial help.
Within the complex structure of the region here described, 
the inter-action of gentry, merchants, town and country folk,
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attorneys, and bankers in the processes of capital investment 
has been studied in a number of cases drawn from agriculture, 
mining, manufacture, and transport. But so intricately enmeshed 
are these procedures and so peculiar the individual instances, 
that generalization proves difficult. In the matter of the 
sources of capital for example it might seem appropriate to 
begin by eliminating the nobility, for the most significant 
contribution of a peer like Lord Poulett was to the maintenance 
of a stable society within which individual interests could be 
pursued. But this is to ignore the role of archaic figures like 
the four Lords Royal, committed to providing the fixed capital 
employed at the lead and calamine mineries. As representatives 
of the old order they and their counterparts the free miners 
stood at one end of a range of sources of capital at the other 
end of which were the independent Bristol merchant capitalists 
involved in the manufacture of for example copper, brass, 
glass, and gunpowder. But their success may have come to depend 
less on their continuing entrepreneurial skills as expressed in 
risk taking and the allocation of scarce resources, than on the 
earlier decision to exploit the links between the port with its 
trading facilities, and the hinterland with its waterpower and 
labour. In between were the coal masters, many of them gentry 
living within the region, whose resources they exploited on an 
entrepreneurial basis as mining rights were leased from land­
owners. Decisions had to be made about which mines to open up, 
and how long to continue investing capital in yet-unrewarding 
pits as at Farrington. The problem of land-locked mines led to
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support for the Somerset Coal Canal, and an allocation of 
capital and time to this venture which yielded direct financial 
as well as indirect business returns through the enlargement of 
the market. It should be stressed that these and other entre­
preneurs rarely acted alone, preferring to share both capital 
provision and risk taking, usually in partnerships established 
by legal articles. The interlocking partnerships of the coal- 
masters were particularly important for they allowed the costs 
of new ventures to be offset by the profits of established pits 
in a way never achieved by the free lead and calamine miners. 
The number of partners ranged from three at Farrington Pit in 
the 1780s to 14 at the Percival Copper Co.in the 1760s. The 
resolve of the latter to limit the number of shares held 
suggests a wish to prevent an accumulation of power in few 
hands, though a contrary move at Woolley inspired by the high 
returns to capital, reduced the number of partners there.
The investment opportunities for surplus capital provided by 
these private networks were supplemented at this time by a 
number of new and specific outlets in the region, created 
through the legal provisions authorizing various undertakings, 
which had the effect of providing outlets for a wider range of 
savers than would otherwise have been the case. Parliamentary 
enclosure for example was financed by the compulsory sale of 
land which permitted investment ranging from the small-scale by 
countrymen eager to consolidate existing farms, to the larger- 
scale aimed at creating new ones. A classification of those
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concerned in each enclosure showed that almost half buying land 
were yeoman farmers, whilst others ranged from peers and gentry 
to small savers such as innkeepers. The system, which enacted 
an economic cost on those receiving an allotment, also allowed 
speculation in land suitable for house building especially in 
developing coastal resorts. Fewer opportunities for outsiders 
to invest were offered by the rate-financed drainage schemes 
which exacted an enforced saving, but these are of interest for 
the way that the responsibility for this provision of fixed 
capital was allocated between landlords and tenants. Further 
specific linkages created in these years enabled small savings 
to be channelled into particular outlets through the risk-free 
and marketable institutional mortgages offered by the turnpike 
trustees and improvement commissioners. This was of particular 
importance for these appointees rarely made a financial invest­
ment themselves, perhaps because as manufacturers or landowners 
they had better alternative uses for their funds. But an 
opportunity was thus created for the investment of the small 
savings of for example lodging house keepers or craftsmen, who 
would otherwise not have had this choice available to them.
The importance of creating appropriate legal entities for the 
handling of funds and formation of assets should also be noted. 
In public matters this often took the form of a body charged 
with a specific task, of which Enclosure and Improvement 
Commissions provide examples. Their members were authorized by 
law to raise capital for public investment by selling land or
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property in which a range of interests existed. Established 
earlier but with less specific though continuing powers the 
Courts of Sewers lacked the confidence that their commission 
extended to the authorization and funding of large scale new 
works. Despite the re-assurance of counsel that if an orderly 
procedure were followed no penalties would be incurred, the 
Courts preferred not to embark on new work for which the 
proprietors had no traditional obligations. New Acts of Parlia­
ment setting up Drainage Commissions with the powers to achieve 
certain objectives were therefore sought. The way these issues 
were settled throws new light on the changing relationship 
between such bodies and their legal advisers, for it can be 
argued from these cases that public activities in the provinces 
came to be based less upon the opinion of London barristers and 
more upon legislation drafted by local attorneys in 
consultation with Parliamentary lawyers, who were dependent 
upon them for a considerable part of their business.
Like the Enclosure, Drainage, and Improvement Commissioners, 
the Turnpike Trustees were also empowered to raise funds for 
new investment, but they then became trustees of the works 
created. The adaptation of this concept from the land law was 
of immense importance because it meant that public capital 
investment could be undertaken without private assets being 
placed at risk, over the years, and not as in the other cases 
until a certain limited objective had been achieved. Lastly, 
the view as to what constituted an appropriate legal entity
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might change. Thus the joint stock Bristol Brass Company was 
felt to have become so unwieldy by the 1780s that it was re­
formed as a partnership, although it had earlier been able to 
recruit capital from a larger number of shareholders than a 
partnership could ever rival. This move was made possible by 
the partners' ability to supplement the new capital from their 
private funds, and to secure loans from outside sources.
The pattern of linkages here described shows the complexity 
of the relationship between the sources and employment of 
capital. It also reveals an imperfect capital market, which 
would seem to be unfruitful ground in which to look for example 
for movements between agricultural profits and investment in 
transport. But what can be shown instead is that individuals 
took advantage of the opportunities presented to them, as when 
landowners shared in the development of mineral resources, 
coalmasters invested in the coal canal, and commissioners 
bought land auctioned at enclosures they were executing. 
Evidence is limited but it appears that changes in financial 
returns alone were rarely enough to attract funds from other 
uses. Thus although the continuing investment in coal mining, 
canals, and enclosures in the 1790s suggests no overall 
shortage of capital, yet savings were not forthcoming for the 
Bath Turnpike Trust in the years after 1793 until 1801, despite 
the raising of the rate offered from 4.0 to 4.5 per cent in 
1793 and to 5.0 per cent in 1797. For the several manufacturing 
concerns studied the position was more open, because these were
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an important outlet for the surplus funds of Bristol merchants, 
operating within a network of personal and professional 
contacts able to facilitate capital investment.
On the matter of the importance of the long-term metropolitan 
rate of interest as both an indicator of financial conditions 
in the provinces and a significant factor in the timing of 
investment, it has already been observed on the first point 
that the similarity of movement between the London and Bath 
rates may be explained in terms of the economic conditions 
affecting both, and the activity of urban investors seeking a 
financial rather than an economic return. Scattered evidence 
from land and property mortgages within the region suggests in 
this respect the importance of convention, lower interest rates 
being paid as long as custom prevailed. On the question of the 
relationship between the rate of interest and the undertaking 
of capital works it can be said that these were embarked upon 
in response to physical pressures (drainage, and to some extent 
the roads), and conditions of demand as reflected in prices 
(enclosures, coal mining, and coal canal), and that delays were 
more likely to be due to administrative uncertainties 
(drainage) than to a shortage of funds. There appears to have 
been little connection between lower rates and the undertaking 
of capital works, and indeed for bodies such as the Bath Trust 
the association was between investment and the paying of a 
higher interest rate.
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The difficulty of drawing conclusions about the employment 
of capital is great, for unlike the rate of interest or the 
legal form, this must be considered in the light of conventions 
which are anachronistic and so difficult to apply. The study of 
the distribution of costs has been pursued where possible for 
undertakings, and this analysis has revealed the difficulty of 
allocation. For example, to make drainage schemes effective 
land had to be purchased and damages paid, whilst in road 
making some building material costs concealed a labour charge. 
Indeed the labour-intensity of much construction in these years 
poses its own problems. Despite this it is worth considering 
the annual increments to capital stock, for the purposes of 
comparison within the region. The impact of Parliamentary 
enclosure and drainage has been assessed on the basis of an 
estimation of the original capital stock (through a capital­
ization of the rents of land affected, from Billingsley’s 
estimates made in the mid-1790s, and according to the known 
proportions of the different types of land concerned). For the 
Bath Trust the estimate of original value has been based on the 
capital investment authorized before the 1750s. The annual 
accounts of the Woolley and Harford works provide evidence on 
the value of the fixed capital as estimated by the partners. 
Information on mining is least satisfactory for although to a 
greater extent than with manufacturing,investment at Farrington 
was part of a growing capital stock in the industry in the 
region, it is difficult to know how typical the procedures were 
The volume of investment over the years has been estimated from
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the tables compiled, in full awareness of problems made clear 
by evidence on the distribution of costs, such as that not all 
investment was equally productive of new physical stock.
From these and other qualifications it will be clear that 
only the most tentative generalizations can be made. After a 
high initial rate for the Bath Trust in the 1750s the annual 
rate of increase over the whole period until 1830 was 4.4 per 
cent. The highest rates came in the second and third decades of 
the nineteenth century, being associated with the activities 
of Wingrove at 5.8 per cent, and McAdam at 7.8 per cent 
respectively. Investment in the roads was at its lowest rate of 
0.7 per cent between 1793 and 1801, when agricultural invest­
ment through enclosures was showing an increase which was 
sustained in the following decade through the drainage schemes. 
If an allowance is made for farm creation on the lines 
suggested by Billingsley, then to the annual rate for the years 
concerned of 0.7 per cent for enclosure and 1.0 per cent for 
drainage schemes, may be added an annual increment of about 3.0 
per cent, bringing the overall rate closer to that for the 
roads. Information on mining and manufacture is very limited 
but it seems unlikely that the annual rate of increase (at the 
Woolley works over the years 1746 to 1801 for example it 
averaged only 1.1 per cent), was as great as that for farming 
or road transport. This may indicate either the greater 
importance of developments in the basic infrastructure, or the 
lower annual increments through which industrial activity could
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be sustained. In the longer term however manufacturing in this 
region was penalized by the failure to introduce the new 
techniques and equipment which would have encouraged its 
diversification and growth.
The relationship between fixed and circulating capital can 
only be satisfactorily studied for the manufacturing concerns. 
Much of the investment in agriculture, transport and the public 
utilities was in the form of fixed capital, and to a lesser 
extent this was true also of mining, for in the absence of 
large raw material requirements, and with much of the sale of 
lead, calamine, and coal being from the mineries and pitheads, 
the financing of stocks and stores was much less important than 
with industry. Very little relevant material has been found on 
the making of woollen cloth, but at least its organization on a 
putting-out basis, especially before the introduction of 
spinning mills from the 1790s, suggests that circulating 
capital was likely to have had an importance relative to fixed 
capital which would distinguish this form of manufacture from 
that of factories in the region. But such a generalization is 
hard to sustain because these proportions varied so greatly in 
the undertakings studied. At the old Bristol Brass Co. for 
example raw material stocks were generally so high that in the 
years 1779 to 1784 fixed capital represented only 12 per cent 
of the combined assets. Yet at the Woolley powder works which 
also carried large stocks and stores because of its widespread 
network of suppliers and customers at home and overseas, this
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proportion was the much higher 37 per cent, a calculation based 
on the years when the position was not confused by the 
absorption of some of the powder stores into the trade credit 
figures. Perhaps the fixed capital embodied in some water- 
powered mills was of greater significance relative to 
circulating capital than generally thought, and if this was the 
case for the powder mills it was probably even more true for
the grain and paper mills of the region whose trade was more
local. Factory organization was also influential, for the 
circulating capital requirements of a firm like the Percival &
Copper Co. were increased by the scattered nature of its works.
An attempt was made earlier to assess the profitability of 
the capital employed in manufacturing concerns, and despite the 
many difficulties it is worth returning to the subject for the 
question it prompts of whether there was some optimal point in 
the relationship between fixed and circulating capital which 
was most likely to promote an efficient use of the physical 
assets. Evidence is limited and enterprises are in any case 
likely to have had different 'ideal' positions because of 
variations in the cost and supply of raw materials and in 
conditions of sale. Nevertheless it may be suggested that at 
the Woolley Works where the fixed capital formed one-third or 
more of the assets this ratio was too high for the most 
efficient use of capital, a conclusion the partners had reached 
by the end of the eighteenth century when they decided their 
productive capacity was too great, despite the fact that
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profits were not adversely affected as long as market 
conditions were favourable. At the old Bristol Brass Co. where 
fixed capital was little more than one-tenth of the assets this 
proportion was too low for either capital efficiency or returns 
to capital invested. At the re-formed Harford's Bristol Brass 
Co. however, where fixed capital was one-fifth to one-quarter 
of total inventory assets (the new partners having taken 
immediate steps to slim down stocks in the later 1780s), then 
this proportion was one likely to promote efficiency as judged 
by the profitability of the capital employed. In other sectors 
this may be revealed in ways which go beyond the limited scope 
of this research, through for example increased productivity in 
agriculture, or social returns to transport developments.
In studying the relationship between capital investment and 
economic change in north Somerset, the pattern which emerges is 
that of two levels of economic activity in these years: first, 
the general internal developments which may be termed land- or 
resource-based, and second, the externally financed 
manufacturing enclaves which may be termed capital- or trade- 
based. The former include the enclosure, drainage, mining, 
river, canal, and road transport undertakings, all related to 
local needs and mostly financed from within the region. On the 
whole these were large in structure, but the capital input was 
either built up slowly (mining and farm making), compiled from 
small separate contributions (turnpike mortgages, canal shares, 
drainage rates), or even realized by the sale of assets
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(enclosures). Although one of these spheres of investment 
(agriculture) was perhaps as profitable as those at the second 
level and another (the coal canal) was certainly so, returns 
were generally lower because of the need to offset gains by 
losses (mining) and through limits on the institutional rate 
(turnpike trusts and improvement commission). There is no 
evidence that banks played a role of importance in these 
undertakings until the end of the eighteenth century. Loans 
enabling enclosure schemes to get underway came from the local 
gentry and clergy, and turnpike finances were handled by 
trustees, for example wine or linen merchants. There was a 
network of local suppliers, for example of candles and 
gunpowder for the mines, but there is no evidence that credit 
was an important factor in their operation and indeed surviving 
accounts show the regular settlement of debts. This may have 
been because as studies of the distribution of costs showed, 
the undertakings in this first group were labour rather than 
capital intensive, and although the end product was a 
significant item of fixed capital (a mine or a new road), there 
were long periods of construction during which wages and other 
small payments had to be made.
The manufacturing ventures at the second level of economic 
activity (gunpowder, copper, brass, and glassmaking) were not 
themselves necessarily large in scale, but they were part of an 
extensive network of foreign and coast-wise trade, credit 
facilities, merchant capital, and banking support, centring on
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the port of Bristol. To the merchants of that city north 
Somerset offered scope for investment and expansion on 
accessible, water-powered rural sites. There were of course 
other, longer-established manufacturing concerns in the region 
(woollen textiles, paper making, pottery, brewing, distilling, 
and iron founding), but apart from the first these are to be 
classified with resource-based developments, using local 
capital and supplying largely local customers, rather than as 
part of Bristol’s shipping and credit network. It is 
unfortunate that there is little surviving evidence about them 
to suggest exceptions to this generalization, but perhaps the 
very fact that the records of local paper makers or iron 
masters were less likely to survive than those kept by Bristol 
entrepreneurs engaged in a wide range of overseas ventures, may 
serve as a further indication of the distinction here being 
drawn. In the case of the woollen industry classification is 
more difficult, but to regard it as capital- or trade- rather 
than resource-based seems appropriate. This is because although 
in the period under consideration English wool was still widely 
used, and the home market was gaining an increasing precedence, 
yet foreign (chiefly Spanish) wool continued to be of great 
importance in a system of manufacture which was enmeshed within 
a network of international trade, and which was controlled by 
capitalist clothiers through their financing of both the 
domestic and factory stages of production. Indeed the fact that 
in the mid-fourteenth century this industry began to move from 
its manufacturing and trading base in the port of Bristol, into
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the countryside in search of water power and a freedom from 
restrictions, makes it a forerunner of the pattern here being 
described for later years.
One sector which has received less attention than it deserves 
in this study is that of building, especially of houses. But 
this is a subject in which primary evidence has proved hard to 
come by, and Somerset’s earlier high ranking in terms of 
population numbers and density, and the later absence of great 
industrial concentrations, combine to suggest that the growing 
population may have been housed within the existing stock, as 
well as in locally financed developments, of for example 
housing for miners in Radstock by the Waldegraves, and for 
glassworkers in Nailsea by J.R.Lucas. Since larger-scale 
projects were also developed by local initiative, for example 
at Weston-super-Mare by the Smyth-Piggots and at Clevedon by 
the Eltons, then residential building may in general be 
accommodated within the proposed analysis. There remains the 
problem of Bath, where the importance of aristocratic 
entrepreneurs like the Duke of Chandos and the Earl of Bath, 
and of the great web of credit involving builders, attorneys, 
and bankers, has been revealed by the research of Chalklin and 
Neale. The city provided an economic stimulus to northeast 
Somerset as a market for food, coal, and stone, but made little 
reciprocal investment in the region. Men like Walter Wiltshire 
who had made a fortune as a carrier bought nearby estates and 
built great houses, but the focus of attention remained the
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city and its links with the metropolis rather than with the 
countryside. Since its connections with Bristol remained 
tenuous its buildings may be seen from the point of view of 
this analysis as land-based, but financed through links with 
London as well as from within Bath.
The reasons for the land- or resource-based developments lie 
largely within the region itself and have been fully rehearsed 
in the earlier chapters which dealt with its agricultural, 
mining and manufacturing possibilities; its relatively large 
and growing population; the stability of its settlement 
patterns and social structure (especially its broadly based 
gentry of whom many were committed to the development of its 
resources); its active enthusiasts for improvement; and the 
early development of its legal and banking systems, 
particularly the former.
In seeking reasons for the presence of trade-based 
manufacturing enclaves in north Somerset it may not be 
necessary to look beyond the difficulties of industrial 
expansion within Bristol and the opportunities provided by 
accessible rural locations offering water power and a labour 
force. But it is of interest to consider other factors which 
may have influenced both the nature of this investment and its 
timing, for it was particularly noticeable in the decades from 
the 1720s and again in the 1780s. An explanation for the 
earlier years may be sought in 'peculiar' factors outside the
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traditional pattern of commerce, for Bristol became involved in 
the slave trade in the eighteenth century, and was indeed the 
leading English port from the 1720s to the early 1740s when it 
was overtaken by Liverpool. It is not appropriate to embark on 
the vexed question of slave trade profits now, other than to 
note that their scaling down by Roger Anstey to a possible 
return of 10 per cent^, was based on evidence from the second 
part of the eighteenth century and not from the period of 
Bristol's dominance when smaller ships carrying possibly more 
slaves per ton thaa the later better-regulated vessels, 
although with smaller outset costs, may have made more 
profitable voyages than was later the case, especially as the 
prices fetched may on the evidence available have compared well
o
with the average for the times . ^
To concentrate on these profits alone is however to proceed 
on too narrow a front, for as well as providing Bristol 
merchants with surplus funds, the Africa trade also stimulated 
economic development by the market it offered for manufactured 
goods throughout the eighteenth century. Accounts, inventories, 
and correspondence all provide evidence of production for this 
special outlet, as was shown for example by the distinction 
made by gunpowder makers between Guinea powder for the Africa 
trade and Merchant powder for other customers, and by the 
Guinea manillas, rods, kettles, and 'Neptune' pans, produced by 
brass and copper manufacturers. Clues to the importance of this 
market lie in the Bristol Port Books which have been culled by
-406-
David Richardson for evidence on the Africa trade between 1698 
and 1769^, and in the Bristol Presentments for the later period 
of 1773 to the 1790s^, from which I have gathered material 
whose analysis is still proceeding. All this evidence confirms 
the importance of the trade for manufacturing firms in north 
Somerset in these years. Cargoes were assembled with care to 
meet the demands of traders in West Africa, and along with the 
cottons, cowries, iron bars, glass beads and strong liquor, the 
barter goods regularly included gunpowder and brass and copper 
ware to the extent of one-quarter to one-third in value of the 
whole where such an estimation can be made'*.
An association between the profits of the Africa trade and 
investment in north Somerset through the actions of individuals 
concerned is not easily demonstrated, especially as unlike 
London or Liverpool the operation of this trade in Bristol was 
not concentrated in the hands of a few easily identifiable 
merchants, but more widely dispersed in changing partnerships. 
However in the course of this study, particularly in the 
chapter on manufacturing, the connection between the two has 
been established at all available opportunities, on the basis 
of a cross-referencing between the registers of interests and 
activities drawn up for the region. In more general terms it 
can be argued that under this stimulus there developed an 
interlocking network of interests involving the port of 
Bristol, the Africa trade, the trans-Atlantic plantations, and 
manufacturing sites in north Somerset, in a relationship which
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was largely dependent on that city for the provision of capital 
and credit, shipping, raw materials, and markets. These links 
were facilitated by the close relationship between Bristol and 
north Somerset on such levels as landowning, which not only 
familiarized merchants with conditions in the countryside, but 
also meant that on occasions they already owned or could easily 
rent the sites where manufacturing ventures were planned.
That the experience of this region was not singular may be
£
seen from Eric William's general survey0, and from particular 
accounts like that by Pierre Boule of the French port of
Nantes^. The latter suggests that the demands of the slave
traders for goods with which to purchase slaves, coupled with 
the availability of capital from the trade, led to the 
industrial development of the region from 1730 to the 1750s.
But growth was curtailed in the short run by the setback to
trade of the Seven Years War and in the long run by the
isolation of Nantes. Bristol's dominance was also lost by the 
mid-century, and although its economy was too broadly based for 
it to suffer a general decline, its commerce continued to be 
upset by wars in the eighteenth century, particularly that for 
American Independence when shipping faced the problems of 
privateering and a loss of markets. It may have been these 
uncertainties in trade which helped to increase interest in 
manufacturing in north Somerset in the 1780s, despite the fact 
that for the Quaker Harfords their take-over of the old Brass 
Wire & Copper Co. increased their stake in a firm whose
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prosperity lay in part in the manufacture of barter goods for 
the Guinea Coast.
The circumstances of this business manoeuvre can be studied 
in Edward Harford's ledgers, which show that the investment in 
the new Brass Co. partnership was preceded by a withdrawal from 
trade, so that the revenue from that source which in 1780 had 
formed 33 per cent of the whole, had by 1786 dropped to 16 per 
cent, before falling away entirely thereafter. Compensation 
came from interest and dividends, and by 1798 this deficiency 
had been fully overcome. In addition to the returns from the 
new partnership there were those from other industrial 
investments (some in South Wales), from loans to industrial and 
merchanting partnerships, mortgages, and holdings of Government
o
stock, and from rents . Like most of the other Bristol 
merchants, manufacturers, and bankers encountered in this 
research, Edward Harford acquired or inherited landed estates 
in the countryside, but like them he did not thereby become cut 
off from the active life of the city and its port.
In conclusion, what was the influence of the two levels of 
capital investment on the course of economic change in the 
region? It may be suggested that the effect of the trade-based 
undertakings was first to help stimulate but then to retard the 
course of development. As noted, many of the essential pre­
conditions for growth were present in north Somerset in the 
first half of the eighteenth century - a settled social and
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economic framework in a traditionally wealthy and populous 
county, a growing domestic market, an active body of lawyers, 
and a large number of gentlemen willing to combine public duty 
with private interest. In this context the enterprises financed 
by merchant capital are likely to have been for much of the 
period an additional factor for change, perhaps stimulating the 
development of an infrastructure, especially a road network, 
greater than was otherwise warranted. The quickening of 
economic activity was however chiefly in traditional areas such 
as agriculture, mining, and transport, and with the failure of 
the trade-based industries to develop backward and forward 
linkages, the decline of the land-based industries such as 
paper making, and the lack of great natural resources, north 
Somerset never achieved the self-sustaining growth of another 
region of Bristol activity, south Wales. This suggests that 
it was not the Bristol link as such which came to inhibit 
development but the fact that the manufacturing ventures 
remained part of the merchanting network instead of becoming 
agents of industrialization.
The woollen industry may be referred to at this point in the 
argument since the taking up of slack rural labour by putting- 
out clothiers producing for external markets in a region of 
increasingly commercialized agriculture could, in terms of the 
idea of proto-industrialization, have helped foster the move 
from a traditional rural culture to a factory-based industrial 
society. This change came close to realization, for despite the
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sometimes violently expressed opposition of workers to the 
introduction of machinery from the 1770s on, there was a 
growing concentration of production in water- and later steam- 
powered factories in the east of the region, especially from 
the 1790s in Frome, Shepton Mallet, and Twerton. But despite 
individual successes the industry declined in the nineteenth 
century, perhaps due to entrepreneurial deficiencies shown by 
the failure to persist with the introduction of machinery 
before the 1790s, to secure the better transport needed for 
improved coal supplies, and to match the determined sales­
manship of the West Riding of Yorkshire^. But this decline must 
be seen not only in relation to outside competitors, but also 
to the changing fortunes of the region. In that context the 
woollen industry may be seen as part of the pattern whereby the 
manufacturing enclaves re-inforced rather than challenged the 
traditional society, which therefore failed to undergo the 
structural changes necessary for sustained economic growth. The 
result was that most manufacturing petered out in the course of 
the nineteenth century and the region reverted to its resource- 
based economy, largely agriculture, coal mining, and quarrying.
As an example of capital formation in a regional economy 
north Somerset cannot be counted a success story. Nevertheless 
the study of its growth experience is important, as part of the 
pattern of change making up the national economy, and because 
it illuminates several themes of current importance, including 
the structure of capital during the industrial revolution,
-411-
'withered enclaves’ and de-industrialization, and 'gentlemanly' 
capitalism^. The distinction between profit and interest, and 
the role of women and Quakers in capital investment all merit 
further research. Even more important than these justifications 
however, it is the contention of this thesis that the subject 
of capital formation can only be fully understood within the 
context of the historical dimension as revealed by empirical 
studies. Through the reconstitution of data on capital 
investment and the identification of the sources and procedures 
by which this took place, the basis of some of the accepted 
generalizations on capital formation may be questioned and the 
process itself analysed and explained. It is realized there are 
problems in this strategy, ranging from practical difficulties 
like that of generalizing satisfactorily from limited evidence, 
to the major philosophical danger that the work will be judged, 
not on its own terms but as some failed attempt at aggregation. 
But it has been a main aim of this thesis to try to overcome
the narrowness of that approach, by a broad concern with the
whole matrix of the subject in its historical context, in order 
to arrive at an understanding of the process of investment as 
the active element in capital formation. Not least, this in­
tegrated approach may lead to an improvement in the conceptual
understanding of and theoretical approach to the whole subject.
1 Roger Anstey,The Atlantic Slave Trade and British Abolition 
1760-1810(1975), pp.45-8.
2 For example, letters from Isaac Hobhouse and his partner 
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The Evolution of the English Turnpike 
Trusts: Lessons from a Case Study
By B. J. BUCHANAN1
The demythologizing of transport studies begun in recent years has shifted attention from an interest in individual undertakings towards 
a broader and more systematic analysis of transport developments in relation 
to the national economy. This move towards “the New Transport History: a 
subject which has escaped from antiquarianism and narrative”2 may make the 
present return to a narrow focus seem retrograde, even wilful. Such an 
unfashionable step can, however, be justified on the ground that only through 
the analysis of comprehensive evidence on discrete ventures can the over­
simplifications and distortions underlying some national assessments be revea­
led. In particular, it can be demonstrated from a study of the Bath Turnpike 
Trust that although the periodic renewal and amendment Acts pertaining to 
individual trusts have been almost entirely ignored in recent macro-studies, 
they were vitally important for the development of each undertaking and 
hence for the road system as a whole.3 Through this legislation the trusts were 
able to renew and extend their initial powers for raising capital, collecting 
revenue, and building and improving the roads. That is, they did not emerge 
fully fledged at the moment of legal inception, but were instead subject to a 
continuing evolution within a network which was itself undergoing change. 
Generalizations which fail to take into account this acquisition of additional 
powers by existing bodies are therefore likely to misrepresent the contributions 
of turnpike roads in terms of both capital investment and construction work.
This view of the turnpike trusts as dynamic rather than static bodies will 
be examined as follows. After a short survey of the relevant literature, the 
typicality of the Bath Trust will be considered, and the provisions of its 
renewal and amendment Acts summarized. The implementation of powers 
relating to mileage can be easily established, and will therefore be described 
briefly. Provisions concerning finance present more difficulty and will be 
studied at greater length. It will be shown that their significance lies not only
1 1 am grateful for the help received from Mr D. J. Johnson of the House of Lords Record Office 
(H.L.R.O.), Mr D. M. M. Shorrocks of the Somerset Record Office (S.R.O.), Mr R. Bryant, formerly of 
the Bath Guildhall Archives (B.G.A.), Miss M. B. Williams of the Bristol Archive Office, and their 
colleagues, and the staff of the Bath Reference Library. I should like to thank R. Angus Buchanan for his 
helpful criticism.
2 T. C. Barker in a reyiew of Derek H. Aldcroft and Michael J. Freeman, eds. Transport in the Industrial 
Revolution (Manchester, 1983), in Journal o f  Transport History, 3rd ser. 5 (1984), p. 99.
3 It is convenient to refer to all legislation subsequent to that which established a trust as renewal and 
amendment Acts, but this general practice is not entirely satisfactory for although Acts renewing general 
powers of the trusts (usually at intervals of 21 years) frequently included clauses amending their scope, 
such changes could also be secured through Acts which were not part of this recurring pattern.
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in the possibility of a more accurate measurement of the capitalization of a 
turnpike trust than has hitherto been available, but also in the novel insights 
they provide into previously unexplored aspects of a regional capital market.
I
Two important studies of the turnpike road system on a national basis were 
published in the 1970s, the first works of substance on this theme since the 
accounts by the Webbs and W. T. Jackman some sixty years earlier. These 
were by William Albert and Eric Pawson, and although there is some overlap 
since both are set within the context of organization and administration, each 
breaks new ground in relation to a different aspect of the turnpike trusts.4 
Pawson is particularly concerned with the spatial distribution and density of 
the turnpike network, as well as with the diffusion of this innovation through 
time.5 In contrast, a special feature of Albert’s work is his concern with the 
financing of the turnpike roads, particularly the relationship between the level 
of trust investment and the prevailing rates of interest.6 The success of these 
attempts to place the construction and financing of the turnpike roads on a 
more systematic footing is, however, limited by the fact that each is based 
upon the Acts of Parliament which established the trusts, and not upon those 
which renewed and extended original powers. This subsequent legislation 
does not pass unnoticed, but the references serve only to emphasize the 
element missing from the authors’ analysis. Thus, although Pawson notes that 
over one-third of such Acts passed before 1770 “added extra mileage to their 
respective trusts, the average amount being anything from five to fifteen miles, 
decade by decade”, his figures and tables are based only on the new trusts.7 
Similarly, Albert observes that “Some renewal acts placed additional roads 
under the trustees’ jurisdiction”, but nevertheless concludes that “trust invest­
ment will be measured by the number of new acts passed in each year” .8 
These omissions mean that the authors’ conclusions relate only to the simple 
changes arising from the creation of new trusts, and exclude the more complex 
ones associated with the evolution of the system as a whole. The effect of this 
serious limitation is minimized by the self-contained nature of the two books, 
but in a third, general, study the problem is greater, for the similarly flawed
4 Sidney and Beatrice Webb, English Local Government: The Story of the King’s Highway (1913); W. T. 
Jackman, The Development of Transportation in Modem England (1916); William Albert, The Turnpike 
Road System in England, 1663-1840 (Cambridge, 1972); Eric Pawson, Transport and Economy: the Turnpike 
Roads of Eighteenth-century Britain (1977).
5 Pawson, Transport and Economy, pp. 137-60.
6 Albert, Turnpike Road System, pp. 120-31.
7 Pawson, Transport and Economy, p. 105. Pawson’s statement that “Renewal Acts are unfortunately 
available in manuscript form only”, ‘Turnpikes and their Traffic: An Agenda for Research', Journal of 
the Railway and Canal Historical Society, 27 (1983), p. 181, is inaccurate. These Acts are available in 
printed form in the Parliamentary sessional volumes, and at county record offices. I should like to thank 
Mr D. J. Johnson of the H.L.R.O., Mr D. M. M. Shorrocks of the S.R.O., Mr K. H. Rogers of the 
Wiltshire Record Office, and Mr C. Cox, historian of the Gloucestershire trusts, for their advice on this 
point.
8 Albert, Turnpike Road System, pp. 121-2. In his later review of ‘The Turnpike Trusts’ in Aldcroft and 
Freeman, eds. Transport in the Industrial Revolution, Albert still uses the “new turnpike Acts as a measure 
[of the] growth of the system”, but he now warns that “Although the number of turnpike Acts is often 
taken as an indicator of investment it is at best an indifferent measure”, pp. 36-8.
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conclusions reached by John Ginarlis in his unpublished thesis of 1970 have 
since formed the basis for estimates of capital formation in the turnpike roads 
in a major, influential work by another scholar, C. H. Feinstein.9
Ginarlis based his estimates of investment from 1750 to 1830 upon a 
backward extrapolation from the established figures for 1822-32, which he 
justified by evidence taken from a sample of trusts, and on the assumption 
that “trust mileages had remained constant over the period 1750-1822 and 
that expenditure patterns similar in the 1820s did not change from 1750”.10 
The whole scheme founders on the weakness of this key assumption, which 
can be invalidated by reference to the same local studies which the author 
cited in support of his contention.11 Thus G. H. Tupling was cited despite 
his observation that even at a time when no fresh authorities were being created 
in Lancashire, “several already in existence obtained powers to take over 
additional lengths of road”.12 Ginarlis also refers to F. H. Maud’s work on 
the Hockerill Highway, although this too reveals the importance of changes 
over the years, such as those arising from the renewal Act of 1791 which 
authorized a new road, cut in the early 1800s.13 The two studies of London 
trusts cited by Ginarlis provide further evidence with which to refute his 
assumption. P. L. Payne’s account of the Bermondsey and Rotherhithe Trust 
founded in 1748 describes, for example, the authorization of a new road in 
1798, for which an initial sum of £1,950 was borrowed. Powers to amend a 
second line were granted in 1803, and this work was still proceeding in 1810, 
by which time costs had reached £6,468.14 C. A. A. Clarke’s study of the 
Islington and Marylebone Trusts, founded in 1716 and 1721 respectively, 
details the importance of their joint work on the New Road along the line of 
the present Marylebone, Euston, and Pentonville Roads. In the first three 
years after its authorization in 1756 the Marylebone Trust spent over £4,000 
on the stretch for which it was responsible.15 Indeed, investment costs were 
so high that in the table of trust expenditure compiled by Pawson the New 
Road tops the list at £1,594*9 per mile.16
Not only do the case studies undermine Ginarlis’s assumption, but also 
open to further criticism is the sample of trusts he used to provide guidance 
in the exercise of extrapolation from the evidence of the 1820s back over the 
uncertain years to the 1750s. The distortions likely to arise from the false
9 J. E. Ginarlis, ‘Road and Waterway Investment in Britain, 1750-1850’ (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, 
University of Sheffield, 1970); C. H. Feinstein, ‘Capital Formation in Great Britain’, in Peter Mathias and 
M. M. Postan, eds. Cambridge Economic History of Europe, VII, The Industrial Economies: Capital, Labour 
and Enterprise, pt. 1 (Cambridge, 1978), pp. 59-60.
10 Ginarlis, ‘Road and Waterway Investment’, pp. 102-15. There is a lack of firm evidence at both ends 
of the process of extrapolation. Figures for 1822-32 were for half the counties based on an average from 
the Parliamentary Returns for 1822 and 1829 (p. 78). Those for 1750-1 were available for only three trusts 
out of the guiding sample of 55, and as each of the three had been founded before 1750 they cannot be 
regarded as providing ‘original outlay figures’ for that year (Tables XI and XII, pp. 116-21).
11 Ibid. p. 103.
12 G. H. Tupling, ‘The Turnpike Trusts of Lancashire’, Memoirs and Proceedings of the Manchester 
Literary and Philosophical Society, XCIV (1953), p. 43.
13 F. H. Maud, The Hockerill Highway (Colchester, 1957), pp. 27-9.
14 P. L. Payne, ‘The Bermondsey, Rotherhithe and Deptford Turnpike 1776-1810’, J . Trans. Hist. 11 
(1956), pp. 138-9* 142 n. 52.
15 C. A. Allen Clarke, ‘The Turnpike Trusts of Islington and Marylebone from 1700-1825’ (unpublished 
M.A. thesis, University of London, 1955), pp. 35-8, 200, 217, 229.
16 Pawson, Transport and Economy, pp. 231-3.
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assumption of a constancy of mileage and expenditure patterns over the years 
may be illustrated by a brief account of the growth of one of the trusts in the 
sample: the Wells Trust, a neighbour of the Bath roads which was set up in 
1753.17 It had powers to turnpike 26*25 miles on three lines of road, increased 
in 1763/4 to 39*0 miles by the undertaking of a fourth road. A further extension 
of nine miles was authorized in 1778/9, although twenty years later this stretch 
was transferred to the Taunton Trust. In 1821 the Wells roads underwent 
further reorganization. Several deviations were authorized and powers over 
one section were repealed, with the result that by the end of the 1820s the 
network had stabilized at 37*0 miles. The mature body was thus more than 
40 per cent larger than the new trust of the 1750s, yet it was the figure for the 
later years, derived from the Parliamentary Papers for the later 1820s and 
1830s,18 which was used by Ginarlis as an indicator of the earlier mileage of 
this and other trusts in the sample.
Enough evidence has now been quoted to establish the importance of the 
point here being made: namely, that the renewal and amendment Acts played 
a significant role in the developing profile of each trust, and that their neglect 
inevitably produces distortions in the national picture. Unfortunately these 
cannot be corrected simply by consulting work already published on individual 
trusts, for the authors of such case studies have so far proved as reluctant to 
investigate the growth of mileage and investment in the roads as have the 
compilers of macro-studies. For example, W. G. Dodds’s account of the 
development of the Northumberland turnpikes, in which trusts first tumpiked 
well-used roads and later developed special lines to meet the needs of new 
commercial and industrial enterprises, is based on impressions rather than 
analysis, for the author admitted that “exact mileage at any one time seems 
to be almost impossible to calculate—owing to administrative complexities”.19 
In J. M. L. Booker’s study of the Essex turnpikes he declared that the 
“structure of administration” should be “examined against the background 
of toll roads increasing in length and complexity”, though he made no attempt 
to calculate the magnitude of the changes involved.20 Whilst confirming the 
dynamic nature of the turnpike trusts, therefore, both of these examples reveal 
also the lack of precision to be found in the traditional approach. The following 
account is an attempt to remedy those deficiencies hitherto to be found in 
both micro- and macro-level studies, by analysing the evolution of the Bath 
Turnpike Trust as authorized by its renewal and amendment Acts, particularly 
as they affected mileage and investment.
II
In the course of its history the Bath Trust exhibited many of the different 
and changing characteristics which formed the general features of such bodies
17 For papers of the Wells Trust see S.R.O. D/T/wel.
18 In particular H.L.R.O., H.L. Sess. Papers 81 and 24 (1833), CCCXXIII, p. 1 et seq. Report of the House 
of Lords Select Committee to examine the Turnpike Returns, and the Abstract thereof Ginarlis’s citation of this 
source is misleading for the Parliamentary Papers to which he refers (thesis, p. 102 n. 2, ‘P.P. 1833, 
H.O.L. Vol. X, B.M.’) do not contain mileage figures for individual trusts.
19 W. G. Dodds, ‘The Turnpike Trusts of Northumberland’ (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of 
Durham, 1965), pp. 261, 45 n. 86.
20 J. M. L. Booker, ‘The Essex Turnpike Trusts’ (unpublished M.Litt. thesis, University of Durham, 
1979), PP* 32, 216 n. 5.
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over the years. In the matter of timing, for example, although established in 
1707, one of the earliest bodies,21 the Bath Trust was substantially reformed 
in 1757 and may therefore be included in the ‘turnpike boom’ of the 1750s 
and 1760s.22 Its administrative arrangements too span the divide between the 
earlier and later trusts. For the first fifty years it functioned as a Justice Trust 
under a small number of commissioners drawn from the area it served: the 
nearer parts of Somerset, Wiltshire, and Gloucestershire, and the city of Bath. 
At its mid-century reorganization these duties were transferred to trustees, of 
whom some 400 were fisted by name or office. The Trust thus adopted the 
practice, which had been emerging since the second decade of the eighteenth 
century, by which these bodies were run by men representative of the economic 
fife of the area, rather than as part of the county administration.
In its physical features the Bath Trust straddles the usual classifications. It 
is generally referred to as one of the ‘town-centred* trusts of the west country 
which functioned chiefly in relation to an active provincial centre, rather than 
as part of the system of ‘linear’ trusts whose roads led to London.23 But these 
roles were not mutually exclusive, and the Bath Trust can be shown to have 
acted in both capacities. Thus although the initial legislation authorized the 
turnpiking of seven roads leading into the city, the only one of outstanding 
importance at the time was the London Road which formed part of one of the 
great roads from the west country to the capital. In 1707 this section of the 
Bath Roads represented 40 per cent of the Trust’s total mileage, and although 
this proportion declined as Bath flourished as a regional centre and its other 
roads were extended, so that by the 1820s it formed only 10 per cent of the 
total, yet the London Road retained its importance in terms of revenue. In 
the later 1820s, as in the 1800s and in the 1750s, approximately one-third of 
the annual income from the tolls came from the London Road.24 Comparisons 
of total mileage are difficult because trusts varied so much at different stages 
of growth, but in this matter too the Trust was fairly typical, for when fully 
formed at about 50 miles it constituted neither one of the few large trusts of 
over 100 miles, nor one of the small number of 10 miles or less.
In the course of its fife history, therefore, the Bath Trust exhibited features 
which allow it to be considered as representative of its kind. In view of this 
generalization, and because of the fortunate survival of a good collection of 
archival material, it is reasonable to treat the documentary evidence relating 
to this body with some confidence, as revealing not only the way the Bath 
Trust changed in response to legislation, but also by suggesting the possible 
effect of a similar sequence of Acts upon the evolution of other trusts.
The roads of the Bath Trust built up gradually from the 12*5 miles 
authorized in 1707 (6 Anne c.42) to 14-75 miles in 1721 (7 Geo. I c.19), 20-15 
miles in 1739 (12 Geo. II c.20), 31-2 miles in 1757 (30 Geo. II c.67), 41-05 
miles in 1759 (32 Geo. II c.51), and 47-9 miles in 1761 (1 Geo. Ill c.31). It
21 For chronological lists of new trusts see Albert, Turnpike R oad System, pp. 201-23 and Pawson, 
Transport and Economy, pp. 341-60.
22Albert, Turnpike R oad System, pp. 49-52 and Pawson, Transport and Economy, pp. 122-7, 150-8.
23 Albert, Turnpike R oad System, pp. 44-9, 202 and Pawson, Transport and Economy, pp. 136-45.
24 S.R.O. 1707/8, 6 Anne c.42; D/T/ba, Minute Book 6, 30 March 1758, Min. Bk. 9, 20 Feb. 1802; 
Quarter Sessions Records (Q/R), Turnpike Trust Returns for 1820 and General Statement of Account for 
1829.
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fluctuated thereafter at around 50 miles, for the Acts of 1793 (33 Geo. Ill 
c.144) and 1829 (10 Geo. IV c.cx) were concerned with the construction of 
new roads as major deviations rather than as extensions of mileage. Surveys 
undertaken by the Trust indicate an estimated 48-25 miles in 1776, and 
measured lengths of 52-0 miles in 1787, 47-7 miles in 1791, and 49-19 miles 
in 1813. Later surveys in response to Parliamentary initiative established 
measures of 49-4 miles in the early 1820s, and 48-47 miles at the end of the 
decade.25 Two years after the expiry Act of 1876 (39/40 Viet, c.39) the 
authority of the Trust ceased.
These Acts of Parliament also contained provisions which permitted the 
raising of funds in a financial market and the levying of tolls on road users. 
From the practice of the trustees it can be suggested that in general the former 
provided the long-term capital of the Trust (invested in new and improved 
roads with their attendant Parliamentary and legal costs) and the latter its 
current revenue (spent on road repairs, administration, and interest payments). 
In Table 1 the evidence has been classified accordingly for the years from the 
mid-eighteenth century (before which there is no known relevant material), 
to the early 1830s, after which the compilation of statistics at the national 
level renders such information generally available.26 Column 1 confirms the
Table I.
Sources: Acts of Parliament and papers of the Bath Turnpike Trust especially the following: S.R.O. 
D/T/ba, 5, Trustees’ Subscription Book to Oaths of Qualification, 1793-1851; 6-12, minute books for 1757- 
1854; 15, Proceedings of sub-committee for the London Road, 1757-62; 18, Register of Mortgages of Tolls, 
1760-82; 19, Register of Mortgages of Tolls, 1801-16; 20, Abstract of Title to Mortgages of Tolls, 1857; 
26-40, administrative and financial records relating to receipts from tolls and expenditure on roads; 41, 
Lists of Creditors for 1785 and 1805; 42, Deeds of mortgage, assignment, declaration etc., 1758-1849. 
S.R.O. Q/R Turnpike Trust Returns for 1820 and General Statements of Account, 1822-50.
Notes:
Year: The Trust’s accounting system was irregular and therefore figures in Col. 4 cover calendar years
(1770-6, 1803-5), years ending in spring (1757-8, 1798-1802, 1807-9, 1816-22), and in autumn 
(1790-2, 1811-6, 1823-33). AU other figures in the table are for calendar years.
Col. 1: Capital authorized by Act of Parliament, here shown cumulatively.
Col. 2: Capital raised on the security of the tolls. Figures before 1823 have been reconstituted from
mortgage deeds, minute books, and financial papers. Later figures are from the annual General 
Statements of Account. Unsecured loans from the Trust’s bankers after their appointment in 
1808 are not included.
Col. 3: The cumulative mortgage debt. Figures before 1823 have largely been calculated from additional
borrowings minus repayments (undertaken on a regular basis by ballot after 1810, when 5% of 
the tolls was reserved annually of this purpose). The incorporation of firm evidence for 1772, 
1806, 1810 (minute books), 1785,1805 (lists of creditors), and 1820 (Quarter Sessions records), 
show the calculations are of the right order. Figures from 1823 are from the annual General 
Statements of Account.
Col. 4: Income received for the use of the roads, including tolls, payments for overweight, and
compositions. These are gross sums, including costs of collection (about £250 p.a. in the 1770s, 
£400 p.a. in the early 1800s) except when tolls were fanned, and a net figure is then shown. 
Changes in the scope or rate of toll (shown by an asterisk) had an uncertain effect. In 1829 for 
example, the imposition of multiple tolls on certain roads, and of charges on draught animals 
individually instead of on vehicles as a unit, was followed by a sharp fall in the revenue.
25 S.R.O. D/T/ba, Min. Bk. 8, Summary of Accounts 1770-6, 7 July 1787, 5 Nov. 1791; Min. Bk. 10, 
20 Nov. 1813; Q/R Turnpike Trust Returns for 1820. H.L.R.O., H.L. Sess. Papers 81 and 24 (1833) 
c c c x x iii , pp. 204-5, Returns for 1829.
26 W. J. Reader, MacAdam: The McAdam Family and the Turnpike Roads, 1798-1861 (1980), p. 230, 
Table 5: Finances of the Bath Trust, 1830-53, provides a relevant example of the use of these printed 
sources. In the years which overlap with Table 1 of the present study, discrepancies arise largely from 
differences of interpretation. For example, Reader includes county allowances for bridge repairs within 
the income from tolls, from which category they are excluded in Table 1.
Table I. The Long-term Capital and Current Revenue of the Bath Turnpike
Trust, 1757-1833
1 2 3 4 I 2 3 4
Year C apital C apital Long-term Current Year Capital Capital Long-term Current
authorized raised capital revenue authorized raised capital revenue
£ £ £ £ £ £ £ £
1757* 12,000 1,262 1808 350 21,450 8,107 net
1758 12,0001 1,683 1809 600 22,050 8,131 net
1759 19,000 J 12,000 1810* 30,000 2,300 22,100
1762 800 12,800 1811 150 23,876 10,480
1764 12,000 1812 450 23,834 9,840
1770 4,451 1813 500 23,872 9,954 net
1771 4,524 1814 750 24,135 9,740
1772 500 12,500 4,470 1815 300 23,905 10,600
1773* 4,500 17,000 4,261 1816 100 23,457 10,960
171 A* 4,365 1817 200 23,108 10,968
1775 4,520 1818 22,552 11,880 net
1776 4,872 1819 2,000 23,901 11,810 net
1779 2,300 17,000 1820 24,129 11,989 net
1785 17,000 1821 100 23,629 11,999 net
1790 200 17,200 5,859 net 1822* limit removed 23,029 11,999 net
1791 800 18,000 6,889 net 1823 900 23,579 12,240
1792 7,151 net 1824 4,850 28,279 14,530
1793* 25,000 1,000 19,000 1825 28,279 14,119
1798 7,415 1826 28,279 14,498
1801 1,100 20,100 1827 24,679 13,764
1802 100 20,200 7,556 net 1828 23,929 15,870
1803 7,935 1829* 23,379 15,030
1804 7,794 1830 6,500 29,779 10,935
1805 100 20,700 7,850 1831 13,700 43,079 11,101
1806 600 20,200 1832 2,800 45,629 11,625
1807 500 21,100 8,520 net 1833 1,200 46,679 10,869
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growth of the fund-raising powers of the Trust, for it shows that the permitted 
level of borrowing was increased from £12,000 in 1757 to £19,000 in 1759, 
£25,000 in 1793, and £30,000 in 1810. Before the 1750s the limit was £3,000. 
After the General Turnpike Act of 1822 (3 Geo. IV c.126) all limits were 
removed.
Detailed evidence on the implementation of such financial powers by this 
and other turnpike trusts is extremely difficult to come by. Ginarlis surveyed 
the account books of 55 trusts in pursuit of an estimation of capital formation 
in the turnpike roads, but was quite unable to unravel the confusion between 
capital funds and current revenue, construction and administrative costs, to 
be found in those rare accounts which do survive.27 For the Bath Trust not 
even this unsatisfactory source is available, but fortunately its mortgage deeds 
have survived in such unusual profusion as to make possible a reconstitution 
of its finances. The fact that no comparable body of information for any other 
trust is available now, or possibly in the future because of the paucity of 
source material and the difficulty of its reconstitution, means that the case of 
the Bath Trust is of special significance for the whole study of the turnpike 
roads.
The long-term capital of the Bath Trust was raised largely on the security 
of its assets by a process which helped to develop the concept of the “mortgage” 
beyond its landed origins. There were essentially two forms of the mortgage 
deed of the Trust. Before 1793 the tolls formed the only security, and these 
were assigned to three landed trustees. Each mortgagee had “all the Right 
Title and Interest in and to the said Tolls”. After 1793 (33 Geo. Ill c.144) 
the security offered was extended to include the tollhouses and turnpikes, of 
which the mortgagee was now promised the same proportion as the sum 
advanced bore to the whole sum subscribed. Also, the tolls were now assigned 
to any seven trustees, amongst whom local townspeople became dominant. 
The fact that in both cases the mortgagee had equal rights against the securities 
offered, regardless of the date of individual deeds, facilitated the raising of 
capital, for it meant that trustees could borrow at any time without creating 
a special mortgage28 whilst new lenders had the advantage of equal status 
with earlier investors. These funds assumed the permanence associated with 
share capital rather than a loan, although this apparent stability concealed a 
remarkable degree of flux as individual deeds changed hands with ease in a 
secondary market which flourished alongside the primary one.
The mortagage deeds have survived because when paid off they were stored 
in bundles according to their final ownership. Within these bundles each deed 
carries its own distinctive history, for the details on its face show its nominal 
value, date of issue, and name and style of the first purchaser, whilst the 
endorsements record details of its subsequent changes of ownership. From 
this evidence, supplemented by the minute books, registers of mortgages of 
tolls, and lists of creditors,29 it has proved possible to trace back through the
27 Ginarlis, ‘Road and Waterway Investment’, pp. 28-36.
28 The sum of £7,000 authorized in 1759 was at first referred to as a “Second Mortgage”, but this usage 
did not persist after 1763, and the form of the mortgage deed was not changed.
29 S.R.O. D/T/ba, Box 42, Deeds of mortgage, assignment, declaration etc. relating to mortgaging of 
tolls, 1758-1849; Min. Bks. 6-12, for years 1757-1854; 18, Register of Mortgages of Tolls, 1760-82; 19, 
Register of Mortgages of Tolls, 1801-16; 41, Lists of Creditors for 1785 and 1805.
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network of transactions in the secondary market to the primary holdings of 
these financial instruments, and so to establish the stages by which the Bath 
Trust met its capital requirements from the mid-eighteenth century to the 
early 1830s. This evidence, set out in columns 2 and 3 of Table 1, confirms 
that the financial powers conferred by the renewal and amendment Acts were 
implemented, but it also reveals that for most of the period the process was 
a gradual one.
Ill
The pace at which capital was raised by the Bath Trust was determined in 
part by the timing of demand within the context of changing economic 
circumstances and practical needs, and in part by factors affecting the supply 
of capital. In terms of the gap between the authorization and implementation 
of the Trust’s powers seen in Table 1, the latter were of possibly greater 
significance, since it may be argued that whilst the demands for capital were 
launched by the trustees at what were judged to be propitious times its supply 
was determined by forces largely outside their control. In particular, the 
“disinterested” character of many investors seeking financial rather than 
economic returns, and the vitality of the secondary market which deflected 
funds from primary investment, both served to delay the raising of new 
capital.
The first point to establish about the structure of investment is the limited 
involvement of the trustees, for only 5 per cent of those elected and 10 per 
cent of those qualified played any part in the financing of the Trust,30 and 
their role was not paramount. Although they provided about 80 per cent of 
the capital raised at the mid-eighteenth century reorganization of the Trust 
and during the difficult first decade of the nineteenth century, against this 
must be set the much lower level of participation in the intervening and 
following years, for which the nadir was 1773 when only 2$ per cent of the 
£4,500 then invested came from trustees. This involvement was also generally 
shortlived. For example, 70 per cent of the capital sum of £12,000 raised in 
the late 1750s had been sold in the secondary market within twelve years, the 
transactions through which this was achieved reducing the participation of the 
trustees from the 80 per cent already noted, to 40 per cent. This was a 
continuing pattern, for the secondary market was dominated by non-trustees 
to the extent of the purchase by them of 73 per cent of the securities sold in 
the period studied. The outcome of this reluctance to invest except in special 
cases, coupled with the subsequent process of disinvestment, is revealed in 
two Lists of creditors which show that in 1785 the qualified trustees formed 
28*8 per cent of that body holding 33*8 per cent of the debt, and in 1805 they 
formed 33-3 per cent, holding 36-7 per cent of the debt. The hybrid nature 
of this evidence, which blends together holdings built up in both the primary 
and secondary markets, may limit its usefulness in some ways, but not in
30 S.R.O. D/T/ba. Acts of Parliament, Minute Books, and the Trustees’ Subscription Book to Oaths of 
Qualification 1793-1851, all combine to show that between 1757 and 1829, 1,612 men were elected as 
trustees, of whom only 781 (48%) qualified to act in that capacity, sometimes after a lapse of up to 20 
years.
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relation to the important concept of the capital which sustained the undertak­
ing. In this respect it may be said that the trustees held about only one-third 
of the continuing capital of the Trust.
This low level of participation is puzzling, until it is recognized that the 
financial option involved certain disadvantages which may be illustrated from 
the case of one of the wealthiest trustees, Ralph Allen. In 1759, and again in 
1761, he offered £1,000 on the security of the tolls provided £700 could be 
earmarked for the road convenient to his estates, which included the stone 
mines at Combe Down as well as the great house at Prior Park. But the 
investment of funds did not guarantee control of their use, and the offer was 
withdrawn when it was ruled that new capital had first to be applied to projects 
specified by Act of Parliament.31 Other trustees found that their own economic 
interests were better served by a practical involvement with the roads, as may 
be seen from the success of Jacob Mogg. This prosperous coal master from 
the High Littleton-Farrington Gurney area made no financial investment, but 
after taking the oath in 1761 he was for 45 years responsible for the construction 
and maintenance of a new road to the south-west which linked up with the 
Wells and Bristol Trusts at Rush Hill.32 For an entrepreneur with better 
alternative uses for his capital, this input of time may well have stood in lieu 
of a financial investment. It certainly produced a real economic return, for 
the new road enabled coal from Jacob Mogg’s land-locked mines to be 
transported more easily to the important market in Bath, thus providing a 
happy coincidence of private profit and public benefit.
The second group whose financial involvement was limited was the landed 
interest, for despite strong economic motives, and contrary to the usual 
generalizations,33 they were not major investors in the Trust. Indeed, their 
position was a declining one, for although they held 27-4 per cent of the debt 
in 1785 when they formed 28*8 per cent of the creditors, by 1805 they held 
only 6*5 per cent and represented 17*5 per cent of that body. In the absence 
of a sustained involvement by either the trustees or the landed interest, the 
role of the small urban saver became crucial to the Bath Trust. The term 
‘small’ is used advisedly because in 1785 86-5 per cent of the creditors had 
holdings of £$00 or less, amounting to 52*3 per cent of the whole in value; in 
1805 80*7 per cent held £500 or less, amounting to 39*9 per cent of the whole. 
In both years only some 7-0 per cent held £1,000 or more, representing one- 
third of the total sum. The main difference between the two periods was that 
the proportion of middling investors holding more than £500 but less than 
£1,000 increased from 5*8 per cent in 1785 to 12-3 per cent in 1805, and the 
value of their holdings rose from 12-9 per cent to 23*9 per cent of the whole.
The relative importance of the urban savers can be judged from the
31 S.R.O. D/T/ba, Min. Bk. 6, 26 June, 27 July, and 17 Aug. 1759, 6 March and 10 April 1761.
32 S.R.O. D/T/ba, Min. Bk. 6, 20 Feb. 1761; Min. Bk. 9, 7 June 1806.
33 In the Turnpike Road System, p. 113, Albert concluded that “the greatest proportion of capital invested 
came from the landed classes—farmers, gentry and landowners”, a view repeated in ‘The Turnpike Roads’, 
p. 54. But the growing importance of other social groups was noted in both studies, though with the 
acknowledgment in the former that “To discover the occupations of many trusts’ investors would require 
very detailed local research”, p. 101 n, 71, repeated in the latter, p. 53. This problem has been tackled 
for the Bath Trust by reference to a wide range of sources, e.g. leases of Bath Corporation and local 
directories.
Table 2. Capital Raised on the Mortgage Deeds of the Bath Turnpike Trust,
1758-1833: An Analysis of Investors
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Year Capital Peers Gentry Farmers Capitalists Manufacturers Tradesmen Professionals Clergy Women Institutions
raised
£ £ £ £ £ £ £ £ £ £ £
1758-9 12,000 200 5,300 1,000 5,000 500
1762 800 500 300
1772 500 250 50 200
1773 4,500 250 500 500 100 750 2,400
1779 2,300 600 250 500 950
1790 200 200
1791-5 1,800 1,400 100
1796-1800
1801-5 1,300 200 400 100 100 200 100 100
1806-10 4,350 100 700 600 1,500 450 1,000
1811-5 2,150 200 150 900 250 450 50 50 100
1816-20 2,300 700 500 100
1821-5 5,850 1,300 900 500 100
1826-30 6,500 2,500 1,000 2,000
1831-3 17,700 300 2,100
Sources: See Table I 
Notes:
1 See the text for an explanation of the method of classification. In later years some investment remains unclassified, due to lack of evidence.
2 After 1790 the years have been grouped, since capital could then no longer be raised as required. Easier conditions began to return in the 1820s, and in 
1830 an advertisement for £6,000 at 4% produced offers totalling £21,000 (S.R.O. D/T/ba, Min. Bk. 12, 3 July 1830).
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Table 3. The Secondary Market in the Mortgage Deeds of the Bath Turnpike 
Trusty 1759-1835: An Analysis of Purchasers
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Year Securities sold Peers Gentry Farmers Capitalists Manufacturers Tradesmen Professionals Clergy Women Institutions
£ £ £ £ £ £ £ £ £ £ £
1759-60 1,250 50 150 1,000 50
1761-5 7,750 2,000 100 1,000 2,000 1,700 950
1766-70 2,300 2,300
1771-5 3,150 500 1,000 900 100 150 500
1776-80 7,900 600 850 500 400 2,000 500 850 2,200
1781-5 5,650 700 650 450 1,600 1,000 500 750
1786-90 2,650 1,000 200 700 50 200 500
1791-5 4,200 1,300 900 1,550 450
1796-1800 5,450 200 1,500 2,850 900
1801-5 3,400 200 150 1,350 100 400 400 700 100
1806-10 2,400 250 1,450 450 50 100 100
1811-5 1,750 350 1,000 100 100 50 150
1816-20 1,400 200 50 300 300 550
1821-5 1,500 1,100 400
1826-30 700 300 400
1831-5 2,000 1,000 1,000
Sources: See Table I
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Table 4. The Long-term Capital of the Bath Turnpike Trust: An Analysis of
Creditors in the Years 178s and 1805
Year
1785
1805
Mortgage debt 
£
1
Peers
£
2
Gentry
£
3
Farmers
£
4
Capitalists
£
5
Manufacturers
£
6
Tradesmen
£
7
Professionals
£
8
Clergy
£
9
Women
£
10
Institutions
£
Value of deeds held: 
£17,000
2,700
15.9%
1,950 
11-5%
4,300
25-3%
3,000
17-6%
950
5.6%
400
2-3%
3,700
21-8%
Number of 
creditors: 52
5 10 6 6 2 3 20
Value of deeds held: 
£20,700 including 
£500 with
unspecified creditors
800
3-9%
550
2-7%
6,750
32-6%
5,450
26.3%
1,250
6-o%
600
2-9%
4,500
21.7%
300
1-5%
Number of specified 
creditors: 56
5 5 12 7 4 3 17 3
Sources: Sec Table I. In particular S.R.O. B/T/ba 41, Lists of creditors for 1785 and 1805
to
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accompanying tables, of which Table 2 deals with the primary capital market, 
Table 3 shows activity in the secondary market, and Table 4 provides cross- 
sections for particular years, summarizing the results of participation in both 
markets. The system of classification is essentially that devised by J. R. Ward 
in his work on the financing of canals, though with certain modifications to 
meet the present case.34 The most important relates to the changing status of 
investors, for the present analysis deals with investment over time, whilst 
Ward’s concern was with the original shareholders only. This problem has 
been met by incorporating changes of status so that, for example, a maltster 
or wine merchant has been shifted from the category of manufacturer or 
tradesman to that of capitalist at the point when his designation as esquire by 
contemporaries indicated a change in the scale of operations and an accumula­
tion of private assets, although the earlier business may have remained the 
source of income. The classifications used by R. S. Neale in his study of Bath 
have not been adopted despite their possible advantage for comparative 
purposes, because his system of four groups (leisured and professional men; 
building trades; service trades; and others), within each of which investors 
are listed separately, is too unwieldy for an analysis spanning 80 years. Neale 
himself uses these categories only rarely, and then usually to analyse a specific 
project in a particular year.35
The first three columns in each table comprise the landed interest whose 
generally low level of investment, already noted, is all the more surprising in 
view of the extension of Ward’s categories to include here substantial country 
clothiers and mining proprietors with the landed gentry (col. 2), and rural 
tradesman such as blacksmiths and victuallers with the farmers (col. 3), for 
all these may be considered to have had an economic interest in the roads. 
The remaining categories (cols. 4 to 10) comprise the urban interest, mostly 
resident in Bath but with a few Bristol and London addresses. These included 
capitalists or urban gentlemen (col. 4) whose ranks were increased, as time 
passed, by the infusion of successful merchants and professional men; trades­
men (col.6), including upholsterers and saddlers as well as Ward’s grocers, 
ironmongers, and lesser merchants; and professional men (col. 7), including 
architects and musicians as well as Ward’s attorneys, surgeons, and apotheca­
ries. The low level of involvement by manufacturers (col. 5) with other uses 
for their funds is not surprising. However, they and clergymen (col. 8) were 
briefly important in the 1770s and again after the turn of the century, from 
which time, too, there were occasional contributions from smaller tradesmen 
such as butchers and coal merchants, and from artisans investing individually 
or through friendly societies (col. 10). Special mention must be made of 
women (col. 9), particularly as their role has elsewhere been described as 
“marginal”.36 They covered a wide social and economic range (including 
gentlewomen, widows and daughters of professional and trades men, lodging- 
house keepers pursuing a vigorous economic life of their own, and occasionally 
servants), and they were important in volume of subscriptions as well as in 
numbers. They were especially important in the 1770s when they provided 
46 per cent of the capital then raised.
34 J. R. Ward, The Finance of Canal Building in Eighteenth-century England (Oxford, 1974), pp. 18-26.
35 R. S. Neale, Bath, 1680-1850: A Social History (1981), pp. 153-4, 298-9.
36 Albert, Turnpike Road System, p. 107.
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Some of these investors may, of course, have had an indirect economic 
interest, but the structure of investment here described, with its emphasis on 
the small urban saver, suggests that the chief concern was not the state of the 
roads but a good return on a secure marketable investment. The claim of a 
financial motive at this early date calls for a fuller review of the regional capital 
market, both to explain how it functioned for the purpose of disinterested 
investment, and to elucidate those features which made for delay in the 
realization of the Trust’s financial powers. The work of the attorneys was of 
prime importance in these matters. Their expertise in the development of the 
institutional mortgage was of great consequence, but of even more significance 
in the present argument was the shift in their role from its former emphasis 
on matching the financial needs of known clients in a personal capital market, 
to that of soliciting funds from unknown clients (through notices on turnpike 
gates and later by advertisements in newspapers) for investment in public 
utilities with which the savers had no direct economic concern.37 This develop­
ment was doubly important: to the turnpike trust, because although their 
capital requirements were considerable they had no recognized place in the 
structure of credit which supported other concerns such as manufacturing 
ventures; and to the urban savers because of the investment outlet thus 
created.
This facility did not, however, exist, in isolation but as part of a general 
pattern of institutional borrowing in the area. By the mid-eighteenth century 
borrowing at interest by the Corporation of the city of Bath was already well 
established on the security of bonds given under the Common Seal, and in 
the 20 years from 1757, during which the Trust raised £17,000, the Council 
borrowed a very similar sum.38 Then between 1778 and 1786 a total of £10,700 
was raised by the Corporation, largely on a new form of bond made out in 
units of £100 instead of simply reflecting the sum offered.39 In contrast, ^ {iere 
was little Corporation borrowing in the later 1780s, probably because of the 
activities of the newly formed Bath Improvement Commissioners, who raised 
£25,000 in the years 1789-91.40 A classification of the investors in this urban 
renewal scheme on the basis described earlier shows that 9*2 per cent of the 
capital subscribed came from the landed interest, 50*2 per cent came from 
the urban gentry and substantial merchants, 6*o per cent from tradesmen,
37 The role of the attorney as “an intermediary for inter-personal lending” has been explored by B. L. 
Anderson, ‘The Attorney and the Early Capital Market in Lancashire’, in Francois Crouzet, ed. Capital 
Formation in the Industrial Revolution (1972), p. 229, and their importance as “go-betweens in directing 
money” into transport and public utility schemes has been briefly touched upon by M. Miles, ‘The Money 
Market in the early Industrial Revolution: the Evidence from West Riding Attorneys, c. 1750-1800’, 
Business History, 23 (1981), p. 140. But the development of function by which attorneys came to operate 
the impersonal capital market here described, has so far been neglected.
38 B.G.A. Minute Books of Bath Corporation and the Book of Account of the several Sums of Money 
borrowed by the Corporation of Bath, 1765-1803. See also Neale, B ath , app. A, pp. 384-90, and Sylvia 
McIntyre, ‘Towns as Health and Pleasure Resorts: Bath, Scarborough and Weymouth, 1700-1815’ 
(unpublished D.Phil. thesis, University of Oxford, 1973), pp. 443-6. Both calculate the cumulative debt 
of Bath Corporation from the Chamberlains’ Accounts, but by 1800 Neale records a total of £57,500 against 
McIntyre’s £32,600. See also McIntyre, ‘Bath: The Rise of a Resort Town, 1600-1800’ in Peter Clark, ed. 
Country Towns in Pre-industrial England (Leicester, 1981), pp. 226-7.
39 B.G.A. Minute Books of Bath Corporation and the Account Book of the several Bonds made out in 
the nature of East India Bonds to the several Persons as within . . ., 1778-1803.
40 B.G.A. Order Books of the Improvement Commissioners and The Bond Book of the Improvement 
Commissioners, 1789-1823.
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13-2 per cent from the professions, and 21 *4 per cent from women. Manufactu­
rers and clergymen made no contribution. The rural interest thus played an 
even smaller part than in funding the roads, but the urban capitalists were 
more important. Meanwhile, and much more slowly, the Bath Trust had 
increased its total capital raised from the £17,000 already mentioned for the 
1770s to £20,300 by 1791, at a pace which suggests that its funding dovetailed 
with, and was delayed by, the activities of the other two institutional borrow­
ers. To the saver this network not only gave the advantage of alternative 
opportunities, it also encouraged a familiarity with such mechanics of the 
market as the mortgage deed and rate of interest, through both of which 
devices investors were able to demonstrate their lack of an economic motive.
The mortgage deeds of the Bath Trust were attractive financial instruments 
because they were relatively risk free, available in small units of £50 (though 
with some larger ones of £100, especially from the turn of the century) and 
capable of holding their nominal value. They could be sold with ease when 
investors needed to realize their assets. The highest proportion of turnover in 
the secondary market to which this practice gave rise was between 1761 and 
1765 (see Table 3) when deeds to the value of £7,750 changed hands out of a 
mortgage debt of £12,000. Sales were even higher between 1776 and 1780, 
with a value of £7,900, but the mortgage debt was then £17,000. The vigour 
of these sales suggests that in other five year periods it may have been not so 
much a shortage of funds which limited this secondary market as a shortage 
of deeds for sale. This situation may have arisen because the deeds were 
capable of performing different functions for different savers. Possibly one- 
fifth were held as long standing investments, devised by will or coming on 
the market only when sold by executors, for over 20 per cent of the £12,000 
raised in the later 1750s was disposed of in this way, and the fist of creditors 
for 1805 shows that a similar proportion of the capital sum was then held by 
executors. But most deeds circulated more rapidly, being held only for a short 
time before being re-sold, perhaps by a tradesman “having an occasion for 
the said £50”, in the words of some endorsements. The period of greatest 
velocity was the decade from the early 1790s, when not only the deeds of the 
Trust but also the financial securities of the Bath Corporation and Improve­
ment Commission changed hands with great rapidity, some deeds several 
times in the course of a year. The results of this activity may be seen in Table 
5. The fact that the secondary market flourished thus at a time when there 
was some difficulty in raising capital for new works suggests that although 
the marketability of the deeds helped the Trust raise funds by generating 
confidence in its securities, this quality may also have worked to its disadvan­
tage by deflecting into the secondary market some of the savings needed for 
improvements and construction work.
Negotiation of the terms on which investment capital could be secured also 
tended to cause delays. For example, after an initial offer of 3*5 per cent in 
1757, the trustees were less than a year later obliged to settle on 4*0 per cent 
in order to raise £12,000. Between December 1760 and June 1764 the rate had 
to be raised to 4*5 per cent, and in the course of this period (in 1762) the 
trustees had to pay 5*0 per cent on a further £800 in order to start work on 
the new road to be built by Jacob Mogg already mentioned.41 Viewed in
41 S.R.O. D/T/ba, Min. Bk. 6,21 July, 28 July, and 11 Oct. 1757,28 Nov. 1760,23 Oct. 1761,2 April 
and 17 Dec. 1762, 13 April 1764.
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Table 5: The Secondary Market in Institutional Securities in Bath,
1 7 8 9 - 1 8 0 4
I 2 3 4
Bath Bath Bath Total
Year Corporation Turnpike Improvement sums
Trust Commission involved
£ £ £ £
1789 100 100
1790 900 900
1791 800 500 1,300
1792 250 2,500 2,750
1793 500 2,700 3,200
1794 17,400 300 17,700
1795 1,000 2,650 1,100 4,750
1796 7,000 200 2,150 9,350
1797 4,150 100 4,250
1798 1,300 1,400 2,100 4,800
1799 900 2,850 400 4,150
1800 600 1,000 2,000 3,600
1801 2,700 1,850 400 4,950
1802 2,250 500 2,750
1803 900 500 1,400
1804 1,050 100 1,150
Sources: As for Table I. In addition, B.G.A. Minute Books of Bath Corporation, 1757-1834; Book of 
Account of the several Sums of Money borrowed by the Corporation of Bath, 1765-1803; Account Book 
of the several Bonds made out in the nature of East India Bonds, 1778-1803; Order Books of the Bath 
Improvement Commissioners, 1789-1832 and Bond Book of the Improvement Commissioners, 1789-1823.
Notes: The table covers the years from the first sale of a deed of the Bath Improvement Commission to 
the last available evidence on the deeds of the Bath Corporation. The secondary market in the latter did 
not necessarily cease at this point, for after a similar absence of evidence a decade earlier the registration 
of transactions totalling the unusually high sum of £17,400 in 1794, suggests that this was probably a 
retrospective figure covering sales from the preceding years.
isolation these and subsequent negotiations may suggest caprice on the part 
of the investors, but when studied in context they can be seen to reflect the 
general financial conditions of the time and are therefore further evidence that 
savers were influenced by these, rather than economic, motives. Thus the 
offer of 3*5 per cent in 1757 represented not only the going local rate (for 
Bath Corporation had just negotiated a loan of £600 at that price), but also 
the return on long-term London securities as shown by yields on Bank stock 
and the Funds.42 The rate in both the London and provincial markets then 
fluctuated upwards in a trend associated with the Seven Years War (1756-63), 
with Bank stock approaching a yield of 5-0 per cent in 1762. It is therefore 
not surprising that potential investors held back until the Bath Trust also 
offered higher rates to secure and retain the capital it needed. The Trust rate 
was reduced to 4-0 per cent from June 1764 until December 1778, when an 
increase to 4-5 per cent was associated with the need to raise £2,300.43 From 
the mid-1760s the London rate also fell, rising again during the War of
42 B.G.A. Bath Corporation Min. Bk. 7, 27 June 1757. Information on Bank of England stock and 
government securities is from L. S. Pressnell, ‘The Rate of Interest in the Eighteenth Century’, in L. S. 
Pressnell, ed. Studies in the Industrial Revolution (i960), pp. 178-214. See also Albert, Turnpike Road 
System, pp. 120-31.
43 S.R.O. D/T/ba, Min. Bk. 8, 5 Sept. 1778 and 2 Jan. 1779.
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American Independence (1776-83), especially in the years from 1778 when it 
reached 4-5 per cent and then fluctuated around 5-0 per cent. From the mid- 
1780s to the mid-1790s it fell again, reaching almost record low levels in 1792. 
From 1788 the minutes of the Bath Trust record their efforts similarly to 
lower the rate. They achieved this briefly in 1792/3 with a reduction to 4*0 
per cent, as did the Corporation and Improvement Commissioners also, but 
they were then thwarted by their creditors who threatened withdrawal unless 
the rate returned to 4*5 per cent. The trustees had to agree and the rate 
remained at 4*5 per cent until December 1796 when they sought £1,300 for a 
new road, whereupon it was raised to the legal limit of 5*0 per cent. The rates 
of the Bath Corporation and the Improvement Commissioners were similarly 
raised to 5-0 per cent in 1796-7, and the London yield was also then rising, 
fluctuating around the 5-0 per cent level during the French and Napoleonic 
Wars. Not until the early 1820s were the three bodies in Bath able to reduce 
their respective rates to 4*5 per cent.44
These observations on the closeness of movement between the returns on 
capital in London and Bath may provide some confirmation of the suggestion 
of T. S. Ashton, developed by Pressnell, that trends in the metropolis were 
indicative of financial conditions in the provinces. This is contrary to the 
general tenor of Albert’s findings, although he does concede the development 
of a closer adjustment between trust rates and London conditions from about 
1775, but his conclusions are based upon a heterogeneous collection of rates 
from many trusts, and a method which fails to provide the continuity necessary 
to show movements in the provincial rates themselves is unlikely to permit a 
satisfactory comparison with the metropolitan rates. The complementary 
suggestion by Ashton that these prevailing rates were significant for those 
contemplating investment, particularly in the public utilities, was examined 
by Albert and also found wanting.45 On this matter the evidence from Bath 
is more equivocal, for although lower rates may have been associated with 
investment decisions, it was often necessary for trustees to increase their offer 
before capital could be raised and new work begun.
The similarity of movement with the London rate may suggest that Bath 
was metropolitan rather than provincial in character, so that however represen­
tative its structure and administration, the Trust cannot stand proxy for these 
bodies in general. But several arguments can be advanced to show that contrary 
to this implication, Bath was not a special case. First, the circumstances of its 
building as a fashionable spa have long made the city a focus for special 
attention, but the growing volume of research on urban history is now changing 
the perspective within which all towns are viewed, allowing Bath to be seen 
as only one centre amongst many which were undergoing such changes. P. J. 
Corfield has summed up this new understanding by writing that Bath “was 
by no means a solitary case. Indeed, rather the contrary: the extent of 
fashionable townscaping, smart housing, and dextrous refronting of older 
buildings was apparent in many towns.”46
44 S.R.O. D/T/ba, Min. Bk. 8, 2 Aug. 1788 and 3 March 1792; Min. Bk. 9, 6 July 1793 and 7 Jan. 
1797; Min. Bk. 11, 6 Sept. 1823. B.G.A. Bath Corporation Min. Bk. 11, 20 April 1792; Min. Bk. 12, 20 
March 1797; Min. Bk. 14,11 Nov. 1822. Order Book of the Improvement Commissioners, 15 June 1792, 
26 July 1797, 31 Aug. 1822.
45 AJbert, Turnpike Road System, pp. 120-31.
46 P. J. Corfield, The Impact of English Towns, 1700-1800 (1982), p. 175.
E N G L I S H  T U R N P I K E  TRUSTS 24I
Second, the funding of the turnpike trust was in any case almost completely 
detached from the financing of the speculative and building activities in the 
city. The fact that only some 7-5 per cent of those financing the Trust can be 
found in the pages of R. S. Neale’s recent study of Bath, and then sometimes 
only in lists of councillors granting permission for building works, provides 
useful support for the view that the funding of this undertaking was distinct 
from the more famous social and economic activities of the city.47 Further 
evidence comes from differences of timing, for after the major investment in 
the later 1750s, fund raising by the Bath Trust did not coincide with the 
building booms identified by Neale, and described by him as being “embedded 
in the national money market”.48 Although some capital was raised in the 
two periods singled out by Neale, 1762 to 1771 and 1785 to 1792, borrowing 
by the Trust was heavier in the intervening years.49 It is probably the neglect 
of this separate financial market which has led to an important omission in 
Neale’s account of the transformation of Bath from Cotswold town to Palladian 
city. This change is analysed chiefly in terms of the entrepreneurial skills of 
the financiers and builders on the one hand, and the labour of the workers on 
the other, without giving due weight to the important role of the small saver 
in the provision of the infrastructure upon which the whole edifice depended.
Third, no evidence has been found of any institutional finks between the 
Bath Trust and the metropolis for most of this time. The Trust made no use 
of the developing banking system until 1808 when Messrs Clement and 
Tugwell of Bath (both qualified trustees) became its treasurers.50 Before that 
its finances were handled by local businessmen, such as a linen draper.51 Nor 
has any overlap been found between metropolitan and provincial savers, for 
the Bath investors were largely local residents rather than temporary visitors. 
A causal connexion between movements in the returns on capital therefore 
seems unlikely. Instead, it may be the case that these financial markets 
were similarly but independently influenced by the comparable motives of 
investors, for it can be argued that the disinterested provincial savers were 
close in attitude if not in scale of investment to the merchants, professionals, 
tradesmen, and women of London who were the most important individual 
domestic investors in government and related stock.52 The conclusion, there­
47 An example of the separation of these markets is provided by Lewis Clutterbuck, attorney, and town 
clerk of Bath 1757-76, who loaned speculative funds to the architect John Wood the younger (Neale, Bath, 
p. 161), after divesting himself of his substantial investment in the Trust through 12 different transactions 
between 1759 and 1764.
48 Neale, Bath, p. 168.
49 Ibid. pp. 167-8. But figures in apps. A and B, pp. 384-97, raise questions about timing. For example, 
whilst the number of “Total houses” built in the boom years between 1765 and 1771 increased by only 
12-7%, those between 1772 and 1780 (not accorded this epithet by Neale), can be seen to have increased 
by 27-8%. Building in those years also included the Hot Bath and Guildhall, both completed in 1778. I 
am grateful to Miss E. A. Holland and Mrs M. Oliver for their advice, based upon their Survey of Old 
Bath.
50 L. S. PressnelTs observation in Country Banking in the Industrial Revolution (Oxford, 1956), pp. 265- 
6, that little was known of the financial aspects of local undertakings from orignal sources is still largely 
true. But supposition is an unsatisfactory remedy, and PressnelTs reasoning, based on the payment of 
turnpike trust ‘dividends’ by a London West End bank in the 1770s, that where they existed local banks 
“would surely have been used for this purpose” is not borne out by the Bath Trust, for which there is no 
available evidence to support the notion of an informal link before the formal association.
51 The annual balance in the treasurer’s hands was £410 in the mid-eighteenth century, £1,147 towards
the end of it. S.R.O. D/T/ba, Min. Bk. 6, 23 Aug. 1757; Min. Bk. 9, 7 Sept. 1793.
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fore, is not that Bath was metropolitan and its turnpike trust consequently 
unrepresentative, but that the disinterested investors in both London and the 
provinces may have behaved in a similar fashion.
Finally, reference must be made to the annual income from the tolls as an 
influence on the pace at which capital was raised, since the more that the 
trustees could finance capital expenditure from the current revenue, the less 
susceptible were they likely to be to delays in the financial market. This 
capacity was not so much a function of the growing income from the tolls 
(Table I, col. 4) as of the decreasing proportion of this revenue which was 
spent on repairs and other costs, and of the increasing surplus which was 
therefore available for capital works. Evidence that the growth in the tolls 
really could increase the net resources of the Trust comes from the fact that 
although over this period administrative costs and interest payments continued 
to absorb about 20 per cent of the current revenue, the cost of repairs as a 
proportion of income fell from about 78 per cent in the 1770s to 70 per cent 
in the early 1790s, and 50 per cent to 55 per cent in the later 1820s.53 But this 
trend did not provide the trustees with a smoothly growing control over the 
timing of investment, first because the financial constraints of the French and 
Napoleonic Wars (1793-1815) severely limited the additional funds available 
in the capital market, and secondly because the expensive practices of the 
Trust’s first professional surveyor, appointed in 1817, limited their manage­
ment options. Benjamin Wingrove’s strong commitment to sound construction 
in the Telford manner meant that much work of an improving nature was 
undertaken as a matter of routine, thus leaving little scope or finance for the 
trustees to exercise their executive powers. Disagreements on these matters 
led to Wingrove’s resignation and the appointment of J. L. Me Adam as 
general surveyor in 1826. As a result of this move the importance of the 
surplus revenue as a source of capital can be most fully demonstrated, for 
over the next three years a balance-in-hand of over £8,000 was built up to be 
invested in the major new works authorized in 1829.54 On this base, and in 
the easier financial conditions of the early 1830s (see Table 1 cols. 2 & 3, and 
Table 2 n. 2), the trustees were able to undertake this construction without 
undue delay, by supplementing these reserves with funds raised in the local 
capital market. The borrowing powers granted earlier were thus eventually 
realized. The fact that by then all limits had been removed by the general 
Act of 1822 does not diminish the significance of the factors considered here, 
because for some 70 years they had influenced the time-lag between the 
authorization and implementation of the Trust’s powers.
IV
It has now been demonstrated that the Bath Trust was not a static body but 
an evolving one, whose continuing development was shaped by legislation 
subsequent to that which established it. This conclusion is contrary to the
52 P. G. M. Dickson, The Financial Revolution in England: A Study in the Development of Public Credit, 
1688-1756 (1967), PP- 297-303.
53 S.R.O. D/T/ba, Min. Bk. 8, Summary of Accounts 1770-6, 5 Nov. 1791; Q/R, Turnpike Trust 
General Statements of Account, 1822-50.
54 S.R.O. D/T/ba, Min. Bk. 11, 22 July 1826; Q/R, Turnpike Trust General Statements of Account, 
1822-50.
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view implicit in recent macro-studies. The fact that in the case of the Bath 
Trust there was an approximately four-fold increase in both mileage and long­
term capital stock suggests the need for a re-assessment of the whole matter 
of turnpike development by concentrating on the evolution of individual trusts 
within a network which was itself expanding. This would not only amplify 
our understanding of the overall contribution of the turnpike roads to the 
national economy in matters of construction, capital formation and finance, 
it would also open up for investigation previously unstudied aspects of the 
public utilities, especially the primary and secondary capital markets in which 
they operated, and the early practice of disinterested investment by provincial 
savers which they allowed.
The significance of this research goes beyond the immediate question of the 
turnpike trusts and their financing, however, for it also draws attention to the 
more general problem of the manner in which macro-studies are pursued, 
especially when they are based upon the unhistoric assumption that the 
component parts of an expanding system were not themselves also subject to 
change. By doing so this study illustrates the way in which the advent of the 
new economic history has signalled a change, not only in the method and 
form of macro-studies, but also in the function of research at the micro-level. 
The case study is no longer of only minor importance, either in its own right 
or as a contribution to the understanding of some general theme. It has now 
acquired significance as a corrective to the distortions and over-simplifications 
which may arise from the formation of national assessments on the basis of 
inadequate historical evidence. It is thus the current practice of macro-history 
itself which gives a new importance to the lessons to be learnt from the 
case study, and so rescues this approach from the tendentious charge of 
antiquarianism.
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Summary: The m anufacture o f  gunpow der is perhaps one 
o f  the m ost u n d er-ra ted  aspects o f  the changes associated  
w ith  the classical years o f  the B ritish  industria l revolution. 
W ith  its roots in Chinese learning an d  its associations w ith  
alchemy a n d  the search f o r  longevity, this commodity was 
nevertheless o f  imm ense practica l significance in the 
developm ent o f  both m in ing an d  trade, especially the 
triangular tran s-A tlan tic  trade which brought into B rita in  
such im portant ra w  m aterials as sugar, tobacco an d  cotton. 
This article pursues the lim ited  aim  o f  exploring one p o w d er  
m anufacturing site in the light o f  the docum entary and  
physical evidence rela ting  to it, bu t it is hoped that this may 
p ro v e  the starting p o in t o f  a more comprehensive stu dy o f  
this neglected subject.
The Woolley powder works were built in the 1720s 
in the deep valley of the Lam Brook, 3 miles north 
of the city of Bath and -}■ mile from the small village 
of Woolley (ST 749688). They were one of several 
such mills in the countryside of the northern part of 
the former county of Somerset1 where wooded 
valleys provided water power, charcoal, and the 
isolation which was so desirable in the manu­
facture of a hazardous product such as gunpowder. 
Despite the rural seclusion however, these sites were 
only relatively remote, for the early development of 
road and river transport in this region had made 
the trading centre of Bristol fairly easily accessible 
to its hinterland from the early decades of the 
eighteenth century. Into this port came saltpetre 
and sulphur, raw materials vital to the manu­
facture of gunpowder, whilst from it the finished 
product was shipped both coast-wise and abroad. 
As well as supplying these practical facilities the 
merchant community of Bristol provided the credit 
network upon which such trade depended, and 
helped to meet the capital requirements of the 
manufacturing concerns.
The production of gunpowder at the Woolley 
mills came to an end in the early years of the nine­
teenth century, and since then the site has-been 
much changed. Some buildings have been lost 
through the processes of natural decay or demoli­
tion, and others have survived only by a continuing 
and confusing adaptation for agricultural and 
domestic use. Three rollers ex situ  provide the only 
evidence of the plant which was once used, 
although the survival of two mill ponds and the 
remains of a network of watercourses suggest a once 
extensive use of water power. These fragmentary 
physical remains can support only a very speculative 
interpretation. However, this situation is redeemed 
by an unusual wealth of documentary evidence 
which provides information of a remarkable con­
tinuity from the 1740s to the early years of the nine­
teenth century and thus allows a more informed 
consideration of the manufacture of gunpowder at 
this site.
The survival of these papers was due entirely to 
the interest of the Stracheys, a gentry family who 
had lived since the 1630s at Sutton Court manor 
house some 10 miles south of Bristol.2 Their 
association with the Woolley works followed upon a 
marriage into the family of John Parkin, a merchant 
of Bristol and an original partner in the firm. Filed 
away by the Stracheys were copies of early leases 
and partnership agreements from the 1720s; almost 
all the annual balance sheets from the 1740s to the 
turn of the century; and bundles of corre­
spondence dealing with particular subjects such as 
the attempts to produce a powder which would 
meet the government’s exacting requirements.3 
These documents have already been used as part of 
a study of the financing of economic developments 
in the region,4 and in an attempt to relate the 
specific evidence from Woolley to general develop­
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ments in the technology o f  powder making.5 It is 
now intended to put them to yet another purpose, 
that o f helping to interpret the site to which they 
relate.
The challenge o f  this task is two-fold. First, the 
documents are chiefly concerned with the business 
and financial aspects o f the undertaking, so that 
even information on the technological processes is 
only incidental, whilst that on the layout at Woolley 
is o f an inferential nature. Second, there are the 
problems inherent in the site itself. The task o f  
interpretation would be easier if it could be 
assumed that the disposition o f  the buildings had 
followed a pattern which was appropriate to 
powder making in general, but this was not the 
case. Restored powder works such as those at 
Frederiksvoerk in Denmark established in 1756 by 
royal decree, or those in the Brandywine valley o f  
Delaware founded in 1802 by the Du Pont family, 
impress by their linear layout along a river valley in 
an arrangement which allowed for a recurring use 
o f the available water power. This pattern had also 
been adopted at powder works which were historic­
ally and geographically closer to Woolley, as may be 
seen from a contemporary survey sketch o f the early 
eighteenth century Chilworth mills in Surrey.6 At 
Woolley however, there is sufficient evidence to 
suggest that, even when allowances are made for the 
inevitable decay, disappearance, and adaptation o f  
the original structures, the layout was essentially 
that o f  a scatter o f buildings rather than a linear 
development. This means that the arrangements at 
Woolley must be explained in terms o f the 
problems and opportunities internal to the site, 
rather than by comparison with other under­
takings.
It is proposed to explore these problems under 
three heads. First, there will be a brief account o f  
the processes involved in powder making so that 
some estimate may be formed o f the buildings and 
plant which had to be accommodated at Woolley. 
Second, there will be a description o f the site, its 
past and present structures, their possible function 
in earlier times, and the factors peculiar to this 
location which may have influenced these arrange­
ments. Third, there will be an attempt to assess the 
wider significance o f  the Woolley powder works in 
terms o f the international trading network within 
which they functioned, o f the relationship between 
Bristol and its hinterland, where they were only one 
o f several manufacturing concerns associated with 
the port and its merchants, and o f the changing 
chronological and geographical pattern o f  powder 
making in England within which they had an
important role. The site at Woolley is of great 
interest, and it is likely that much would be revealed 
by excavation, but with the present paucity o f  
physical evidence and the consequent uncertainties 
o f interpretation, it is the context within which the 
powder works operated, as revealed by the docu­
mentary evidence, which justifies this concentra­
tion o f attention upon one enterprise.
Gunpowder Manufacture
Gunpowder is essentially a simple mixture o f  
charcoal, saltpetre and sulphur, in varying propor­
tions.7 A memorandum o f 1747/9 shows that at 
Woolley the ‘best powder’ was then held to be that 
composed o f 64 or 70 lb o f saltpetre, 18 lb o f  
sulphur and 18 lb o f charcoal.8 O f these three 
ingredients the charcoal presented least problems, 
for as the annual balance sheets reveal this was pur­
chased locally and already charred,9 so that no 
special provision had to be made for its pre­
paration other than crushing. However, as the 
charcoal stocks at the mid-year casting up could 
amount to 1,500 to 2,000 bushels, some buildings 
were probably required for storage.
In contrast, both the saltpetre and sulphur came 
from abroad,10 and before use both underwent pre­
paration at Woolley, with a consequent need for 
special buildings and plant. The evidence for this 
claim comes largely from the annual inventories of 
raw materials, for these frequently recorded 
separately the amount and value o f rough petre and 
refined petre, rough brimstone and refined brim­
stone, showing that at the stock taking there were at 
the mill some ingredients which had not yet been 
refined and some which had.11 Although details of 
the raw materials on board ship were remarkably 
fully itemised in the case o f  saltpetre, perhaps 
because these cargoes were handled by the Bristol 
merchants rather than those in London who 
organized the shipment o f  sulphur, it was not until 
1788 that any was described as being already 
refined. Furthermore, correspondence in the early 
1760s between the proprietors and the Board o f  
Ordnance confirms that these preparations were 
indeed commonly undertaken at Woolley, for the 
Board paid particular attention to the refining o f  
ingredients at the works, as an area providing scope 
for improvement.12
The prepared ingredients were then mixed or 
incorporated under edge runners, with the addition 
o f water to minimize the risk o f  an explosion. This 
was the most dangerous o f  the processes and may 
have been responsible for the loss o f  two lives 
recorded in the Swainswick parish register in 1724
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and a third in 17 34.13 It may be presumed that 
safety precautions or expertise were improved, for 
no other such incidents are recorded.
The memorandum of 1747/9 records that at 
Woolley there were four mills, each capable of 
grinding 25 lb in 2 hours. The water was ‘worked 
twice over’. In the 1760s the quality of the edge 
runner stones came under close scrutiny, for the 
proprietors were concerned at their continuing 
failure to meet the government’s standards. They 
thought this may be due to ‘. .. a defect in the 
weight o f our Runners as they are not heavier than 
from 50 €  [hundredweight] to 3 Tons 8c those of the 
Powder Makers in London are from 5 to 6 Tons 
weight’.14 However, in the correspondence already 
referred to, Sir Charles Frederick of the Board of 
Ordnance advised that the problem was more likely 
to be a want of smoothness in both runners and bed 
than a lack of weight, for the runners at Faversham 
did not much exceed 2 tons. But they had been ‘. .. 
turned Smooth (in a kind of Turning loom) . . .  by 
Two Men who were sent thither by the makers of 
the Runners’, and this course was recommended to 
the Woolley partners.
The product of this incorporation under pressure 
was termed serpentine powder. It was the simplest 
form of gunpowder which could be made, but it 
suffered the disadvantage of separating out into its 
distinctive ingredients when transported in barrels. 
Three further stages were therefore added to the 
process, each designed to minimize this separation 
by increasing the consolidation of the grains.15 
There is evidence that each of these three improve­
ments was practised at Woolley, with a consequent 
need for appropriate equipment.
First, there was the technique of corning, the 
earliest reference to which was in 1440 in Germany. 
The wet incorporated powder was forced through a 
sieve, thereby making pellets resembling grains of 
corn, hence the name. There is evidence from the 
inventories that at Woolley the corning process had 
evolved to the stage where not merely discrete 
grains of powder, but grains of a specified uniform 
size could be produced. Thus, from the 1740s 
onwards, stocks of gunpowder were listed as F, FF, 
or FFF, in increasing order not only of fineness of 
grain but also value, for the smaller the grain the 
easier it was to ignite and the more rapidly the 
powder burnt. A typical example, that for 1749, 
reads:
By 3 barrls 8c { FFF Gunpdr at 73/- 12.15.6
By95barrls FF D o  at 68/- 323.00.0
By 96 barrls 8c j F Do at 63/- 303.19.6
In the 1789 balance sheet the item ‘111 Barrels F & 
FF Corn’d and in dust 55/-’, provides the only 
reference by name to a process which the circum­
stantial evidence shows to have been long estab­
lished.
The second improvement came with the intro­
duction of glazing in the 1680s. Before the corned 
powder was dried it was tumbled in the rotating 
wooden drums of a glazing mill, the grains being 
thus rounded off, compacted and polished. The 
resulting dust was usually removed by screening, 
although the occasional references in the Woolley 
papers to powder ‘in dust’, as in the above item for 
1789, raises doubts as to whether this was always 
done. This wording may however imply only that 
the powder awaited screening.
The last development to be introduced into this 
sequence of processes came when the incorporated 
powder was pressed before being corned, in order 
to raise the specific gravity and increase the 
explosive power. This was introduced into the 
industry from the 1780s, at first with the small 
boxes and hand operated screws which were in 
general use until the mid-nineteenth century, later 
with hydraulic presses. The Woolley papers contain 
no specific reference to this process.
Finally came the drying of the powder, for even 
after all these processes it still retained some of the 
water added during incorporation. This would not 
at first have called for special buildings, the powder 
being simply dried in the sun on long tables. Later 
however special dry houses were built and the 
powder was set out on trays over which hot air 
circulated, heated for safety by an external stove. 
This method continued to be the general practice 
until the 1870s (after which the powder was dried 
whilst being glazed in large barrels) and its use at 
Woolley is suggested by the 1747/9 memorandum 
which states that ‘The Stove drys from 70 to 80 
Barrels at a time and that in 48 hours’, each barrel 
representing 100 lb of powder. However, the 1795 
inventory records ‘Powder in Stove and Glazg Mill, 
70 Bars @ 75/-’, thus giving only one valuation for 
the powder being dried and glazed. It is tempting to 
speculate on the technological innovation thus 
implied, but the joint valuation probably reflects 
only administrative convenience.
To sum up, the manufacture of gunpowder at 
Woolley involved the preparation of the raw 
materials, their incorporation in water powered 
edge runner mills, the pressing of the resulting mill 
cake, and its corning into discrete grains which were 
then glazed, dried and packed in barrels. This 
description of the stages of manufacture cannot
188 Industrial Archaeology Review, V, 3, Autumn 1981
establish beyond doubt the range of buildings and 
equipment which would have been found on the 
site in its productive years, but it can suggest the 
structures that m a y  reasonably be assumed to have 
been there during that time.
The Woolley Site
Consideration must n o w  be given to the physical 
appearance of the site on which these historical 
features were once established. As Figure 1 shows,16 
the most obvious remains of Woolley’s earlier 
manufacturing history are the two millponds, each 
with its attendant group of buildings. It seems 
probable that the lower site near the brook was the 
long-established location of the corn mills at 
Woolley, two of which are recorded in Domesday 
Book, whilst the manufacture of gunpowder was 
probably undertaken chiefly on the upper ground.
S o m e  confirmation of this supposition may be 
derived from the terms of the lease of the Woolley 
site in 1729.17 This indenture, which was a renewal 
of a first lease of 1722, distinguishes between the 
existing mill and mill house, and the new powder 
mills served by a ‘... Cutt lately m a d e  at Woolley 
aforesaid and running down to the new Powder 
Mills there lately erected ...’. The new cut was 
presumably the formerly substantial leat which ran 
for about f mile from a d a m  on a principal branch 
of the L a m  Brook at Lower Langridge (ST 743695). 
Its silted-up and grassed-over course can be traced 
along the 200 ft contour to the massively-embanked 
upper mill pond at Woolley, located on the steep 
hillside some 50 ft above the brook. The import­
ance of this leat for the powder making site was 
emphasized by a further clause in the 1729 lease 
which allowed for a rebate to the lessees should they
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Fig. 1 Mill Farm, Woolley, B ath: site of gunpow der mills. Plan o f site with buildings standing c. 1930.
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ever \  . . be obliged to Turn the Water again from  
the above mentioned New Cutt into the Neighbour­
ing Brook from whence it hath been Diverted’.
It is presumed that the lower pond was already in 
existence for the corn mill before the establishment 
o f the powder mills. It was served by a 150 yd leat, 
now dry, from a dam on the Lam Brook (ST 
749690). The lower site would have benefited from 
the extra storage capacity o f  the upper pond, which 
discharged into the lower one. Whether corn 
milling was continued during the operation o f the 
powder mills in the eighteenth century is not 
known.
The pre-emption by the corn mill o f  the more 
conventional lower ground explains in part the 
location o f the new works some distance above the 
brook. An incidental benefit would be isolation 
from floods, for in common with other streams in 
the Bristol Avon catchment area the Lam Brook 
falls fairly steeply over a clay subsoil and run-off is 
relatively flashy, responding rapidly to rainfall. But 
dry weather conditions can be expected to have 
been the determining factor. In the dry periods o f  
summer, the springs from the oolitic limestone 
capping the hills, maintain only a modest flow, o f  
the order o f  0.5 mgd below Woolley, whilst due to 
the geography o f  the site the water available for the 
upper mill pond would have been about half this 
estimate. This is one-tenth o f  the flows that can 
occur in wet weather and perhaps only one-sixtieth 
o f peak flood flows.18 The main advantage offered 
by the upper location on this site where water 
supplies were limited and fluctuating would be the 
prospect o f using water twice or more times over as 
it returned down the steep hillside from the upper 
to the lower pond and thence to the brook, though 
such a scheme would require substantial construc- 
■ tion works.
It seems clear that steps were taken to improve 
the general supply by bringing to the powder mills 
nearly all the water available in the Manor o f  
Woolley. In addition to the two leats already 
mentioned, a -J mile long leat was built from a small 
side stream south o f Woolley (ST 748683) and into 
this were diverted springs still further down the 
valley (ST 753680) via a stone conduit. There was 
also a direct supply o f  pure spring water, to be 
referred to later. Even so, the mills had to shut 
down in midsummer through lack o f water, an 
inconvenience o f which Henry Strachey was 
reminded by the managing partner in 1801 when 
the latter observed that the annual stock taking took 
place in June because then ‘. . . our Mills usually 
stand still for want o f  Water’.19 If an industrial
venture was to aspire to a reasonable continuity o f  
production on this relatively small stream there­
fore, it was essential that a system should be devised 
which was able to abstract the maximum potential 
energy from a limited volume o f water, and it is 
likely that the upper site offered the best scope for 
such a layout.20
Unfortunately the location o f the buildings 
associated with the hydraulic works is largely a 
matter o f speculation. Thomas Thorpe’s map of 
1742 shows what is probably only a diagrammatic 
scatter o f buildings, and later maps are no more 
helpful.21 When powder making ceased in the early 
nineteenth century the site became, or reverted to, 
an agricultural holding worked in conjunction with 
the corn mill which continued to function as such 
until the mid-twentieth century. The paucity o f  
substantial remains suggests that some buildings 
were dismantled, perhaps to provide stone for 
alternative uses such as field walls, or because they 
were considered unsafe. An unusual abundance o f 
field walls, some containing pieces o f  dressed stone, 
may indicate the extent o f  demolitions. Other 
buildings underwent a change o f use. Thus at the 
upper site the principal remains are now incor­
porated in the agricultural and domestic buildings 
o f Mill Farm. Evidence for their earlier uses is 
tantalisingly inconclusive, being mostly in the form 
o f  blocked openings and discontinuities o f  
masonry. Walls are o f the oolitic limestone rubble 
typical o f  the southern Cotswold Hills, usually with 
dressed quoins. The farmhouse o f three storeys plus 
basement is Georgian in proportion but its details 
and tall storey heights suggest a mid-nineteenth 
century construction. The single-storeyed kitchen 
wing is older, however, with a chimney o f  
eighteenth century vernacular appearance extended 
upwards in nineteenth-century red brick. The 
Worgan family who had a continuing interest in the 
powder mills as managing partners lived at the site, 
perhaps in a predecessor o f the present house.
The adjoining farm cottage, formerly Rose 
Cottage and now named The Decoy, achieved its 
present form in the late nineteenth century. At its 
rear it incorporates an older structure, originally 
one and a half storeys high, with a single-light stone 
window o f cusped round-headed quasi-Gothic 
design and the remains o f  a second one, both set 
symmetrically beneath blocked-up rectangular 
panels o f more classical derivation. This would 
seem to be eighteenth-century ornamental work, 
perhaps undertaken at the whim o f  Mrs Elizabeth 
Parkin, another o f  the proprietors and Lady o f  the 
Manor, for whom in 1761 Woolley church was
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Fig. 2a Plan o f form er cowshed at Mill Farm.
rebuilt in the Gothic style. A  brick archway suitable 
for a cart to pass is incorporated internally.
Adjoining this cottage is the one-time cowshed 
(Figure 2), a single-storeyed building with 
handsome doorways and the remains of a line of 
shuttered windows unsuited to an agricultural 
purpose, all with fine dressed stone surrounds in a
0 Feet 10
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Entrance to 
vault
_______V.'
Butt-purlin roof. 
Trusses infilled with 
lath and plaster.
Cow stall
Fig. 2b Sectional elevation on A-A, o f  form er cowshed.
vernacular style, probably of the first half of the 
eighteenth century. The rear wall shows signs of 
m a n y  changes and repairs, indicating a succession 
of doorways including a broad cart entrance. This 
building was last altered in the 1960s to form a 
garage and workshop. Remains were found of a 
lime-plaster floor surface, a suitable precaution 
against the striking of sparks if gunpowder were 
handled here.
Set into the hillside at the end of the cowshed is a 
vault which was used as a cider house in the earlier 
twentieth century. Such a building would be suit­
able for the safe-keeping of inflammable materials. 
Its vernacular-style doorway has a stone surround 
similar to two in the cowshed, but the elliptical 
tunnel-vaulted roof is built of red bricks (net 
dimensions 9 in. by 4.5 in. by 2.25 in.) which were 
in limited use in the Bath area from the early 
eighteenth century.22 Beneath the turf in the steep 
hillside beyond the vault, and aligning with the end 
of the cowshed, are the foundations of a line of
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stone piers. This m a y  be the site of the pointed- 
arched aqueduct depicted in a pencil sketch of 1826 
(Figure 3).23 It shows an aqueduct carrying a pipe 
which terminated in a water tower raised above the 
roofs of the buildings below. By this date the 
p o w d e r  mill wou l d  have been out of use for over 20 
years so the absence of a water wheel is not 
significant. T h e  available pow e r  w o u l d  not in any 
case have been great. T h e  water c a m e  via a 4in 
square rubble stone conduit or ‘drock’ from a 
spring 300 yds to the west (ST 747689) and this 
small but silt-free supply, which still provides 
drinking water, m a y  have been valued particularly 
for purifying the ingredients and other processes.
At a small distance downhill from this group is
Fig. 3 W oolley  P ow der Mill as it a p p e a re d  in 1826: fro m  a 
sketch by D u lcibella  C hester.
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the building used until recently as a stable (Figure 
4). This much decayed structure evidently had three 
storeys at one time, but it shows signs of having 
undergone several major alterations and partial 
rebuildings including changes of floor level. It 
retains features indicating the use of water power, 
for, unlike the buildings hitherto described, it lies 
below the upper mill pond and the minor leat from 
Woolley, and could have received water from one 
or both sources. These features are discussed in the 
appendix. They include a recess in the rear wall 
which, from detailed examination, is considered to 
have contained a waterwheel with a diameter of 
30 ft.
If the application of water power in this part of 
the site was limited to the stable and any other 
buildings which may have been below the level of 
the upper mill pond, this suggests that the build­
ings close to the manager’s dwelling housed only 
the comparatively safe though possibly unpleasant 
refining processes for which no power driven 
equipment was needed. It is therefore in the vicinity 
of the cowshed that the sulphur may have been 
distilled and the saltpetre boiled and crystallized, all 
of which operations required space, heat, vats and 
vessels, and a limited supply of water which could 
have been drawn from the aqueduct. The stable 
building, with its power driven equipment, may 
have functioned as a crushing shed, treating the 
materials before or after refining was undertaken.
In this context it is worth noting that in the 1728 
sketch of the Chilworth powder mills mentioned 
earlier, apart from the four incorporating mills, 
there was only one building which was designated a 
mill, and that was the ‘Coal and Brimstone Mill’. 
The use of the stable building for the crushing of 
charcoal appears to be confirmed by a black 
powdery deposit about one sixteenth of an inch 
thick which adheres to parts of the rear wall within 
and adjoining the recess described elsewhere. 
Chemical analysis has shown it to be carbon, largely 
free of soluble salts, and microscopic examination 
has revealed the fibrous and perforated con­
ductive-tissue structures of charcoal from broad- 
leaved trees, thought to be willow.
After the preparation of the raw materials the 
next and most hazardous stage of manufacture was 
the intimate mixing of the three ingredients in the 
incorporating mills, four of which were mentioned 
at Woolley in the memorandum of 1747/9. It is not 
likely that these would have been near the dwelling- 
house because of the danger of explosion, and they 
must therefore have constituted part of a separate 
group or groups of buildings concerned with the 
production of the gunpowder rather than its 
preparation, and requiring a steady supply of water 
power. For clues to their location it is necessary to 
return to the upper mill pond which probably 
represented their source of power supply.
The embankment of this pond (formerly 0.33
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acres) stands 10 ft high on the downward side, sup­
ported at its eastern corner by retaining walls which 
are up to 7 ft high and built o f rubble stone blocks 
o f cyclopean size. On the bank o f  the pond are three 
yew trees whose girth is consistent with a mid- or 
late-eighteenth century planting, perhaps con­
temporary with the two yew trees in the churchyard 
at Woolley, laid out by Elizabeth Parkin in 1761. 
Changes o f alignment and coursing suggest that 
there were buildings against the walls, o f which the 
present pigsties and animal sheds are the suc­
cessors. Supporting the roof o f one o f these sheds 
are the three cylindrical rollers already mentioned. 
Placed end on end they make a pillar 5 ft 3 in. high 
(Figure 3). They are o f soft Bath stone, unsuitable 
for any pulverising function, and are respectively 
15, 18, and 20 in. diameter, and an estimated 270, 
340, and 550 lb in weight. They have a flat cut on 
one side, with fixing holes and a broad chase \  in. 
deep, probably designed to receive a cir­
cumferential belt o f cloth or leather held in place by 
a piece o f  wood fixed to the flat. They may have 
been used for pressing the powder after its incor­
poration and for this purpose an oscillating motion  
can be envisaged. Other finishing processes which 
may have been water powered in similarly sited 
buildings were those concerned with the glazing of 
powder in rotating barrels, and its screening in 
revolving wooden frames to remove dust.
It seems likely that the incorporating mills were 
accommodated on the ground between the upper 
and lower mill ponds. There is about 35 ft differ­
ence in level between the ponds, and after an allow­
ance for drawing down the upper pond by 7 ft or so 
to exploit its storage capacity, there would be room  
to place one or more large diameter wheels at a 
single level, or pairs o f small overshot wheels o f  
about 12 ft diameter at two levels in series. H ow­
ever, the upper wheels o f such pairs could have 
been required to power auxiliary processes in the 
stable and other buildings, rather than the incor­
porating mills, so one or two o f  the latter could 
have been sited below the lower pond. The arrange­
ment which best accords with the mid-eighteenth 
century statement that ‘The water is worked twice 
over’ is open to debate and divides the present 
authors. It may in any case have been modified 
later.
The penstocks to feed these water wheels from the 
upper pond cannot now be traced, and no positive 
evidence o f the incorporating mills survives above 
ground, perhaps because o f the practice o f  
dismantling such structures when they went out o f  
use to avoid the risk o f  explosion o f accumulated
dust.24 However, two probable sites, both a few feet 
above the lower pond and 100 yds apart, can be 
identified in areas o f  uneven ground adjoining 
underground watercourses. One o f these is a stone 
drain, 12 in. by 12 in., which takes water from the 
low-level outlet at the north end o f the upper pond. 
The other drain, 15 in. deep by 20 in. wide, runs 
from the vicinity o f the stable building and would 
have received the tail culvert o f the latter. The 
precise layout o f these features could be estab­
lished only by excavation.
The amount o f time devoted to the incor­
poration o f  any one batch o f gunpowder was very 
closely controlled, but there is at Woolley no 
surface evidence o f the clock tower which remains a 
prominent feature o f the comparable site at 
Littleton, now Powder Mill Farm.25
The lower mill pond is retained by an earthen 
bank above the Lam Brook. It is now 0.4 acres, 
having been doubled in width since the 1839 tithe 
map was drawn, probably to compensate for the 
silting-up and abandonment o f the long leat to the 
upper pond. It was fed by both the spent water from 
the upper pond and by the 150 yds leat already 
mentioned. Although the total fall was about half 
that from the upper pond, more water could be 
taken advantage o f here as a major tributary joins 
the brook between the two dam sites. Until 1935, 
when the brook cut round the end o f the dam in a 
cloud-burst, this pond supplied a small corn mill 
which has since been converted into a dwelling 
house. The mill had a style and layout which sug­
gested a nineteenth century construction. In 
particular it had a pitchback water wheel, about 17 
ft 6 in. diameter and 3 j ft wide with a rim drive, 
until a turbine was installed around 1925.
This corn mill post-dated the powder mill, but 
on the other side o f the wheel pit is a building o f  
unusual layout, now Mill Cottage, which appears to 
have had an earlier industrial use (Figure 6). It 
comprises living quarters on one floor above a 
semi-basement excavated into the hillside and 
measuring 18 ft by 30 ft. This was formerly 
completely open at the front and was used as a cart 
shed o f more than ample size. There are blocked 
circular and semi-circular openings available for 
shafting in the wall facing the wheel pit. The layout 
is unlike that o f  a corn mill, and it is probable that 
this building played some part in the powder 
making process before being converted into a 
cottage in the first half o f the nineteenth century, 
perhaps for the miller when the corn mill was re­
built and the site reverted to its agricultural role.
It is impossible to be conclusive about the earlier
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function of the Mill Cottage. In layout and size it 
could have been well-suited as an incorporating 
mill, for whereas light constructions were often 
favoured in the nineteenth century as the best way 
of minimizing the hazards attendant upon an 
explosion, the solid masonry here accords with the 
eighteenth-century practice of having three heavy 
walls to channel the blast.26 Furthermore it would 
be reasonable to expect the partners to make the 
fullest use of the site they had leased, and the 
evidence of extensive work on the tailrace in order 
to gain extra fall suggests that they did seek to use a 
building in this vicinity for power-intensive 
purposes, such as incorporation.27 However, the 
reference in the lease of 1729 to the ‘new Powder 
Mills’ served by the new cut suggests that initial 
investment was not at the corn mill site, while the 
only major building work specifically recorded in 
the balance sheets from the 1740s to the 1800s is 
that for a new magazine in 1753.
Just upstream of the outfall from the tailrace (ST 
751687), an arch passes through the neck of a small 
meander of the brook and serves no immediately 
apparent purpose unless as a by-pass to a water- 
powered site. The bed of the brook here would have 
been an opportune location for an undershot wheel 
with a fall of up to 5 ft. Other features near the 
cornmill include two areas of stone foundations
buried in the embankment of the mill pond, and an 
isolated section of retaining wall in the bank of the 
brook below. This suggests that there were further 
installations in that vicinity, and the tithe m a p  of 
1839 does indicate a building on the side of the mill 
pond there. While other powder mill sites are 
characterized by widely separated buildings to 
minimize the consequences of explosions, the 
scatter of possible installations at the lower end of 
the Woolley site m a y  also reflect the difficulties of 
obtaining power.
The picture which emerges from this considera­
tion of both the documentary and the physical 
evidence is that of a cascade of water-driven 
installations d o w n  the hillside, effectively at right 
angles to the flow of the brook (Figure 7), and thus 
in contrast to the linear arrangement along a head 
leat parallel to the stream that characterizes most 
gunpowder works. Whether the production flow 
pattern was as straightforward is more doubtful, 
and it m a y  have varied over time as facilities were 
added or altered. The limited evidence suggests that 
after the preparation of materials at the top and 
middle of the site, they passed downhill to the 
incorporating mills, and then to a number of water 
powered locations for the finishing processes. After 
drying, the powder would be stored in a magazine 
at a considerable distance from the other activities,
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perhaps on the further side o f the brook, but no 
trace o f a building survives above ground. The 
easiest route for the finished powder to leave for 
Bristol would be up the lane on the far side o f the 
brook, still called Powdermill Hill, and then north­
westwards up the valley either to the Chippenham  
to Bristol road, or via Upton Cheyney and North 
Stoke to the Avon Navigation, so avoiding passage 
through Bath.
The present condition o f this eighteenth-century 
manufacturing site has now been described, and an 
attempt has been made to relate the structures still 
remaining to those other features integral to the 
process o f powder making for which no visual 
evidence now survives, and to interpret this 
evidence in the context o f  the likely pattern o f  
power and production requirements. On the basis 
o f this exercise it is possible to suggest a 
technological rationale behind the apparently 
random scatter o f buildings, namely that o f making 
the fullest possible use o f the water power avail­
able.
It is not intended by this interpretation o f the 
Woolley site to invest the layout with a greater 
significance than it should bear. This scattered 
alternative to the linear arrangement o f some other 
powder works probably represented a pragmatic 
response to the topographical restraints o f the site 
rather than a positive reason for choosing Woolley. 
Indeed to the first proprietors o f the 1720s the 
attraction o f  the site was more likely to be its con­
venience, firstly in the geographical sense because it 
offered the combination o f accessibility and 
seclusion already referred to, and secondly in an 
administrative way because it was owned as part o f  
the Manor o f Woolley by William Parkin, brother 
o f one o f the original partners and himself a 
London merchant with whom a trade balance was 
maintained in the early years. On his death the 
property passed first to his niece Elizabeth Parkin,28 
and then to her nephew Matthew Worgan,29 both o f  
whom functioned as partners as well as landowners 
so that a close relationship between lessor and 
lessees continued for much o f the eighteenth 
century.
The Significance o f  the Woolley Powder Works
The last question to be considered is that o f the 
general importance o f  the Woolley mills, and it is as 
difficult to draw any neat conclusions about this 
matter, as it was about the possible arrangement of 
the site. This is largely because their significance 
varies according to the context within which they 
are viewed. First, from the point o f  view o f the level
o f technology employed, it cannot be claimed that 
any great degree o f expertise was displayed. It is 
true that incorporation seems always to have been 
by rollers rather than stamps, so it is possible there 
were some ways in which the Woolley works were 
ahead o f contemporary practice.30 On the other 
hand the making o f gunpowder remained an art 
and a mystery, and a sequence o f letters from the 
early 1760s portraying the company’s efforts to 
obtain government contracts impress by the 
haphazard nature o f the enterprise. The partners 
were urged by Sir Charles Frederick o f  the Board o f  
Ordnance to . . keep one M il l  at work trying 
experiments (for a little while) on different 
Compositions different times o f grinding etcr by 
which means we may hit on the right methods as 
others have done’.31
Second, from the point o f view o f their role in the 
area the importance of the Woolley works appears 
to have been slight. Their rural seclusion has 
already been noted, and this physical isolation was 
symptomatic o f a general detachment from the 
local economy. Charcoal was the only raw material 
purchased locally, and outlets for the sale o f the 
finished product were limited by its nature. The 
numbers employed were never very large. Accord­
ing to the memorandum of 1747/ 9 , twelve men 
were then engaged on the work, and even if that 
number doubled in the course o f  the eighteenth 
century on the assumption that the doubling o f the 
capital invested in buildings and equipment32 
duplicated existing provisions, rather than having a 
strong labour saving element, the impact on  
employment is unlikely to have been very great 
beyond the immediate locality.33 Indeed it seems 
likely that as far as personnel were concerned the 
links with Bristol were stronger than those with the 
neighbourhood, for not only were most o f  the 
proprietors and trading associates resident there, 
but the names o f  many tradesmen and craftsmen 
mentioned in the Woolley balance sheets have been 
found in the Bristol directories of the time.34 These 
included coopers, braziers, plumbers and 
carpenters, showing that in matters such as the 
making of the vitally important barrels, the partners 
preferred to employ men skilled in the port trades 
rather than the rural craftsmen.
This reference to the links with Bristol intro­
duces a third context, and one in which the Woolley 
works were o f  greater importance. Not only did 
they become through Bristol a part o f  an inter­
national trading network, importing raw materials 
from the Mediterranean world, the Baltic and 
India, and shipping the finished product to the
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African coast, Ireland and North America, but they 
also functioned in north Somerset as an outpost o f  
the Bristol merchant interest. They were in fact one 
of several such manufacturing enclaves (of which 
other examples are the brass, copper and glass 
industries) which flourished on rural sites offering 
facilities not easily found in the growing city of 
Bristol, such as space for development and a good  
supply of water. A special stimulus to the founding 
of such enclaves in the early decades o f the 
eighteenth century may have been provided by the 
growth o f the slave trade, from which the outports 
had been excluded until the turn o f the century, but 
in which Bristol came to achieve an important but 
short-lived dominance, overtaking the London 
interest in the 1720s and 1730s before being itself 
overtaken by the competition from Liverpool in the 
1740s. The significance o f this trade was two-fold, 
for it both provided the Bristol merchants with 
surplus funds for investment, and stimulated 
industrial enterprise by the market it offered for 
manufactured products. Slave barter goods carried 
by ships sailing for the coast of Africa commonly 
included copper, brass and iron ware, gunpowder 
and muskets, cotton pieces and fine hats, cowries 
and glass beads, brandy and gin.35 The demand for 
gunpowder was such as important feature o f this 
trade that in addition to their magazine in Bristol36 
the Woolley partners had a depot in the port o f  
Liverpool.37 The products of the plantations to 
which slaves were shipped in the West Indies and 
the southern colonies o f North America, for 
example sugar, tobacco and cotton, were brought 
into the western seaports on the last leg o f this tri­
angular trade.
The importance o f this trade in musket powder, 
however, must not lead to a neglect o f the con­
tinuing production o f  blast powder for use in 
mining, especially as it was the recurring purchase 
o f the same in a local coal mining account which 
prompted speculation about its source and so led to 
the papers analysed in this study. The use o f powder 
for this purpose probably came early to this region, 
for reports of its employment in lead mining in the 
m id-1680s38 followed closely upon its introduction 
for blasting at the Ecton copper mine in Stafford­
shire in about 1670,39 whilst by 1719 there is 
evidence of its use in north Somerset coal mines.40 
But important though the stimulus o f the local 
market must have been, it was once more the links 
with the port o f Bristol which enabled the Woolley 
partners to sell their product more widely, 
particularly in Wales and Cornwall.41
By these references to the two widely different
functions o f  gunpowder we approach the fourth 
context in which the importance o f Woolley must 
be considered, that o f  its place in the changing 
pattern o f powder making in England. Until the 
establishment o f the group o f  north Somerset mills 
in the early eighteenth century, the only significant 
sites o f powder making had been in Essex, 
Middlesex, Kent and Surrey, most importantly at 
Waltham Abbey,42 Faversham43 and Chilworth (see 
earlier reference). The origins o f this group lay in 
the mid-sixteenth century and they produced 
powder almost exclusively for military and naval 
use. O f the mills founded later than those o f north 
Somerset perhaps the most important were in 
Westmorland and Furness, mentioned earlier, 
dating from the later decades o f the eighteenth 
century and producing powder chiefly for use in 
mining. For much o f the eighteenth century there­
fore, the north Somerset mills occupied an impor­
tant position in the chronology and geography of  
powder making, supplying products for use in both 
mining and musketry in the immediate region, the 
western seaboard, the Africa trade and the 
American colonies, thus meeting new needs in new 
markets. It may be suggested that the greatest 
significance o f the Woolley works lay in the part 
they and the other north Somerset mills played in 
the shifting location o f powder production and 
trade in the eighteenth century.
In 1803 the Woolley partners entered into an 
agreement with the proprietors of the Littleton 
powder works some 10 miles south o f Bristol, by 
which the two firms were to be ‘consolidated’.44 As 
the Woolley lease was close to expiry whilst the 
Littleton site was freehold and owned by the 
partners, it was decided to close down the former 
and concentrate production at the latter, thus 
bringing to an end 80 years o f profitable powder 
making at Woolley. This rationalization was under­
taken because by the end o f the eighteenth century 
the productive capacity o f  the mills in the Bristol 
area greatly exceeded the demand they had to meet. 
The African trade had declined45 and at the same 
time the North American market had also become 
vulnerable. Although trade with the United States 
had in general revived after the hostilities o f the 
Independence War, the set-back in some com ­
modities had continued as home produced goods 
replaced those previously shipped across the 
Atlantic. This was the case with gunpowder as the 
Du Pont and other mills began to supply the needs 
of this greatly expanding market.
The urgency o f  the situation produced by these 
declining markets can be established by comparing
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information from two documents relating to pro­
duction figures. In the first, the memorandum o f  
1747/ 9 , it was stated that the W oolley works 
produced 2,000 to 4,000  barrels o f powder each 
year, a barrel containing 100 lb. In the second, a 
paper o f 1802 setting out the position at both the 
Woolley and Littleton mills, it was stated that in the 
past 8 years the former had produced 8,846 barrels 
and the latter 8,942 barrels, the partners’ capital 
employed at both being the same, namely 
£ 12,000 .46 These figures suggest that for each o f the 
previous 8 years the two mills had together been 
producing only as much as, and possibly less than, 
Woolley alone in the 1740s. The decline in overseas 
markets had thus left the mills with a productive 
capacity which not even the conditions o f war had 
caused to be fully employed. The growth and 
diversification o f the Du Pont mills shows that there 
was no lack o f development possibilities in this 
industry, but these depended on an investment in 
new technology which was not forthcoming in the 
north Somerset mills. The Woolley site therefore 
reverted to its agricultural status, a fate which befell 
the other powder mills in the area in the course o f  
the early decades o f the nineteenth century.
Appendix: Discussion of features in the stable building 
related to the use of water power.
The one-time stable is built into a steep bank below a 
level, embanked area which may have been a small pond. 
In the rear wall of the building, at a point suitable for an 
outlet from this pond, there is a blocked opening, 
terminated by a stone sill, and immediately below this 
there is a deep recess, 2ft 6in. wide, with an inclined soffit 
or ‘breast’, (See Fig. 4d). In one wall of the recess is a 
chase, about a quarter of an inch deep and 2 in. wide, on 
a slight but regular curve of 15 ft radius. This would seem 
to be the score mark made by a high-breast waterwheel 
about 2 ft wide and 30 ft in diameter. Probably no 
examples of such large wheels survive from the eighteenth 
century, but several are documented, e.g. overshot wheels 
by Smeaton at Alston, Cumberland, (c. 1785) and Wood- 
hall, Northumberland, (1775), and the Great Wheel at 
Broseley, Salop.
Before the construction of a partition wall and floors, 
the backfilling of the wheel pit and the raising of the 
lower floor level, such a wheel would have fitted very 
neatly within the building. Its lowest point would have 
been about 1 ft above the surface level of the lower mill 
pond, giving a net fall of 27f ft, and it would have been 
ideal to exploit the high head and limited supply of water 
at the site, although excavating and maintaining a wheel 
pit in clay soil to a mean depth of over 20 ft must have 
presented considerable difficulties. Some of the masonry 
of the stable building is of a different period, probably 
earlier than the construction of the wheel recess, so
perhaps there were earlier installations precluding the 
siting of the wheel further down the hillside where it 
could have stood largely above ground.
There is evidence to suggest that instability of the wheel 
pit caused the wheel’s demise, for the outer (south­
eastern) wall of the recess is out of plumb and bulges 
inwards by 3 in. at the present lower floor level (see Figs. 
4a and 4c). A progressive movement of the side of the pit 
could have led to the score mark on the opposite wall and 
the eventual stopping of the wheel. Further evidence that 
the wheel had a limited life is provided by the absence of 
significant incrustations of lime from the hard water of 
the district and by the presence of deposits of charcoal 
dust which water would have washed away. Deposits of 
lime at fissures in the masonry do suggest that the water­
course above was maintained for a longer period, and a 
smaller wheel of overshot type could have been sub­
stituted, either internally or externally. A blocked 
opening in another part of the south-eastern wall (see Fig. 
4d) has the appearance of a bearing arch and could have 
carried the shaft of this later wheel.
A trial excavation to determine the extent of the wheel 
pit proved inconclusive, revealing compacted earth and 
rubble fill and no sign of the north-western wall of the pit 
within 3f ft of the present floor level, but the original 
floor was probably lower. A transverse wall across the 
mouth of the recess separated two different types of fill, 
perhaps of different periods.
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THE DECLINE OF THE SMALL LANDOWNER I I I
example in Cambridgeshire, where the 
small owner in the fenland village of Willing­
ham continued to make a living, and was able 
to resist the incursions o f large farms, 
whereas at Chippenham (corn-sheep) hold­
ings of 15 to 40 or 45 acres disappeared in the 
period 1560-1636. Thus the small owner 
survived in one village, but disappeared early 
in the seventeenth century in the other. In the 
eighteenth century Wiltshire small owners 
declined rapidly in the chalk areas (corn- 
sheep), but they continued to dominate the 
cheese areas, which concentrated on dairy 
farming. Similarly in Lincolnshire small 
owners survived, and indeed still survive on 
the fens and marsh lands, while they dis­
appeared on the wolds, heath and cliff, much 
of which was enclosed by legislation.68 
Taken together with the Cumbrian phe-
68Margaret Spuflford, ‘Peasant Inheritance Custom s and Land 
Distribution in Cambridgeshire from the sixteenth to the 
eighteenth centuries’, in J Goody, J Thirsk and E P Thom pson, 
eds, Family and Inheritance, Cambridge, 1976, pp 160-1. The 
theme is developed in her book Contrasting Communities, 
Cambridge, 1974. E Kerridge, ‘Agriculture, 1500-1793’, V C H 
Wiltshire, IV, pp 49-50, 59-60; D  B Grigg, ‘Small and Large 
Farms in England and Wales’, Geography, X LV 11I, 1963, p 270; 
Joan Thirsk, English Peasant Farming, 1957, p 2; W O M assing- 
berd’s review o f  Johnson, op cit, in Lincolnshire Notes and Queries, 
XI, 1910-11, pp 26-32.
nomenon o f large farms existing alongside 
the small holdings o f customary tenants, this 
evidence reveals the importance of making 
local distinctions. Furthermore, such re­
gional disparities remain apparent in the 
twentieth century. By the middle of the last 
century large farms (defined by then as over 
500 acres) were found mainly in the south 
Midlands, East Anglia and the southern 
counties, while small farms ( ioo- i 50 acres or 
less) predominated in the north-west, the 
north Midlands, Wales, the south-west, and 
the Lincolnshire fenlands. This cannot be 
explained entirely by the seventeenth- and 
eighteenth-century economic difficulties, or 
by parliamentary enclosure, although re­
gional differences in the latter movement 
may help to account for the situation of large 
farms. The pattern of larger farms in the 
eastern and southern arable areas, and smal­
ler in the pastoral lands, remains largely 
unchanged in the mid-twentieth century.69 It 
suggests a complicated and diverse picture of 
small owner decline stretching from the 
sixteenth century and not finally complete 
today.
Grigg, loc cit, pp 268-79.
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The Financing of Parliamentary Waste Land 
Enclosure: Some Evidence from North 
Somerset, 1770-183o1
By  B J B U C H A N A N
I
H istorical studies o f  enclosure, the process by which the system o f cultivation was transform ed from 
the traditional and corporate m ethod o f 
farming in com m on to the m odern and 
individualistic one o f farm ing in severalty, 
have tended to focus upon the arable open 
fields rather than upon the com m ons and 
waste lands.2 Indeed, the changes in 
farming organization outside open-field 
England have been m ost informatively 
explored in recent years by those approach­
ing the subject as geographers, although 
attention has then necessarily been concen­
trated on the physical rather than the 
economic aspects o f change over tim e.3 
There is therefore a need for the subject o f 
the waste lands to be reclaimed by 
historians, to ensure that the generaliza­
tions which are made about the financing o f 
enclosures are not unduly weighted by the 
research bias tow ards the open fields.
This paper is concerned w ith the subject 
o f  waste-land enclosure costs. It will be
‘This article draws substantially on chapters 2 and 3 of B J Buchanan, ‘Capital Formation in North Somerset, 1750-1830’, thesis submitted to the University of Bristol, 1979. I would like to thank Professor W Ashworth and Dr C G A Clay for their helpful comments and advice. I am also grateful for the help received from MrDMM Shorrocks of the Somerset Record Office (SRO) and Miss M E Williams of the Bristol Archive Office (BAO) and their colleagues.2The case for the inclusion of the waste lands was made by E K C Gonner, Common Land and Inclosure, 1912, pp 192-4, but they have been excluded by more recent scholars, for example D N McCloskey, The Enclosure of Open Fields . . . ’, Jnl Econ Hist, XXXII, 1972, pp 15-35.3For example Michael Williams, ‘The Enclosure of Waste Land in Somerset, 1700-1900’, Trans Inst Brit Geogs, LVII, 1972, pp 99-123, and John Chapman, ‘Parliamentary Enclosure in the Uplands: the Case of the North York Moors’, Ag Hist Rev, XXIV, 1976, pp 1-17-
dem onstrated that, contrary to the assump­
tion am ongst m odern agricultural histor­
ians that land sales were o f  little signifi­
cance as a way o f financing enclosures until 
the nineteenth century, in N orth  Somerset 
at least the m ethod was well established by 
the i77o’s. Ample evidence o f  this claim 
can be extracted from  the enclosure awards 
which reveal details o f both  the financial 
and economic costs imposed by this 
method. The paper examines, first, the 
financing o f the N orth  Somerset enclo­
sures, and second, the relationship between 
this evidence and that which is generally 
available on the subject. By emphasizing 
the economic aspects o f the enclosure o f 
the waste lands it is intended that this study 
should offer a corrective to both  the tradi­
tional concern o f  historians w ith the arable 
open fields, and that o f  geographers w ith 
physical change.
II
O ur initial concern is w ith the parliam ent­
ary enclosure o f  some 42,000 acres o f  waste 
land in the northern third o f  the historic 
county o f Somerset, stretching from the 
southern slopes o f the M endip Hills north­
wards to the River Avon. W ithin this 
region there were three quite different 
farming areas. First there were the uplands, 
chiefly the carboniferous limestone M en- 
dips and its outliers but including also the 
southerly extensions o f  the oolitic lim e­
stone Cotswolds, for example D undry Hill 
south o f Bristol. Second, there was the 
northern extension o f  the central Somerset
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Levels, low -lying and frequently flooded 
peat bogs and alluvial lands that skirted 
m uch o f  the coast from  the m ouths o f the 
Rivers Axe to A von and lay inland by the 
river valleys. Third, there was the rest o f 
N o rth  Somerset, undulating lands between 
the northern  slopes o f the M endips and the 
River A von, made up largely o f fertile red 
marls and sandstones. By the mid-eighteenth 
century this last area was already 
long enclosed and attuned to the market 
econom y provided by the grow ing city 
and port o f  Bristol and the seasonal influx 
o f  visitors to B ath .4 It was therefore the 
under-utilized potential o f the uplands and 
low  m oorlands, offering com m on sheep 
pasture and cattle grazing respectively, that 
excited interest in the second half o f the 
eighteenth century.
The im pulse to enclose, o f course, was 
felt widely at this time, but whereas in 
m any counties the wastes remained com­
m on grazing ground until pressures were 
further intensified in the French W ars,5 in 
N orth  Somerset these were w ith some 
small exceptions the only areas still to be 
enclosed. It was to them , therefore, that 
attention was turned, first to the Mendips 
from  the 1770’s and then to the Levels, 
w ith interest in the latter increasing from 
the i79o’s. The reasons for these differ­
ences in tim ing can be suggested only 
briefly, but it seems likely that the enclo­
sure o f the uplands began early in response 
to wheat prices which fluctuated upwards 
from  the i75o’s because these lighter soils 
could be m ore easily adapted to tillage than 
the richer but heavier soils o f the wet 
grasslands. The incentive to enclose the 
latter came w ith the significant rise in meat 
prices during the war years.6 These stim u­
lated a change in the organization o f land- 
holding in the Levels, if  not in land use.
*WETate, Somerset Enclosure Acts and Awards, 1948, pp 13-25; Peter Mathias, The First Industrial Nation, 1969, pp 92-3. sMichael Turner, English Parliamentary Enclosure, its Historical Geog­
raphy and Economic History, Folkestone, 1980, pp 86-93.6J D Chambers and G E Mingay, The Agricultural Revolution 
1750-1880, 1966, pp 83, no.
Evidence o f the financing o f N orth  
Somerset enclosures did not at first seem 
prom ising. Com m issioners’ accounts are 
rare, thus ruling out the possibility o f  a 
study o f  costs like that conducted so com ­
prehensively for W arwickshire, and very 
little extra-award material has been found, 
unlike that discovered for Buckingham ­
shire.7 However, a close study o f  the 
surviving awards for the period housed in 
the Somerset Record Office has revealed 
that, in the absence o f  financial details o f  a 
m ore orthodox nature, there is neverthe­
less an alternative source o f inform ation 
which can be used to the same end. This 
indirect evidence is to be found am ongst 
the profusion o f  organizational details in 
the awards, for these frequently record 
both the am ount o f land sold to finance the 
enclosure and the capital sum thus raised. It 
m ay seem a kind o f legerdemain to trans­
m ute this land transaction into the total 
public cost o f  the enclosure in question, but 
the commissioners were instructed by the 
relevant Acts o f Parliament to sell such 
proportion o f the land to be enclosed as 
they judged would enable them  to cover 
the cost o f the undertaking, and the details 
in the awards indicate that they did so. 
C orroborative evidence comes from  the 
only award accompanied by a set o f com ­
m issioners’ accounts, for the sum realized 
by the sale o f land as recorded in the form er 
tallies exactly w ith the total cost o f  the 
enclosure as accounted for in the latter.8
It is this practice o f  land sale which 
makes the N orth  Somerset evidence on 
financing markedly different from  that o f 
other areas studied intensively, though this 
is probably only a reflection o f the form er 
concentration on the open-field counties
7J M Martin, ‘The Cost of Parliamentary Enclosure in Warwick­shire’ in E L Jones (ed), Agriculture and Economic Growth in England, 
1650-1815, 1967, pp 128-51. M E Turner, ‘Some Social and Economic Considerations of Parliamentary Enclosure in Bucking­hamshire, 1738-1865’, PhD thesis, University of Sheffield, 1973, and ‘The Cost of Parliamentary Enclosure in Buckinghamshire’, 
Ag Hist Rev, XXI, 1973, pp 35-46.8SRO, Shipham and Winscombe Enclosure Award, Q/RDe 13,
1797-99.
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already observed. Indeed, the m ethod was 
frequently rem arked upon by earlier w ri­
ters w ho had a wide if  generalized familiar­
ity w ith enclosure practices,9 although it 
has been questioned on the basis o f  m ore 
recent scholarship. Thus M  E Turner has 
w ritten that the belief that enclosures were 
ever widely financed by land sales \  . . was 
an erroneous view but one which has been 
repeated often. It was only during the 
nineteenth century that land deductions 
and sales became prevalent. Form erly it 
was strictly applied to certain charity lands 
and then only in specific cases.’10 However, 
o f  the 41 parliam entary enclosures in 
N orth  Somerset between 1770 and 1830 for 
w hich awards survive, 37 were financed by 
the sale o f  land and only four by the 
levying o f a rate. This difference w ould be 
o f  a positive but lim ited interest were it not 
for the possibly different effect o f each 
m ethod on enclosure costs. It has hitherto 
been assumed that the costs o f  waste land 
enclosure were high because o f the physical 
problem s associated w ith the difficult ter­
rain, but a consideration o f the practice o f 
raising capital sums by land sale does 
prom pt the suggestion that procedural or 
adm inistrative factors in these areas may 
have been as im portant as the topographi­
cal ones.
In N orth  Somerset the land was sold at 
public auction after due notice in the parish 
church and in local newspapers. The auc­
tions took place after the commissioners 
had had time to peram bulate the land, 
assessing its quality and situation on the 
advice o f  a surveyor, and they were held at 
som e convenient inn. M eanwhile, a m ort­
gage was arranged, thus allowing w ork to 
beg in .11 Decisions about the am ount to be
9Lord Ernie, English Farming Past and Present, 6th edn, 1961, p 251;Gonner, op cit, p 90; W H R Curtler, The Enclosure and Redistribu­
tion of our Land, Oxford, 1920, p 166.'“Turner, thesis, p 326."For example, SRO, Wookey Enclosure Award Q/RDe 134, 1782-86 and SRO, DD/S/CX, 'Proceedings of the Commission­ers’ 1782-87. In September 1782 a mortgage of the moors and
auctioned were matters for fine judgem ent, 
complicated by tw o sets o f problems.
First, the commissioners had to estimate 
the internal costs, and here there was an 
element o f uncertainty because o f  the need 
for construction works such as drainage 
channels. However, unexpected and es­
calating costs could be met by further land 
sales, o f which there is evidence in bo th  the 
awards and the limited supplem entary 
evidence.12 As an insurance against such 
delays the experienced commissioners may 
have over-estimated the initial acreage to 
be sold, especially as the legal clause direct­
ing the expenditure o f any surplus m o­
nies on lasting im provem ents relieved 
them  o f the task o f dividing this am ongst 
the proprietors. Second, the com m ission­
ers had to assess the external factors affec­
ting the value o f land, and again they 
sometimes misjudged the situation, the 
unexpectedly high prices realized at some 
auctions providing them  w ith m ore abun­
dant funds than anticipated. W hen this 
happened at the W eston-super-M are enclo­
sure the proprietors requested that the 
surplus be spent on further im provem ents 
to walls, banks and roads.13
The possible significance o f these 
administrative factors will now  be seen. 
Balanced as they were on the tw in uncer­
tainties o f internal costs and external va­
lues, land sales could tend to result in larger 
sums o f capital being raised w ith greater 
ease and, therefore, lead to m ore costly 
enclosures, than the m ethod o f financing 
by the imposition o f a rate, often grudg­
ingly paid under threat o f distraint, which 
could therefore tend to result in cheaper 
enclosures.
commons to be enclosed was executed to the Rev Henry Harris and £800 was . . paid into the hands of Mr Robert Wright [a commissioner] who is hereby appointed Treasurer’."For example, SRO, DD/FS, Box 67, FL ‘Bleadon Inclosure 1788’. Two sales were held in 1788, but when in June 1789 it was found '. . . necessary to raise more money for finishing the several works made and to be made in the Inclosure . . .’, a third auction was ordered.IJSRO, DD/BK, Correspondence and Papers; Weston-super-Mare Public Ref Lib, LOO/53, S/W17/43, ‘Commissioner’s Proceed­ings’, ‘Commissioner’s Accounts’ and Sales Bills.
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Evidence on the financing o f enclosures 
in this region has been assembled in Table 
1, w here colum ns I to IV display inform a­
tion established from  the awards. Al­
though o f interest because o f their bearing 
on costs, additional details relating for 
exam ple to the allotments made are om it­
ted on this occasion because attention is 
here directed to the acreage sold (column
III) and the capital sum thus raised (column
IV). The figures in colum n IV are taken in 
this study to constitute the total public 
costs o f  the enclosures listed. Historic 
prices are given throughout.
T he contents o f  the last three columns o f 
Table 1 are derived from  the inform ation in 
the first four. Financial costs per acre are 
show n in colum n V. The three enclosures 
o f  the 1770’s for which figures are available 
support the suggestion that the levying o f  a 
rate tended to keep dow n costs (Doulting 
and Stoke St Michael, 1775-76, 23.05 per 
acre) whilst land sales led to higher costs 
(C om pton Bishop, 1777-79, 61.55 per acre, 
and Brislington, 1778-80, 58.55 per acre), 
for each case involved the physical prob­
lems associated w ith the waste lands, al­
though these varied for individual enclo­
sures, as did other factors such as acreage. 
In the only other rate-financed enclosure 
for which costs are available (Portishead 
and W eston-in-Gordano, 1807-09), severe 
adm inistrative problem s arose from the 
need to sort out tw o inter-m ixed parishes, 
and it may have been this complication 
which over-ruled the contrast w ith con­
tem porary cases financed by land sale.
A lthough land sales meant that prop­
rietors had to meet no direct financial 
obligations, they did have to face a very 
real cost in term s o f  the reduction in the 
am ount o f land allotted, and the loss o f the 
future stream  o f  income they would other­
wise have received.14 I propose to call this
uBAO, 0i097(5)g, letter of December 1809. The Portbury com­moners were aware of this cost and complained that the commis­sioners had sold 102 acres of the best land, *. . . leaving only 156 to be divided’.
the economic cost and to measure it by the 
percentage o f land sold. It is show n in 
column VII. These financial and economic 
costs rarely bore w ith equal severity on the 
same parish. For example, at Locking 
(1800-01) the financial cost averaged nearly 
£10 per acre but the real economic cost in 
terms o f  land and income foregone was less 
than 20 per cent, whilst at Shipham and 
W inscombe (1797-99) the financial cost 
was less than £3 per acre but each prop­
rietor lost over half the land to which he 
was otherwise entitled.
An intriguing aspect o f this relationship 
was the selling price o f land, for this 
influenced both the financial and economic 
costs. It is shown in colum n VI. A lthough 
a high selling price did not necessarily lead 
to a reduction in the financial cost o f 
enclosure, it was generally associated with 
a reduction in the economic cost. This 
inverse relationship between the auction 
price o f  land and the percentage sold is 
shown in Table 2 where the enclosures for 
which this evidence is available are ranked 
according to the former. W ith some excep­
tions (such as early enclosures where fa­
vourable circumstances led to a high selling 
price for land), there was a decline over 
time in the economic cost, which may 
indicate that in general land values rose 
faster than the financial costs o f  enclosure. 
However, it m ust be observed that there 
was here no simple chronological escala­
tion o f financial costs in the m anner which 
is usually accounted for elsewhere in terms 
o f  war-tim e inflation and the leaving till 
last o f the m ore complicated and so more 
costly cases.
The complexity o f the chronological 
problem  may be summarized thus: 2 enclo­
sures w ith Acts as widely separate as 1775 
and 1795 cost below £2 per acre; 8 w ith 
Acts from 1778 to 1801 came in the £2 to £3 
bracket; 9 w ith Acts between 1777 and 
1809 cost between £3 and £4; 12 with Acts 
spreading from  1788 to the end o f  the 
period cost more than £4 per acre. Some
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clues to these widespread variations over 
time are provided by the various factors 
which exerted a probable influence on the 
selling price o f  land and so indirectly on 
financial costs. As show n in Table 2 these 
influences ranged from  the possibility o f 
extra-agricultural use (eg as building land) 
to the changing value o f land in relation to 
its ow n agricultural possibilities and the 
prices o f  arable and animal husbandry 
products m entioned earlier.
The sum m arizing o f  these factors pro­
motes the suggestion that there was at this 
time not one but several land markets, each 
w ith its prevailing values. The force o f this 
point is som ew hat obscured in Table 2 
because the evidence there relates to the 
average price at which land was sold, that 
being for m any enclosures the best infor­
m ation w hich is available. How ever, the 
position is clarified in Table 3, which is 
based on the further analysis o f those 
awards which are sufficiently detailed to 
allow selling prices to be attributed to 
different types o f  land, and those in which 
only one category o f land was offered for 
sale in any case. This evidence shows that 
w ithin each land m arket selling prices 
m oved in distinct but separate patterns, so 
that whilst, for example, the price o f the 
low  m oorland acres rose steadily until the 
early i79o’s, w hen a plateau was reached 
which continued until the last o f the low ­
lands for w hich this inform ation is avail­
able had been enclosed, the much m ore 
modest selling prices o f the M endip up­
lands m oved generally though erratically 
upwards until the second half o f  the i79o’s, 
before falling away thereafter.
Conclusions on such a subject are hazar­
dous, but w ithin the context o f  enclosures 
made costly by the land sale m ethod o f 
raising capital and by the technical and 
topographical problem s o f  the waste lands, 
it was perhaps the operation o f these 
separate land m arkets which stimulated the 
puzzling variations in financial costs per 
acre. Lastly, it may have been because
some o f the earlier enclosures for these 
reasons were made m ore costly than w ould 
otherwise have been the case, and som e o f  
the later ones rendered less costly, that the 
general inflation associated w ith the years 
o f  the French Revolutionary and N apo­
leonic Wars did not in this region (from the 
evidence based on the awards) result in the 
large increases in costs relative to earlier 
years that were m ore generally the case.
The pursuit o f  this line o f enquiry invests 
the purchasers o f land w ith  a special im ­
portance, for their judgem ent was crucial 
to the determ ination o f prices w ithin the 
different markets. From  the awards it is 
possible to make three generalizations. 
Firstly, m ost o f  the land auctioned was 
bought by those already living in the 
region, though not necessarily involved in 
the enclosure in question, nor even living 
in the same parish. The exceptions to this 
generalization were m ostly from  B risto l,15 
but on the whole there was a lack o f 
involvem ent by its citizens which is sur­
prising in view o f the speculations in canal 
and house build ing .16 How ever, it is prob­
ably an indication that the Bristol m erchant 
interest in N orth  Somerset o f the earlier 
decades o f  the eighteenth century had been 
exhausted.17
Secondly, a classification o f  the purchas­
ers o f  land has show n that although the 
gentry predom inated there was consider­
able buying by yeom en farmers, as well as 
by other country dwellers w ho had a less 
personal link w ith farm ing.18 These in­
cluded local clergymen, doctors, lawyers, 
and rural tradesm en, w ho all bought land 
at the sales. Thirdly, the purchasers occas­
ionally included the enclosure com m ission­
ers themselves, for until the turn  o f the 
century (41 Geo III c 101) an involvem ent
lsFor example, SRO, Clevedon Enclosure Award, Q/RDe 78, 1799-1801. Land was bought for £918 by a Bristol butcher, with a grazier as trustee. l6J R Ward, The Finance of Canal Building in Eighteenth-Century 
England, Oxford, 1974, pp 138-40, and ‘Speculative Building at Bristol and Clifton, 1783-1793’, Bus Hist, xx, 1978, pp 3-18. ‘7Buchanan, thesis, pp 258-366. l8Ibid, pp 53-7, Table 2(5).
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w ith the executive aspects o f  the undertak­
ing was no t a barrier to the purchase o f 
land, even w ithin the enclosure concer­
n ed .19
T he rural base o f  m ost purchasers, their 
status as gentry and farmers, and in several 
cases their experience o f  the business o f 
enclosure, together w ith  the general ab­
sence o f  urban speculators, all im ply a 
considerable degree o f  fam iliarity w ith the 
practice o f  farm ing in the region. It is 
likely, therefore, that the prospective buy­
ers m ade their bids in the light o f  an 
awareness o f  the agricultural possibilities o f 
the land on offer. This suggests that, 
despite a current value influenced by the 
pressing dem and for food and the high 
com m odity prices and therefore high rents 
resulting from  this, the land was marginal 
only in the sense o f  being the next unit 
available for cultivation should the cost o f 
bringing it into production  be balanced by 
the revenue it could then produce, and not 
in the sense o f  being inherently poor 
agricultural land. Indeed, in the case o f 
M endip it was possibly an earlier pre­
em ption for the production o f  w ool for 
the local textile industry and for the 
m ining o f  lead and calamine, all in decline 
by the m id-eighteenth century, which had 
restricted it to an agricultural use below  
its potential.20
Ill
The enclosure costs for N o rth  Somerset 
will now  be com pared w ith  the general 
evidence com piled by B A Holderness, 
about w hich this author has concluded that 
although his tables are provisional \  . . it is 
unlikely that further research will m odify 
the trends they reveal very significantly’.21
I9See the following awards: SRO, West Harptree, Q/RDe 18, 1787-90; Wells (East Horrington and Chilcot), Q/RDe 73, 1792-94; Wells (St Cuthbert), Q/RDe 81, 1793-95; Shipham and Winscombe, Q/RDe 13, 1797-99.20J D Hanwell, ‘Agriculture on Mendip’ in W G Hall (ed), M a n  and 
the Mendips, Mendip Society, Frome, 1971, pp 78-9.2IB A Holderness, ‘Capital Formation in Agriculture’ in J P P Higgins and Sidney Pollard (eds), Aspects of Capital Investment in 
Great Britain 1750-1850, 1971, pp 162-70..
It may be seen from  Table 4 that average 
costs in N orth  Somerset, as anticipated, 
were considerably greater than for the 
rate-financed parliamentary enclosures 
(column r). They were how ever unexpec­
tedly less than for the waste lands in 
general (column 4), especially in the sig­
nificant period 1793 to 1815, and when 
grouped by the year o f  the act. It is the 
reason for this anomaly which will now  be 
pursued, but first a com m ent m ust be 
made about the difference between the 
N orth  Somerset waste land costs and those 
for the open fields.
This observation is that the contrast in 
costs persisted despite certain heavy expen­
ditures which were m ore likely to be 
encountered in the open fields than the 
waste lands. Firstly, the fencing o f  the tithe 
ow ner’s allotment could be a very im por­
tant item in open-field enclosures, am ount­
ing in some cases to one-third o f the total, 
but this charge is almost entirely absent 
from the N orth  Somerset aw ards.22 Se­
condly, a cost o f  open-field enclosure 
which has no parallel in the N orth  Som er­
set wastes was the spending on grass 
seeds, which could be m ore than 20 per 
cent o f public costs in the earlier decades, 
though falling away thereafter.23 Thirdly, 
expenditure on road making in open-field 
enclosure was considerable from the 1790’s 
and could am ount to between 20 and 30 per 
cent o f costs.24 Again, there is little com ­
parable evidence in the N orth  Somerset 
awards, some o f which even declared no 
public roads to be necessary (contrary to 
the general assum ption that they would be 
m ost needed where waste land was re­
claimed). This was the case w ith seven 
enclosure awards between 1791 and 1809 
when such costs were particularly high in 
open-field enclosure.25
2Martin, op cit, pp 148-51, Appendix B.23Turner, thesis, pp 322-4, Appendix IX(b).24Ibid, pp 322-4. Also, Martin, op cit, p 137.25Public roads were declared unnecessary at Westbury, 1788-91; Bleadon 1788-91; Banwell, 1795-97; Locking, 1800-01; Tick- enham, 1801-03; Worle, 1801-03; Portishead and Weston-in- Gordano, 1807-09.
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This difficulty in classifying costs 
suggests that the polarization between 
open field and waste land is misleading, 
and that enclosures m ay be m ore instruc­
tively viewed as a re-organization o f land 
holding w ithin a w ide range o f  topographi­
cal, economic and social conditions. Such 
an approach m ay provide a clue to the 
anomaly m entioned previously, namely 
the unexpected difference between the 
average costs o f  N o rth  Somerset enclo­
sures and those o f  the waste lands in 
general. If it is assumed that all waste land 
costs were likely to be similar for topog­
raphical and adm inistrative reasons, then 
this is difficult to explain. But if  these were 
part o f a range o f  conditions and expendi­
tures then it m ay be that the general waste 
land costs w ere heavier than those for 
N orth  Somerset because o f  some special 
difference o f  circumstance. In particular it 
m ay be that whilst the form er were in­
creased by the inclusion o f  reclamation 
schemes, such as that undertaken in the 
East, West and W ildm ore Fens by John 
Rennie in the early nineteenth century at a 
cost o f  £10 per acre,26 the latter were 
prim arily for the purpose o f  enclosure, the 
task o f  m ajor reclam ation being underta­
ken separately.
This suggestion will now  be tested in 
tw o stages. First, the expenditure on ca­
pital im provem ents in N orth  Somerset 
enclosures (ie surveying and construction 
costs) will be com pared w ith the general 
evidence, in order to check that the lower 
overall costs o f  the form er did not mask an 
investm ent in capital w orks as great as that 
in the waste lands generally. Second, the 
three com prehensive drainage schemes in 
the region will be exam ined to determine 
their relation to the enclosure schemes 
upon which they followed.
The rarity o f  com m issioners’ accounts in 
N orth  Somerset means that there is unfor­
tunately little inform ation on the first
26Holdemess, op cit, pp 167-8.
matter, but what is available on the distri­
bution o f costs w ithin enclosure has been 
analysed, and that which relates to capital 
im provem ents has been set out in Table 5. 
It must be admitted that this evidence is 
both  too limited (the three enclosures) and 
too general (that based on John  Billing­
sley), but it does relate to the critical years 
1793 to 1815, and it has a certain internal 
consistency. Thus, in both the upland 
enclosure at Shipham and W inscom be and 
the lowland one at C ongresbury the con­
struction costs represent about 44 per cent 
o f the public expenditure, and although the 
proportion was m ore nearly 59 per cent at 
W eston-super-M are, where investm ent in 
term s o f shillings per acre was also higher, 
it may be recalled that extra w orks were 
undertaken here because unexpectedly high 
capital sums had been raised. In the general 
evidence from Billingsley the im prove­
m ent costs were o f a similar order to those 
in the three specific cases in financial term s, 
though representing a higher proportion  o f 
total costs. But this m ay simply indicate 
that, w ith his first-hand experience o f 
enclosures, Billingsley was able to prevent 
the escape o f certain im provem ent costs to 
other categories.27 U nfortunately, in the 
Shipham and W inscombe enclosure the 
surveyor’s attendance at meetings, though 
not his field w ork, was irretrievably ac­
counted for amongst the adm inistrative 
costs.
A comparison o f this evidence w ith  that 
compiled by Holderness28 suggests that in 
waste land enclosures generally the invest­
m ent in capital im provem ents was twice as 
great as in N orth  Somerset. Betw een 1793 
and 1801 when the im provem ent costs for 
the waste lands in general averaged 66.0s
27John Billingsley (1747-1811) served as commissioner in the following enclosures: West Harptree, 1787-90; Rode and Wing­field, 1790-92; Rodney Stoke, 1791-93; Croscombe and Dinder, 1792-93; Wells (East Horrington and Chilcot), 1792-94; Wells (St Cuthbert), 1793-95; East Harptree, 1794-96; Cheddar, 1795-1801; Cheddar, Priddy and Rodney Stoke, 1811 until his death. He was the author of the General View of the Agriculture of 
the County of Somerset, drawn up in the year 1795, Bath, 1797. 28Holderness, op cit, p 169, Table 3B.
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per acre, the N orth  Somerset evidence 
suggests costs o f  about 33.05 per acre. For 
the years 1802 to 1815 the figures were 
respectively 100.15 per acre and 57.35 per 
acre, and for the succeeding years they 
were 76.05 per acre and 32.05 per acre. 
Despite the very considerable limitations o f 
this comparative evidence, the gap be­
tw een this investm ent in the waste lands in 
general and those in N orth  Somerset is 
here show n to be so great as to make it 
unlikely that the large-scale reclamations o f 
the form er could have been undertaken 
w ithin the m uch low er im provem ent costs 
o f  the latter.
Before considering the role o f the drain­
age schemes it is o f interest to refer briefly 
to those construction works which were 
undertaken w ithin enclosures. In Table 5 
these are arranged under such heads as 
roads, fences and drainage ditches, but this 
neat classification belies the great range o f 
provisions revealed by the descriptive evid­
ence in the awards. The setting out o f 
public roads was always a first task, but as 
already noted these were sometimes found 
unnecessary. The provision o f fencing also 
varied greatly. Its im portance was lessened 
in the lowlands because the essential drain­
age ditches could there function as bound­
aries, thus constituting a reduction in cost. 
A nd ju s t as m ost drainage works were 
financed from  within the undertakings, so 
until the turn o f the century and particu­
larly w ithin the M endip enclosures it was 
not uncom m on for the fencing o f indivi­
dual allotments to be covered by public 
costs, though not the subdivisions w ithin 
farms. After the tu rn  o f the century this 
was less likely, but the outer boundaries 
(subject to negotiation with adjoining par­
ishes), the public roads, and the land to be 
sold, were all still likely to be fenced. The 
allotments relating to special rights, for 
example those made frequently in lieu o f 
the lo rd’s right o f  soil, or occasionally in 
respect o f  com m on rights attached to glebe 
land, or very rarely in lieu o f  tithes, were
all awarded after the sale o f  land. Even 
w hen fenced as a public cost, therefore, 
they still bore the economic cost o f enclo­
sure. But the fact that in all cases these 
varied and im portant construction w orks 
were limited to the individual enclosures, 
suggests that the prim ary purpose was land 
reorganization and not comprehensive re­
clamation. The function o f the large drain­
age undertakings in the lowlands m ust 
therefore now  be considered.
The general powers o f the Com m issions 
o f  Sewers to seek the control o f flood- 
waters in the Levels were long 
established.29 B ut from  the later decades o f 
the eighteenth century they were being 
urged by the agricultural interest to em ­
bark upon ambitious new schemes for 
whole catchment areas, and this they were 
unwilling to do. Their caution arose essen­
tially from the fear o f  jeopardizing their 
personal finances by initiating works to ­
wards which those benefiting had no obli­
gations established by traditions o f  
tenure.30 The proprietors were therefore 
obliged to obtain parliam entary authoriza­
tion for the im provem ents they sought, a 
step which led to the appointm ent o f  a 
body o f commissioners w ith the pow er to 
execute certain capital works, financed by 
the levying o f a rate. As w ith the drainage 
aspects o f  enclosure, the adm inistration o f  
the completed works reverted to the C om ­
missioners o f  Sewers.
The financial aspects o f  the drainage 
schemes have been analysed in detail else­
where, and for present purposes it is only 
possible to state briefly that in the Axe 
Drainage (1802-10) the average cost was
80.55 per acre, o f which capital im prove-
29Sidney and Beatrice Webb, Statutory Authorities for Special Purposes, 1922, reprinted 1963, pp 39-45. Their warning that ‘this is the most obscure corner in the whole of English Local Government’ is still relevant despite the work of Michael Williams, The 
Draining of the Somerset Levels, Cambridge, 1970, for in this the focus of attention is the landscape and not administration and finance.J°SRO, D/RA SWn, ‘Proceedings of the Commissioners of Sewers in the business of the Congresbury Drainage’ 1811-12, and the ‘Case for the opinion of Consr Moore’ 30 June 1812, and 18 November 1812.
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m ents accounted for 65.45 per acre, whilst 
in the W eston Drainage (1810-15) the 
figures were respectively 113.35 and 61.55 
per acre. In the Congresbury Drainage 
(1819-26) they were 93.75 and 69.95 per 
acre.31
It cannot be claimed that the same 
low land acres were necessarily subject to 
both  parliam entary enclosure and parlia­
m entary drainage schemes, but the overlap 
was sufficiently great to bestow signific­
ance upon an exercise whereby the costs 
sustained in those parishes which were 
previously the subject o f  an enclosure 
award are related to the costs o f the subse­
quent drainage scheme. For example, in 
the six parishes enclosed between 1777 and
1801 which later form ed part o f the Axe 
Drainage scheme o f 1802-10, the com ­
bined cost o f enclosure (averaging 69.75 per 
acre) and drainage (80.55 per acre) was
150.25 per acre. This figure for the separate 
but related processes is comparable to that 
for the waste lands in general where such 
w orks were undertaken jo in tly  at an aver­
age cost o f  110.05 per acre in the years 1793 
to 1801, and 150.05 per acre in the years
1802 to 1815 (Table 4).
The com plem entary relationship between 
lowland enclosure and drainage in N orth  
Somerset can be examined in greater detail 
and in term s o f  capital im provem ents in 
one instance, and then only because o f the 
rare survival o f the extra-aw ard documents 
o f  the C ongresbury, Week St Lawrence 
and Puxton enclosure o f  1809-16 which 
preceded the C ongresbury Drainage scheme 
o f 1819-26. The overlap applied to 
about one-third o f the acreage drained; 
to the personnel, for Young Sturge 
acted as com m issioner for the enclo-
3'Buchanan, thesis, pp 98-132 and Tables 3(3) to 3(10). Capital improvement costs here cover those expenditures crucial to the new works: surveying, construction, land purchases, and damages. The last two items were relatively unimportant in the Axe and Congresbury schemes (averaging 9. or per acre), but more important in the Weston scheme (40.05 per acre) because of the complication presented by a tide mill.
sure and surveyor to both  undertakings;32 
and to the basic engineering concept, for 
when John Rennie drew  up his drainage 
plans the proposed new cut from the sea 
back into the m oors linked up w ith chan­
nels dug during the recently com pleted 
enclosure.33
This close constructional relationship 
was reflected in the financial aspects o f  the 
schemes, which provide specific evidence 
o f  the general case being made. Thus, in 
terms o f the investm ent in capital im prove­
ments the Congresbury enclosure ( 3 2 . 0 5  per 
acre, Table 5) and drainage (69.95 per acre, 
see above) costs at 101.95 per acre were 
very close to the putative capital costs o f 
100.15 per acre for the years 1802-15 f ° r the 
waste lands generally (see above) though 
greater than the 76.05 per acre for the years 
from  1816 when the large reclamations 
may have been completed.
The conclusion to this analysis is that 
whilst the average costs o f N orth Somerset 
enclosures were significantly greater than 
those for open-field enclosure, they were 
less than for the waste lands generally 
because the extensive drainage provisions 
which com m only featured as an enclosure 
cost in the latter were to be found in N o rth  
Somerset as a post-enclosure cost. The 
Congresbury Enclosure and Drainage 
schemes offer the m ost detailed evidence o f 
the close relationship between the two.
Viewed in this perspective the N orth  
Somerset enclosures were an organiza­
tional preliminary to that further invest­
ment in drainage, soil reclamation and 
farm creation which was essential if  the 
upland and lowland wastes were to be 
converted into productive farms. B ut con­
tem porary evidence on rents suggests that 
because this subsequent and cumulative 
investm ent was needed to consolidate the 
initial capital input through enclosure, the
3iYoung Sturge was a commissioner in the following enclosures: Portishead, 1807-09; Congresbury, 1809-16; Wraxall, 1813-19; Long Ashton, 1813-20; Uphill, 1813-18; and in the Weston Drainage scheme, 1810-15.33SRO, Congresbury Drainage Award, Q/RDe 139.
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rates o f return in the waste lands were not 
as high as in the already established agricul­
tural areas where they were less likely to be 
eroded by such heavy post-enclosure costs.
IV
It is possible the close attention to docu­
m entary evidence m ay place this study 
am ongst those referred to pejoratively as 
‘antiquarian’ and ‘source-orientated’, but 
these regional roots provide an informed 
base from  which to probe the accepted 
notions on the subject, identifying certain 
problem s which the generalizations obs­
cure.
First, there is the question o f the way in 
w hich enclosures were financed. It has 
been dem onstrated that, contrary to the 
current view, capital sums were raised by 
land sale from  at least the 1770’s. The lack 
o f evidence for the use o f  this m ethod in 
other waste land regions may indicate only 
that this inform ation has not previously 
been thought relevant, rather than that it 
does not exist. For example, although land 
sales were authorized in each o f  the enclo­
sure acts o f the eighteenth century des­
cribed in detail by the H am m onds in The 
Village Labourer,34 no subsequent study has 
rem arked on this fact, even though that for 
H olland Fen (1767, 22,000 acres) was in an 
area which has since inspired much re­
search.35 But the question of how  widely 
this m ethod was em ployed is an im portant 
one, both in the context o f  the individual 
enclosures, for it freed the commissioners 
from  the constraints o f  rate finance, and in 
that o f the subject as a whole, for about 
one-third o f  all enclosure was o f the com -
J4J L and Barbara Hammond, The Village Labourer 1760-1832, 1920, 
PP 309-30. John Chapman has recently drawn attention to the re-distributive aspect of land sales, ‘Land purchasers at enclosure: evidence from West Sussex’, Local Historian, XII, 1977, 
PP 3 3 7—4 1, but without reference to the capital sums raised or the dates of the enclosures.3SH C Darby, The Draining of the Fens, Cambridge, 1940, revised 1969; D B Grigg, The Agricultural Revolution in South Lincolnshire, Cambridge, 1966; Dorothy Summers, The Great Level, Newton Abbot, 1976.
mons and wastes.36 Clearly m ore evidence 
is needed, and if  a distinction could be 
made between land sales as a valid alterna­
tive to rate finance, and land deductions as 
only one o f several ways o f m eeting the 
rate, then the subject could be placed upon 
a much firm er analytical foundation.37
Second, there is the m atter o f the influ­
ences upon the cost o f enclosure. These are 
usually discussed in terms o f the physical 
problem s and the claims to land, but the 
recognition o f  the im portance o f certain 
administrative procedures and o f the land 
sales to which they gave rise, places the 
subject in a new perspective by shifting the 
focus from  the endogenously determ ined 
demand for capital to the question o f  its 
supply. N ot only did this resort to the land 
m arket affect the m agnitude o f the capital 
sum available, it also introduced an ele­
m ent o f personal judgem ent into the busi­
ness o f enclosure (whether through the 
com m issioners’ decisions about the 
am ount o f land to be sold or the purchas­
ers’ decisions about the price o f  land to be 
bought) and so allowed a note o f  unpredic­
tability to enter into the financial and 
economic costs and their variations over 
time.
Third, there is the problem  o f classifica­
tion. Ambiguities arise at several levels, 
and in so far as such evidence is used as a 
basis for generalization or aggregation they 
are a serious m atter. It is probable that 
m uch construction w ork financed by sur­
plus funds w ithin the N orth  Somerset 
enclosures, or as part o f large-scale recla­
m ation w ithin the waste lands generally, 
should be m ore properly regarded as an 
investm ent consequent upon enclosure 
than a cost o f  enclosure itself. Such distinc­
tions are difficult to establish w ithin the
3<5Turner, op cit, 1980, pp 69-71, Table II. 27.7 per cent of all parliamentary enclosure before 1793 was of commons and waste and 31.3 per cent of all that between 1793 and 1815.37Since completing this article I have been able to read Dr Turner’s forthcoming study, ‘Cost, Finance and Parliamentary Enclosure’, to be published in the Econ Hist Rev. I am most grateful to him for this opportunity.
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This difficulty in classifying costs 
suggests that the polarization between 
open field and waste land is misleading, 
and that enclosures m ay be m ore instruc­
tively viewed as a re-organization o f  land 
holding w ithin a wide range o f  topographi­
cal, economic and social conditions. Such 
an approach m ay provide a clue to the 
anom aly m entioned previously, namely 
the unexpected difference between the 
average costs o f  N orth  Somerset enclo­
sures and those o f the waste lands in 
general. If  it is assumed that all waste land 
costs were likely to be similar for topog­
raphical and adm inistrative reasons, then 
this is difficult to explain. But if  these were 
part o f  a range o f  conditions and expendi­
tures then it m ay be that the general waste 
land costs were heavier than those for 
N orth  Somerset because o f  some special 
difference o f  circumstance. In particular it 
may be that whilst the form er were in­
creased by the inclusion o f  reclamation 
schemes, such as that undertaken in the 
East, West and W ildm ore Fens by John 
Rennie in the early nineteenth century at a 
cost o f  £10 per acre,26 the latter were 
prim arily for the purpose o f  enclosure, the 
task o f  m ajor reclam ation being underta­
ken separately.
This suggestion will now  be tested in 
tw o stages. First, the expenditure on ca­
pital im provem ents in N orth  Somerset 
enclosures (ie surveying and construction 
costs) will be com pared w ith the general 
evidence, in order to check that the lower 
overall costs o f  the form er did not mask an 
investm ent in capital w orks as great as that 
in the waste lands generally. Second, the 
three com prehensive drainage schemes in 
the region will be examined to determine 
their relation to the enclosure schemes 
upon which they followed.
The rarity o f  com m issioners’ accounts in 
N orth  Somerset means that there is unfor­
tunately little inform ation on the first
26Holderness, op cit, pp 167-8.
matter, but what is available on the distri­
bution o f  costs w ithin enclosure has been 
analysed, and that which relates to capital 
im provem ents has been set out in Table 5. 
It m ust be adm itted that this evidence is 
both too limited (the three enclosures) and 
too general (that based on John Billing­
sley), but it does relate to the critical years 
1793 to 1815, and it has a certain internal 
consistency. Thus, in both the upland 
enclosure at Shipham and W inscombe and 
the lowland one at Congresbury the con­
struction costs represent about 44 per cent 
o f the public expenditure, and although the 
proportion was m ore nearly 59 per cent at 
W eston-super-M are, where investm ent in 
term s o f shillings per acre was also higher, 
it may be recalled that extra w orks were 
undertaken here because unexpectedly high 
capital sums had been raised. In the general 
evidence from  Billingsley the im prove­
m ent costs were o f a similar order to those 
in the three specific cases in financial terms, 
though representing a higher proportion o f 
total costs. But this may simply indicate 
that, w ith his first-hand experience o f 
enclosures, Billingsley was able to prevent 
the escape o f certain im provem ent costs to 
other categories.27 U nfortunately, in the 
Shipham and W inscombe enclosure the 
surveyor’s attendance at meetings, though 
not his field w ork, was irretrievably ac­
counted for am ongst the administrative 
costs.
A comparison o f this evidence with that 
compiled by Holderness28 suggests that in 
waste land enclosures generally the invest­
m ent in capital im provem ents was twice as 
great as in N orth  Somerset. Between 1793 
and 1801 when the im provem ent costs for 
the waste lands in general averaged 66.05
27John Billingsley (1747-1811) served as commissioner in the following enclosures: West Harptree, 1787-90; Rode and Wing­field, 1790-92; Rodney Stoke, 1791-93; Croscombe and Dinder, 1792-93; Wells (East Horrington and Chilcot), 1792-94; Wells (St Cuthbert), 1793-95; East Harptree, 1794-96; Cheddar, 1795-1801; Cheddar, Priddy and Rodney Stoke, 1811 until his death. He was the author of the General View of the Agriculture of 
the County of Somerset, drawn up in the year 179s, Bath, 1797. 2SHolderness, op cit, p 169, Table 3B.
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per acre, the N o rth  Somerset evidence 
suggests costs o f  about 33.05 per acre. For 
the years 1802 to 1815 the figures were 
respectively 100.15 per acre and 57.35 per 
acre, and for the succeeding years they 
were 76.05 per acre and 32.05 per acre. 
Despite the very considerable lim itations o f 
this comparative evidence, the gap be­
tween this investm ent in the waste lands in 
general and those in N orth  Somerset is 
here show n to be so great as to make it 
unlikely that the large-scale reclamations o f 
the form er could have been undertaken 
w ithin the m uch low er im provem ent costs 
o f  the latter.
Before considering the role o f  the drain­
age schemes it is o f  interest to refer briefly 
to those construction works which were 
undertaken w ithin  enclosures. In Table 5 
these are arranged under such heads as 
roads, fences and drainage ditches, but this 
neat classification belies the great range o f 
provisions revealed by the descriptive evid­
ence in the awards. The setting out o f 
public roads was always a first task, but as 
already noted these were sometimes found 
unnecessary. The provision o f fencing also 
varied greatly. Its im portance was lessened 
in the lowlands because the essential drain­
age ditches could there function as bound­
aries, thus constituting a reduction in cost. 
And ju st as m ost drainage w orks were 
financed from  w ithin the undertakings, so 
until the turn o f  the century and particu­
larly w ithin the M endip enclosures it was 
not uncom m on for the fencing o f indivi­
dual allotments to be covered by public 
costs, though not the subdivisions w ithin 
farms. After the turn  o f the century this 
was less likely, but the outer boundaries 
(subject to negotiation w ith adjoining par­
ishes), the public roads, and the land to be 
sold, were all still likely to be fenced. The 
allotments relating to special rights, for 
example those m ade frequently in lieu o f 
the lo rd’s right o f  soil, or occasionally in 
respect o f com m on rights attached to glebe 
land, or very rarely in lieu o f  tithes, were
all awarded after the sale o f land. Even 
w hen fenced as a public cost, therefore, 
they still bore the economic cost o f enclo­
sure. But the fact that in all cases these 
varied and im portant construction w orks 
were limited to the individual enclosures, 
suggests that the prim ary purpose was land 
reorganization and not comprehensive re­
clamation. The function o f  the large drain­
age undertakings in the lowlands m ust 
therefore now  be considered.
The general powers o f the Com m issions 
o f  Sewers to seek the control o f flood- 
waters in the Levels were long 
established.29 But from  the later decades o f  
the eighteenth century they were being 
urged by the agricultural interest to em ­
bark upon ambitious new schemes for 
whole catchment areas, and this they were 
unwilling to do. Their caution arose essen­
tially from  the fear o f jeopardizing their 
personal finances by initiating works to ­
wards which those benefiting had no obli­
gations established by traditions o f 
tenure.30 The proprietors were therefore 
obliged to obtain parliam entary authoriza­
tion for the im provem ents they sought, a 
step which led to the appointm ent o f a 
body o f commissioners w ith the pow er to 
execute certain capital works, financed by 
the levying o f  a rate. As w ith the drainage 
aspects o f enclosure, the adm inistration o f 
the completed works reverted to the C om ­
missioners o f Sewers.
The financial aspects o f the drainage 
schemes have been analysed in detail else­
where, and for present purposes it is only 
possible to state briefly that in the Axe 
Drainage (1802-10) the average cost was
80.55 per acre, o f  which capital im prove-
29Sidney and Beatrice Webb, Statutory Authorities for Special Purposes, 1922, reprinted 1963, pp 39-45. Their warning that ‘this is the most obscure corner in the whole of English Local Government’ is still relevant despite the work of Michael Williams, The 
Draining of the Somerset Levels, Cambridge, 1970, for in this the focus of attention is the landscape and not administration and finance.3°SRO, D/RA SW11, ‘Proceedings of the Commissioners of Sewers in the business of the Congresbury Drainage’ 1811-12, and the ‘Case for the opinion of Consr Moore’ 30 June 1812, and 18 November 1812.
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m ents accounted for 65.45 per acre, whilst 
in the W eston Drainage (1810-15) the 
figures were respectively 113.35 and 61.55 
per acre. In the C ongresbury Drainage 
(1819—26) they were 93.75 and 69.95 per 
acre.31
It cannot be claimed that the same 
lowland acres were necessarily subject to 
both  parliam entary enclosure and parlia­
m entary drainage schemes, but the overlap 
was sufficiently great to bestow  signific­
ance upon an exercise w hereby the costs 
sustained in those parishes which were 
previously the subject o f  an enclosure 
award are related to the costs o f the subse­
quent drainage scheme. For example, in 
the six parishes enclosed betw een 1777 and
1801 which later form ed part o f the Axe 
Drainage scheme o f  1802-10, the com ­
bined cost o f  enclosure (averaging 69.75 per 
acre) and drainage (80.55 per acre) was
150.25 per acre. This figure for the separate 
but related processes is comparable to that 
for the waste lands in general where such 
w orks were undertaken jo in tly  at an aver­
age cost o f  110.05 per acre in the years 1793 
to 1801, and 150.05 per acre in the years
1802 to 1815 (Table 4).
The com plem entary relationship between 
lowland enclosure and drainage in N orth  
Somerset can be examined in greater detail 
and in term s o f capital im provem ents in 
one instance, and then only because o f the 
rare survival o f  the extra-aw ard documents 
o f  the Congresbury, Week St Lawrence 
and Puxton enclosure o f 1809-16 which 
preceded the C ongresbury Drainage scheme 
o f  1819-26. The overlap applied to 
about one-third o f  the acreage drained; 
to the personnel, for Young Sturge 
acted as com m issioner for the enclo-
3‘Buchanan, thesis, pp 98-132 and Tables 3(3) to 3(10). Capital improvement costs here cover those expenditures crucial to the new works: surveying, construction, land purchases, and damages. The last two items were relatively unimportant in the Axe and Congresbury schemes (averaging 9.05 peracre), butmore important in the Weston scheme (40.05 per acre) because of the complication presented by a tide mill.
sure and surveyor to bo th  undertakings;32 
and to the basic engineering concept, for 
w hen John Rennie drew  up his drainage 
plans the proposed new cut from the sea 
back into the moors linked up w ith chan­
nels dug during the recently completed 
enclosure.33
This close constructional relationship 
was reflected in the financial aspects o f  the 
schemes, which provide specific evidence 
o f the general case being made. Thus, in 
term s o f the investm ent in capital im prove­
ments the Congresbury enclosure ( 32 .05  per 
acre, Table 5) and drainage (69.95 per acre, 
see above) costs at 101.95 per acre were 
very close to the putative capital costs o f  
100.15 per acre for the years 1802-15 for the 
waste lands generally (see above) though 
greater than the 76.05 per acre for the years 
from  1816 when the large reclamations 
may have been completed.
The conclusion to this analysis is that 
whilst the average costs o f  N orth  Somerset 
enclosures were significantly greater than 
those for open-field enclosure, they were 
less than for the waste lands generally 
because the extensive drainage provisions 
which com m only featured as an enclosure 
cost in the latter were to be found in N orth  
Somerset as a post-enclosure cost. The 
Congresbury Enclosure and Drainage 
schemes offer the most detailed evidence o f 
the close relationship between the two.
Viewed in this perspective the N orth  
Somerset enclosures were an organiza­
tional preliminary to that further invest­
ment in drainage, soil reclamation and 
farm creation which was essential if the 
upland and lowland wastes were to be 
converted into productive farms. But con­
tem porary evidence on rents suggests that 
because this subsequent and cumulative 
investm ent was needed to consolidate the 
initial capital input through enclosure, the
32Young Sturge was a commissioner in the following enclosures: Portishead, 1807-09; Congresbury, 1809-16; Wraxall, 1813-19; Long Ashton, 1813-20; Uphill, 1813-18; and in the Weston Drainage scheme, 1810-15.33SRO, Congresbury Drainage Award, Q/RDe 139.
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rates o f  return  in the waste lands were not 
as h igh as in the already established agricul­
tural areas w here they were less likely to be 
eroded by such heavy post-enclosure costs.
IV
It is possible the close attention to docu­
m entary  evidence may place this study 
am ongst those referred to pejoratively as 
‘antiquarian’ and ‘source-orientated’, but 
these regional roots provide an informed 
base from  w hich to probe the accepted 
notions on the subject, identifying certain 
problem s w hich the generalizations obs­
cure.
First, there is the question o f  the way in 
which enclosures were financed. It has 
been dem onstrated that, contrary to the 
current view, capital sums were raised by 
land sale from  at least the 1770’s. The lack 
o f  evidence for the use o f  this m ethod in 
other waste land regions may indicate only 
that this inform ation has not previously 
been thought relevant, rather than that it 
does no t exist. For example, although land 
sales were authorized in each o f  the enclo­
sure acts o f  the eighteenth century des­
cribed in detail by the H am m onds in The 
Village Labourer,H no subsequent study has 
rem arked on this fact, even though that for 
H olland Fen (1767, 22,000 acres) was in an 
area w hich has since inspired much re­
search.35 But the question o f how  widely 
this m ethod was employed is an im portant 
one, both  in the context o f the individual 
enclosures, for it freed the commissioners 
from  the constraints o f  rate finance, and in 
that o f  the subject as a whole, for about 
one-third o f  all enclosure was o f the com ­
34J L and Barbara Hammond, The Village Labourer 1760-1832, 1920, pp 309-30. John Chapman has recently drawn attention to the re-distributive aspect ofland sales, ‘Land purchasers at enclosure: evidence from West Sussex’, Local Historian, XII, 1977, PP 337—41 > but without reference to the capital sums raised or the dates of the enclosures.35H C Darby, The Draining of the Fens, Cambridge, 1940, revised 1969; D B Grigg, The Agricultural Revolution in South Lincolnshire,Cambridge, 1966; Dorothy Summers, The Great Level, NewtonAbbot, 1976.
mons and w astes.36 Clearly m ore evidence 
is needed, and if  a distinction could be 
made between land sales as a valid alterna­
tive to rate finance, and land deductions as 
only one o f several ways o f  meeting the 
rate, then the subject could be placed upon 
a much firmer analytical foundation.37
Second, there is the m atter o f the influ­
ences upon the cost o f enclosure. These are 
usually discussed in terms o f the physical 
problem s and the claims to land, but the 
recognition o f the im portance o f certain 
administrative procedures and o f  the land 
sales to which they gave rise, places the 
subject in a new perspective by shifting the 
focus from the endogenously determined 
demand for capital to the question o f its 
supply. N ot only did this resort to the land 
market affect the m agnitude o f  the capital 
sum available, it also introduced an ele­
ment o f personal judgem ent into the busi­
ness o f enclosure (whether through the 
comm issioners’ decisions about the 
am ount o f land to be sold or the purchas­
ers’ decisions about the price o f  land to be 
bought) and so allowed a note o f unpredic­
tability to enter into the financial and 
economic costs and their variations over 
time.
Third, there is the problem  o f classifica­
tion. Ambiguities arise at several levels, 
and in so far as such evidence is used as a 
basis for generalization or aggregation they 
are a serious matter. It is probable that 
much construction w ork financed by sur­
plus funds within the N orth  Somerset 
enclosures, or as part o f large-scale recla­
m ation w ithin the waste lands generally, 
should be m ore properly regarded as an 
investm ent consequent upon enclosure 
than a cost o f enclosure itself. Such distinc­
tions are difficult to establish within the
36Turner, op cit, 1980, pp 69-71, Table 11. 27.7 per cent of all parliamentary enclosure before 1793 was of commons and waste and 31.3 per cent of all that between 1793 and 1815.37Since completing this article I have been able to read Dr Turner’s forthcoming study, ‘Cost, Finance and Parliamentary Enclosure’, to be published in the Econ Hist Rev. 1 am most grateful to him for this opportunity.
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overall sum recorded as that raised to 
finance the undertaking, but the iden­
tification of this problem, and of others 
raised here, shows the importance of re­
gional evidence. It is thus as both a sig­
nificant part of the general subject in its
own right and as a corrective to the 
traditional emphasis on the open fields, 
that waste land enclosures in their financial 
aspects constitute an important but neglec­
ted area o f research.
T A B L E  I
Parliamentary Enclosure in North Somerset, 1770-1830
I II III I V V VI Vll
C o m m o n  Land Selling 
Price ofFinancial Econoti
Act Land Cost of Cost per Land Cost. 11
S R O — Acreage Lowland Upland Open Sold Enclosure Acre Per Acre centajt
Q / R D e  Parish Award enclosed Waste Waste Fields Acres £ shillings shillings So/|
Cranmore 1770 (400)1 Mendip62 Ubley 1 771-73 902 Mendip 164 18.2
58 Doulting and Stoke RateSt Michael 1 7 7 5 -7 6 1,200 Mendip Levied 1,382 23.0117 ComptonBishop 1777-79 275 Moors 28 845 61.5 603.6 10.2130 Brislington 1778-80 400 BrislingtonCommon 20 1,170 58.5 1,170.0 5-°|
27 SheptonMallet 1782-85 724 Mendip RateLevied
134 Wookey 1782-86 1.193 Moors Mendip 411 4 ,338 72.7 211.1 34 5 |132 Blagdon 1784-87 967 Mendip 283 2,061 42.6 1 4 5 7 29.3118 WestHarptree 1787-90 857 Mendip 438 2,703 63 1 1234 51 X|22 Bleadon 1788-91 M94 Moors Mendip 243 5.955 99-7 490.1 20.4
7 i ComptonMartin 1788-91 [664] Mendip 37 2 [2,232] 67.2 120.0 56.0I'21 Westbury 1788-91 841 Moors Mendip 166 3.091 73-5 372 .4
55 Rode and Wingfield 1790-92 489 RodeCommon 53 10.8
74 RodneyStoke 1791-93 754 Moors 56 2,788 73-9 995-7 7 4 1
72 Croscombe Rateand Dinder 1792-93 603 Mendip Levied
73 Wells (East Horringtonand Chilcot) 1792-94 701 Mendip 126 [1,4 4 9] 41-3 230.0 18.0
47 Kewstoke 1 7 9 3 -9 4 160 Moors 16 903 112.9 1,128.8 10.0 181 Wells (Out Parish ofSt Cuthbert) 1 79 3 -9 5 4,343 Moors Mendip 773 11,319 52.1 292.9 17.8
65 EastHarptree 1794-96 1.033 Mendip 255 2,580 49-9 202.3 24 741 Pilton and Moors MendipNorth Wotton 1 7 9 4 -9 6 961 882 acres 79 acres 62 3,1992 72.5 1,031.9 7.0
42 Banwell 1795-97 1,001 Moors Mendip 138 4,060 81.1 588.4 13-81
38 Cheddar 1795-1801 (4,400) Moors Mendip 400 587 8,119 36 .9 276.6 13 3<— 4,000 acres — * acresOpenFields
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I II III IV V VI VII
Common Land Selling 
Price ofFinancial Economic
Act Land Cost of Cost per Land Cost. Per­
SRO — Acreage Lowland Upland Open Sold Enclosure Acre Per Acre centage
'/RDe Parish Award enclosed Waste Waste Fields Acres £ shillings shillings Sold
23 Chewton
Mendip 1797-1800 2,266 Mendip 345 5,567 49.1 322.7 15.2
13 Shipham and
MendipW inscombe 1797-99 1,072 550 3,129 58.4 113-8 51-3
76 Portbury 1798-1806 962 M oors Mendip 244 5,393 112.1 442.0 25.4
Outlier
78 Clevedon 1799-1801 488 Moors Mendip 52 1,762 72.2 677-7 10.7
Outlier
70 Locking 1800-01 (161) M oors 3 i 1,605 199.4 i , 035-5 19.2
46 Tickenham 1801-03 561 M oors Mendip 57 1,658 59-1 581.7 10.2
Outlier
53 Worle 1801-03 211 Moors Mendip 120 1,232 116.8 205.3 56.9
6 Backwell 1807-12 (885) Mendip
Outlier
277 3 i -3
60 Portishead 
and W eston- Mendip
T w o
Rates
in-Gordano 1807-09 (800) M oors Outlier Levied 3,430 85.8
33 Congresbury, 
Week St 
Lawrence and
1809
and Mendip Open
Puxton 1814-16 (820) Moors Outlier Fields 92 3,257 79-4 708.0 11.2
23 W eston-
super-Mare 1810-15 993 437
acres
417
acres
139
acres
72 4,972 100.1 1,381.1 7-2
M oors Mendip Open
Fields
24 W rington and 1810-13 1 Mendip
Outlier
210 )
35 Yatton and 
Kenn 1810-15
j (3,650) Moors + 555 345 >
15.2
33 Cheddar,
Priddy and 
Rodney
1811 
and
Stoke 1816-21 (1,100) Mendip 644 7,570 137-6 235-1 58.5
19 Long Ashton 1813-20 (690) Mendip Open 65 9-4
Outlier Fields
24 Uphill 1813-18 388 M oors Mendip 40 57 14-7
<— 348 acres —> acres
Open
Fields
29 Wraxall,
Nailsea and Mendip Open 96 5-9
Flax Bourton 1813-19 (1,617) M oors Outlier Fields (2 1 acres sold for £1,279 =  1,218.1 per acre)
4 Berkley and Open
Standerwick 1814-18 (300) Com m ons Fields 49 C 794 119.6 732.2 16.3
88 Portishead 1814-23 703 403
acres
Mendip
Outlier
300
acres
Open
Fields
41 2 ,150-1 106.7 1,048.8 10.2
13 Dundry 1815-19 (236) Cotswold 46 [1,821] 154-3 791.7 19-5
Outlier
1 tee: E nclosure aw ards as indicated .
tes: 1 P arentheses indicate an es tim ated  figure , usually  derived  from  the A ct o f  P arliam ent. Square brackets indicate a figure arrived  at by  calculation, usually
from  in fo rm atio n  w ith in  the aw ard .
2 C osts  do  n o t refer to  the  up land  acres, as the M end ip  p ro p rie to rs  asked tha t they  shou ld  pay the ir o w n  charges.
3 C osts  do  n o t refer to  the o pen  fields, w hose  p rop rie to rs  b o re  a separate charge. T h is d iscre tionary  po w er w as au tho rized  in fo u r o f  the la ter acts 
covering  b o th  w aste  lands and  open  fields, b u t it appears to  have been exercised on ly  in this case.
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TABLE 2
N o r th  S o m erse t E n clo su res R an ked  A c c o r d in g  to  A v era g e  S e llin g  P rice  o f  Land
P er A cre
A c t  P a rish
A v e r a g e  
S e ll in g  P r ice  
P e r  A c r e  
S h il l in g s
P ercen ta g e  
o f  L a n d  
S o ld
C o s t  o f  
E n c lo su re  
P e r  A c re  
S h il l in g s
F actors  
In flu en c in g  
P rice  o f  
L a n d
1810 Weston-super-Mare 1,381.1 7-2 100.1 F V f r a _
1813 Wraxall, Nailsea, 
etc 1,218.1 5-9
N o  
Evidence I
JL-j A l l  d
) agricultural 
value1778 Brislington 1,170.0 5-0 58.5 J
1793 Kewstoke 1,128.8 10.0 112.9
1814 Portishead 1,048.8 10.2 106.7
1800 Locking 1,035-5 19.2 199.4 Grazing
1794 Pilton and North 
Wotton 1,031.9 7-0 72.5
| land
1791 Rodney Stoke 995-7 7-4 73-9 J
1815 Dundry 791.7 19-5 154-3
1814 Berkley and 
Standerwick 732.2 16.3 119.6
Proximity 
to markets
1809 Congresbury 708.0 11.2 79-4 ,
1799 Clevedon 677.7 10.7 72.2 , Grazing land
1777 Compton Bishop 603.6 10.2 61.5 but with value
1795 Banwell 588.4 13.8 81.1 lowered by
1801 Tickenham 581.7 10.2 59-1 > lesser quality
1788 Bleadon 490.1 20.4 99-7 moorland (salt
1798 Portbury 442.0 25.4 112.1 wharves) or
1788 Westbury 372.4 19.7 73-5 ' inclusion o f
1797 Chewton Mendip 322.7 15-2 49-1 '
uplands
1793 Wells 292.9 17.8 52.1 (moors)
1795 Cheddar 276.6 13-3 36.9 (moors)
1811 Cheddar 235-1 58.5 137-6 Mendip
1792 Wells 230.0 18.0 41-3 Commons
1782 Wookcy 211.1 34-5 72.7 with values
1801 Worlc 205.3 56.9 116.8 ) raised in
1794 East Harptree 202.3 24.7 49-9 two cases
1784 Blagdon 145-7 29-3 42.6 by inclusion
1787 West Harptree 123.4 511 63.1 o f moorlands
1788 Compton Martin 120.0 56.0 67.2
1797 Shipham and 
Winscombe 113.8 51-3 58.4 i
S o u r c e : See Table i.
A c t
1777
1778
1782
1784
1787
1788
1788
1788
1791
1792
1793
1793
1794
1794
1795
1795
1797
1797
1798
1799
1800
1801
1801
1809
1810
1811
1813
1814
1814
1815
ource:
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TABLE 3
V aria tion s in  Land V alu e W ith in  N o r th  S om erset E n closu res
S e ll in g  P r ice  in S h il l in g s  P e r  A c re
N o n -
O th e r  O th e r  a g r icu ltu ra l
P a r ish  M o o rs  M e n d ip s  L o w la n d s  U p la n d s  U se
Compton Bishop 603.6
Brislington 1,170.0
W ookey 671.6 89.2
Blagdon 145-7
West Harptree 1-23-4
Bleadon 807.8 266.0
Compton Martin 120.0
Westbury 9 0 4 .9  197-8
Rodney Stoke 995-7
Wells 230.0
Kcwstoke 1,128.8
Wells 1,240.0 225.3
East Harptree 202.3
Pilton and N  Wotton 1,031.9
Banwell 1,075.0 366.7
Cheddar 1,129.8 129.2
Chewton Mendip 322.7
Shipham and
Winscombe 113.8
Portbury 667.7 244.8
Clevedon 677.7
Locking 1.035.5
Tickenham 581.7
Worle 205.3
Congresbury 2,800.0 347-2
Weston-super-Mare 1,329.5 1,667.2
Cheddar 235.1
Wraxall, Nailsea, etc 1,218.1
Berkley and
Standerwick 732.2
Portishead 765.9 3,624.6
Dundry 791-7
From additional evidence in the enclosure awards this Table develops the findings o f  
Table 1, column VI.
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TABLE 4
per A cre  o f  P ar lia m en ta ry  E n clo su re  (in  sh illin g s)
Period
1
P arlia ­
m entary
Enclosure A c t
2
N orth
Som erset
A w a rd
3
N orth  
Som erset 
A c t A w a rd
4
P arlia­
m entary  
W aste Lan d  
Enclosure Period
1740-59 10.5 Before
(30) 40.0 1760
1760-69 12.7
(76)
1770-79 19-3 47-7 42.2
(88) (3) (2)
61.5 62.4 65.0 1761-92
1780-89 19.2 69.8 57-9 (11) (9)
(34) (6) (3)
1790-99 3i -0 67.7 70.5
(73) (12) (12) 82.5 75.0 110.0 1793-1801
(13) (12)
1800-15 42.8 H 5-9 92.4
(17) (10) (9) h i .9 94.8 150.0 1802-15
(7) (5)
1816- 67-3 119.5 119.5 120.0 1816-
(8) (5) (5)
Parentheses indicate number of awards consulted 
Sources:Cols i and 4 Holderness, op cit, pp 162-9. From the table on which col 1 is based administrative costs were excluded. 
Cols 2 and 3 Table 1. In the absence of any general convention as to the grouping of enclosure costs by the year of the act (Turner, thesis, pp 286-7) or the award (Martin, op cit, pp 145-7), both are shown here. In col 2 this evidence is timed to fit with col 1. That in col 3 fits with col 4.
TABLE 5
A n a ly sis  o f  C ap ita l Im p r o v e m e n t C osts in  N o r th  S o m erset E n closu res
T otal
Fences G ates C o st o f Im provem ent
S u rv e y o r’s and D rainage and C o n ­ C osts P er
Fees R oads W alls D itches Bridges struction A cre
£ £  £ £ £ £ Shillings
1 Mendip Enclosures
mid-i 790’s 80 350 850 56 1,336 33-4
2 Lowland Enclosures
mid-i 790’s 140 450 850 140 1,580 39-5
3 Shipham and Winscombe
Enclosure Included
1797-99 106 46 1,262 in Roads 1,414 26.4
4 Weston-super-Mare
Enclosure
1810-15 399 2,448 including sea wall 2,847 57-3
5 Congresbury, Week 
St Lawrence and 
Puxton Enclosure
1809-16 916 including road making 
costs of £102
398
Bridges
1,314 32.0
Sources: 1 and 2 Billingsley, op cit, pp 55-62.3 SRO Q/RDe 13.4 SRO Q/RDe 123; WSM Pub Ref Lib LOO/53, S / W 17/43.5 S R O  Q/RDe 133; BAO 32395(21), 25642.
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39 Acts of Privy Council, 1592, pp. 11-12; R. Bennett and J. Elton, A History of Corn Milling, 4 vols (1898-1904), III, pp. 168-71; R. B. Wester field. 
Middlemen in English Business (Newton Abbot, 1968 edn), p. 168. Millers at Hertford, Ware, Broxbourne and, possibly, Waltham invested in barges: Fair­clough, ‘The River Lea 1571-1757’, pp. 76-7.
40 For a description of the terms and details of their activities: Westerfield, Middlemen in English 
Business, pp. 134-74; D. O. Pam, Tudor Enfield: the 
Maltmen and the Lea Navigation, Edmonton Hundred Historical Society, Occasional Papers, new series no. 18 (undated), pp. 3-7.
41 Bill submitted in 1585: PRO, SP 12/177 nos 8, 10 (dating of bill: Bodl. MS Rawlinson Essex 11, fo. 93). Petitions: BL Landsdowne MS 32 no. 40, 38 nos 32, 34, 35, 41 no. 48, 80 no. 38; PRO, SP 12/146 no. 86, 12/177 no. 9; Bodl. MS Rawlinson Essex 11, fos 89—98. Details of riots and disputes: Pam, Tudor 
Enfield, pp. 8-10; E. M. Hunt, The History of Ware,
(Hertford, 1986 reprint), pp. 18-20; Jackman, De­
velopment of Transportation, pp. 165—8; Fairclough, ‘The River Lea 1571-1757’, pp. 80-99.
42 CLRO MS 36c, fos 2-35; PRO, STAC 5 L46/6; Bodl. MS Rawlinson Essex 11, fo. 89; Acts of Privy 
Council, 1591-92, pp. 537, 553-4; Acts of PHvy 
Council, 1592, pp. 11-12.
43 CLRO, MS 36c, fos 2-28, 174-7; Essex Record Office, Calendar of County Records (Essex), Sessions Records 1590-96, nos 123/47, 123/93; PRO C234/20.
44 CLRO MS 36c, fos 2-38, 50-92; BL Lands­downe MS 76 no. 55; PRO, SP 12/248 no. 97.
45 BL Landsdowne MS 77 no. 16.
46 For details of the re-emergence of the traditio­nal system and its success in the ensuing century: Fairclough, ‘The River Lea 1571—1757’, pp. 100-10; ‘ I he River Lea before 1767’, The Journal of Transport 
History, 3rd series, X (2) (1989), pp. 128-44.
47 BL Landsdowne MS 53 no. 82, 60 no. 35; PRO, SP 15/30 no. 38.
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The turnpike roads: a classic trap?
B. J . BUCHANAN University o f  London
T h e  long-aw aited volum e o f  Studies in Capital Formation in the United Kingdom 
1750—19 2 0 1 includes a ch ap ter o f  special in terest to readeis o f this jo u rn a l, 
e n titled  ‘Roads and  W aterways, 1750-1850’. A lthough  con ribu ted  by Jo h n  
G inarlis and  Sidney Pollard ,2 it is m ade clear tha t it is based on the thesis by the 
fo rm er, com pleted  in 1970.3 In  a lengthy first footnote the  authors dismiss my 
recen t and  inconveniently  tim ed con tribu tion  to the study o f the tu rn p ik e  roads, 
pub lished  in the Economic History Review o f  1986, in which I suggest that certain  
g en era l studies o f  the  tu rn p ik e  trusts had  failed to take in to  a x o u n t the way in 
w hich individual bodies con tinued  to evolve w ithin the developing netw ork  o f 
ro ad s .4 G inarlis and  Pollard claim that they have looked carefully at the fo rm e r’s 
m ateria l and  find  no reason to m odify the ir p ro ced u re  o r conclusions. T hey  
assert th a t ‘earlie r local historical w ork had  d em o n stra ted  corxlusively th a t the 
B ath  a n d  Bristol trusts discussed by B uchanan  w ere highly atypical as reg a rd s 
adm in istra tion , ex ten t, and  ou tlay’. I am  charged  with falling into ‘the  alm ost 
classic trap  o f  a rg u in g  from  a particu lar case study to the general’.5
T h is  charge  is unacceptable. T h e  poin t at issue is tha t o f  w hether o r n o t the  
m ileage an d  e x p en d itu re  p a tte rn s  au tho rised  by the  renew al and  a m en d m en t 
Acts a lte red  significantly the  developm ent p rofile  o f  turnpike trusts. My 
com m ents on  this im p o rtan t m atte r did  no t arise solely o r  even prim arily  from  
evidence on the Bath T u rn p ik e  T rust. T h e  criticisms o f  Ginarlis’s w ork w ere 
based  u p o n  sources in te rnal to tha t study which failed to provide the  ju stifica tion  
fo r his thesis claim ed by the  au th o r. G inarlis had  based his estimates o f  ou tlay  on  
the  English tu rn p ik e  roads from  1750 to 1822 u p o n  a process o f  backw ard  
ex trapo la tion  from  the  established figures fo r the  decade 1822-32 to  the  
u n ce rta in  years o f the  m id-eigh teen th  cen tu ry  on  the  assum ption th a t ‘tru s t 
m ileages h ad  rem ained  constan t over the  period  1750—1822 and th a t e x p e n d i­
tu re  p a tte rn s  sim ilar in the  1820’s d id  no t change from  1750\6 H ow ever, th e  
sm all n u m b e r o f  case-studies an d  the  sam ple o f trusts quo ted  d3 no t fully ju s tify
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this crucial assum ption. I f  the  evidence o f  the 1820s is not an  accurate reflection  
o f trusts in their earlie r years, th en  the  p ro ced u res by which ex p en d itu re  
pa tterns have been  calculated m ust also be flawed.
In  su p p o rt o f his con ten tion  G inarlis cites G. H. T u p lin g ’s study o f  the  
L ancashire trusts, b u t this o ffers little th a t is germ ane  to the  issue o th e r th an  the  
observation tha t at a tim e w hen no new  tu rnp ike  au thorities w ere being c rea ted  
in the county ‘several already in existence ob tained  powers to take over 
additional lengths o f  ro a d ’.7 R eference is also m ade to F. H . M aud’s account o f  
the  Hockerill Highway, yet here  new works and  im provem ents are  a con tinu ing  
them e, especially a fte r the  renew al and  am en d m en t Act o f  1791 fu r th e r  
en larged  the powers o f  the  T rustees .8 Tw o studies o f L ondon  trusts cited by 
Ginarlis also refu te  his assum ption. P. L. Payne shows how the B erm ondsey, 
R o therh ithe  and  D ep tfo rd  T rust, fo u n d ed  in 1748, received au thorisation  fo r  a 
new road  in 1798, fo r which pu rpose  an  add itional sum  o f nearly £2,000 was 
borrow ed. In  the nex t decade fu r th e r  powers w ere sought fo r new w ork on  
which costs had  reached £6,468 by 1810.9 C. A. A llen C larke describes the  w ork 
o f  the Islington and  M arylebone T rusts , founded  in 1716 and  1721, respectively, 
on the ir shared  New R oad begun in 1756.10 Investm ent costs on this ex tra  w ork 
were so high they top the  list in a table o f  tru st ex p en d itu re  p e r mile com piled by 
Eric Paw son.11 A no ther view o f this m ajor new construction  work is to be fo u n d  
in F. H. W. S h ep p ard ’s study o f local governm en t in St M arylebone. H e 
describes the provisions o f  a fu r th e r  Act five years later, u n d e r  which the  
n o rth e rn  ring  road  was ex tended  substantially at its eastern  end  to M oorga te .12 
F. H. M aud sum m ed u p  the general position by his ju d g em en t th a t on  the  
H ockerill Highway ‘T h e  m ain tenance and  enlargement [my italics] o f  the  ro ad  
was the m ain duty o f the  T ru s t’,13 and  this conclusion was endorsed  by my study 
o f the Bath T u rn p ik e  T ru s t which revealed  an increase over tim e in term s o f  
bo th  m ileage and  expend itu re . In  view o f  the  persisten t evidence prov ided  by 
these studies, it is d ifficu lt to see how the no tion  tha t the tu rn p ik e  roads 
rem ained  unchanged over the years can be sustained  as the  basis fo r a crucial 
assum ption about m ileage.
G inarlis’s com plem entary  assum ption  that ex p en d itu re  pa ttern s h ad  also 
rem ained  unchanged  over the years from  1750 to 1822 m ay likewise be criticised 
from  sources in ternal to the thesis, especially th e  sam ple o f fifty-five trusts 
described as providing guidance in this m atter. D espite its significance fo r the  
construction o f estim ates o f  investm ent, in fo rm ation  on the  ‘detailed figures fo r 
1750-1822 from  som e 55 trusts’14 is no t included  in the ch ap te r on ‘Roads and  
W aterways’, but m ust be sought in the  thesis. H e re  T able XI provides the  basic 
list o f  fifty-five ‘Nam es o f  Roads with O riginal O utlay  Figures, 1750-1822’, b u t 
this inform ation is patchy because o f  the  uneven  span o f  years d u rin g  which 
each tru st functioned an d  the varying availability o f  surviving docum ents fo r 
tha t p e rio d ,15 For exam ple, in the m id-e igh teen th  century , tow ards which the
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ex trap o la tio n  is d irected , the  evidence fo r 1750—51 rests on  th ree  tru;ts, to talling  
34 miles, all in L ondon, a n d  all fo u n d ed  in the  early decades o f  the <entury an d  
so well beyond  the  p erio d  o f  th e ir establishm ent. O n this im p o rta it m atte r o f  
initial costs in fo rm ation  is lim ited to tw enty-four trusts, o f  which L u rteen  a re  
fro m  the two counties o f  K ent and  Y orksh ire .16 Fuller details o f tie  outlay o f  
trusts listed in T able XI a re  d ivided confusingly betw een T abe XX an d  
A p p en d ix  B. O f  these, T ab le  XX provides a ‘Sam ple o f  D etailed lk h  C en tu ry  
T u rn p ik e  E x p en d itu re ’ an d  gives in fo rm ation  on  th irteen  tru s ts .17 Appendix B 
is en titled  prom isingly  ‘Q uasi-N et E x p en d itu re  Figures fo r Fifty-Five T u rn p ik e  
T ru s ts ’, b u t provides this in fo rm ation  fo r only forty  o f  th e m .18 V hen a d d ed  
toge ther, th e  total is fifty -th ree  no t fifty-five, as a resu lt o f  confusion between the  
counties o f  N o rth am p to n sh ire  an d  W arw ickshire, and  the  two sets of figures 
m ay no t be com patible fo r one  shows ‘E x p en d itu re ’ and  the  o ther ‘Q uasi-N et 
E x p en d itu re ’. W hen the a rg u m e n t m oves to the ‘E x trapo la ted  T otds’ o f  T ab le  
X III , used as the  basis o f  the  study, the  responsibility bo rn e  by tfe sam ple o f 
tru sts is revealed , fo r the ir historical in p u t form s a very low proportion o f  w hat is 
nevertheless described  as ‘T o ta l E x p en d itu re ’.19 Even if dispkyed m ore  
convincingly, it w ould still be difficu lt to see how th e  assumption o f  an  
u n chang ing  p a tte rn  o f  ex p en d itu re  could  be ju stified  from  evidenct which is so 
lim ited.
T h e  fo u r sets o f  da ta  on  w hich G inarlis based his calculations o f  ret outlay on 
English tu rn p ik e  roads in the  period  1750—182220 may also be criicised from  
sources w ithin the  study. First, ‘deta iled  ex p en d itu re  figures fo r each trust in the  
decade  1822- 32’ w ere exam ined  fo r only h a lf o f  the counties, th< rem ainder 
being  averaged  from  the re tu rn s  fo r 1822 and  1829.21 Secondly, tie  e x p en d i­
tu re  figures fo r the  fifty-five trusts w ere com piled with an  even g r e a t r  deg ree  o f 
app rox im ation , for, as T ab le  X II reveals, nearly  h a lf o f  all outlay figures p e r 
mile fo r  the  sam ple w ere based entirely  u p o n  estim ations.22 T aken  together, this 
m eans tha t the  calculations o f  investm en t in the tu rn p ik e  roads were founded  to 
a considerable ex ten t u p o n  p rio r estim ation  w ithin the  database. Thirdly, the  
da te  o f  orig in  o f  each trust, w hich provides an essential bench-m ark in  G inarlis’s 
calculations, is occasionally obscured , fo r exam ple by a failu re  to recognise a 
change o f nam e, lead ing  to a d isto rtion  o f  a tru s t’s evolutionar/ p a tte rn .23 
Fourth ly , th e re  is the  da ta  on tru s t m ileage in the 1820s. Evidence hat this d id  
no t rem ain  u n ch an g ed  com es from  trusts w ithin the  sam ple selectedby Ginarlis, 
which includes th ree  from  Som erset. A fte r the ir fo undation  in the  1750s each o f  
these grew  in size in the  period  in question: the Wells T ru s t  by 40 per cent; the  
Yeovil T ru s t by 26 p e r cent; and  the  T au n to n  T ru s t by 17 p e rcen t. T hese  
tu rnp ikes w ere thus all sm aller at incep tion  than  in la ter years, yet tie length  o f 
road  a ttrib u ted  to them  by G inarlis as th a t u pon  which outlay  was expended over 
the  whole period  is tha t o f  th e ir  m aturity . F u rth e r exam ples from  ths county, o f  
the  coastal d istrict o f  the  M inehead  T ru s t and  the ru ra l roads of the  W est
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H a rp tre e  T ru s t, which grew  by 60 p e r cen t an d  25 p e r cent, respectively, suggest 
th a t these  cases w ere no t atypical.24 T h e  fo u rfo ld  grow th  o f  the  B ath  T ru s t  was 
ex p lo red  in my article, a n d  it is evidence from  this body w hich also shows how 
p a tte rn s  o f  finance in early years m ay have d iffe red  from  the  la ter system. 
A ccount books have not survived b u t a s ta tem en t from  the 1770s shows th a t 
c u rre n t revenue  from  the tolls was th en  fully sp en t on  repa irs , in te rest paym ents 
and  adm in istra tion . In  contrast, the  financial statem ents fo r the  1820s an d  early 
1830s show a considerable d eg ree  o f  sophistication in the  hand ling  o f  funds, 
with su rp lu s revenue  carried  over from  year to year to be invested in  new 
w orks.25 T h ese  la ter papers also d istinguish  betw een c u rre n t revenue  fro m  the 
tolls an d  th e  capital sum s raised  (usually on  a m ortgage  o f  the  tolls), a d istinction 
which is ex p lo red  in the  study o f  the  B ath  T ru s t b u t no t by Ginarlis, who 
concen tra tes on  the  ind iscrim inate  in fo rm ation  p rov ided  by cash books and  
ledgers.
In  th e  ligh t o f  the  fo u r sets o f  da ta  an d  on  the  assum ptions already questioned , 
G inarlis th en  slotted the  tu rn p ik e  roads by da te  o f  o rig in  into a category 
d e te rm in ed  by m ileage and  ex p en d itu re  in the  1820s. O utlay  p a tte rn s  were 
fo rm u la ted  fo r individual tru sts on  the  evidence from  th e  sam ple, and  so fo r the 
tu rn p ik e  roads as a whole. I f  m ileage in the  1820s was n o t an accurate  reflection 
o f  leng th  in the  p reced ing  years, then  the w hole system by which roads were 
classified is called in to  question , n o t only because this raises the  possibility that 
roads should  be placed in d iffe re n t categories at d iffe ren t stages in th e ir life 
h istory b u t also because changes in m ileage over the  years a re  likely to have 
affected  p a tte rn s  o f  ex p en d itu re .
T h e re  is su p p o rtin g  evidence available from  case-studies. R esearch like th a t by 
B. K eith-Lucas in to  the  K ent tu rnp ikes, fo r exam ple, confirm s the  general po in t 
bu t w ithou t specific details. T h is is to be reg re tted  since only one  o th e r county 
provides m ore  exam ples in G inarlis’s sam ple o f  fifty-five. K eith-Lucas writes that 
legislation was ‘com plicated by the  fact th a t each tru s t had  no t one, bu t a series o f 
statutes, ex ten d in g  its pow ers and  geographical a rea  as well as the  term s o f  its 
existence’.26 In  studies o f  the  counties o f  N o rth u m b erlan d  by W. G. D odds and  
Essex by J . M. L. B ooker, we find  sim ilar references to ‘toll roads increasing in 
length  an d  com plexity’, a lthough  again  th e re  is no estim ation  o f  the changes 
involved.27 T h e  w ork o f  A rth u r  Cossons on the  counties o f  N ottingham shire, 
W arw ickshire, N o rtham p tonsh ire , N orfo lk  an d  W iltshire is im pressively de ­
tailed in th a t all Acts re la ting  to each tru s t a re  listed an d  categorised by 
function .28 T hose  ex tend ing  th e  pow ers o f  these bodies a re  thus indicated, bu t 
with n o  account o f  mileage. T w o reg ional studies exam ine the problem s o f  road  
bu ild ing  in  difficult te rra in . G. G. H opkinson  shows how the  trusts o f  south 
Y orkshire  an d  n o rth  D erbyshire  m et the  need  fo r a substantial re-a lignm ent and  
im provem en t o f  earlie r tu rn p ik e  roads, as well as th e ir ex tension , in the years 
a fte r th e  fram ew ork  o f  the systems had  been created ; an d  C hristopher Cox
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describes the continuing evolution of the turnpike roads o f the Stroudwater area 
o f Gloucestershire. In  his view: ‘T he final roads before repeal and dispiking 
were often significantly d ifferent from  the roads o f the initiating Act.’29 
K. A. M acM ahon’s study o f the turnpike roads of east Yorkshire adds fu rther 
to the case. He observes that trusts sought to extend their term s and powers ‘on 
the grounds that a larger un it was financially m ore secure and administratively 
m ore efficient’,30 and dem onstrates this by details o f when and where mileage 
was extended and roads re-aligned. Similarly detailed inform ation is provided 
by three o f the oldest studies in this sample. Benjamin W instone’s account o f the 
E pping and O ngar T rust, which marshals evidence on a growing mileage from 
legislation, m inute books and  maps, was published in 1891,31 and instructive 
work on the Liverpool area and Bedfordshire was published in the m id-1930s. 
F. A. Bailey describes the extension o f the Liverpool to Prescot, St Helens, 
W arrington and Ashton T urnp ike  T rust from  its original 9 miles in 1726 to 13 
miles in 1746, and 28 miles in 1753, with two fu rth er m inor extensions in 1771 
and a small alteration in 1802. N um bered milestones on a m ap make clear this 
sequence o f change.32 F. G. Emmison’s task was m ore complicated, for his 
survey covered nineteen trusts in Bedfordshire. T he Biggleswade to Alconbury 
Hill Road was established in 1725. It grew by a series o f renewal and am endm ent 
Acts in 1736, 1770 and  1791 to a total o f 44 miles, almost twice its original length 
and the greatest mileage o f any trust connected with that county.33 T he 
provision o f a m ap again shows the developing pattern  and growing mileage. 
Finally, recent work by A. D. M. Phillips and B. J. T u rto n  has followed up  my 
observations by noting that 23 per cent o f all tu rnp ike Acts in Staffordshire 
authorised some extension o f an existing trust road, whilst 51 per cent renewed 
powers without extending mileage and 26 per cent authorised new trusts. T he 
authors conclude: ‘T he num ber o f such am ending Acts emphasises their 
im portance in augm enting the length of original routes in Staffordshire and 
underlines the necessity recognised by Buchanan to exam ine such subsequent 
Acts in any study o f turnpike evolution.’34 
This evidence from  a range o f case-studies does not, o f course, constitute a 
claim that all trusts evolved in the same m anner, and a reading of the two 
general studies published in the 1970s by Eric Pawson and William Albert 
confirm s this. Despite the renewal and am endm ent Acts not being a special area 
o f study for either au thor, Pawson noted that over one-third  of such Acts passed 
before 1770 ‘added extra mileage to their respective trusts, the average am ount 
being anything from  five to fifteen miles, decade by decade’; whilst Albert 
conceded that: ‘Some renewal acts placed additional roads under the trustees 
jurisdiction’,35 so casting doubt upon a procedure which assumes size to be 
constant and then bases estimates o f outlay upon that assumption.
W hat is now at issue is not w hether this enlargem ent o f the trusts happened at 
all, but the extent to which it occurred and the significance of this evolutionary
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growth for investm ent patterns. On this the aggregationists have nothing to say, 
for their m ethods cannot cope with the complexities o f the historical situation. In 
my article I suggested case-study evidence could reveal some o f the over­
simplification and distortions which m ight arise from  the form ation o f national 
assessments on an inadequate historical base. I argued  that such evidence may 
not only correct bu t also amplify and sustain the m ore general approach. I no 
longer think such com plem entarity is possible. Ginarlis and Pollard claim in 
‘Roads and W aterways’ that: ‘T he estimates are deliberately cast in such a form  
that they may easily be im proved as m ore original turnpike m aterial comes to 
light and is investigated’,36 but their sum m ary dismissal o f the legitimate 
concerns raised in my article suggests instead that the two approaches are 
fundam entally incom patible. As it is em ployed in this research, the aggregative 
m ethod proceeds by the developm ent o f a self-contained system which is not 
susceptible to refinem ent by later historical evidence. Any new m aterial which 
throws doubt on assum ptions and m ethods is not welcome and m ust be th e re ­
fore either ignored o r rejected.
T he question o f the profile o f trusts at d ifferen t stages in their life history is 
too im portant an issue to be dismissed, for it concerns m ore than the history o f 
the turnpike roads and  their contribution to capital form ation in the U nited 
Kingdom. It is also central to the question o f historical evidence, m ethod and 
understanding. T he  ‘classic trap ’ at the heart o f this debate is not that o f arguing  
from  the particular to the general, but that o f producing national statistics of 
investm ent from  a base which is im perfect in term s o f theory and inadequate in 
term s o f evidence.
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THE USE OF DOCUMENTARY SOURCES 
IN THE INTERPRETATION 
OF PHYSICAL EVIDENCE :
THE WOOLEY POWDER WORKS NEAR BRISTOL
A CASE STUDY
BJ. BUCHANAM*
Apres avoir expose les raisons de la rarete des vestiges de manufactures de poudre dans 
la region de Bristol (reutilisation des sites a d'autres fins), Pauteur indique que les seules 
traces veritablement exploitables sont des documents d’archives, emanant souvent de fonds 
priv£s.
Ainsi, les documents deposes par la famille Strachey aux Archives du Somerset (principa- 
lement des bilans et de la correspondance commerciale) donnent des indications sur la 
fabrique de poudre de Wooley. Bien que tres particulier, ce type d’informations est riche de 
donnees concernant la localisation geographique de ce type de manufactures, le role 
economique de la region ou elles etaient implantees, et Papport de temoignages nouveaux sur 
cette industrie meconnue.
Pour la manufacture de Woolley, Pauteur est en mesure de decrire, en s’appuyant sur le 
fonds Strachey et les recherches d’un ingenieur, le deroulement des differentes etapes de la 
production de la poudre, depuis la qualite du melange de sulfure, de salpetre et de charbon, 
jusqu’& Pecoulement de la production dans un contexte economique parfois difficile.
L’auteur conclut en insistant sur le fait que « ce sujet neglige aurait beaucoup a gagner a 
Putilisation des sources documentaires pour Pinterpretation des sites ».
During the eighteenth century gunpowder was manufactured at several rural sites 
in the Bristol region, but the physical remains of this industry are fragmentary and 
elusive. This is because powder making declined in this area in the early decades of 
the nineteenth century, and with the passage of time here has been an inevitable 
decay and re-use of the structures on these sites. Some buildings were probably 
dismantled because they were considered an explosive hazard, whilst others were 
absorbed into farms or, more recently, concerted into secluded houses. In one case 
the whole site has been lost under the waters of a reservoir serving the city of Bristol.
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Elsewhere, however, some features do still exist, chiefly in the form of overgrown 
millponds and their associated water courses, ruined structures, and those founda­
tions and walls which were incorporated in later buildings now serving agricultural 
or domestic rather than manufacturing purposes.
The paucity of this physical evidence is such that it can do little more than arouse 
the interest of the historien in this neglected process, and prompt a search for further 
information from archival or documentary sources. Unfortunately appropriate 
source material providing detailed evidence on individual manufacturing sites is 
extremely difficult to find, chiefly because in England such works were usually 
privately owned and operated and the survival of their business papers has therefore 
been particularly haphazard. In contrast, institutional, administrative, and local and 
central government records are more likely to have survived in a systematic and 
comprehensive form. This therefore affords a greater prospect of success to an 
extensive study of the location and distribution of sites based on, for example, 
institutional materiel such as insurance records, than it does to an intensive study 
of individual sites, based as that must be on the entirely fortuitous survival of private 
papers
D o c u m e n t a r y  ev id en c e
Fortunately for the subject of powder making, some useful documents have been 
found in the archives of the Somerset Record Office amongst the papers deposited 
by the Strachey family. It is a disadvantage that this evidence relates in detail to only 
one site, at a small village near Bath called Woolley, and that the papers are more 
concerned with fiancial than technical matters. Within these limitations, however 
this documentary source is a very good one because of the continuity of evidence 
provided through the annual balance sheets which survive for most years from the 
1740s to the early nineteenth century. There are also partnership agreements and 
leases from the 1720s, and bundles of correspondance dealing with particular 
subjects such as the sale of gunpowder to the government. The Stracheys were a 
Somerset landed gentry family who had acquired an interest in the Woolley works 
through marriage into a Bristol merchant family. Their residence in London for 
much of the year and closeness to court and government circles led to a lobbying 
of officials on behalf of the partners, and it was this circumstance which occasioned 
much of the correspondence filed away by the family together with the annual 
financial statements. These last papers show the business to have been a very 
profitable one, which may explain the continuing interest of the Stracheys in what 
must otherwise have seemed a very unlikely enterprise for this family.
Despite the intrinsic interest of these papers for any historian with a concern for 
past industrial processes, it is nevertheless important that the consequent focussing 
of attention upon one powder making site should be justified in general terms if the 
criticism of antiquarianism is to be avoided. Happily, such a justification can be 
made at three levels. First, this study of an individual site prompts new ideas about 
the general chronology and location of powder manufacture in England ; second, 
it gives rise to a new insight into the economy of the region ; and third, it makes a 
contribution to the evidence required for a comparative study of this hitherto 
neglected industry.
On the first point it may be stated that the local mills flourished in the eighteenth 
century near a western seaport, and that they made powder for both mining and 
musketry. But the mills founded in previous centuries had been located in the south 
east, near London, and they had concentrated on powder for warfare, whilst those 
founded later in the north west and south west, in the Lake District and Cornwall, 
produced powder for use in mining operations. For much of the eighteenth century 
therefore, the mills of the Bristol hinterland such as Woolley occupied a special 
place and role in the manufacture of powder in England, in terms of its changing 
location and function.
Secondly it may be suggested that although located in the countryside for reasons 
of water power and safety, powder making was essentially a port industry. The mills 
at Woolley were dependent upon Bristol for the use of its shipping facilities and 
credit network, and for the provision of personnel, including not only the partners 
who invested capital in the enterprise and managed the business, but also the skilled 
craftsmen of the port who made, for example, the barrels used in the transport of 
powder. Saltpetre and sulphur from such widely ranging sources as the Baltic, the 
Mediterranean and India, came to Woolley through the port, and from in the 
gunpowder was shipped coastwise to Wales, Cornwall and Liverpool, and overseas 
to Ireland and the American colonies. But the relationship had a still deeper 
significance, for the Woolley mills made an important contribution to the economy 
of the region through the operation of the slave trade. Gunpowder was one of the 
commodities used in the bartering for slaves, and it was carried by those vessels 
leaving Bristol to engage in this business on the west coast of Africa. This was the 
first leg of a triangular trade. The next stage was the shipping of the human cargo 
across the Atlantic to the plantations from which, lastly, were carried raw materials 
such as sugar and tobacco for processing in the home port, Bristol. When powder 
sales declined at the end of the eighteenth century, their letters show that the 
Woolley partners attributed this to the decline of the slave trade. Also important was 
the establishment of rival mills in former markets such as Cornwall and the United 
States, and the failure of the partners to invest in and diversify their business. It is 
of interest to note, lastly, that the decline of the powder industry mirrored the 
lessening importance of the port of Bristol itself in the course of the eighteenth 
century, especially in relation to the newer western seaport of Liverpool.
The third point, that of the contribution an individual study may make towards 
the comparative evidence on a subject in general will be considered at the end of 
this short paper, when matters such as the process of manufacture and the layout 
of the site have been treated more fully.
T he use  o f  d o c u m e n t a r y  so u r c e s  in  t h e  in t e r p r e t a t io n  o f  ph y sic a l  ev id e n c e
For convenience, this question will be considered under three headings, First, the 
processes carried out on the site, for evidence on this matter will indicate the range 
of buildings which formerly existed at Woolley. Second, the provision of water 
power and the disposition of buildings on the site, for this evidence will suggest the 
likely flow of production. Third, the problems encountered in the manufacture and 
sale of powder, for this evidence will reveal something of the techniques employed 
at Woolley. However, when even the partners referred to the process of manufacture
as ‘an art and a mystery’ it is necessary to be cautious about how far it is possible 
to interpret the physical evidence in the light of the documentary sources.
First, the stages of production. From a memorandum of the mid-eighteenth 
century we know that the ‘best powder’ the manufactured at Woolley was a simple 
mix of Saltpetre (64 lb or 70 lb), sulphur (18 lb), and charcoal (18 lb). The inventories 
found in many of the annual Financial statements show that when the stores were 
counted they included some saltpetre and sulphur which had been refined and some 
which had not. This suggest that there must have been equipment for the refining 
of both at the site, with vats and vessels and a good supply of pure water. The 
inventories also show that charcoal was bought from a local estate. Such large 
quantities are recorded that storage space, possibly in buildings, would have been 
essential.
From the memorandum referred to we learn that the ingredients were mixed or 
incorporated in four water-powered mills. Pressure was provided by vertically 
revolving edge runners. The resulting mixture was then pressed, the only stage to 
which the Woolley papers make no reference. After this, came the ‘corning’ of the 
powder, when it was forced through a sieve to produce compact grains which were 
less likely to crumble in transit. The inventory reference to some corned powder as 
still ‘in dust’ suggest that after granulation the powder needed to be screened. 
Evidence of the production of grains of a specified uniform size comes from those 
inventories which labelled stocks of finished powder separately as F, FF, or FFF, 
in increasing order of fineness of grain and therefore also of value. The papers also 
refer to the glazing mill and drying stove. These indicate the last two stages of 
production when the compacted grains were further rounded-off by glazing and 
then dried to remove the last vestige of the water added at the first stage to lessen 
the danger of an explosion. The finished product was first stored at the site, where 
the building of a new magazine was recorded in the balance sheets of the 
mid-eighteenth century. It was then transported to warehouses rented in Bristol, 
although that sold for use in local lead and coal mining probably went straight to 
those customers.
Second, the accommodation of this sequence of processes. The remains of the 
Woolley works are in a steep-sided valley with two mill ponds, a lower one in the 
valley and an upper one on the hillside. Each had its associated water courses. The 
structural remains suggest that there was a confused scatter of buildings on the site, 
an impression confirmed by contemporary maps, though these may show an artistic 
rather than a realistic representation of the arrangements. A clearer picture emerges 
when the legal papers are consulted, for the leases of the 1720s show that the upper 
location was the site of the powder mills. This may have been because the lower site 
was already occupied by corn mills, the fore-runners of which were listed in the 
Domesday Book of 1086. But there was also the problem of an inadequate and 
fluctuating water supply, revealed by the observation of a partner in 1801 that in 
June ‘...our Mills usually stand still for want of Water’. Therefore the utilisation of 
the upper site, stimulating as it did the construction of hydraulic engineering works 
which allowed for a maximisation of the supply of water for processing and power, 
may have been a positive response to the challenge of water shortage, and not simply 
an evasion of the already pre-empted lower site. This conclusion has been arrived 
at after much close consultation and lively discussion with an engineering colleague, 
Mr M.T. Tucker, who has made numerous drawings and plans of the site and its
features, and has measured the flow and course of the water supply. Our findings 
are shortly to be published in an article in a forthcoming issue of the Industrial 
Archaeology Review (Oxford University Press). It is an over-simplification of our 
study, but in brief we suggest that the raw materials were prepared at the top and 
middle of the site, that they then passed downhill to the incorporating mills between 
the mill ponds (the memorandum notes that the water for the four mills was ‘worked 
twice over’, suggesting an arrangement two by two), and thence to a number of sites 
for the finishing processes, some of which were water powered. The storage 
magazines were probably isolated on the other side of the valley.
Third, the problems encountered by the partners. The great value of the balance 
sheets with their inventories lies in the continuity of evidence they provide over 
some sixty years, but their disadvantage is that evidence of a technical nature is only 
incidental. With the correspondence on other hand, technical problems may be a 
first concern, but the letters rarely cover more than a short period, so that the 
evidence they provide can relate only to a cross-section of time within the continuing 
history of the firm. One such period however that of the 1760s, is of great interest 
because the partners were then trying unsuccessfully to sell powder to the govern­
ment. Their failure led to a correspondence in which a number of problems were 
discussed, relating to the difficulties in the refining of saltpetre and sulphur, the 
importance of the weight and smoothness of the edge runners, and the length of time 
spent on the incorporation of each batch o f powder. The advice of the Board of 
Ordnance that they should continue to experiment so that they may hit on the 
right methods as others have done’ does not suggest that there was a high level of 
expertise and understanding amongst powder makers. Nevertheless, this insight into 
the practical problems the partners faced does illustrate the invaluable evidence to 
be gained from business letters. It should also be observed that the Woolley partners 
were not too distressed at this failure to meet the government’s standards, for their 
other customers remained well-satisfied, including the privateers who sailed from 
Bristol during the many wars of the eighteenth century. However in the long run it 
may have been this failure, together with the decline in trade already noted, which 
caused production to cease at Woolley in the early nineteenth century. There was 
a ‘consolidation’ with the nearby powder works at Littleton, to which site the 
business was transferred.
It is hoped that the case for an intensive study of particular works, in which 
documentary sources are related to physical evidence, has now been made. 
However, the usefulness of such an approach is not limited to the interpretation of 
an individual site, for the body of detailed information thus provided can become 
the basis on which different sites are compared. Two examples may be given. First, 
at the level of technical details it may be observed that at Woolley incorporation was 
by edge runners from at least the mid-eighteenth century, yet at the Du Pont works 
in the Brandywine valley in the U.S.A. incorporation was by the more out-dated 
method of stamps until the 1820s. Second, at the level of the general lay-out of  
works, it may be suggested that the constraints of the site at Woolley, especially the 
problems of water supply, produced a sequence of water-driven installations down 
the hillside at right angles to the stream in the valley, in a pattern which contrasts 
greatly with the linear arrangement of buildings along a head leat parallel to the 
stream, to be seen at other powder works such as those at Frederiksvoerk in 
Denmark, founded in 1756. Clearly, this neglected subject would gain much from 
the use of documentary evidence in the interpretation of sites. It would also benefit
from the undertaking of a comparative analysis of the industry both within countries 
and internationally. Anyone interested in the exchange of information on this 
subject is invited to contact the writer through the Centre for the Study of the 
History of Technology at the University of Bath, U.K.
LES ARCHIVES D’ENTREPRISES 
COMME SOURCES DOCUMENTAIRE 
DE L’ARCHEOLOGIE INDUSTRIELLE : 
PROBLEMES DE METHODE 
ET DE CONSERVATION.
Eliane CAROUGE*
Comme toule discipline historlque, Parcheologle industrielle trouve une large 
part de sa documentation dans les archives. Nous ne nous arreterons pas longue- 
ment ici aux archives publiques, mieux connues, mieux protegees et plus accessibles 
mais d’un interet limite en la matiere. Non qu’elles en soient denuees car PEtat aussi 
est un batisseur ; de plus, il doit veiller a la securite et a la salubrite publiques 
menacees par les constructions industrielles, il etudie parfois quelque etablissement 
pionnier dont Pexemple contribuera au d6vcloppcment de I'iconomie, il tranche les 
iitiges ou, simplement, se preoccupe de Passiette de Pimpot (I). Ceci n’est pas 
negligeable et represente sans dout la presque totalite des sources d’archives sur 
lesquelles ont peut compter jusqu’au xvme siecle. Cette documentation se poursuit 
ensuite, et se developpe meme, mais k partir du xixe siecle, elle ne suffit plus a la 
connaissance des constructions industrielles qui sont du domaine prive. C'est done 
par les archives privees qu’il faudra la completer.
La construction d’un batiment industriel, comme celle de tout batiment ou 
Tinstallation d’une machine, suppose la rencontre de plusieurs personnes : disons 
en simplifiant, celui qui commande, celui qui con9oit et celui qui construit. Celui 
qui commande un batiment industriel ou une machine est generalement un chef 
d’entreprise. C’est done naturellement dans les archives de Pentreprise que Ton 
cherchera la documentation correspondante. En fait, ni cette construction ni cette 
machine ne sont le souci principale de Pentreprise : ils ne sont que des outils au 
service de cet objectif principal qu’est la production, Cette place secondaire a son 
reflet dans le relativement faible volume des documents qui decrivent les construc­
tions et Poutillage dans nombre de fonds d’archives d’entreprises. Ceux-ci ne sont 
en realite facteurs de dossiers que lorsque leur fonctionnement normal est empeche 
ou interrompu par une malfa^on ou une destruction inopinee (2). Nous sommes 
done mieux renseignes sur les serviteurs defaillants que sur ceux qui remplissent 
normalement leur office. En revanche, on trouve dans les dossiers qui n’ont pas 
directement trait au domaine et a Pequipement de Pentreprise les raisons techniques
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Aspects of Capital Formation: 
Some Insights From North 
Somerset, 1750-1830
BRENDA BUCHANAN
The object of this paper is to point out some of the shortcomings in 
recent studies of capital formation and to indicate from work in a 
particular region how these weaknesses may be overcom e.1 These 
aims are based on the premise that the study of capital formation has 
both a measurable aspect, concerning the increase of capital stock 
over time, and a narrative dimension, concerning the explanation of 
the process by which capital formation has taken place.2 Most 
previous studies have concentrated on the first element to the neglect 
of the second, and this narrowing of the subject has resulted in a loss 
to our understanding in both respects -  to the quantitative aspect 
because this would benefit from a greater infusion of empirical 
evidence than it has so far been given, and to the study of the process 
of capital formation because this has hitherto received little attention. 
This over-emphasis on measurement is particularly regrettable for 
the crucial years of the British industrial revolution, as the 
documentary evidence for this period is too insubstantial to bear 
interpretation by a quantitative approach alone. It has recently been 
observed that in going back beyond the mid-nineteenth century, data 
limitations weaken the value of quantitative national accounting 
approaches relative to other m ethods.3
The paper begins with a review of general issues in order to 
indicate the inadequacies of the conventional approach to this 
subject, and from a survey of north Somerset 1750 to 1830 an 
interpretation of the process  o f capital formation will then be 
suggested. The emphasis is on the general framework and hence 
there are no tables of figures.
I
The process of capital formation is of acknowledged significance, for
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as a recent analysis has pointed out, it is as important to ask how  
capital investment was motivated and financed as to know how much 
of the growth of output was attributable to such investm ent.4 Yet  
there have been no comprehensive answers to the first question. 
Well-funded investigations o f  M erseyside, and o f  the national e c o ­
nomy through a project based at the University o f Sheffield, have 
both produced only preliminary results.^ Smaller studies such as that 
by D.T. Jenkins on the West Riding, Ian D onnachie on Scottish 
brewing, and J.R. Ward on canal finance, have identified sources of  
capital but say little on the processes o f  its form ation /’ Business 
historians seem  primarily concerned with profits rather than with the 
composition of total capital em p loyed .7 C.W . Chalklin and R.S. 
Neale have described the context o f  capital formation in building, but 
are limited to that industry and by their urban settings.8 Other studies 
on a regional basis are similarly restrictive, especially in concentrat­
ing on a p ost-1830 or even later period, because o f data limitations.9 
This suggests that although such deficiencies may be masked by 
statistical techniques, the availability o f  data determ ines the areas, 
periods, and sectors chosen in this field o f  research just as much as for 
the more traditional 'source-oriented’ historians. A .G . K enw ood’s 
study of north-eastern England exemplifies this p o in t .10 C .H . Fein- 
stein, although outstanding in his contribution to national aggregative 
analyses of capital stock, nevertheless excludes the savings and 
finance aspects and thereby ignores the processes  o f  capital 
form ation .11
There is no lack o f  challenge in seeking to find out how capital was 
formed, and the matter is o f  importance to econom ic theory as well as 
to empirical econom ic history since it involves analyses o f the flow of  
savings, the role of financial intermediaries, and the act o f  investment 
in the creation of capital assets. Conceptual problems arise less from 
the difficulty o f  importing ideas from the study of econom ics into the 
different discipline o f  history, than from the disparity between  
concept and evidence to be found in both fields. In econom ics this is 
indicated by the theoretical problems inherent in the measurement of  
capital, as well as in the more practical difficulties involved in the 
construction of estimates in developing countries. O ne eminent 
economist has remarked that 'it is o f  no use framing definitions more 
precise than the subject-matter to which they apply’12 and a doyen in 
this field has stated that 'No standard  definition o f capital formation  
exists at pesent; and I doubt whether one is desirable now ’ for in the 
pursuit of 'different analytical purposes and problems' different 
definitions may be appropriate.13 This flexibility o f approach is 
desirable in the historical context too, if the possibilities o f  develop­
Aspects o f Capital Formation 75
ing our knowledge of the processes o f  capital formation are not to be 
constrained.
A  definition o f capital formation as:
Additions made during a particular period o f time to the stock of  
goods which are for use in future production. These are both fixed 
assets, such as buildings, items o f plant and so on, and work in 
progress, stocks of raw materials and finished g o o d s .14
has been generally accepted by econom ic historians, rather than 
d eb a ted .15 H ow ever, if ‘additions' can be taken to cover both 
measurement o f capital incrementation and  the processes by which it 
was m ade, then it is perhaps a useful definition and preferable to one  
substituting a more ambiguous term such as ‘investm ent’. 16
The pre-occupation o f som e econom ic historians with the applica­
tion of the econom ists’ skills o f  m easurem ent at the m acro-econom ic  
level, devising approximations and aggregates to overcom e deficien­
cies o f  data, may account for the neglect o f  the process o f capital 
formation. Kuznets defends the concentration on the national e c o ­
nomy on the grounds that the sovereign state formulates p o lic ies ,17 
but historians are not for the most part concerned with producing  
analyses for policy making, and there are cases where the region is a 
much more appropriate and ‘real’ unit for the investigation of  
econom ic change. It may ‘reveal critical relationships far more clearly 
than national studies’. 18
The dangers o f ‘an excessively aggregative approach’ have also 
been stressed, for:
With structural, sectoral and regional change being so pronounced  
during the early stages o f  industrialization . . . national aggregates 
and averages can be more than usually m islead ing .19
Not only may the national aggregates be m isleading, but to employ  
capital formation as simply an aggregative concept is unacceptable. 
Despite widespread practice, aggregation is no necessary part o f  any 
recognized definition o f  capital formation: rather it is a chosen  
method, which has led to the neglect o f  alternative approaches.
Research into the process o f  capital formation requires a continuity  
of evidence which is often lacking. Stanley C hapm an’s study o f  cotton 
spinning in the east Midlands found sufficient documentation for an 
analysis o f  the financial structure o f  one firm, and even then for only  
thirteen continuous years.20 These difficulties are widely  
acknowledged,21 and caution has been urged in the presentation of
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findings which are based to som e degree on ‘conjecture and  
speculation'''.22 Yet som e historians have converted  speculative co n ­
clusions into dogm atic assertions, as an exam ple  o f  which Feinstein  
has cited R .M . Hartwell's restatem ent o f  the findings o f  D ea n e  and 
Cole on the m ovem ent o f  the investm ent ratio in the eighteenth  
century.23 Even more serious is the insufficient distinction betw een  
historical and statistically derived ‘facts' to be found for exam ple in 
work on the ratio o f investm ent to national in com e in the n ineteenth  
century Am erican econ om y. ‘D ram atic increase' is c la im ed, but data 
pre-1840 is notoriously deficient on both increases in capital stock and 
the size o f  the national p rod u ct.24 Such studies dem onstrate the need  
for more factual inform ation, not only because the available data 
have been overstretched in the pursuit o f  national aggregates and the 
testing o f  hypotheses , but also to ensure that the concept o f  capital 
formation should not be confined  within a narrow and restrictive 
interpretation which fails to take into account the historical d im en ­
sions o f  the subject.
II
The northern third o f  the old county o f  Som erset stretches from the 
southern edge o f  the M endip  hills northwards to the River A v o n , and 
lies b etw een  the m ouths o f  the Rivers A v o n  and A x e  on the west 
coast and the towns o f  Bath and From e on the east. A lthough  the 
application o f the term ‘region' to this physical entity  is fraught with 
difficulties it is not proposed  to argue the case on this occasion , other  
than to say that the designation is not an arbitrary on e  for the area  
has both historic credibility and eco n o m ic  coh es ion . It was defined by 
John Billingsley in the 1790s in his review o f  the county for the Board  
of Agriculture,23 and although it had links with both the rest o f  
Somerset and the port o f  Bristol (accorded county status in 1373), it 
remained separate from each.
Somerset had long been  regarded by contem poraries as a rich and 
populous co u n ty .26 Its wealth rested on agriculture and w oollen  
textiles, to which must be added for the northern third, paper 
making, lead, calam ine, stone and coal m ining, and the flow of  
visitors to Bath. A t the beginning o f  the e ighteenth  century it was one  
of only six English counties with an estim ated  population  o f  more  
than 200,000. By 1831 this had risen to m ore than 400 ,000  and the 
county then ranked e ig h th .27 M ore significant than these overall 
figures however was the density o f  p opu lation , and in this Som erset  
ranked second relative to other counties  in 1700 and fourth in 1750,
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although by 1801 it was ninth.28 This loss o f  rank accords with 
estim ations o f  migration and natural increase, which show that 
despite Som erset’s doubling o f  population during this period there 
was a continuing loss by migration, particularly during the three 
decades after 1751.29 The Census returns by parish show that 45 per 
cent of the county's population lived in the northern third in 1801, 
and 47 per cent in 1831.30
Apart from the M endips there was in the early eighteenth century a 
good scattering of villages in north Som erset, especially around Bath, 
described by Camden as ka flourishing place, both for the woollen  
manufacture, and a great resort o f  strangers’,31 and south o f  Bristol 
where the settlem ent had begun to assume a suburban aspect. 
Shepton M allet, From e, and the ecclesiastical centre o f  W ells were 
already established w oollen  textile towns. The developm ent o f  coal 
mining centres such as Radstock and M idsom er Norton and leisure 
resorts such as W eston-super-M are and C levedon  lay in the future. 
The growth o f  the former cam e in the second half o f  the eighteenth  
century, and of the latter in the early decades o f  the nineteenth  
century.32
The stability o f  this long established settlem ent was unaffected for 
good  or ill by the strong influence o f  any great noble families. Like 
the rest o f  the county the northern third was governed by a broadly 
based gentry w hose manor houses were well distributed in the region, 
though not in the more inhospitable parts. Several o f  these families, 
like the Eltons o f C levedon Court, had their origins as Bristol 
merchants and maintained links with the city and its port. More  
rarely others, such as the Stracheys o f  Sutton Court, established a 
political and comm ercial base in London. Most o f  the gentry 
however, like the M oggs (later R ees M oggs) o f  Farrington Gurney, 
were content to function within the region, furthering both private 
and public interest through their activities as, for exam ple, turnpike 
trustees, enclosure, and sewerage com m issioners. The impact o f  the 
idea o f  progress and the spirit o f  im provem ent in such a society is 
difficult to determ ine, except in so far as such notions were institu­
tionalized in bodies like the Bath and W est Agricultural Society, 
founded in 1777 and widely supported as its m em bership lists and 
journals sh o w .33 The Society provided a forum for the gentry, clergy, 
and men o f  science and m edicine, as well as activists such as John 
Billingsley who rose from humble dissenting origins to becom e a 
clothier, landowner, improving farmer, enclosure and sewerage  
com m issioner, turnpike trustee, and canal and coal proprietor, as 
well as writing the report to the Board o f  Agriculture already 
m entioned.
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Important though it was, this growth of amateur, gentlemanly 
concern would have been ineffective without a parallel development 
of professional expertise. Surveyors and engineers were of growing 
importance towards the end of the eighteenth century, but even more 
important and from an earlier date were the attorneys, for their role 
in the process of capital formation was crucial. Perhaps due largely to 
its earlier wealth, and to the tradition of settled, orderly develop­
ment, there was in the county by the second half of the eighteenth 
century a body of lawyers sufficiently numerous to meet the increas­
ing demand for their legal services, and with enough professional 
awareness to form two of the earliest provincial law societies.34
Any claims as to the appropriateness and value of an historical 
approach to the study of capital formation in a region such as this 
must now be tempered by an acknowledgement of the difficulties 
involved, and here three constraints must be mentioned. The first 
relates to timing, for it is only from the mid-eighteenth century that 
there begins that accumulation and continuity of primary evidence 
which has been judged essential for a sustained analysis of capital 
formation. But although the period of detailed research has been 
influenced by this practical requirement, the signs of an earlier 
economic activity may nevertheless be found amongst the later 
material. For example, although the annual balance sheets of the 
Woolley gunpowder mills are available for analysis only from the 
later 1740s, partnership agreements show that the works were 
founded in the 1720s.35 Similar indications for other manufacturing 
and mining concerns suggest the importance of the 1720s and 1730s in 
this region, especially as these years saw also the founding of the 
Bristol Turnpike Trust (1727), and the construction of a tramway 
(1731) for the transport of Bath stone to the newly navigable River 
Avon (1727).36 Indeed, although there is insufficient evidence to 
study these decades in detail, the founding of these ventures in a 
relatively stable society with a functioning legal system and security 
of property, and a considerable degree of craftsmanship and spe­
cialization, suggests that by the early decades of the eighteenth 
century this region had reached a stage of readiness for more rapid 
economic development. This responsive environment may then have 
encouraged further change by providing both an expectation of 
growth and a context within which it could take place, for there was 
in north Somerset none of that ample endowment with natural 
resources which stimulated the development of some other regions.
The second constraint relates to the range of evidence available, 
for this is inevitably limited by special circumstances. Thus primary 
sources may have survived because they were of an institutional
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nature (the papers of turnpike trusts, improvement commissioners), 
because they constituted a legal claim or title to land (enclosure 
awards), because they authorised the collection of a rate (drainage 
commissions), or because they had been filed with family or estate 
papers (mining and manufacturing concerns). Not only does this 
mean that the detailed and continuous evidence being sought has 
rarely survived for significant areas such as residential building, 
routine agricultural investment, and many manufacturing concerns, 
but also that even amongst the most fruitful sources such material is 
unlikely to be comprehensively available. For example, although the 
papers of the Bath Turnpike Trust have been well-preserved since the 
renewal Act of 1757, almost nothing survives for the neighbouring 
Bristol Trust before the official returns of the 1820s and 1830s. To  
some extent these difficulties can be eased by reference to secondary 
sources, but there remains a great problem of assimilation, of judging 
the weight of generalization which can be borne by the possibly 
untypical evidence. However these problems may be no greater than 
those of the aggregation of data on a statistical basis, and there are 
even certain advantages, for the precision of the particular is not lost 
within the aggregative whole, and the extent o f  the generalization is 
likely to remain clear.
Thirdly, much of the material which does survive is often not in a 
form capable of yielding easily the kind o f information being sought. 
This problem may be illustrated by reference to the financing of  
enclosures, and of the turnpike trusts. Evidence on the former 
seem ed to be entirely lacking for this region, for in only one case was 
an enclosure award accompanied by comm issioners’ accounts, and 
very little extra-award material survives. But a close study of the 
awards has shown that in almost all cases the enclosure was financed 
by the sale of land, the recorded details of which include the capital 
sum thus raised. It may seem a sleight o f hand to transmute this land 
transaction into a capital investment, but when allowance has been 
made for administrative costs the expenditure of the sum remaining 
served to extend the capacity o f the com m ons and waste lands in 
terms of space and time. In the one case for which a full and orthodox 
financial account is available, the capital sum raised by land sale 
tallies exactly with that spent on the enclosure.37
The documents put to fresh use for the turnpike roads are the 
mortgage deeds o f  the Bath Trust. These have survived because when 
paid up they were stored by the clerks to the Trust, in bundles 
according to their final ownership. These collections can be unravel­
led, for each individual deed carries details o f  the initial transaction 
on its face, with all subsequent changes o f  hand in what may be
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regarded as a secondary market, recorded as endorsements. Again 
there is the problem of administrative costs, as well as the matter of 
repairs as opposed to new works, but because the mortgage deeds 
show when capital sums were actually raised and not merely when 
they were authorised, this material provides evidence o f investment 
in the roads which is more satisfactory than that derived from Acts of  
Parliament. The understanding of investment decisions is enhanced  
by evidence from the minute b ooks.38
These examples have a two-fold interest, for not only do they show  
how unpromising material may yield significant information, they 
also suggest that regional evidence may open to question some  
accepted generalizations on a subject. Thus the evidence from north 
Somerset challenges the view of some modern agricultural historians 
that enclosures were rarely financed by land sale. It also raises the 
possibility that waste land enclosure costs were high because large 
capital sums could be raised more easily by land auction than by the 
imposition o f a rate, and not simply because o f topographical 
problems as is generally thought.39. In the case of the turnpike roads, 
the foundation of Feinstein's aggregates is acknowledged to be the 
work of J.E. Ginarlis, whose estimates are based on a backward 
extrapolation from the 1820s with guidance from a number of trusts 
for which details of expenditure are available. The crucial assumption 
behind this procedure is 'that trust mileages had remained constant 
over the period 1750-1822 and that expenditure patterns similar in 
the 1820s did not change from 1 750 \40 But this ignores the signi­
ficance o f the renewal Acts. The Wells Turnpike Trust is included in 
the sample through which Ginarlis justifies this assumption yet its 
mileage rose from 26.25 to 37.0 miles in those years. This was not 
unusual, for that of the Bath Trust more than doubled in the same 
period, from 20.15 to 48.47 m iles.41 The fact that no turnpike 
network in this region emerged fully-fledged in the year of its 
inception has important implications for the continuing construction 
of new and amended roads.
The value of this factual, historical evidence is more than that of a 
corrective to generalizations and aggregations at the national level 
however, for despite the constraints o f  the primary material there are 
several ways in which it can make a positive contribution to the 
understanding of the process o f capital formation. First, the rela­
tionship between the sources o f capital, the mechanisms by which 
funds were channelled into capital projects, and the particular form 
and structure of the assets thus created may be identified. Second, 
any archival material capable o f  providing a continuity o f  evidence on 
the financing of individual undertakings in the major sectors of the
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regional econ om y may be retrieved and reconstituted, and then  
analysed in order to measure such features as the increase in physical 
stock, the costs involved in the creation o f  fixed assets and their 
distribution, the relationship betw een  fixed and circulating capital, 
and the returns to productive investm ent. Such an approach, it may  
be noted , overcom es the narrow concern o f  aggregative studies with 
fixed capital alone. Third, the relationship betw een  capital invest­
ment and the overall pattern o f  econ om ic  change may be explored as 
a matter o f  im portance for the region itself, and as a basis for 
com parative analysis, though this exercise is handicapped by the lack 
of similar studies for other regions in these years.
I l l
Several generalizations in support o f  these three contentions may be 
drawn from a study o f  this subject in north Som erset, though the 
detailed ev idence on which they are based lies beyond the scope or 
intention o f  this article. On the first matter, although the 'plentiful- 
ness' o f  capital and the range o f  investm ent opportunities w ere both  
important, the existence o f  specific outlets for capital from particular 
sources was o f  greater practical significance. T hese linkages were  
largely shaped by the legal provisions authorizing different undertak­
ings. Som e were quite specific so that, as already n oted , parliam en­
tary enclosure was financed by the com pulsory sale o f  land. Others  
allow ed for the channelling o f  small savings into particular outlets, 
through for exam ple the risk-free and m arketable institutional m ort­
gages offered  by the turnpike trustees and im provem ent com m ission­
ers. The im portance o f  this linkage may be seen  from the fact that 
although those who m anaged these public bodies (eg  the gentry, 
coalm asters) gave readily o f  their tim e they rarely m ade a financial 
investm ent, perhaps because unlike the small urban savers (eg  
upholsterers, lodging house keepers) they had better alternative uses 
for their funds.42 The linkages offered  by the agreem ents under 
which mining and manufacturing partnerships operated  were flexible, 
but no less important. T he interlocking partnerships o f  the coal 
proprietors for exam ple a llow ed the costs o f  new  ventures to be offset 
by the profits o f  established pits, and it may have been the failure of  
the free lead and calam ine miners to d eve lop  such supportive  
networks which left them  unable to com e to terms with their capital 
requirem ents, especially in the matter o f  drainage.43 The woollen  
industry in contrast was dom inated  by independent, often large-scale 
clothiers, able to m eet their capital needs from within the industry
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chiefly because o f its long-standing im portance in the countryside, 
especially in the eastern part o f  the region where it flourished as part 
of the larger West o f  England cloth industry, and its well-established  
trading patterns.44
The importance o f creating appropriate legal entities for the 
handling o f funds and the form ation o f  assets must also be noted. The  
sewerage com m issioners for exam ple were repeatedly  reassured by 
counsel that their powers exten ded  to the undertaking o f  com p reh en ­
sive new drainage schem es, but they declined to put this opinion to 
the test because they feared that the creation o f  new works towards 
which proprietors had no traditional obligations might jeopardise  
their personal finances. An Act o f  Parliament authorising a separate  
body o f  com m issioners to finance and execu te  the new work had 
therefore to be obtained in each ca se .4> T he com m issioners o f  sewers  
evidently felt them selves less w ell-protected  than others such as 
turnpike trustees and enclosure com m issoners, w ho were similarly 
involved in public capital investm ent but without the fear o f  private 
assets being placed at risk. O f course the view as to what constituted  
an appropriate legal entity might change over time. Thus the 
pre-Bubble A ct unincorporated joint stock Bristol Brass C om pany  
with its several branches in north Som erset was thought to have  
becom e so unwieldy by the 1780s that it was re-form ed as a 
partnership. This m ove was m ade possible by the fact that the funds 
previously recruited from a large body o f  shareholders had becom e  
available from other sources, nam ely the Harford merchant family o f  
Bristol, and the Bristol Fire O ffice .46
Further, because the pattern o f  linkages here described constituted  
an imperfect capital market, this would seem  to be unfruitful ground  
in which to look for m ovem ents b etw een  for exam ple agricultural 
profits and transport investm ent. It can be shown that individuals 
took advantage o f  opportunities which would bring them practical 
benefits as well as financial returns, as when som e coal masters 
invested in the coal canal.47 But although ev idence is limited it 
appears that changes in financial returns alone were not always  
enough to attract funds from other uses. Thus, although the co n ­
tinuing investment in coal mining, canals, and enclosures in the 1790s 
suggests there was then no overall shortage o f  capital, yet savings 
were not forthcoming for the Bath Turnpike Trust in the years after 
1793 until 1801, despite the raising o f  the rate offered  from 4 .0  per 
cent to 4.5 per cent in 1793 and to 5 .0  per cent in 1797.48 The  
situation with regard to several m anufacturing concerns in the region  
was more open, chiefly because o f  the interest o f  the Bristol merchant 
community in this outlet for surplus funds, and the network o f
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personal and institutional contacts through which long-term capital 
investments could be made. Short-term finance was also important as 
it allowed for considerable mobility of funds. Of the sum of nearly 
£80,000 borrowed in the course o f  the 1760s by a copper company 
working on five sites in north Somerset for example, one-third of the 
loans came from banks and were held for an average of AVi months, 
and two-thirds came from other Bristol sources (mainly merchants, 
tradesmen, and women) and were held for an average of 4 years.49
Reference must also be made to the activities of attorneys in the 
process of capital formation. Their importance rested in general upon 
the devising of an appropriate legal framework within which bodies 
could operate, and in particular upon the development of financial 
instruments through which savings could be channelled. The raising 
of funds on the security of land was a long-established method of 
easing financial constraints, but even when this was extended to land 
containing paper mills or coal mines, it is likely that these transac­
tions continued to take place within a personal market in which 
attorneys matched the needs of their different clients.50 But from at 
least the mid-eighteenth century the importance of attorneys in north 
Somerset extended beyond this role, for they actively promoted the 
growth of an impersonal capital market. This was achieved through 
what will here be described as the institutional mortgage, by which as 
a result of advertisements on turnpike gates and later in newspapers, 
funds were recruited from unknown clients for investment in public 
utilities. There were two important consequences of this develop­
ment : it facilitated the building up of the infrastructure of the region, 
most notably the road system, and it promoted the growth of a local 
securities market for these financial instruments were in small easily 
sold units. The volume of such transactions (in 1764 mortgage deeds 
of the Bath Trust to the value of £5,850 were re-sold, representing 
nearly 50 per cent of the total mortgage debt of £12,000), and the 
number o f deeds held for only short periods, suggest that this 
financial market may have performed a quasi-banking function.51
On the second question, some tentative generalizations may be 
made despite the difficulty of achieving a breadth and continuity of  
evidence on the increase o f capital stock in the region. For example, 
investment in the turnpike roads was most active in the three decades 
after 1750 and again in the 1820s and 1830s. With some exceptions 
due to the circumstances of individual trusts it remained low in the 
intervening years, although from the 1790s the rate of investment in 
agriculture (through enclosures, drainage, and farm making) and in 
canals was increasing. A continuing low rate of increase of capital 
stock in mining and manufacture indicates the small annual incre­
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ments through which such activity could be maintained. The rela­
tionship between fixed and circulating capital can be satisfactorily 
studied for the manufacturing concerns only, but here some interest­
ing evidence emerges. The organization of the woollen cloth industry 
on a putting-out basis, especially before the introduction of spinning 
mills from the 1790s, suggests that circulating capital was likely to 
have an importance relative to fixed capital which would distinguish 
this form of manufacture from others in the region. But such a 
generalization is difficult to sustain because these proportions varied 
so greatly in the more integrated undertakings. Thus at the brass and 
copper works raw material stocks were generally high, so that at the 
former in the years 1779-84, fixed capital represented only 12 per 
cent of the combined assets. Yet at the gunpowder works, which had 
to carry large stocks because of the importance of its foreign suppliers 
and customers, this proportion was more nearly 40 per cent. Perhaps 
the fixed capital embodied in water-powered mills was of greater 
significance relative to circulating capital than has generally been 
thought, and if this was the case for the powder mills it was probably 
even more true for the grain and paper mills of the region with their 
more local trading networks.
An investigation of the profitability of the capital employed  
prompts the question of whether there was some optimal point in the 
relationship between fixed capital and stocks which was most likely to 
promote an efficient use of the physical assets. Evidence is limited, 
and enterprises are in any case likely to have had different ‘ideal’ 
positions because of variations in the cost and supply of raw materials 
and in conditions of sale. Nevertheless it is possible to suggest 
tentatively that when fixed capital was 20 per cent to 25 per cent of 
the total inventory assets (as at the re-formed Bristol Brass Com ­
pany, after the new partners had taken immediate steps to slim down 
stocks in the late 1780s), then this was a proportion likely to promote 
efficiency as judged by the profitability of the capital employed.
Third, there is the matter of the relationship between capital 
formation and economic change. The pattern which emerges from 
the evidence on north Somerset is that of two levels of economic 
activity in these years : first, the general internal developments which 
may be termed land- or resource-based, and second, the externally 
financed manufacturing enclaves which may be termed capital- or 
trade-based. The former include the enclosure, drainage, coal min­
ing, river, canal, and road transport undertakings, all related to local 
needs and mostly financed from within the region. On the whole 
these were large in structure, but the capital input was either built up 
slowly (mining and farm making), compiled from small separate
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contributions (turnpike mortgages, canal shares, drainage rates), or 
even realised by the sale o f  assets (enclosures). A lthough one o f  these  
spheres o f  investment (agriculture) was perhaps as profitable as those  
at the second level, and another (the coal canal) was certainly so, 
returns were generally lower because o f the need to offset gains by 
losses (mining), and through the limits on the institutional rate 
(turnpike trusts and improvem ent com m ission). There is no evidence  
that banks played a role o f  any importance in these undertakings until 
the early decades o f the nineteenth century. Loans enabling enclo­
sure schem es to get underway came from local gentry, and turnpike 
finances were handled by trustees (eg a wine merchant). There was a 
network of local suppliers (eg o f  candles and gunpowder for the 
coalm ines), but there is no evidence that credit was an important 
factor in their operation, and indeed surviving accounts show the 
regular settlem ents of debts. This may have been because the 
undertakings in this first group were labour rather than capital 
intensive, and although the end product was a significant item of fixed 
capital (a mine or a new road) there was a long period o f construction  
during which wages and other small payments had to be made.
The manufacturing ventures at the second level o f  econom ic  
activity (gunpowder, copper, brass, and glass making) were not 
them selves necessarily large in scale, but they were part of an 
extensive network of foreign and coast-wise trade, credit facilities, 
merchant capital and banking support, centring on the port of  
Bristol. T o the merchants o f  that city, north Somerset offered scope  
for investment and expansion on accessible, water-powered rural 
sites. There were o f  course other, longer-established manufacturing 
concerns in the region (woollen  textiles, paper making, brewing, 
distilling, and iron founding), but apart from the first these are to be 
classified with resource-based developm ents, using local capital and 
supplying largely local customers, rather than as part o f  Bristol’s 
shipping and credit network. It is unfortunate that there is little 
surviving evidence about them to suggest exceptions to this gener­
alization, but perhaps the very fact that the records o f  local paper 
makers or iron masters were less likely to survive than those kept 
‘ship-shape and Bristol fashion’ by entrepreneurs engaged in a wide 
range o f  ventures, may serve as a further indication o f the distinction 
here being drawn. In the case o f  the w oollen  industry classification is 
more difficult, but to regard it as capital- or trade- rather than 
resource-based would seem  appropriate. This is because although in 
the period under consideration English w ool was still widely used, 
and the hom e market was gaining an increasing precedence, yet 
foreign (chiefly Spanish) wool continued to be o f  great importance in
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a system of manufacture which was enm eshed within a network of  
international trade, and which was controlled by capitalist clothiers 
through their financing o f both the domestic and factory stages of  
production. Indeed the fact that in the mid-fourteenth century this 
industry began to move from its manufacturing and trading base in 
the port of Bristol, into the countryside in search of water power and 
a freedom from restrictions, makes it a forerunner o f the pattern here 
being described for later years.
Two areas have received less attention than they deserve in this 
analysis : general investment in agriculture, and residential building. 
In both cases primary evidence is hard to com e by. H owever, nothing 
in the secondary literature on farming conflicts with the observations 
already made about the financing o f land-based developm ents from 
within the region, whilst Somerset's earlier high ranking in terms of  
population numbers and density, and the later absence of great 
industrial concentrations, combine to suggest that the growing 
population may have been housed within the existing stock or in 
small locally financed housing developm ents (eg housing for miners). 
Because larger-scale projects were also developed on local initiative 
(eg at Weston-super-Mare by the Smyth-Piggots and Clevedon by the 
Eltons), then residential building may in general be accommodated  
within the proposed analysis. There remains the problem of Bath, 
where the importance of aristocratic entrepreneurs like the Duke of  
Chandos and the Earl of Bath, and of the great web of credit 
involving builders, attorneys, and bankers, has now been revealed by 
Chalklin and Neale. The wealth of detail in the latter’s recent book  
makes it difficult to retain a sense o f  perspective about the city, but it 
is necessary to do so because when viewed in its regional setting 
Georgian Bath seem s to have been as detached from the life o f  north 
Somerset in the eighteenth century as is the esoteric Bath Festival 
from the generality of local life to-day. It provided a market for local 
produce (food, coal, stone) but undertook little reciprocal investment 
in the region. Yet despite this detachment, from the point o f  view  
of this investigation its buildings may be seen as land-based, but 
financed from the metropolis as well as from within the city itself.
In seeking reasons for the presence o f trade-based manufacturing 
enclaves in north Somerset it may not be necessary to look beyond 
the difficulties of industrial expansion in Bristol and the opportunities 
provided by rural locations and a growing population. But it is of 
interest to consider other factors which may have influenced both the 
nature of this investment and its timing. The lack o f interest by 
clothiers in ventures distinct from the textile trade52 may be ex­
plained by the long stagnation o f the woollen industry from the 1720s
Aspects o f  Capital Formation 87
to the 1760s,^  but the developm ent o f  the Bristol interest in these 
years is less easily accounted for unless an explanation is sought in 
peculiar factors outside the traditional pattern o f  com m erce. Perhaps 
the most important o f  these was Bristol’s involvem ent in the slave 
trade, in which it was the leading English port from the 1720s to the 
early 1740s. It is not intended to embark upon the vexed question of  
slave trade profits, other than to note that their scaling down by 
Roger A nstey was based on evidence from the second part o f  the 
eighteenth century and not from the period o f  Bristol’s dom inance.54 
To concentrate on these profits alone would be in any case to proceed  
on too narrow a front, for as well as providing Bristol merchants with 
surplus funds, the Africa trade also stimulated econom ic develop­
ment by the market it offered for manufactured goods. Accounts,  
inventories, and correspondence all provide evidence o f  production  
for this special market, for exam ple in the distinction made between  
Guinea powder for the Africa trade and Merchant powder for other  
customers, as well as in the manufacture o f  such barter goods as 
‘m onelas’ o f  copper and ‘Guinea rods’ o f  brass.55 It may be argued 
that under this stimulus there developed  an interlocking network of  
interests involving the port o f  Bristol, the Africa trade, the trans- 
Atlantic plantations, and the manufacturing ventures o f  the region, in 
a relationship which was largely dependent upon that city for the 
provision o f  capital and credit, transport, raw materials and 
m arkets.56
IV
In conclusion, what was the influence o f  the two levels o f  capital 
formation on the course o f  econom ic change in the region? It is only  
possible to suggest an explanation, but it may be that the effect of the 
trade-based undertakings was first to help stimulate but then to retard 
the course o f  developm ent. A s has been noted, many o f  the essential 
pre-conditions for growth were present in north Somerset in the first 
half o f  the eighteenth century -  a settled social and econom ic  
framework in a traditionally wealthy and populous county, a growing 
domestic market, access to a major port offering trading and credit 
facilities, an active body o f  lawyers, and a large number o f  gentlemen  
willing to com bine public duty with private interest. In this situation 
the enterprises financed by merchant capital are likely to have been  
for much of the eighteenth century an additional factor for change, 
perhaps stimulating the developm ent o f  an infrastructure, especially 
a road network, greater than was otherwise warranted. The quicken­
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ing o f  econom ic activity was how ever chiefly in traditional areas such  
as agriculture, mining and transport, and with the failure o f  the 
trade-based industries to develop  backward and forward linkages, the 
decline o f  the land-based industries such as paper m aking, and the 
lack of great natural resources, north Som erset never achieved the 
self-sustaining growth o f  another region o f  Bristol activity, south  
W ales. This last reference suggests that it was not the Bristol link as 
such which came to inhibit d evelop m en t but rather the fact that the 
manufacturing ventures rem ained a part o f  the m erchanting network  
instead o f  becom ing agents o f  industrialization.
The contribution o f  the w oollen  industry is here o f  particular 
interest, since in the terms o f  the current debate on proto­
industrialization, the taking up o f  slack rural labour by putting-out 
clothiers producing for external markets in a region o f  increasingly  
com m ercialized agriculture, could have helped foster the transition 
from a traditional rural culture to a factory-based industrial so c ie ty .57 
Indeed, this change cam e close to realization, for despite the often  
violently expressed opposition  o f  workers to the introduction o f  
machinery from the 1770s on , there was a growing concentration o f  
production in water- and later steam -pow ered  factories on the 
eastern edge o f  the region, especially  from the 1790s in From e, 
Shepton M allet, and Tw erton now a suburb o f  Bath. But although  
som e individual concerns continued  to flourish, the industry in 
general declined in the n ineteenth  century in the face o f  foreign and 
regional com petition. The reasons for this are difficult to determ ine  
but they may be sum m arised as a deficiency o f  entrepeneurship , 
whether this was m anifested as a failure to persist with the introduc­
tion o f  machinery before the 1790s, as an inability to secure the 
improved forms o f  transport which could have brought coal from the 
nearby coalfield, or through inadequate marketing in the face o f  
determ ined salesm anship by the men o f  the W est Riding o f  
Yorkshire.58 H ow ever this decline should be seen  not only in contrast 
to the success o f  outside com petitors, but also in relation to the 
general fortunes o f  the region. In that context the w oollen  industry 
may be seen as part o f  the pattern whereby the manufacturing  
enclaves re-inforced rather than challenged the traditional society  
which therefore failed to undergo the structural changes necessary for 
sustained econom ic growth. T he result was that most o f  the m anufac­
turing undertakings petered out in the course o f  the nineteenth  
century and the region reverted to its land- or resource-based  
econom y, largely agriculture, coal m ining, and quarrying.
A s an exam ple o f  capital form ation in a regional econ om y there­
fore, north Som erset cannot be counted  a success story. N evertheless
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a study o f  the growth experience o f  the region is important, because it 
is part o f  the kaleidoscope o f  change making up the shifting pattern of  
the national econ om y, and because it touches upon several them es o f  
current interest in economic history. These include proto­
industrialization and econom ic  retardation, both o f  which are illu­
minated by the experience o f  north Som erset. E ven m ore important 
than these justifications how ever, it is the thesis o f  this article that the 
subject o f  capital formation can only be fully understood within the 
context o f  the historical d im ension as revealed by empirical studies. 
The significance o f  this m ethod goes d eeper than the provision of  
illustrative details, for through the exercise o f  an historical approach  
(in particular, the reconstitution o f  data on investm ent in capital 
stock, and the identification o f  the procedures by which this took  
place), the basis o f  som e o f  the accepted generalizations on capital 
formation may be questioned, and the process itself may be analysed  
and explained. M oreover, as the statistical ev idence for the British 
industrial revolution is too  insubstantial to be interpreted by the 
quantitative m ethod a lone, it is im possible to explore the subject o f  
capital formation in this period in a m eaningful manner except by a 
greater reliance on detailed historical research o f  the sort described in 
this paper. It is accepted that there are disadvantages to this m ethod ,  
such as the difficulty o f  investigating the investm ent ratio on a 
regional basis, but against this must be set the many advantages  
stem m ing from a broad concern with the w hole matrix o f  capital 
form ation rather than with a restrictive concentration on the 
m easurem ent o f  its som etim es conjectural parts.59 N ot least, this 
integrated approach to the subject should lead to an im provem ent in 
the conceptual understanding o f  and the theoretical approach to the 
w hole matter o f  capital form ation.
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